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SYNOPSIS 	  	  
The cost of medicines imposes a significant financial burden on society, with New 
Zealand spending $783.6 million between 2012 and 2013 alone. The majority of these 
costs are due to the monopoly prices charged for new patented drugs. The 
pharmaceutical industry argues that these high prices are necessary to recover the 
costs of drug development, which can exceed a billion dollars for a single drug. 
Because new medicines are relatively cheap to reverse-engineer and manufacture, in 
absence of a minimum period of exclusivity provided by patents, it is alleged that it 
would not be commercially viable to develop new medicines.  
 
Most criticisms of the patent system relate to the high prices charged for patented 
medicines. However, there is another issue which has received limited academic 
commentary to date, namely, whether the pharmaceutical industry’s reliance on 
patents means that otherwise socially valuable medical therapies are being screened 
out or ignored, and whether alternative incentive mechanisms are needed to address 
this problem.  
 
The aim of this thesis is to address this issue. First, the laws applicable to patentability 
and regulatory approval of new medicines will be discussed, with a focus on New 
Zealand and the United States. Second, evidence will be provided for the existence of 
three broad categories of medical therapies which lack private incentives for 
development under the current patent system: unpatentable therapies, 
unmonopolisable therapies and unprofitable therapies. Other problems with the 
reliance on patent monopolies will also be discussed. Third, the process of 
pharmaceutical reimbursement that is used to determine the price of medicines under 
the current system will be described, and a set of criteria will be proposed for an ideal 
incentive system, against which the current system is compared. Fourth, alternative 
incentive mechanisms for medical therapies comprising exclusivity-based ‘pull’ 
incentives, prize-based ‘pull’ incentives, and publicly funded ‘push’ incentives, will 
be analysed and ranked against these ideal criteria. This thesis concludes by proposing 
two legislative frameworks as part of an optimal incentive system alongside the 
current patent system, namely, extended regulatory exclusivity for incentivising 
unpatentable therapies and a prize-based mechanism combined with increased public 
funding for incentivising unmonopolisable and unprofitable therapies.  
 
 
vii	  	  
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 	  
 
I am grateful to my supervisors, Dr Debra Wilson and Professor Jeremy Finn for their 
helpful feedback and assistance. I thank various members of the pharmaceutical 
industry and patent attorney profession, including Dr Roy Waldron, Dr Mike 
Bickerdike, Dr John Arrowsmith, Dr Aris Persidis, Alexis Borisy and Lita Nelsen, 
who provided helpful insights as to whether the problems identified in this thesis are 
real or merely theoretical. I also thank Stefano Barazza, for agreeing to highlight the 
topic of my thesis on the IPKat Blog in my (ultimately unsuccessful) attempt to obtain 
participants for my survey, and for his insightful commentary and feedback.  
 
I would like to thank Marc Boutin and Eric Gascho of the National Health Council for 
providing an enlightening insider view into the process of drafting and lobbying for 
the implementation of the MODDERN Cures Act. My thanks to Aidan Hollis, Jake 
Hirsch-Allen and Lavi Erisson of Incentives for Global Health, and Dr Michael 
Schultz and members of the Gut Health Network, for their support and engaging 
discussions regarding my charitable crowdfunded prize initiative, Crowd Funded 
Cures (www.crowdfundedcures.org). I also thank Jenny Vandine and Steven 
Werkheiser of Thomson Reuters for kindly providing me with access to the 
proprietary Cortellis database. My sincere thanks to Penny Analytis, Rhonda 
Tombros, and Alex Kerdemelidis who provided helpful commentary on drafts as well 
as proof reading, and my family for supporting me during the long and sometimes 
painful process of finalising this thesis.   
 
Finally, I would like to dedicate this work to persons close to me affected by chronic 
illness, without whom none of this would have been written.  
STYLE 
 
This thesis has followed the second edition of the New Zealand Law Style Guide.1 
Where sources were not covered, citations have been made as consistently as possible 
with the guide or in accordance with a common citation style for a foreign source in 
the applicable jurisdiction. This thesis also differs from the guide in that major 
headings in Chapter Six have been divided into sub-parts 6A, 6B and 6C. Further, in 
order to condense footnotes and for consistency, authors are referenced by their 
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1 G McLay, C Murray and J Orpin New Zealand Law Style Guide (2nd ed, Thomson Reuters, 
Wellington, 2011).  
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 I Introduction 
A Patenting the Sun: The Problem with Reliance on Patents 
 
[The interviewer] asked Salk, "Who owns the patent on this vaccine?" 
Salk magnanimously replied: "Well, the people, I would say. There is no 
patent. Could you patent the sun?"1  
 
Dr Jonas Salk developed the first safe and effective polio vaccine in 1952.2 Since the 
early 20th century, polio had terrorised the global population (in regular epidemics), 
including New Zealand.3 In 1952 alone, polio infected nearly 58,000 people in the 
United States, killing 3,145, and leaving 21,269 people, mostly children, with 
moderate to disabling paralysis.4 However, as a result of the development of the Salk 
vaccine, after the United States implemented a mass immunisation programme in 
1955, polio cases fell to just 5,600 people in 1957.5 Overseas countries, including 
New Zealand,6 rapidly adopted equivalent immunisation programmes, which have 
ultimately reduced the global incidence of polio from “an estimated 350,000 cases in 
1988 to a low of 493 cases reported in 2001”.7 The impact of the Salk vaccine on 
global disease burden is undeniable. The above quote, from a televised interview in 
1955, reinforced the image of Dr Salk as a selfless hero, dismissing the notion of 
patenting medicine for private gain.  
 
It is unfortunate that, in addition to being somewhat misleading,8 the inference 
that may be drawn from Dr Salk’s quote is an anachronism. In the modern era, if 
“there is no patent”, then it usually follows that there is no drug, because new 
medicines require patent protection to have any chance of receiving the private 
funding necessary for their development.9 It could be said that under the current 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1 G Johnson “Once Again, A Man With A Mission” The New York Times (25 November 1990).  
2 R Singh, AK Monga and S Bais “Polio: A Review” (2013) 4 Int J of Pharm Sci & Res 1714 at 1718. 
3 G Rice “Epidemics - The polio era, 1920s to 1960s” (20 June 2013) Te Ara - the Encyclopedia of 
New Zealand <www.teara.govt.nz> at 5.  
4 E Zamula “A New Challenge for Former Polio Patients” (1991) 25 FDA Consumer 21 at 23.  
5 Singh, Monga and Bais, above n 2 at 1718. 
6 A Day “An American Tragedy'. The Cutter Incident and its Implications for the Salk Polio Vaccine in 
New Zealand 1955-1960” (2009) Health and History 42 at 42. 
7 O Kew “Reaching the last one per cent: progress and challenges in global polio eradication” (2012) 
2(2) Curr Op in Vir 188 at 188.  
8 Commentators have argued that the National Foundation for Infantile Paralysis had attempted to 
patent the Salk vaccine, but it was deemed unpatentable because of prior disclosures: see R Zwahlen 
“The Real Reason Why Salk Refused to Patent the Polio Vaccine” (27 January 2012) Biotechnology 
Industry Organization <www.biotech-now.org>. Years later, Dr Salk established a private company 
that patented an experimental HIV vaccine, although it failed in clinical trials: see Johnson, n 1 above.  
9  PW Grubb and PR Thomsen Patents for Chemicals, Pharmaceuticals, and Biotechnology: 
Fundamentals of Global Law (5th ed, Oxford University Press, New York, 2010) at 426; BN Roin 
“Unpatentable drugs and the standards of patentability” (2009) 87 Tex L Rev 503 at 504-505; RS 
Eisenberg “The Problem of New Uses” (2005) 5 Yale J Health Policy L & Ethics 717 at 721; H 
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system, enforceable patent protection is the most important ingredient of a new 
medicine, with all other considerations being secondary, including medical efficacy 
and the needs of society at large.  
 
In particular, it is currently estimated to cost over USD 1 billion and take over 
10 years to bring a new medicine to market.10 Further, an experimental medicine has 
only approximately 20 per cent chance of overcoming the expensive, lengthy but 
essential clinical trials required to prove safety and efficacy, which allow it to be 
legally sold to the public.11 Governments and charities do not assume the high costs 
and risks of drug development, leaving it to the private pharmaceutical industry.12 For 
this reason, pharmaceutical companies rely on patents to guarantee a minimum period 
of exclusivity against competition in order to recover their development costs.13 
Society ends up indirectly paying for the high costs of drug development, through the 
estimated USD 500 billion per annum paid in monopoly markups over new drugs.14 
 
While the high monopoly prices charged for new patented medicines is 
frequently debated,15 the reliance on patents to fuel the engine of medical progress has 
other severe but unseen consequences, which as a result have received little academic 
commentary to date. In particular, in order for medicines to be patentable, they must 
satisfy certain strict patentability criteria, which disregards the potentially large social 
value of ‘unpatentable therapies’. Further, a patent is only useful to the extent that it 
can be practically enforced against infringers to prevent competition or extract 
monopoly profits from the sale of a medicine, which means that socially valuable 
‘unmonopolisable’ and ‘unprofitable’ therapies are unlikely to receive private 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Grabowski “Patents, Innovation and Access to New Pharmaceuticals” (2002) 5(4) J Int Economic Law 
849 at 850. 
10 JA DiMasi and HG Grabowski “The cost of biopharmaceutical R&D: is biotech different?” (2007) 
28 Managerial and Decision Economics 469 at 475. 
11 JA DiMasi and others “Trends in risks associated with new drug development: success rates for 
investigational drugs” (2010) 87(3) Clin Pharmacol Ther 272 at 272. 
12 While the Salk vaccine’s development was publicly funded through the National Foundation of 
Infantile Paralysis (known currently as the ‘March of Dimes’), this unprecedented funding drive was 
only possible because of the pressing and visible nature of the polio threat to the United States. See DJ 
Wilson Polio (Greenwood Publishing Group, California, 2009) at 106.  
13 See discussion of the process of regulatory approval and generic competition in Chapter Two.  
14 This estimate is calculated on the basis that patented or ‘branded’ drugs are generally 12 times more 
expensive than off-patent or ‘generic’ drugs, and that global sales of branded drugs were USD 596 
billion in 2011. See J Love and T Hubbard “The Big Idea: Prizes to Stimulate R&D for New 
Medicines” (2007) 82 Chi-Kent L Rev 1519 at 1522; The Global Use of Medicines: outlook through 
2016 (IMS Institute for Healthcare Informatics, July 2012) at 8.   
15 E Rosenthal “The Soaring Cost of a Simple Breath” New York Times (online ed, New York, 12 
October 2013); D Armstrong “At $84,000 Gilead Hepatitis C Drug Sets Off Payer Revolt” (28 January 
2014) Bloomberg <www.bloomberg.com>; E Torreele and J Bloom “Should Patents on 
Pharmaceuticals Be Extended to Encourage Innovation?” Wall Street Journal (online ed, New York, 23 
January 2012).  
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funding.16 As a result, such therapies will be screened out from development by 
pharmaceutical companies, irrespective of social need. This screening occurs at an 
early stage of development, and the basis for doing so is not publicly disclosed. In 
addition, the use of patent monopolies creates other inefficiencies in the 
pharmaceutical industry, such as excessive litigation, price gouging, marketing, 
potential inhibition of research, and incentives to develop lucrative ‘me-too’ and 
‘lifestyle’ drugs with limited health benefits.17 This thesis will analyse problems with 
the current incentive system and whether alternative incentive mechanisms would be 
preferable in order to encourage private investment in a direction that will maximise 
public health.  
 
B Aim of the Thesis 
 
The aim of the thesis is to identify particular inadequacies in the current patent 
system18 for incentivising socially valuable medical therapies and to propose an 
optimal incentive system to address these issues. This aim will be achieved by 
satisfying four objectives. The first objective is to provide background information on 
the legal requirements for patentability and regulatory approval of new medicines and 
describe in what circumstances exclusivity can be lost. The second objective is to 
analyse the pharmaceutical industry’s reliance on patent protection for incentivising 
new medical therapies and the problems with such reliance. The third objective is to 
consider the determination of rewards under the current incentive system and propose 
criteria for an ideal incentive system that would address the problems already 
identified. The fourth objective is to analyse current and alternative incentive systems 
using these ideal criteria, and propose an optimal incentive framework in light of this 
analysis.  
 
The thesis will meet these objectives by considering the applicable law 
regarding patents and drug development, and research by various commentators on 
gaps in the patent system for medical research, particularly the views of Roin on the 
lack of incentives to develop unpatentable drugs and second uses of ‘off-patent’ 
drugs.19 It will confirm and expand on this analysis by identifying specific factors that 
cause otherwise socially valuable medicines to become unpatentable, and will rebut 
the argument that patenting slightly modified drugs or new uses could overcome this 
problem. The thesis will also define broader categories of ‘unmonopolisable 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 ‘Unpatentable’, ‘unmonopolisable’ and unprofitable therapies will be defined and discussed in 
Chapter Three.  
17 See discussion of other problems with patent system in Chapter Three.  
18 The current system refers to the patent system, regulatory environment, and reimbursement 
mechanisms that incentivise development of new medicines in New Zealand and the United States.  
19 BN Roin, above n 10; BN Roin “Solving the Problem of New Uses” (1 October 2013) Social Science 
Research Network <www.ssrn.com>. 
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therapies’ and ‘unprofitable therapies’ which lack private incentives for development. 
It will consider how the current system determines reimbursement of new patentable 
medical therapies and the feasibility of various alternative incentive mechanisms in 
light of proposed ideal criteria.  
 
Finally, the thesis will propose two new incentive mechanisms to optimally 
incentivise unpatentable, unmonopolisable and unprofitable therapies. It will also 
make practical suggestions for how these proposed mechanisms should be 
administered as part of a legal framework, and will analyse them with reference to the 
ideal criteria.  
 
C Methodology, Scope and Limitations of the Thesis 
 
This thesis will use a sociolegal methodology, 20  which includes a broader 
consideration of the ‘law in action’ having regard to the influence of practical 
commercial and scientific factors on incentives for drug development, rather than 
focusing on case law and legislation. The major limitation of the research is the lack 
of empirical data available on the scale of screening of otherwise socially valuable 
therapies, due to the high levels of secrecy in the pharmaceutical industry. Therefore, 
in some cases, the author has had to estimate the level of screening, based on what can 
be logically inferred from publicly available information.  
 
In order to maintain a manageable size for the thesis, it will focus on New 
Zealand and the United States, although other jurisdictions will be referred to if useful 
for comparative purposes. While this thesis will consider incentives to develop a 
broad range of medical therapies beyond the use of pharmaceuticals, including dietary 
supplements, diets, and lifestyle interventions, it will not consider the incentive 
framework for medical devices, as these generally have lower barriers to obtain 
market entry. 21  It will also focus the analysis on seven alternative incentive 
mechanisms, although a large number of alternatives have been proposed.22 Finally, 
although this thesis will consider existing gaps in protection for medicines under 
patent law, it will not suggest amendments to lower those patentability standards, as 
this would be a drastic reform with potential for abusive patenting strategies by 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 M Salter and J Mason Writing Law Dissertations: an Introduction and Guide to the Conduct of Legal 
Research (Pearson Longman, Harlow, 2007) at 119.  
21 An exception is implantable medical devices, referred to as Class III devices, which require clinical 
trials in humans in order to be legally sold. See “Overview of Medical Devices and Their Regulatory 
Pathways” (6 March 2013) Food and Drug Administration <www.fda.gov>. 
22  A non exhaustive list of other alternative incentive mechanisms include: Advance Market 
Commitments and Advance Purchase Commitments, Transferable Exclusivity and Priority Review 
‘Wildcard’ Vouchers, Patent Buyouts, and Tax Incentives. An analysis of these alternatives was not 
included in the thesis because of space constraints and the fact they do not share features with the 
proposed optimal framework.  
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pharmaceutical companies and would likely breach international obligations. Rather it 
will propose alternative incentive mechanisms that can be managed alongside the 
existing patent and regulatory framework.  
 
D Thesis outline: An Overview of Chapters Two to Eight 
 
Chapter Two provides an overview of the purpose of the patent system. It then 
discusses the criteria for a patentable medicine in New Zealand and the United States, 
and the circumstances under which patentability can be excluded. The regulatory 
framework for obtaining market approval for new medicines is discussed, as well as 
how this interacts with the patent system to allow a pharmaceutical company to be 
temporarily protected against competition.  
 
Chapter Three explains the reasons for the high costs and risks of drug 
development, and how pharmaceutical companies will screen out otherwise promising 
medicines if they cannot ensure that a monopoly price can be enforced in order to 
recover these development costs. First, the factors that cause some therapies to be 
unpatentable are discussed. It is argued that flexibilities in the patent system referred 
to as ‘evergreening’ are inadequate to restore effective patent protection over such 
unpatentable therapies. Second, the chapter discusses unmonopolisable therapies, for 
which the ingredients are readily available from multiple sources. Third, the chapter 
discusses unprofitable therapies, such as treatments for diseases prevalent in 
developing countries and antibiotics. Finally, other problems with the patent system 
are discussed, such as the prevalence of wasteful litigation between pharmaceutical 
companies and their competitors, gaming of the system to maximise monopoly rents, 
stifling innovation through an ‘anti-commons’ effect, and incentivising development 
of profitable ‘me-too’ or ‘lifestyle’ drugs with limited health impact.  
 
Chapter Four discusses the pricing and reimbursement of new medicines under 
the current system, and the tools of pharmacoeconomic analysis and healthcare 
metrics used to ensure that the prices paid are cost-effective having regard to the 
health benefits obtained. It will compare and contrast how prices for medicines are 
determined by pharmaceutical payers in New Zealand and the United States.  
 
Chapter Five discusses the goals and criteria of the ideal incentive system. 
First, the chapter addresses applicable international obligations and goals to 
implement the highest standards of health will be discussed. Next, eight criteria are 
proposed for the ideal incentive system, which broadly correspond to overcoming the 
problems identified in Chapter Three. These ideal criteria are then used to rate the 
current patent system.   
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Chapter Six considers various alternative incentive mechanisms to provide 
incentives for medical therapies that have either been implemented or proposed. The 
chapter is separated into three parts. In Chapter 6A, various exclusivity-based ‘pull’ 
incentives are discussed and compared against the ideal criteria from Chapter Five. 
These incentives include patent extensions, regulatory exclusivity mechanisms, and 
Orphan Drug reforms. The benefits and limitations of each proposal is considered 
having regard to the ideal criteria. Chapter 6B discusses various prize-based ‘pull’ 
incentives. Proposals for fixed and flexible prize mechanisms will be compared, as 
well as their advantages and disadvantages. Finally, Chapter 6C discusses ‘push’ 
incentives, which involve mechanisms that support medical research during the 
process of drug development. These include direct public funding via grants and 
‘open source’ mechanisms to increase the level of co-operation between medical 
researchers and the pharmaceutical industry in order to solve common problems.  
 
Chapter Seven proposes two legislative frameworks for an optimal incentive 
system, having regard to the advantages and disadvantages of the various alternative 
incentive mechanisms analysed in Chapter Six and with reference to the ideal criteria 
from Chapter Five. The first proposal involves the use of extended market exclusivity 
to incentivise unpatentable therapies. The second proposal uses prizes to provide 
private incentives to prove the efficacy of unmonopolisable and unprofitable therapies 
in early stage clinical trials, and subsequent public funding to validate those results in 
larger clinical trials. These proposals are compared against the ideal criteria, and 
shown to achieve better overall ratings than the alternative incentive mechanisms 
discussed in Chapter Six.  	  
Chapter Eight concludes the thesis. It discusses the aim of the thesis to analyse 
problems with the current patent system for incentivising development of medical 
therapies. It reiterates the research problem and discusses the satisfaction of the four 
research objectives indentified earlier in this chapter. It also considers the need to 
implement equivalent reforms in major pharmaceutical markets such as the United 
States and Europe for the optimal incentive system to be a success and highlights the 
significance of the problem and the need for further debate to highlight this issue and 
address the current gap in incentives.  	  
E Appendices 
 
Two appendices are attached to this thesis. Appendix One includes the author’s 
Human Ethics Committee approval notice and survey for collecting quantitative and 
qualitative data regarding the extent that unpatentable, unmonopolisable, and 
unprofitable therapies are screened out of development by the pharmaceutical 
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industry. Although the survey was sent to over 200 members of the pharmaceutical 
industry in targeted emails, only one partially completed response was received. This 
confirms the high level of secrecy in the industry, which contributes to the public’s 
lack of awareness of the screening problem. Appendix Two contains an extract of the 
MODDERN Cures Act of 2013, which is a bill currently before the 113th United 
States Congress. This bill provides 15 years of regulatory exclusivity to compensate 
for the lack of private incentives to develop unpatentable therapies.23 The bill is used 
as a basis for the extended regulatory exclusivity mechanism proposed in Chapter 
Seven.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 Notably, the legislation refers to these as ‘dormant therapies’.  
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II Patentability and Regulatory Approval of Medicines 
A Introduction  
 
Chapter Two will cover the main legal requirements for obtaining patent rights over 
medicines and regulatory requirements for market entry. First, a general overview of 
the patent system is provided. Second, the criteria which need to be satisfied to obtain 
a patent in the jurisdictions of New Zealand and the United States will be discussed, 
namely, patentable subject matter, novelty, inventive step, and utility. Sufficiency, the 
major ground for revoking a patent will also be discussed. Third, the main exclusions 
to patentability under law will be discussed, in particular, inventions contrary to 
public policy or morality, and methods of medical treatment. Fourth, various 
judicially-developed inroads into the exclusions for methods of medical treatment 
under law will be addressed, namely: ‘Swiss-claims’, novel dosage regimens, 
methods of administration, and novel patient groups. Finally, the chapter will outline 
the regulatory law applying to the approval of medicines in New Zealand and the 
United States, including the ‘regulatory exclusivity’ mechanisms that can act as a 
form of ‘quasi-patent’ protection over new medicines.  
 
The purpose of this chapter is to familiarise the reader with the legal doctrines 
that govern the patentability and regulation of medicines, and the circumstances by 
which gaps in protection can occur for otherwise socially valuable medical therapies. 
Chapter Three will focus on the consequences of these gaps and provide evidence that 
certain categories of socially valuable therapies are not being developed as a result.
1  
 
B Overview of the Patent System 
 
Ironically, patent laws conceived of over 400 years ago are still used to incentivise the 
development of the latest technology.2 In particular, the origin of New Zealand patent 
law dates back to the post-Elizabethan Statute of Monopolies enacted in 1624. Section 
6 of the Statute of Monopolies provides that patents will be granted for “…any 
manner of new manufactures within this realm, to the true and first inventor, and 
inventors of such manufactures.” Section 6 is incorporated into New Zealand law as 
part of the definition of invention in section 2 of the Patents Act 1953, and most 
recently in section 14 of the Patents Act 2013 (Patents Act).  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Namely, unpatentable, unmonopolisable, and unprofitable therapies.  
2 This could be both a criticism of the patent system and an endorsement.   
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The Statute of Monopolies formalised the process of granting patent 
monopolies, which had only been possible under royal prerogative.3 Instead, Crown 
law officers had the right to grant ‘letters patent’ for the disclosure of inventions 
which fulfilled the requirement of being a ‘manner of new manufacture.’4 Thus, the 
Statute of Monopolies codified minimum patentability standards, which promoted 
technological development by incentivising the disclosure of new inventions.  
 
Similarly, patent law in the United States has a long history, having been 
enshrined in article I, section 8(8) of the United States Constitution, which held that 
its purpose was ‘To Promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for 
limited Times to … Inventors the exclusive Right to their … Discoveries.’5 The 
United States is generally viewed as being the most pro-patent jurisdiction in the 
world, with a specialist appellate patent court6 that has led the expansion of the scope 
of patentable subject matter to life forms, software, and business methods.7 
 
Commentators have attempted to justify the establishment of the patent system 
under various theoretical frameworks. Under ‘contract theory’, society awards an 
exclusivity right to an inventor for a certain period of time as compensation for the 
full disclosure of information relating to how to make and perform the invention.8 
Therefore, theoretically, exclusivity rights discourage inventors from relying on trade 
secret protection and encourage the exchange of scientific and technological 
information.9  These rights are particularly crucial in the pharmaceutical industry 
where the costs of discovering new drugs are high and the marginal costs of 
manufacturing them are low.10 The importance of this ‘social contract’ or ‘bargain’ 
for facilitating medical progress is reflected in the more stringent disclosure 
requirement for pharmaceutical patents, particularly those using biotechnological 
processes.11  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3  See C MacLeod Inventing the industrial revolution: The English patent system, 1660-1800 
(Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2002) at 14-19. 
4 Statute of Monopolies 1624 (UK) 21 Jac 1, c3, s 6. ‘Manner of new manufacture’ as a patent criterion 
will be discussed in more detail below.  
5 Constitution of the United States, art I, s 8, cl 8.  
6 Namely, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.   
7 Y Kihara “US pro-patent policy: A review of the last 20 years” (2000) 7 CASRIP Newsletter 11 at 
15. See discussion of main exclusions to patentability below. The patentability of software and 
business methods is beyond the scope of this thesis.  
8 V Denicolò and L Alberto Franzoni “The Contract Theory of Patents” (2004) 23 International Review 
of Law and Economics 365 at 365.  
9 S Frankel Intellectual Property in New Zealand (2nd ed, Lexis Nexis, Wellington, 2011) at 392.   
10 The high costs of drug development as well as adverse consequences of the pharmaceutical 
industry’s reliance on patent exclusivity will be discussed in Chapter Three. 
11 DL Burk and MA Lemley “Is patent law technology-specific” (2002) 17 Berkeley Tech LJ 1155 at 
1155. See further discussion under ‘Sufficiency’ subheading below.  
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Every patent has various common features, whether issued in New Zealand, 
the United States, or other jurisdictions. Information regarding how to make and 
perform the invention is contained within a document called a ‘specification’, which 
is typically supported by drawings. The most important part of the specification is the 
claims, which describe the boundaries of the invention and scope of monopoly 
granted.12 A claim is a carefully-worded sentence which describes the various features 
or ‘integers’ comprising an invention. In order for a product or process to infringe a 
patent claim, every single integer must be present. Therefore, in general, narrow 
patent claims have more integers and broad patent claims have fewer integers. A 
patent owner has exclusive rights to make, use, sell, and import any invention covered 
by the claims and may seek injunctive relief or damages from the Courts against 
anyone who would infringe those rights.13 
 
In order to provide adequate protection for medicines, claims must cover a 
commercially relevant product or process and must be sufficiently broad so that they 
cannot be ‘designed around’ by competitors, which means manufacturing or selling a 
medicine in a way that does not infringe the patent. For medicines such as new drugs, 
the most valuable claims are known as ‘composition of matter’ claims, which describe 
the chemical structure of the drug. It is also possible to claim chemical structures in a 
broad manner, covering a core functional group or ‘active ingredient’ with millions of 
variations of optional chemical groups. These are known as ‘Markush’ claims in the 
United States.14  
 
Further, it is possible to claim a method of using a known chemical to treat a 
particular disease, which is called a ‘method-of-use’ claim. However, ‘composition of 
matter’ claims are the most valuable, because they prevent the drug from being 
manufactured for any medical use whatsoever.15 With strategic use of patents, an 
applicant can secure market exclusivity over a new drug, assuming claims fulfill the 
requirements for patentability as at the filing date, which is also referred to as the 
‘priority date.’  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Formal claims must be submitted with a ‘complete specification’. It is possible for an applicant to 
file a ‘provisional’ specification without formal claims, provided that they submit a complete 
specification within 12 months of filing.  
13 Patents Act 2013, s18. For a discussion of the principles relevant to injunctive relief see Klissers 
Farmhouse Bakeries Ltd v Harvest Bakeries Ltd [1985] 2 NZLR 129 (HC) at 142 and for a discussion 
of damages remedy in New Zealand see generally Acquaculture Corporation v New Zealand Green 
Mussel Co Ltd [1990] 3 NZLR 299. Damages are significantly higher in the United States because the 
Courts can grant triple damages for patent infringement: see 35 USC § 284.  
14 See PW Grubb and PR Thomsen Patents for Chemicals, Pharmaceuticals, and Biotechnology: 
Fundamentals of Global Law (5th ed, Oxford University Press, New York, 2010) at 379-380.  
15 Method of use patents can sometimes be used to effectively extend patent protection after a 
composition of matter patent has expired, if used in a strategic manner. These patent ‘evergreening’ 
strategies will be discussed in Chapter Three. 
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Patent rights are in force for 20 years from the priority date, unless the patent is 
challenged and revoked before expiry.16 According to ‘prospect theory’, introduced in 
a seminal paper by Edmund Kitch, the granting of monopoly rights from the priority 
date helps incentivise investment in development of an invention by preventing 
wasteful races to commercialisation.17 However, the downside of an early priority 
date is that it reduces the effective length of patent exclusivity when the product is 
ready to be commercialised. This is particularly relevant to the pharmaceutical 
industry, where drug development can take over a dozen years and cost more than a 
billion dollars in up-front investment.18 
 
The priority date of a patent application is also important because that is the 
date from which the patentability criteria are formally examined. These criteria, which 
have now been standardised pursuant to international agreements, will now be 
discussed.  
 
1 Minimum standards of patentability under TRIPS 
 
The standards of patentability of medical therapies are the same as the patentability of 
other inventions, subject to some specific exclusions.19 These standards are now 
relatively consistent in World Trade Organization (WTO) member countries pursuant 
to the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), 
which was signed in 1994.20 Part 5 of TRIPS (Articles 27 to 34) requires all WTO 
signatories to impose certain minimum standards of patent protection.  
 
In accordance with international obligations under TRIPS, a patent must be 
allowable for any product (for example, a medicine) or process (for example, a 
method for producing a medicine) which fulfills the requirements of patentability. In 
particular, under Article 27.1 an invention must be novel,21 involve an inventive step - 
also referred to as ‘non-obviousness’ in the United States,22 and be capable of 
industrial application - also referred to as ‘utility’.23  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 The grounds for revoking a patent will be discussed below in this chapter. 
17 EW Kitch “The nature and function of the patent system” (1977) Journal of Law and Economics 265 
at 278.  
18 The implications of long development times and high costs on the ability of patents to provide 
adequate incentives for pharmaceutical research and development (R&D) will be discussed in Chapter 
Three. 
19 See discussion under the sub-heading ‘Exclusions from Patentability’.  
20 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 1869 UNTS 299 (opened for 
signature 15 April 1994, entered into force 1 January 1995) [TRIPS].   
21 See discussion of the ‘novelty’ criterion below.  
22 See discussion of the ‘inventive step’ criterion below.  
23 See discussion of the utility criterion below.  
12	  	  
While TRIPS specified minimum standards of patentability, it did not define how 
those standards were to be applied. Therefore, WTO member countries have 
interpreted these standards in different ways, which has resulted in medical therapies 
being held patentable in some jurisdictions but not in others.24 These patentability 
standards are also applied by patent examiners in accordance with policy decisions of 
regional intellectual property offices, such as the in the Intellectual Property Office of 
New Zealand (IPONZ) and the United States Patent and Trademark Office 
(USPTO).25  
 
In some cases, a WTO member country may be arguably non-compliant with 
TRIPS. For example, under the former Patents Act 1953, a New Zealand patent 
examiner could only examine a new patent specification for novelty.26 However, 
under the new Patents Act, New Zealand is now TRIPS compliant because novelty, 
inventive step, and utility are formally examined.27 New Zealand has also adopted a 
standard of ‘absolute novelty’ which means that the scope of knowledge used to 
determine the novelty or obviousness of an invention - referred to as the ‘prior art 
base’ - comprises all available knowledge, whether located in New Zealand or 
overseas.28 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 For example, in the decision of the United States Federal Circuit, Amgen Inc v Hoechst Marion 
Roussel, Inc 65 USPQ 2d (BNA) 1385, a claim over a biologic drug erythropoietin produced using a 
novel method was upheld, on the basis that it could not be made without human involvement, even 
though it was known how the drug could be extracted from urine.  However, in the United Kingdom, 
the House of Lords in Kirin-Amgen, Inc v Hoechst Marion Roussel Ltd [2004] UKHL 46 rejected this 
type of claim (known as a product-by-process claim), whereby a product may still be novel if it is 
produced by a novel method.  
25 The decisions of examiners can be appealed to tribunals in the regional intellectual property [IP] 
offices. For example, at the Intellectual Property Office of New Zealand [IPONZ] the Commissioner of 
Patents appoints a panel of Hearings Officers to give decisions on matters referred to a hearing.   The 
decisions of Hearing Officers can be appealed to the High Court. In the United States, decisions of the 
examiner of the United States Patent and Trademark Office [USPTO] can be appealed to the Patent 
Trial and Appeal Board [PTAB], formerly the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences [BPAI], 
which is an administrative tribunal within the USPTO. Because of the often highly technical subject 
matter of patents, specialist courts have been established to hear appeals from decisions of the regional 
IP offices. The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit [CAFC] is an example of such a 
specialist court. Decisions from the CAFC can only be appealed to the Supreme Court of the United 
States.  
26 Patents Act 1953, s 13.  
27 Patents Act 2013, s 65(1)(a)(iii). Under this section, the Commissioner will determine on the balance 
of probabilities whether ‘the invention, so far as claimed, is a patentable invention under section 14’. 
Under section 14 a patentable invention must be a manner of manufacture within the meaning of s 6 of 
the Statute of Monopolies, and must novel, inventive, and useful.   
28 Patents Act 2013, s 8. Under the Patents Act 1953, New Zealand applied a ‘local novelty’ standard, 
meaning that novelty was assessed against what was known in New Zealand. However, in Sutton v Bay 
Masonry Limited HC Tauranga CIV-2003-470-000260, 28 May 2004, Williams J held that the scope of 
knowledge would include anything available on-line in New Zealand. The term ‘prior art base’ is 
synonymous with the term ‘prior art’, which will be discussed below regarding the novelty and 
inventive step patentability criteria.  
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Another source of variation between jurisdictions is the applicability of 
exclusions from patentability. TRIPS allows member countries to exclude from 
patentability “inventions, the prevention within their territory of the commercial 
exploitation of which is necessary to protect ordre public or morality”.29 TRIPS also 
allows “diagnostic, therapeutic and surgical methods for the treatment of humans or 
animals” to be excluded from patentability.30 However, there have been certain 
inroads into the exclusion of methods of medical treatment due to judicial acceptance 
of certain types of claim language which are interpreted as falling outside those 
exclusions.31  
 
The following sections will highlight how the criteria for patentability are 
applied to secure monopoly rights over medicines.  
 
C Criteria for Patentability of Medical Therapies 
 
In this part, the main criteria for patentability of a medical therapy will be discussed. 
It is notable that in addition to the ‘novelty’, ‘inventive step’ and ‘utility’ patentability 
criteria required under TRIPS, there is another criterion, which is not defined by 
TRIPS. This concerns the definition of invention, which is required to be either 
‘patentable subject matter’ or a ‘manner of manufacture’. In particular, the definition 
of invention has been broadened from a ‘vendible product’ 32  to include any 
intervention which creates an ‘artificial state of affairs’.33 However, this can be 
contrasted with the ‘discovery’ of a natural principle or ‘abstract idea’ which does not 
fall within the definition of invention.34 These four criteria will be analysed with 
reference to applicable law in New Zealand and the United States.  
 
In New Zealand, the applicable law is set out in the Patents Act, which is the 
first major reform of its patent system since 1953. When the Patents Act enters into 
force,35 inventions will be formally examined against four patentability criteria, 
namely, (a) manner of new manufacture, (b) novelty, (c) inventive step and (d) 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 TRIPS, art 27.2.  
30 TRIPS, art 27.3(a).  
31See discussion of ‘Swiss claims’, and claims over second medical uses, dosing regimens, and novel 
patient groups below. However, as will be noted in Chapter Three, the difficulty with detecting 
infringement of such method claims can significantly reduce their practical value.  
32 See discussion of GEC’s Application [1943] RPC 1 below.  
33 See discussion of National Research Development Corporation v Commissioner of Patents [1959] 
HCA 67 below.  
34 See discussion of Pfizer Inc v Commissioner of Patents [2005] 1 NZLR 362 (CA) and  Bilski v 
Kappos 130 S Ct 3218 (2010) below.  
35 The Patents Act 2013 enters into force on 12 September 2014.  
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utility.36 Similarly, in the United States, the Patents Act is codified under Title 35 of 
the United States Code (USC),37 which has equivalent patentability criteria.38   
 
While there are some differences between the patentability criteria between 
New Zealand, the United States, and other jurisdictions, an in-depth analysis of other 
jurisdictions is not necessary to understand the argument in the thesis, namely, that 
the current patent system fails to incentivise otherwise viable medical therapies which 
do not fulfill the patentability criteria or where it is not possible to enforce a 
monopoly price. The chapter will now turn to those patentability criteria.  
 
1 Patentable subject matter 
 
The first patentability criterion requires that an invention is patentable subject matter. 
As noted above, the question hinges on the definition of invention. However, this 
question also overlaps with exclusions from patentability, discussed separately below, 
because of greater relevance of policy considerations to these issues. Accordingly, the 
appropriate scope of patentable subject matter is usually subject to controversy.39 
What is currently deemed patentable subject matter in New Zealand and the United 
States will now be discussed.  
 
(a)  New Zealand 
 
In order to be patentable, New Zealand law requires that an invention must be a 
‘manner of manufacture.’ The definition of manner of manufacture was considered in 
the Australian case, National Research Development Corporation v Commissioner of 
Patents (NRDC),40 which considered whether a method of applying herbicide to 
weeds could be patentable. Previously, under the English case GEC’s Application,41 a 
‘manner of manufacture’ could only include methods or processes that produce, 
improve or restore a ‘vendible product’ or protect it against deterioration. NRDC 
broadened the definition of manner of new manufacture to include any ‘artificial state 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 Patents Act 2013, s 14.  
37 With the passage of the America Invents Act of 2011 [AIA], United States patent law has undergone 
once of its most significant reforms. The most salient aspect of those reforms is the change from a 
‘first-to-invent’ to a ‘first-to-file’ system for determining the priority date, which brings the United 
States in line with other jurisdictions. See generally, “AIA Implementation” United States Patent and 
Trademark Office <www.uspto.gov>. 
38 See 35 USC § 101-103.  
39 For example, the patentability of genes, software and business methods is subject to considerable 
debate by policy makers and academics. However, only the former is relevant to this thesis.  
40 National Research Development Corporation v Commissioner of Patents [1959] HCA 67 [NRDC].  
41 GEC’s Application [1943] RPC 1 at 4. 
15	  	  
of affairs’.42 This approach was followed in New Zealand,43 and eventually the 
definition of invention was extended to include manufacturing a known drug for a 
new use.44   
 
By contrast, naturally occurring products, pure discoveries, abstract ideas, and 
mere schemes, are not considered a patentable ‘manner of manufacture’ under 
common law.45 However, it is arguable that isolated and purified biological material – 
including genetic material - should be patentable on the basis that it would be an 
‘artificial state of affairs’ that would not spontaneously occur in nature.46 Patents over 
genetic material for use in diagnostic tests have been granted in New Zealand, 
although it is uncertain whether they would be upheld if challenged.47  
 
(b) United States 
 
The United States has an equivalent patentability criterion to ‘manner of 
manufacture’, referred to as ‘statutory subject matter.’ Under 35 USC § 101, for an 
invention to comprise statutory subject matter, it must fall within one of four 
categories: a process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.48 According to 
the Supreme Court of the United States, “laws of nature, natural phenomena, and 
abstract ideas” are judicially excluded from these four categories, and therefore 
cannot be subject matter for a valid patent.49 
 
The unpatentability of abstract ideas can be relevant to medical inventions that 
involve ‘mental steps’. For example, in Prometheus Laboratories v Mayo 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 NRDC, above n 40 at para [25].  
43 Swift & Co v Commissioner of Patents [1960] NZLR 775 (SC).  
44 See Pharmaceutical Management Agency Ltd v Commissioner of Patents [2002] 2 NZLR 529 (CA)  
allowing ‘Swiss claims’, as will be discussed in this chapter below. Compare Pfizer Inc v 
Commissioner of Patents [2005] 1 NZLR 362 (CA), denying patentability to methods of medical 
treatment.  
45 See Pfizer at [103]-[106] per Hammond J citing Swift’s Application [1962] RPC 37 and International 
Business Machines Corporation’s Application [1980] FSR 564. See also Ian Finch (ed) James & Wells 
Intellectual Property Law in New Zealand (Thomson Brookers, Auckland, 2007) at 20; Frankel, above 
n 9, at 404; Paul Sumpter Intellectual Property Law: Principles in Practice (CCH New Zealand, 
Auckland, 2006) at 234.  
46 See T Cleary “Gene Patents: Should New Zealand Let the Gene Genie Out of the Patent Bottle?”  
(LLB (Hons) Dissertation, University of Otago, 2011) at 22.  
47 For example, a controversial patent of Myriad Genetics covering a diagnostic test for the BRCA 
breast cancer gene was been granted by IPONZ as NZ Patent No. 326525. The patentability of the 
Myriad BRCA genes was recently challenged and upheld by the Australian Federal Court in Cancer 
Voices Australia v Myriad Genetics Inc [2013] FCA 65.  
48 35 USC § 101. See generally, Manual of Patent Examining Procedure [MPEP] § 2106, I, The Four 
Categories of Statutory Subject Matter.  
49 See Bilski v Kappos 561 US__(2010) at 39 citing Diamond v Diehr 450 US 175 (1981) at 185. See 
also MPEP § 2106, II, Judicial Exceptions to the Four Categories.  
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Collaborative Services (Prometheus),50  the Supreme Court of the United States 
recently considered the patentability of a method to determine the correct therapeutic 
dose of an immunosuppressant in patients with inflammatory bowel disease.51 The 
Court denied patententability, stating that the claims merely “inform a relevant 
audience about certain laws of nature … any additional steps consist of well 
understood, routine, conventional activity already engaged in by the scientific 
community”.52 
 
The ‘natural phenomena’ exemption also has implications for the patentability 
of medicines that are based on naturally occurring biological materials. Generally, as 
in New Zealand, the isolation and purification of biological material can be patentable 
if it requires human manipulation to achieve that state.53 This means that a biological 
extract found in nature, such as a herbal medicine or dietary supplement, may be 
patentable. However, the Supreme Court of the United States recently decided that 
isolating genes found in nature cannot make them patentable.54 Although medicines 
do not tend to use genetic material per se as their active ingredient,55 it is uncertain 
whether this decision may impact the patentability of medicines based on naturally 
occurring products.  
 
2 Novelty 
 
The second patentability criterion is that an invention must be novel. Mere prior 
publication or public use of a potentially safe and effective medicine before the 
priority date will destroy its patentability. For a medical therapy to be patentable, it 
must claim novel subject matter in respect of anything that was published or used 
before the filing date of the patent application. If all the features of a claim are present 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50 Prometheus Laboratories v Mayo Collaborative Services 566 US__(2012). 
51 The patent disclosed a method of determining the correct dosage of a drug for a patient by (1) 
administering a drug to a patient, (2) measuring the level of metabolites of the drug and (3) changing 
the administered dose by comparing the level of metabolites with a certain threshold level. 
52 At 11.  
53 Parke-Davis & Co v H K Mulford & Co 189 F 95 (CCSD NY 1911). See also RS Gipstein “The 
Isolation and Purification Exception to the General Unpatentability of Products of Nature” (2003) 4 
Colum Sci & Tech L Rev 1 at 4.   
54 See Association for Molecular Pathology v Myriad Genetics 569 US__(2013) at 14 [Myriad]. 
Notably, the Supreme Court allowed the patentability of ‘man-made’ cDNA, which is created by 
removing the non-coding ‘introns’ from a DNA strand. The Myriad decision has been criticised by 
patent attorneys as destabilising the diagnostics industry and disincentivising new innovations in this 
area. See KE Noonan “Mayo Collaborative Services v Prometheus Laboratories -- What the Court's 
Decision Means” (22 March 2012) Patent Docs <www.patentdocs.org>. 
55 One exception is antisense DNA, which is genetic material that can be used as a potential ‘drug’ to 
‘silence’ gene expression. See JL Ryan “Unlikely Splicing: The Myriad Decision, the Genomic 
Research and Accessibility Act, Orphan Diseases, and the Future of Antisense Drugs” (2011) 28 J 
Contemp Health L & Poly 144 at 144.  
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in a single ‘prior art’ reference,56 it is not novel, which is known as ‘anticipation’ of 
the claim. The applicable law in the New Zealand and the United States will now be 
discussed in turn.  
 
(a)  New Zealand 
 
In New Zealand, novelty requires that an invention does not form part of the prior art 
base.57 Section 8(1) of the Patents Act defines the ‘prior art base’ as information about 
a product or process or anything else that has been “made available to the public 
(whether in New Zealand or elsewhere) by written or oral description, by use, or in 
any other way.”58 A patent can either be anticipated by prior publication or prior use.  
 
(i) Prior publication 
 
An invention can be ‘anticipated’ by a prior publication if it is available before the 
priority date.59 The Patents Act does not define ‘publication’. Under section 2 of the 
Patents Act 1953, ‘published’ means a document that “can be inspected as of right at 
any place in New Zealand”.60  
 
Patent applications are commonly cited as prior art documents as they are 
published within 18 months of the filing date, which, as noted above, is also the 
priority date.61 Notably, a patent application which is published after the priority date 
of an invention can still anticipate an invention, if it was filed before the priority date 
of the invention being examined.62 
 
Research articles or technical publications are also a source of novelty-
destroying prior art. An ironic consequence of the prior publication rule is that a 
researcher can invalidate their chance of obtaining a patent over a viable medicine by 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56 It is not possible to combine features from different prior art references for the purpose of assessing 
novelty. However, combinations are possible when assessing inventive step, if it would have been 
obvious to do so. The assessment of inventive step is more complex and uncertain than novelty, as will 
be discussed in the next section below.   
57 Patents Act 2013, s 6.  
58 Patents Act 2013, s 8(1).  
59 As noted above, the priority date is the date the patent application is filed. A patent can have multiple 
priority dates if subsequent applications are filed which rely on subject matter disclosed in the ‘parent’ 
application.  
60 Patents Act 1953, s 2.  
61 Patents Act 2013, s 76. See also Rule 48.3 Patent Co-operation Treaty [PCT]: PCT applications 
published 18 months from earliest priority date. However, provisional patent applications which do not 
proceeded with as ‘complete applications’ are not published.  
62 Patents Act 2013, s 8(2).  
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publishing their own research prematurely.63 For the same reason, pharmaceutical 
companies make ‘defensive publications’ to prevent competitors from obtaining 
patents in a therapeutic area.64 
 
Moreover, a ‘publication’ is not limited to written documents. An oral 
disclosure forms part of the prior art base.  For example, disclosure to a single 
member of the public not under a duty of confidentiality will be novelty destroying.65 
The relevant test for such oral ‘publication’ is that ‘the information [had] been 
communicated to any member of the public who was free in law or equity to use it as 
he pleased.’66  
 
In Peterson Portable Sawing Systems Ltd (in liq) v Lucas (Lucas)67 the New 
Zealand Supreme Court confirmed the applicable test for prior publication or 
‘anticipation’ from General Tire & Rubber Co v Firestone Tyre & Rubber Co.68 The 
latter case established the ‘reverse infringement test’, which is satisfied if “carrying 
out the directions contained in the prior inventor’s publication will inevitably result in 
something being made or done which, if the patentee’s patent were valid, would 
constitute an infringement of the patentee’s claim.”69   
 
Therefore, when considering this test, it is necessary to consider the test for 
patent infringement. In particular, infringement requires the court to interpret or 
‘construct’ the meaning of each ‘integer’ in the claims. The principles of ‘claim 
construction’ for the purpose of determining the scope of a claim are complex and can 
vary between jurisdictions. While a detailed analysis of claim construction is beyond 
the scope of this thesis, in general, claims are provided a ‘purposive construction,’ 
which includes ‘variants’ that would obviously not affect how an invention works, 
provided that a person skilled in the art would not have expected that strict literal 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63 However, as will be discussed below, a ‘grace period’ applies in the United States and some other 
jurisdictions.   
64 See B Barret “Defensive use of publications in an intellectual property strategy” (2002) 20(2) Nature 
Biotechnology 191 at 191.  
65 Bristol-Myers Co’s Application [1969] RPC 146 (QB);  
66 Forlong & Maisey Ltd v Prima Technologies Ltd & Simcro Tech Ltd P01/2004 at 16 citing 
Humpherson v Syer [1887] RPC 407 (CA).  
67 Peterson Portable Sawing Systems Ltd (in liq) v Lucas [2006] NZSC 20, [2006] 3 NZLR 721 at [3] 
[Lucas].  
68 General Tire & Rubber Co v Firestone Tyre & Rubber Co [1972] RPC 457 (CA) [General Tyre].  
69 At 485-486 per Sachs, Buckely and Orr LJJ.  A similar reverse-infringement test is was endorsed by 
Aickin J of the High Court of Australia in Meyers Taylor Pty Ltd v Vicarr Industries Ltd (1977) CLR 
228 at 235 and Gibson J of the Canadian Federal Court in Reeves Brothers Inc v Toronto Quilting & 
Embroidery Ltd (1978), 43 CPR (2d) 145 (FCTD) at 157.  
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compliance with the language of the claim was necessary.70 However, a purposive 
construction will not extend beyond the clear meaning of the words in the claim.71  
 
When applying the ‘reverse infringement test’ from General Tyre, the 
question is whether the patent claims ‘read on’ the prior art. For example, if a research 
article published before the priority date contained “clear and unmistakable 
directions”72 for making a drug compound that would have infringed the claims of a 
latter filed patent application, this would destroy the patentability of those claims. The 
crucial issue is the amount of information required to be disclosed in the prior art 
document in order to constitute ‘anticipation’.   
 
In the leading English case Synthon BV v Smithkline Beecham Plc,73 the House 
of Lords considered two well-known authorities on what would constitute anticipatory 
disclosure: General Tyre74 and Hill v Evans.75 While Synthon has not been applied in 
New Zealand, it was considered in Finch’s Intellectual Property Law in New 
Zealand.76 Lord Hoffman held that that there were actually two parts to the test for 
anticipation, namely, (1) disclosure and (2) enablement. Firstly, the prior art 
document must ‘disclose’ the subject matter of the patent, which if performed would 
only result in the infringement of the patent. For this requirement, no amount of 
experimentation is allowed.77 Secondly, there must be ‘enablement’ so that a prior art 
document would allow a person ‘skilled person in the art’ to be able to perform the 
invention with a minimum degree of experimentation.78  
 
In Synthon it was held that a specification which incorrectly described how to 
make a drug could still invalidate a subsequent patent, because it could be made by a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
70 Catnic Components Ltd. v. Hill & Smith Ltd (1982) RPC 183 at 243 per Lord Diplock.  
71 Portable Sawing Systems Ltd (in liq) v Lucas [2006] NZSC 20, [2006] 3 NZLR 721 at [28].  
72 General Tyre, above n 68 at 486 per Sachs LJ.  
73 Synthon BV v Smithkline Beecham Plc [2005] UKHL 59. 
74 General Tyre, above n 68.  
75 Hill v Evans (1862) 31 LJ Ch (NS) 457 at 463: ‘I apprehend the principle is correctly thus expressed: 
the antecedent statement must be such that a person of ordinary knowledge of the subject would at once 
perceive, understand and be able practically to apply the discovery without the necessity of making 
further experiments…’. A similar test for novelty/anticipation has been adopted in Australia: see 
Nicaro Holdings Pty Ltd v Martin Engineering Co (1990) 91 ALR 513 at 530 per Gummow J; See also 
H Lundbeck A/S v Alphapharm Pty Ltd (2009) 177 FCR 151 at 173 per Bennett J. 
76 Finch, above n 45, at 60-62.  
77 Synthon, above n 73, at [34]-[37].  
78 At [38]-[55]. The two-part test for anticipation was also applied by the Supreme Court of Canada in 
Apotex Inc v Sanofi Synthelabo Canada Inc [2008] 3 SCR 265. The Canadian Supreme Court (at [33]) 
held that the test for enablement requires that these experiments do not constitute an ‘undue burden’. It 
also held (at [37]) that prolonged trial and error experiments were deemed an ‘undue burden’ while 
‘routine’ trials were not.  Notably, the test for ‘enablement’ is equivalent to the test for the 
‘sufficiency’, which will be discussed in this chapter below.   
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‘skilled person’ with a minimum of experimentation.79 The House of Lords also stated 
that ‘disclosure’ and ‘enablement’ are distinct tests that should not be confused.80 
 
Synthon also addressed the important doctrine of ‘inherent anticipation.’ This 
doctrine seemingly contradicts the ‘enablement’ requirement, because it allows an 
invention to be anticipated despite the fact that it was not known to exist in the prior 
art. The House of Lords considered their previous decision in the case Merrell Dow 
Pharmaceuticals v H N Norton & Co Ltd (Merrell Dow).81 This case involved an 
attempt to patent a metabolite of terafibine (a known hayfever drug), which was 
produced in the liver of the person who took terafibine. Lord Hoffman held that the 
patent specification for terafibine anticipated the subsequent metabolite via 
‘disclosure,’ because it described a process that would have infringed the new claims 
for the metabolite patent. This enabled a “skilled reader to work the invention” even 
though nobody realised they were producing it.82  
 
Synthon and Merrell Dow illustrate that even if a prior publication does not 
disclose full scientific details of how a particular medicine works, it may still  
comprise novelty-destroying prior art with respect to aspects of the invention that 
were unknown at the time.  
 
Because the number of prior publications is vast and increasing significantly 
over time,83 an important question is whether specific medically useful compounds 
that have been disclosed within a broader class can still be patented. In particular, it is 
possible to obtain a patent in respect of one or more ‘species’ within a narrow class 
which have already been disclosed as part of a broader ‘genus’ as long as that choice 
of ‘subgenus’ or ‘species’ has a specific advantage which has not been previously 
disclosed. This is referred to as a ‘selection invention’. 
 
In Beecham Group Ltd v Bristol-Myers Company (No 2)84 (Beecham), Barker 
J applied the general test for selection inventions from the English case IG 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
79 Synthon, above n 73 at [27] and [51]-[55] per Lord Hoffman. By way of background, Synthon had 
filed a patent which had incorrectly described technical values for manufacturing a drug. It was held 
that because, according to an expert deposed, the drug could be made by a person skilled in the art 
using Synthon’s description with a minimum of experimentation, this satisfied the ‘enablement’ 
requirement.  
80 At [30] per Lord Hoffman.  
81 Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals v H N Norton & Co Ltd [1996] RPC 76. 
82 At [33]. Lord Hoffman proposed the following test: ‘The question is whether the specification 
conveyed sufficient information to enable the skilled reader to work the invention.’ 
83 See R Van Noorden “Global Scientific output doubles every nine years” (7 May 2014) Nature News 
Blog <www.blogs.nature.com>. 
84 Beecham Group Ltd v Bristol-Myers Company (No 2) [1980] 1 NZLR 192 at 240. 
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Farbenindustrie AG’s Patents (IG Farbenindustrie). 85  The three-part test was 
described as follows:86 
 
First, a selection patent to be valid must be based on some substantial 
advantage to be secured by the use of the selected members. (The phrase will 
be understood to include the case of a substantial disadvantage to be thereby 
avoided.) Secondly, the whole of the selected members must possess the 
advantage in question. Thirdly, the selection must be in respect of a quality of 
a special character which can fairly be said to be peculiar to the selected 
group. 
 
In Beecham, a derivative version of penicillin was held to be patentable, despite the 
fact that its chemical formula was disclosed in a previous patent application, because 
the specific version had “new and unexpected qualities.”87 
 
Thus, selection inventions can mitigate the harsh novelty-destroying effect of 
a broad prior publications containing many potentially viable drug compounds, by 
potentially allowing patentability over drug ‘species’ which have previously unknown 
and substantial advantages.88 
 
(ii) Prior use 
 
Prior use of the subject matter claimed by an invention will also destroy novelty in 
New Zealand. According to the Commissioner of Patents at IPONZ,89 in order to 
establish prior use it must be established: 
 
[1] that the instance of prior use was not secret use; 
[2] what was used and by whom; 
[3] where and when use occurred; and 
[4] whether any apparatus still in existence can be inspected by the Court.   
 
The prior use doctrine was applied in Merrel Dow, which held that ‘information 
about what was being done should have been made available to the public.90 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
85 IG Farbenindustrie AG’s Patents (1930) 47 RPC 289.  
86 At 322-323 per Maugham J.  
87 Beecham, above n 84, at 250.  
88 Chapter Three will discuss whether it is possible to ‘rescue’ patentability of valuable medicines using 
selection inventions and other so-called patent ‘evergreening’ techniques.  
89 IPONZ Practice Note, 76, Patent Office Journal 714 (Issue No 1287, July 1986).  
90 Merrel Dow, above n 84, at 84. This case was influenced by Article 54(2) of the European Patent 
Convention [EPC] which provides that ‘[t]he state of the art [i.e the prior art] shall be held to comprise 
everything made available to the public….by use, or in any other way, before the date of filing of the 
European patent application.’  
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However, interestingly, ‘commercial use’ will invalidate a patent even if under 
conditions of confidentiality, such as taking a confidential order for goods.91 For 
example, this could occur when a biotechnology company enters a license agreement 
regarding the commercial development of its confidential in-house library of drug-like 
compounds.  
 
(b)  United States 
 
In the United States, prior publication or prior use of an invention will also destroy 
patentability.  
 
(i)  Prior publication 
 
Under USC 35 §  102(a), a person shall be entitled to a patent unless “the claimed 
invention was … described in a printed publication … before the effective filing date 
of the claimed invention.”92 A ‘printed publication’ requires “a satisfactory showing 
that such document has been disseminated or otherwise made available to the extent 
that persons interested and ordinarily skilled in the subject matter or art, exercising 
reasonable diligence, can locate it.”93  
 
Publications can still invalidate a patent, even if available for a short period of 
time. In the case In re Klopfenstein,94 the Federal Circuit held that posters which 
could be viewed for three days at a conference “were sufficiently publicly accessible 
to count as a “printed publication”’. 95  Further, as with New Zealand, patent 
applications are frequently cited as prior art because they are usually published 18 
months after filing. 96 An earlier filed patent can be cited against a subsequently filed 
patent, even if the former was published after the latter was filed.97  
 
Anticipation requires that the invention is disclosed within one prior art 
reference. This is known as the ‘single source anticipation rule’.98 The United States 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
91 Wheatley’s Application [1985] RPC 91.  
92 35 USC § 102(a)(1).   
93 In re Wyer 655 F 2d 221 (CCPA 1981) at 226. See generally, MPEP § 2128. Publication includes 
information available in an on-line database. 
94 In re Klopfenstein 380 F 3d 1345 (Fed Cir 2004).    
95 At 1352. 
96 35 USC § 122(b)(1). Europe also requires publication after 18 months from filing. see Article 93 
EPC. 
97 35 USC § 102(a)(2). The position in Europe is similar: see EPC Article 54(3). 
98 Verdegaal Bros v Union Oil Co of California 814 F2d 628 (Fed Cir 1987) at 631; Metabolite 
Laboratories Inc v Laboratory Corp of America Holdings 370 F 3d 1354 (Fed Cir 2004); Continental 
Can Co USA v Monsanto Co 948 F 2d 1264 (Fed Cir 1991). By contrast, the test for inventive 
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also requires a prior publication to comprise an ‘enabled disclosure’, although this has 
a lower threshold for ‘enablement’ than New Zealand.99 Anticipation can even occur 
if “after disclosing an invention, the reference then disparages it.”100 This contributes 
to what has been described as a “hair-trigger approach” to novelty in the United 
States.101 
 
Inherent anticipation was considered by the United States Federal Circuit in 
the case Schering v Geneva (Schering), which held that anything ‘inherent’ in a 
document is included in the prior art, including a product that is inherently produced 
by a disclosed method.102 The case involved similar material facts to Merrell Dow.103 
Schering was a significant departure from previous caselaw,104 and broadened the 
application of the ‘inherent anticipation’ doctrine to situations where the “person of 
ordinary skill in the art” would not have recognised the inherent trait in the prior 
art.105  
 
While commentators have noted the potential for the inherent anticipation 
doctrine to “endanger innovation” by preventing the patenting of metabolites,106 the 
public policy justification of the doctrine is to prevent the undue extension of patent 
protection by claiming metabolites of a drug, without substantially contributing to 
scientific knowledge.107 Such unjustifiable attempts to lengthen the effective period of 
patent protection over drugs are referred to as patent ‘evergreening’, which will be 
discussed in Chapter Three.  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
step/obviousness allows the combination of prior art documents in some circumstances, as discussed 
below.   
99 See MPEP § 2131.01. Unlike New Zealand, the standard for ‘enabled disclosure’ for the purpose of 
anticipation is not equivalent to the requirement for ‘sufficiency’ under 35 USC § 112. See discussion 
of the sufficiency requirement below.  
100 BN Roin “Unpatentable drugs and the standards of patentability” (2008) 87 Tex L Rev 503 at 524 
citing Bristol-Myers Squibb Co v Ben Venue Laboratories, Inc 246 F 3d 1368 (Fed Cir 2001) at 1378 
and Celeritas Techs Ltd v Rockwell Int’l Corp 150 F 3d 1354 (Fed Cir 1998) at 1361.  
101 Roin, at 560.  
102 Schering v Geneva 339 F 3d 1373 (CAFC 2003) at 1377.  
103 In particular, after the patent for loratidine (an anti-histamine) expired, an attempt was made to 
patent desloratidine, a metabolite of loratidine produced in the body.   
104 Continental Can Co, above n 98.  
105Schering, above n 102, at 1377. See also A De La Rosa “A Hard Pill To Swallow: Does Schering v 
Geneva Endanger Innovation Within The Pharmaceutical Industry?” (2007) 8 Colum Sci & Tech L 
Rev 37 at 43. The European Union has not yet adopted the ‘inherent anticipation’ doctrine, although 
anything ‘implicit’ within the content of a prior document, ‘in the sense that, in carrying out the 
teaching of the prior document, the skilled person would inevitably arrive at a result falling within the 
terms of the claim’, would anticipate the claim. See European Patent Office [EPO] Guidelines for 
Examination 2010 – Part G, Chapter VI, Para 6. 
106 De La Rosa, at 37. 
107 De La Rosa, at 48: ‘The Federal Circuit’s concern [in the Schering case] is that permitting the 
consecutive patenting of pharmaceuticals and their in vivo biological by-products would substantially 
lengthen the patent protection of the pharmaceutical without substantially advancing the present 
frontiers of science.’   
24	  	  
The United States also permits patenting of a selection of a narrow species 
with distinct characteristics over the broad genus disclosed, although this is not 
referred to as a ‘selection invention’, as under New Zealand jurisprudence. The 
question asked is in what circumstances the disclosure of a broad genus may 
anticipate a claim to a species.108 This is a question of fact and depends on the 
circumstances of the case.109 However, disclosure of a species will always anticipate a 
genus.110 This means that broad genus claims covering millions of drug variations can 
be risky,111 because if any member of the group is deemed to cover a species 
disclosed in the prior art, the entire group is anticipated.  
 
Some reforms have alleviated the harsh consequences of prior disclosure by 
the inventor on patentability. In particular, the United States has a ‘grace period’, 
which allows prior publications by an inventor not to be cited as prior art against them 
if they file a patent application within 12 months.112 The length of grace periods 
varies depending on the jurisdiction.113 Notably, New Zealand and Europe does not 
have a grace period.114 This means that even an inadvertent publication of research 
will destroy the chance of obtaining a patent in those jurisdictions. 
 
(ii) Prior use 
 
The United States has a similar test to New Zealand regarding public use of an 
invention. Prior to the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act of 2011 (AIA), only public 
use within the United States was relevant prior art. This qualification no longer 
applies and public use anywhere in the world will destroy novelty.115 
 
The United States test for public use is whether the purported use (1) was 
accessible to the public, or (2) was commercially exploited. 116  There will be 
commercial exploitation where the invention is (1) the subject of a commercial offer 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
108 See MPEP § 2131.02.  
109 See Sanofi-Synthelabo v Apotex, Inc 550 F 3d 1075 (Fed Cir 2008) at 1083: ‘[W]hether a generic 
disclosure necessarily anticipates everything within the genus … depends on the factual aspects of the 
specific disclosure and the particular products at issue.’ See also Atofina v Great Lakes Chemical Corp 
441 F 3d 991 (Fed Cir 2006) and In re Baird 16 F 3d 380 (Fed Cir 1994) at 382. 
110 In re Slayter 276 F 2d 408 (CCPA 1960) at 411: ‘A generic claim cannot be allowed to an applicant 
if the prior art discloses a species falling within the claimed genus.’ 
111 For example, refer to discussion of ‘Markush’ claims above.  
112 35 USC § 102 (b).  
113 For example, Canada, Australia, Brazil, South Korea, Argentina, Malaysia, and Mexico have a 12-
month grace period; Japan, Russian Federation, Eurasia, and Taiwan have a 6-month grace period. 
114 However, there is a limited exemption in respect of prior disclosure or use an invention at certain 
gazetted ‘international exhibitions’ or prior disclosure or use made of an invention by a third party 
without the consent of the inventor, provided that a patent is filed within 6 months. Patents Act 2013, s 
9(1))(d); For Europe, see EPC, art 55.  
115 35 USC § 102(a).  
116 Invitrogen Corp v Biocrest Manufacturing LP 424 F3d 1374 (Fed Cir 2005).  
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for sale not primarily for experimental purposes and (2) ready for patenting.117 In 
addition, if invention is put on public display then this is public use even when the 
workings of the invention are hidden. 118 This demonstrates the ease by which 
patentability can be lost over a medicine by allowing the public to access it on 
display.  
 
Notably, however, the explicit reference to “public use” in section 102(a) of 
the AIA has been interpreted by the USPTO as meaning that secret use of an 
invention will not constitute prior art. 119  This would mean that commercial 
exploitation of a secret process for manufacturing a drug may no longer constitute 
prior art against a subsequently filed patent.  
 
 Summary 
 
A medicine will no longer be patentable if it has either been published, used or on 
public display prior to filing a patent. Anticipation occurs if a prior art document 
teaches something which either infringes or inevitably would lead to infringement of 
the claims of a patent. For example, if a claimed pharmaceutical drug has a different 
chemical structure to what was disclosed, then it is not anticipated. However, 
‘intrinsic’ properties of a medicine are automatically disclosed, even if not known to 
the public at the time. This means it is not possible to claim a drug metabolite.  
 
Further, the disclosure of a particular species of drug within a class will 
always anticipate a genus claim over the broader chemical class. Conversely, it may 
be possible to patent certain selected members of a previously disclosed broader class, 
provided that the prior art did not disclose the advantages of making that selection.  
 
The legal tests for novelty are relatively objective, using the principles of 
‘reverse infringement’. However, even if a medicine fulfils the novel criterion, 
patentability is not assured. We now turn to the more complex and subjective tests of 
inventive step.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
117 Pfaff v Wells Elecs, Inc 525 US 55 (1998) at 67.  
118 In re Blaisdell 242 F 2d 779 (CCPA 1957) at 783; Hall v Macneale 107 US 90 (1882) at 96-97; Ex 
parte Kuklo 25 USPQ2d 1387 (BPAI 1992) at 1390.  
119 MPEP § 2132: ‘…a secret use of the process coupled with the sale of the product does not result in a 
public use of the process unless the public could learn the claimed process by examining the product’. 
This interpretation arguably overrides the ‘forfeiture doctrine’ in Metallizing Engineering Co v Kenyon 
Bearing and Auto Parts 153 F 2d 516 (2d Cir 1946) which requires an inventor to choose between 
exploitation of a trade secret or patent protection. But see P Morgan “The Ambiguity in Section 
102(a)(1) of the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act” (2011) Patently-O Patent Law Review 29 at 31.  
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3 Inventive step  
 
The most onerous hurdle for patentability of medicines is the requirement that 
inventions must possess an inventive step with respect to the prior art. Due to the 
large number of chemicals or compounds that could be potentially viable medicines, 
the question of whether a medicine is ‘obvious’, and therefore unpatentable, is a 
particularly difficult question to determine in advance, with multiple relevant factors 
to consider. This lack of clarity has created significant uncertainty for pharmaceutical 
innovators - particularly in the United States - who risk spending hundreds of millions 
of dollars on clinical trials, only to have their patents challenged and invalidated on 
the basis of obviousness. The following sections will discuss the legal tests for 
inventive step in New Zealand and the United States.  
 
(a)  New Zealand 
 
Section 7 of the Patents Act defines an invention as having an inventive step “if it is 
not obvious to a person skilled in the art, having regard to any matter which forms 
part of the prior art base.”120 New Zealand applies a four-part test for inventive 
step. 121  The test was set out by the English Court of Appeal in Windsurfing 
International Inc v Tabur Marine (GB) Ltd: 122 
 
[1] The first is to identify the inventive concept embodied in the patent in 
suit.  
 
[2] Thereafter, the court has to assume the mantle of the normally skilled but 
unimaginative addressee in the art at the priority date and to impute to him 
what was, at that date, common general knowledge in the art in question.  
 
[3] The third step is to identify what, if any, differences exist between the 
matter cited as being 'known or used' and the alleged invention.  
 
[4] Finally, the court has to ask itself whether, viewed without any knowledge 
of the alleged invention, those differences constitute steps which would have 
been obvious to the skilled man or whether they require any degree of 
invention.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
120 Patents Act 2013, s 7.  
121 Portable Sawing Systems Ltd (in liq) v Lucas [2006] NZSC 20, [2006] 3 NZLR 721 at [54]. See also 
Ancare NZ Ltd v Cyanamid of NZ Ltd [2000] 3 NZLR 299 (CA) at 309.  
122 Windsurfing International Inc v Tabur Marine (GB) Ltd [1985] RPC 59 per Oliver LJ at 73-74.  
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The Supreme Court in Peterson Portable Sawing Systems Ltd (in liq) v 
Lucas123 also endorsed the decision of the English Court of Appeal in Mölnlycke AB v 
Procter & Gamble Ltd (No 5)124 which provides that various secondary considerations 
can be relevant to the determination of inventive step, namely: “the failure of others to 
hit on the alleged obvious invention, commercial success and the circumstances of 
particular individuals in the field.”125 
 
In applying the Windsurfing test, the most crucial aspect is to identify the 
‘person skilled in the art’ and the ‘relevant common general knowledge of that 
person’. The ‘person skilled in the art’ is a judicially created entity. In Inglis v 
Mayson126 Prichard J approved the dicta of Lord Reid in Technograph Printed 
Circuits Ltd v Mills and Rockley (Electronics) Ltd,127 who described the person 
skilled in the art as a “skilled technician … who has carefully read the relevant 
literature”, but is “incapable of a scintilla of invention.”128  
 
Therefore, when examining pharmaceutical inventions, the person skilled in 
the art would likely be a medicinal chemist, albeit one with no inventive capacity. A 
determination of the common general knowledge of the person skilled in the art 
involves a consideration of the kind of documentation in the prior art they would be 
familiar with in practice. For example, the common general knowledge of a medicinal 
chemist would likely include known and routine methods of modifying a drug to 
improve its safety and efficacy, and any documents that they would have been likely 
to consider when being faced with the problem solved by the alleged invention. Such 
consideration includes all prior art documents that would have been available, not just 
those that would have been discovered by a “diligent searcher”.129 
 
By contrast to the novelty criterion, it is possible to combine prior art 
documents when assessing inventive step. However, for the invention to be obvious, 
those documents must be deemed to fall within the common general knowledge of the 
person skilled in the art. It is difficult to apply the test in practice.130 Importantly, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
123 Peterson Portable Sawing Systems Ltd (in liq) v Lucas [2006] NZSC 20, [2006] 3 NZLR 721. 
124 Mölnlycke AB v Procter & Gamble Ltd (No 5) [1994] RPC 49 (CA).  
125 At 113.  
126 Inglis v Mayson (1983) 3 IPR 588 at 600.  
127 Technograph Printed Circuits Ltd v Mills and Rockley (Electronics) Ltd [1972] RPC 346.  
128 At 355 per Lord Reid.  
129 Ancare, above n 121, at [43]; Cool 123 Limited v Vodafone New Zealand Limited and Ors HC 
Wellington CIV 2006-485-698, 29 August 2007.  
130 For example, in applying the test, a single prior art reference that includes most of the features of the 
claim can be considered first. Subsequently, it is asked whether it would have been obvious for a 
skilled person to combine the closest prior art reference with other references that include the missing 
features from the claim being considered or otherwise modify the closest reference to include those 
features. If so, the claim is obvious and therefore unpatentable.  
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there is a rule against hindsight when considering multiple prior art references.131 
However, as noted by Lord Reid in the Technograph case, “it is permissible to make a 
‘mosaic' out of the relevant documents, but it must be a mosaic which can be put 
together by an unimaginative man with no inventive capacity.” 132  Moreover, 
combining features that are present in the prior art would only comprise an inventive 
step if that combination were not a “mere collocation”.133 For example, it would not 
be possible to patent a drug combination or formulation where the features are known 
and there are no ‘unexpected’ synergistic effects from the combination. 134 
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has acknowledged that combining known features 
without a synergistic effect may be inventive in “rare cases”.135  
 
Another useful tool for determining the obviousness question is the ‘obvious 
to try’ test. This test asks whether it would have been obvious for a person skilled in 
the art to try a particular step in order to solve the problem requiring an alleged 
inventive step. In the leading English case, Johns-Manville Corporation's Patent,136 
an invention is deemed obvious if “[i]t is enough that the person versed in the art 
would assess the likelihood of success as sufficient to warrant actual trial.”137 New 
Zealand had also endorsed this approach in Ancare.138  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
131 See Lucas v Peterson Portable Sawing Systems Ltd [2003] 3 NZLR 361 (HC) per Fisher J at 369: 
‘The Court must also avoid the danger of falling into ex post facto analysis. It must put out of its mind 
developments since the invention and view the question of obviousness from the perspective of persons 
skilled in the art immediately before the priority date.’ Other jurisdictions also apply this rule against 
hindsight: see the decision of the EPO Board of Appeals in GENENTECH, INC/Expression in yeast T 
455/91 [1995] OJ EPO 684 stating that aim was to answer, objectively and avoiding any ex post facto 
analysis, the question whether it would be obvious to the skilled person to make given changes in a 
structure or procedure. For the position in Australia, see Minnesota Mining & Manufacturing Co v 
Tyco Electronics Pty Ltd (2002) 56 IPR 248 (FCA) at 45; Pac Mining v Esco Corp [2009] FCAFC 18. 
132 Technograph, above n 127, at 355.  
133 See Assa Abloy New Zealand Ltd v Aluminium Systems NZ Ltd HC Wellington CIV-2010-485-2, 7 
March 2011. The rule against the patentability of a ‘mere collocation’ has also been applied in 
Australia: see WM Wrigley JR Co v Cadbury Schweppes Pty Ltd [2005] FCA 1035, (2005) 66 IPR 298; 
Nutrasweet Australia Pty Ltd v Ajinmoto Co Inc (2006) 67 IPR 381 (FCA). See also International 
Paint Co Ltd’s Application [1982] RPC 247] at 275: ‘There is no invention from a ‘mere collocation of 
integers’ where however juxtaposed to the other ingredients of the mixture or parts of the article, each 
part performs its own function and would do so even in the absence of the other parts.’ For the 
European position, see EPO Guidelines for Examination 2012, G-VII, 7.  
134 Lucas, above n 123, at [56].  
135 At [61].  
136 Johns-Manville Corporation's Patent [1967] RPC 479. 
137 At 495 per Lord Diplock. For a discussion of the obvious to try test by the House of Lords, see 
Conor Medsystems Inc v Angiotech Pharmaceuticals Inc [2008] UKHL 49. The Canadian Supreme 
Court also endorsed the obvious to try test in Sanofi-Synthelabo Canada Inc v Apotex Inc (2008) SCC 
61. However, the Australian High Court rejected the obvious to try test in the Alphapharm case.  
138 Ancare above at [43].  
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Ultimately, applying these tests to the same material facts can result in 
inconsistent outcomes for patent validity in different jurisdictions.139 This highlights 
the uncertainty faced by innovators that must rely on patents to recover their costs. 
 
(b)  United States 
 
The inventive step criterion is referred to as ‘non-obviousness’ in the United States. A 
finding of non-obviousness also involves a construing of the “person having ordinary 
skill in the art”,140 whether the differences between the alleged invention and the prior 
art are obvious to that person, and finally whether any ‘secondary considerations’ may 
be relevant. These so-called ‘Graham factors’ are taken from the case Graham v John 
Deere Co. of Kansas City:141 
 
 … the scope and content of the prior art are to be determined; differences 
between the prior art and the claims at issue are to be ascertained; and the 
level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art resolved. Against this background, 
the obviousness or non-obviousness of the subject matter is determined. Such 
secondary considerations as commercial success, long-felt but unsolved 
needs, failure of others, etc., might be utilized to give light to the 
circumstances surrounding the origin of the subject matter sought to be 
patented. 
 
Under the previous leading cases, there was a caution against hindsight or “ex-
post facto” analysis,142 and a requirement of some teaching, suggestion or motivation 
to combine prior art documents in a manner which anticipates the claims.143 The mere 
fact that a combination of documents was “obvious to try” suggested the invention 
was obvious; a “reasonable expectation of success” was required.144 The Supreme 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
139 For example, in Aktiebolaget Hassle v Alphapharm Pty [2002] HCA 59, the High Court of Australia 
held that a three-layered drug formulation was inventive, comprising a known antacid (omeprazole) 
with an inert buffer between the external acidic enteric coating, which allowed breakdown of the drug 
in the upper small intestine not the stomach. The New Zealand Court of Appeal reached the same 
conclusion in equivalent proceedings: Novartis New Zealand Ltd v Aktiebolaget Hassle [2004] 2 NZLR 
721 (CA) per Blanchard J at [3]-[4]. However, compare Cairnstores Limited, Generics (UK) Limited v 
Aktiebolaget Hässle [2002] EWHC 309 (Ch), where Laddie J (at [1]-[2]) reached the opposite 
conclusion with respect to the same drug.   
140 35 USC § 103.  
141 Graham v John Deere Co of Kansas City 383 US 1 (1966) at 17-18.  
142 In re Kahn 441 F 3d 977 (CA Fed Cir 2006) at 986. See also Ortho-McNeil Pharm Inc v Mylan 
Labs 520 F 3d 1358 (Fed Cir 2008) at 1364.   
143 Winner Int'l Royalty Corp v Wang 202 F 3d 1340 (Fed Cir 2000) at 1348. Compare the New 
Zealand position, above n 131. See also EPO Guidelines for Examination 2012, G-VII, 5.3, 6. The 
European test requires some ‘implicit prompting or implicitly recognisable incentive’ to combine the 
elements from the prior art.  
144 In re O’Farrell 853 F 2d 894 (Fed Cir 1988) at 904.  
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Court of the United States in KSR International Co v Teleflex Inc (KSR)145 has since 
raised the hurdle for non-obviousness. The Supreme Court approved the Graham 
factors analysis, but rejected the ‘teaching, suggestion or motivation test’, as well as 
the ‘obvious to try’ test, stating:146  
 
When there is a design need or market pressure to solve a problem and there 
are a finite number of identified, predictable solutions, a person of ordinary 
skill has good reason to pursue the known options within his or her technical 
grasp. … Rigid preventative rules that deny factfinders recourse to common 
sense, however, are neither necessary under our case law nor consistent with 
it.  
 
In supporting a more flexible ‘common-sense’ approach in KSR, the Supreme 
Court stated that “[a] person of ordinary skill is also a person of ordinary creativity, 
not an automaton”.147 There was a concern by various commentators that the higher 
non-obviousness threshold and legal uncertainty post-KSR would result in a 
detrimental effect on pharmaceutical patent protection.148 However, the consensus has 
been that this has not occurred yet, 149  with several challenges to lucrative 
pharmaceutical patents being successfully defended after the KSR decision.150  
 
According to the United States Manual of Patent Examining Procedure 
(MPEP), failure to satisfy the above-referenced tests supports a prima facie 
determination of obviousness by the examiner. 151  Moreover, a combination of 
ingredients having a known purpose will also generally be prima facie obvious.152 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
145 KSR International Co v Teleflex Inc 550 US 398 (2007) [KSR].  
146 At 421 (emphasis added).  
147 At 421.  
148 R Teitelbaum and M Cohen “Obviousness, hindsight and perspective: the impact of KSR v Teleflex 
on biotech and pharmaceutical patents” (2007) 25(10) Nature Biotechnology 1105 at 1105.  
149 KJ Bernier “Obviating the Obvious? An Appraisal of Pharmaceutical Patents” (2010) 10 J High 
Tech L 208 at 236; MJ Sweet “The Patentability of Chiral Drugs Post-KSR: The more things change, 
the more they stay the same” (2009) 24(1) Berkeley Technology Law Journal 129 at 147; J M Spenner 
“Obvious-to-Try Obviousness of Chemical Enantiomers in View of Pre- and Post-KSR 
Analysis”(2008) 90 J Pat & Trademark Off Soc'y 476 at 478-479; AV Trask “Obvious to Try': A 
Proper Patentability Standard in the Pharmaceutical Arts?” (2008) 76(5) Fordham Law Review 2625 at 
2629.  
150 For examples of unsuccessful legal challenges brought by generic drug companies against patents 
subsequent to the decision in KSR v Teleflex see Takeda Chem Indus, Ltd v Alphapharm Pty Ltd 492 F 
3d 1350 (Fed Cir 2007); Eisai Co v Dr Reddy's Laboratories  533 F 3d 1353 (Fed Cir 2008); Ortho-
McNeil, above n 142 at 1360.  
151 See generally, MPEP § 2143: Examples of Basic Requirements of a Prima Facie Case of 
Obviousness.  
152 See MPEP § 2144.06: ‘It is prima facie obvious to combine two compositions each of which is 
taught by the prior art to be useful for the same purpose, in order to form a third composition to be used 
for the very same purpose.... [T]he idea of combining them flows logically from their having been 
individually taught in the prior art’: In re Kerkhoven 626 F 2d 846 (CCPA 1980) at 850. 
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However, ‘secondary considerations’ such as commercial success of the invention can 
help rebut this prima facie presumption.153  
 
Another important factor to rebut the prima facie finding of obviousness is 
whether the prior art teaches away from or discloses a technical prejudice against the 
invention, such as an expectation that a drug would not work.154 However, the fact 
that a drug possesses a benefit that was not recognised until later by a patent applicant 
is not in itself sufficient to make the compound distinct from the prior art.155  
 
It is also problematic, however, that the tests for determining obviousness tend 
to conflict with the modern process of drug development. For example, this process 
typically involves selection of a ‘lead compound’ on the basis of structural similarity 
to another compound with known therapeutically beneficial properties, which is part 
of the modern ‘rational’ drug discovery approach.156 This can be contrasted with 
‘trial-and-error’ screening using animals.157 However, structural similarity increases 
the likelihood of finding obviousness.158  In the case In re Payne,159 the United States 
Court of Customs and Patent Appeals noted that “[a]n obviousness rejection based on 
similarity in chemical structure and function entails the motivation of one skilled in 
the art to make a claimed compound, in the expectation that compounds similar in 
structure will have similar properties.”  
 
Nevertheless, the high level of unpredictability in medicinal chemistry can 
create a “firewall” to protect a drug candidate against a finding of obviousness.160 For 
example, a prima facie case of obviousness based on structural similarity can be 
rebutted by evidence of unexpected advantage or superior properties of the claimed 
compounds.161 Further, in the case In re Baird the Federal Circuit held “the fact that a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
153 Yamanouchi Pharmaceutical Co. v. Danbury Pharmacal, 231 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2000). See 
generally, MPEP § 2145. Compare Mölnlycke, above n 124, at 113: ‘there may be commercial reasons 
for this success unrelated to whether this invention was or was not obvious in the past’.  
154 For example, in Novartis Pharmaceuticals Corporation v Teva Pharmaceuticals USA Inc No 05 Civ 
1887 (D NJ Sept 6, 2007), the patentability for a drug was considered obvious because prior art as a 
whole did not teach away from producing the compound and the greater number of references 
considered it would have powerful therapeutic properties. See also Pozzoli Spa v BDMO SA [2007] 
FSR 37 (CA) at [27]-[29] per Jacob LJ: ‘[a] patentee who contributes something new by showing that, 
contrary to the mistaken prejudice, the idea will work or is practical has shown something new.’  
155 In re Dillon 919 F 2d 688 (Fed Cir 1991).  
156  S Mandal, M Moudgil and SK Mandal “Rational drug design” (2009) 625(1) European Journal of 
Pharmacology 90 at 92.  
157 This is also referred to as phenotypic screening.  
158 MPEP § 2144.09: ‘A prima facie case of obviousness may be made when chemical compounds have 
very close structural similarities and similar utilities.’ 
159 In re Payne 606 F 2d 303 (CCPA 1979) at 313.  
160 Sweet, above n 149, at 147.  
161 In re Papesch 315 F 2d 381(CCPA 1963) at 386-387; see also In re Wiechert, 370 F 2d 927 (CCPA 
1967) at 933; Pfizer Inc v Apotex Inc 480 F 3d 1348 (Fed Cir 2007) at 1369.  
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claimed compound may be encompassed by a disclosed generic formula does not by 
itself render that compound obvious.”162 
 
Therefore, it is the unexpected therapeutic effects of a medicine that provides 
the most support to a finding of non-obviousness. However, this highlights the 
pernicious effect of relying on patents to incentivise drug development: as 
improvements in technology allow the medicinal effects of experimental drugs to be 
predicted with greater accuracy, the non-obviousness criterion will tend to block the 
patentability of an even greater number of therapeutically valuable compounds.163 
 
Summary  
 
The tests for obviousness in New Zealand and the United States have many principles 
in common. In both cases, the relevant person skilled in the art must compare the 
differences between the alleged invention and the prior art. Structural and functional 
similarity to a prior art compound will support a finding of obviousness, and there 
must not be a suggestion in the prior art for a skilled person to make modifications or 
changes to the prior art compound to create the medicine being claimed. However, the 
unpredictable nature of drug development means that even minor changes can have 
unexpected results, which can support a finding of patentability, despite structural 
similarity to a lead compound. Additional factors supporting a finding of inventive 
step are the prior art teaching away from the claimed invention and the absence of a 
reasonable expectation of success. Finally, secondary considerations such as 
commercial success or solving a long-felt need are relevant.  
 
The requirement to take numerous indeterminate factors into account makes it 
difficult for innovator companies to predict whether a medicine will be likely to 
satisfy the obviousness criterion at the time of filing a patent application. Further, as 
technological advances make the therapeutic effects of new medicines less 
unexpected, it will also become more difficult to secure patent protection over new 
medicines.   
 	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
162 In re Baird 16 F 3d 380 (Fed Cir 1994) at 382. See also MPEP § 2144.09.  
163 Roin, above n 100, at 542. Examples of such technological improvements include computer 
modeling techniques, biomarkers, and animal models, which are used as part of pre-clinical testing to 
predict a drug’s safety and efficacy in humans.  
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4 Utility 
 
The fourth patentability criterion requires that an invention is ‘useful’, in the sense 
that it can achieve a practical result.164 In contrast to the novelty and inventive step 
criteria, ‘utility’ generally focuses on the contents of the specification rather than 
external subject matter such as prior art.  
 
Satisfaction of the utility criterion is often a significant hurdle for 
biopharmaceutical inventions, because it requires evidence that a medicine has 
therapeutic value at the time of filing.  However, this is usually unknown because the 
medicine has typically not yet been tested in humans at the time of filing.165 
Accordingly, there is a tension between the advantages of being the first to file, which 
secures priority over competitors in respect of a potentially lucrative medicine, and 
conducting enough laboratory tests to adequately satisfy the utility criterion. The 
applicable law in New Zealand and the United States will now be described.  
 
(a)  New Zealand 
 
Under section 10 of the Patents Act, an invention must have a specific, credible and 
substantial use.166 In Smale v North Sails167 the High Court approved the test for 
utility from the English case, Lane Fox v Kensington & Knightsbridge Electric 
Lighting Co Ltd.168 In Lane Fox it was held that that utility does not depend on 
obtaining results necessary for commercial success, but whether the effects that the 
patentee seeks can be obtained and whether the end result is practically useful in 
terms of the objects indicated by the patentee.169  
 
There is a dearth of applicable caselaw in New Zealand considering the utility 
criterion, although it was unsuccessfully argued in the High Court case Hammar 
Maskin AB v Steelbro New Zealand Ltd.170 It remains to be seen how the New 
Zealand courts will interpret the utility standard under the new Patents Act. The 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
164 The terms ‘useful’, ‘utility’ and ‘industrial applicability’ can be used interchangeably in different 
jurisdictions to refer to the same criterion.  
165 This evidence is typically provided in the form of results from in vitro and in vivo pre-clinical tests, 
as will be discussed below.  
166 Patents Act 2013, s 10. 
167 Smale v North Sails [1991] 3 NZLR 19.  
168 Lane Fox v Kensington & Knightsbridge Electric Lighting Co Ltd (1892) 9 RPC 411. The general 
test for utility is also taken from Fawcett v Homan [1896] RPC 398 (CA) at 405: ‘If an invention does 
what it is intended by the patentee to do and the end attained is itself useful, the invention is a useful 
invention.’ 
169 At 417. 
170 Hammar Maskin AB v Steelbro New Zealand Ltd HC Christchurch CIV-2006-409-977, 8 October 
2008. Leave for the defendant to appeal to the Supreme Court on the grounds of inutility was also 
declined: see Steelbro New Zealand Ltd v Hammar Maskin AB [2010] NZSC 65.  
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requirement for a specific, credible and substantial use is very similar to the test in the 
United States171 and Australia,172 which means that case law in those jurisdictions is 
likely to be influential.  
 
(b)  United States 
 
Under 35 USC § 101 an invention must be useful to be granted a patent.173 As with 
New Zealand, the United States does not require actual evidence of commercial 
success, which means a patent can be granted over a medicine at an early stage of 
clinical development.174 
 
The leading case on utility is the Supreme Court case of Brenner v Manson.175 
This case involved the attempt to patent a steroid with no known utility - although 
related compounds had known utilities - and a method of producing the steroid. The 
majority of the Supreme Court denied patentability, holding that the applicant was 
required to show a ‘specific’ and ‘substantial’ utility to the claims for the steroid and 
the method for producing the same.176 A ‘specific’ utility means that the subject 
matter of the claim can “provide a well-defined and particular benefit to the public”177 
and ‘substantial’ utility requires the disclosure of “real world” value that would 
provide “some immediate benefit”.178 
 
However, Federal Circuit case In re Brana 179  departed from this strict 
standard. The case involved an attempt to patent anti-tumour compounds, where the 
applicant had submitted laboratory evidence from in vitro and in vivo tests in support 
of utility.180 The Court confirmed that proving utility did not require the full extent of 
clinical tests in humans required for regulatory approval, but that evidence from pre-
clinical tests, such as testing on animals, would be acceptable.181  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
171 See Brenner v Manson 383 US 519 (1966), discussed below. 
172 Patents Act 1990 (Cth), s 7A, s 18(1)(c).  
173 35 USC § 101.  
174 Studiengesellschaft Kohle v Eastman Kodak 616 F 2d 1315 (5th Cir 1980) at 1339.  
175 Brenner, n 171.  
176 At 534.  
177 In re Fisher 421 F 3d 1365 (Fed Cir 2005) at 1371. 
178 Nelson v Bowler 626 F 2d 853(CCPA 1980) at 856. 
179 In re Brana 51 F 3d 1560 (Fed Cir 1995). 
180 An in vitro test refers to evidence obtained from outside a living organism such as from a test-tube 
or Petri dish. By contrast, in vivo tests refer to evidence obtained from use in a living organism.  
181 At 1568. The legal requirements for regulatory approval of a new drug will be discussed in this 
chapter below.  
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Therefore, pre-clinical laboratory results will usually be sufficient to establish 
utility for a pharmaceutical compound. 182  Notably, in vitro tests may only 
demonstrate that the compound binds a target protein, which is far removed from 
proving that the compound is a safe and effective treatment in humans. In addition, 
the Federal Circuit has allowed supporting evidence from pre-clinical tests to be 
provided after the filing date of the invention, in order to “substantiate doubts as to 
the asserted utility since this pertains to the accuracy of a statement already in a 
specification”.183  
 
However, a specification must contain “more than respectable guesses as to 
the likelihood of … success”.184 Moreover, if a particular disease etiology is not well-
understood there may not be any target proteins or animal models that can be used to 
generate such pre-clinical evidence of utility.185 For example, this is the case with 
mental disorders that have unknown cause, such as schizophrenia.  
 
Finally, it is notable that a patent over a medicine which is denied for lack of 
utility due to inadequate pre-clinical evidence can still anticipate a subsequently filed 
patent application over the same medicine.186 The potentially adverse effect of this on 
private incentives for drug development will be discussed further in Chapter Three.  
 
Summary  
 
The patent system requires an inventor to create useful information. Accordingly, it is 
not possible to simply patent the discovery of a chemical or protein per se without 
disclosing its utility or functionality. This helps incentivise innovators to find and 
disclose practical uses for new discoveries.  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
182 See generally, MPEP § 2107 Guidelines for Examination of Applications for Compliance with the 
Utility Requirement.  
183 Eli Lilly and Co v Actavis Elizabeth LLC et al No 2010-1500 (Fed Cir July 29, 2011) at 16 citing In 
re Brana at 1567. Contrast Janssen Pharmaceutica NV v Teva pharmaceuticals USA Inc 583 F 3d 1317 
(Fed Cir 2009) and Rasmusson v SmithKline Beecham Corp 413 F 3d 1318 (Fed Cir 
2005)[Rasmusson]. For a discussion of the EPO position regarding after-filed evidence, see Nina L 
White “Time waits for no man: deciding when to file a patent application in Europe” (2007) 25 Nature 
Biotechnology 639.  
184 Rasmusson at 1325.   
185 See CM Holman “Unpredictability in Patent Law and Its Effect on Pharmaceutical Innovation” 
(2011) 76 Mo L Rev 645 at 660 citing Eli Lilly &Co v Actavis Elizabeth LLC 731 F Supp 2d 348 (DNJ 
2010) at 352.  
186 See Roin, above n 100, at 522 citing In re Hafner 410 F 2d 1403 (CCPA 1969) at 1405: ‘‘a 
disclosure lacking a teaching of how to use a fully disclosed compound for a specific, substantial utility 
or of how to use for such purpose a compound produced by a fully disclosed process is, under the 
present state of the law, entirely adequate to anticipate a claim to either the product or the process and, 
at the same time, entirely inadequate to support the allowance of such a claim.’  
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However, because of the commercial pressure to file a patent application 
before information supporting the actual usefulness of a medicine is available, patents 
are often susceptible to attack on the basis of lack of utility. Further, this pressure to 
file early also widens the scope of prior art which can subsequently be used to destroy 
novelty of medicines, even if evidence of utility was insufficient at the time.  
 
Notably, even if a new medicine has been deemed to satisfy the novelty, 
inventive step, and utility criteria and a patent has been allowed, it is still be 
susceptible to revocation on other grounds.  
 
D Grounds for Revocation 
 
While there are various grounds for revocation of a patent after grant,187 this thesis 
will focus on the requirement that a patent specification have adequate sufficiency. 
Like utility, sufficiency is frequently raised as grounds to invalidate a pharmaceutical 
patent due to the pressure to file a patent application early in clinical development.  
 
1 Sufficiency  
 
The concept of sufficiency is at the heart of the social ‘contract’ between the inventor 
and society.188 That is, a patent monopoly is granted in exchange for sufficient 
disclosure of information to allow a person skilled in the art to ‘perform’ the 
invention. With insufficient disclosure, society cannot benefit. There is a tendency to 
confuse the concepts of sufficiency and utility, because in order to obtain a useful 
result, the specification must also provide enough detail for a person skilled in the art 
to perform the invention.189 The next sections will discuss the applicable law in New 
Zealand and the United States.  
 
(a)  New Zealand 
 
Section 39(2)(c) of the Patents Act provides that the contents of a complete 
specification must include claims which are “supported by the matter disclosed in the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
187 Patents Act 2013, s 112. See also 35 USC § 282(b)(2) or (3). These include grounds such as 
obtaining the invention from the true inventor or providing fraudulent information to the patent office.   
188 See Denicolò and Franzoni, above n 8.  
189 This distinction was addressed by the English Court of Appeal in Tetra Molectric Ltd’s Application 
[1977] RPC 290 (CA) at 297: ‘If you cannot achieve the promised result because of deficiencies in the 
information given in the specification, there is insufficiency. But, if following that information and 
having achieved mechanically that which the specification promises you will achieve by so following, 
the end product will not of itself achieve that promise, then that is inutility.’  
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complete specification.”190 If the claims refer to subject matter which is not “broadly 
described” in the specification, the claims are deemed not “fairly based upon the 
disclosure”.191 Although sufficiency does not fall within the formally examined 
patentability criteria, it is possible for the Commissioner to refuse to proceed with a 
patent application which is insufficient.192 
 
The test for sufficiency in New Zealand requires that a skilled person would 
be able to perform the invention by following the specification without applying some 
further invention on their part.193 Notably, the test is the same for ‘enablement’, which 
is the second part of the two-part test for ‘anticipation’ specified in the Synthon case 
above.194  It is a question of fact whether the skilled person can ‘carry out’ the 
invention as claimed, from the wording of the specification.195 The high level of 
unpredictability in drug development would raise the level of disclosure required for 
pharmaceutical inventions.  
 
Sufficiency also requires that the entire scope of a claim is supported by the 
specification. In particular, the Court of Appeal in Beecham Group Limited v Bristol-
Myers Company held that a patentee cannot claim more than they have invented.196 
For example, in Biogen Inc v Medeva it was held that a ‘composition of matter’ claim 
for a drug product will fail for insufficiency if the specification only discloses one 
way of making the drug but “the claims cover other ways in which [the drug] might 
be delivered”.197 The literal application of the ‘Biogen sufficiency’ doctrine can 
threaten any ‘composition of matter’ claim over a drug that could be manufactured by 
different processes. However, the House of Lords distinguished Biogen in Generics 
(UK) Limited & Ors v H Lundbeck A/S, holding that where the method of making a 
drug is novel and inventive, and the specification sufficiently describes how to make 
it, the claim for the drug product is not invalid. 198  Although the Assistant 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
190 Compare section 10(3)(a) of the Patents Act 1953, which stated that a complete patent specification 
must ‘particularly describe the invention and the method by which it is to be performed’.   
191 Mond Nickel Company Ltd's Application (1956) RPC 189 at 194.  
192 Standard Brand Inc’s Patent (No 2) [1981] RPC 499 (CA) at 530-531, cited with approval by 
Synthon BV v Smithkline Beecham Plc IPO P15/2007, 11 June 2007 at 24. 
193 Noton New Zealand Ltd v Alister Bevin Ltd (1999) 1 NZIPR 236 at 238.  
194 Synthon, above n 78, at [38]-[55].  
195 See International Business Machines Corporation’s Application, above n 45, at 542; Edison and 
Swan Electric Co v Holland [1889] RPC 243 (CA) at 280.  
196 Beecham Group Limited v Bristol-Myers Company [1981] NZLR 600 at 612. 
197 Biogen Inc v Medeva [1996] UKHL 18; [1997] RPC 1 at [70] per Lord Hoffman.  
198 Generics (UK) Limited & Ors v H Lundbeck A/S [2009] UKHL 12. Biogen was distinguished in that 
it was a part product and process claim. Lord Neuberger stated [at 83] that a product claim, provided it 
was novel and inventive, would also provide a monopoly over the ‘technical contribution’ which was 
the product itself regardless of the method of producing the product. Lord Hoffman stated [at 46] that 
‘is too late to have regrets about the breadth of the monopoly which such [product] claims confer.’ 
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Commissioner of Patents has followed Biogen without reference to Lunbeck,199  it is 
unclear to what extent ‘Biogen insufficiency’ would apply in New Zealand.  
 
(b)  United States 
 
The United States has a ‘sufficiency’ requirement,200 although it is defined in 
terms of the related concepts of ‘enablement’ and ‘written description.’201 If a patent 
is determined to lack ‘enablement’ or ‘written description’, then it will not be 
granted.202 ‘Enablement’ requires a person skilled in the art to make the invention 
without “undue experimentation”.203 The ‘written description’ requirement is satisfied 
if the invention is conveyed with reasonable clarity such that a person having ordinary 
skill in the art can reasonably conclude that the applicant had ‘possession’ of the 
invention at the time of filing.204 Again, the high level of unpredictability for 
pharmaceutical inventions means that the sufficiency hurdle is more difficult to 
satisfy.  
 
By way of example, it is not possible to claim a therapeutic method without 
disclosing specific compounds which can be used,205 or to broadly claim a chemical 
‘genus’ without disclosing a representative number of ‘species’ so that a person 
skilled in the art can implement any member of the claimed ‘genus’.206 Attempts to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
199  Malik M Hasan v Ministry Of Health, Accident Compensation Corporation, Southern Cross 
Medical Care Society and Telecom New Zealand Limited [2012] NZIPOPAT 2 (9 February 2012) at 
[188]-[208].  
200 35 USC § 112(a) ‘The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the 
manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable 
any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and 
use the same, and shall set forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his 
invention.’ 
201 See MPEP § 2161 - Three Separate Requirements for Specification Under 35 USC 112(a) or Pre-
AIA 35 USC 112, First Paragraph.  
202 See MPEP § 2163 for examination guidelines regarding an objection based on lack of ‘written 
description’ and MPEP § 2164 for a rejection based on lack of ‘enablement’.  
203 Re Wands 858 F 2d 731 (Fed Cir 1988) at 736: ‘The determination of what constitutes undue 
experimentation in a given case requires the application of a standard of reasonableness, having due 
regard for the nature of the invention and the state of the art.’  
204 Vas-Cath Inc v Mahurkar 935 F 2d 1555 (Fed Cir 1991) at 1563-1564; See generally MPEP § 2161-
2163. 
205 For example, in University of Rochester v G D Searle & Co Inc 358 F 3d 916 (Fed Cir 2004), a 
method for inhibiting COX-2 activity by administering a non-steroidal drug which inhibits COX-2 was 
claimed, however, no compounds were disclosed. It was held there was a lack of written description. 
206  In re Alonso 545 F 3d 1015 (Fed Cir 2008), considered a claimed method of treating 
neurofibrosarcoma in a human by administering an effective amount of a monoclonal antibody 
idiotypic to the neurofibrosarcoma. It was held there was a lack of written description as the 
specification only disclosed a single antibody to an antigen and there were no fully characterised 
antigens disclosed, with a large variability in possible antigens and antibodies.  
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file broad claims over medicines without an adequate number of working examples 
will invalidate a patent.207 
 
It is black letter law that enablement for a claimed drug does not require 
disclosure of all possible formulations or methods of use for that drug, although there 
is still large amount of uncertainty in this area.208 While there is still a requirement to 
disclose the “best mode” of performing the invention,209 changes under the AIA mean 
this is no longer a ground for revocation of a patent.210 As a result, pharmaceutical 
companies will not have to disclose all known uses or ‘indications’ for a drug upon 
filing.211 However, the lack of ‘bright line rules’ makes it difficult for pharmaceutical 
companies to know whether their patents may be revoked for insufficiency.212  
 
 Summary 
 
The requirement for sufficiency is a difficult and risky hurdle for an applicant seeking 
patent protection for a pharmaceutical invention. In general, merely disclosing the 
composition of a drug without providing its function will mean the patent will be 
invalid for insufficiency. Pharmaceutical companies must decide whether to file a 
patent application disclosing their lead compounds at an early stage, and risk a claim 
of insufficiency, or delay filing until they have more data.213 
 
Like utility, the more stringent disclosure requirement also increases the scope 
of subject matter available as prior art to invalidate patentability of subsequent 
medicines. Further, while the ‘unpredictability’ of medicinal research can assist to 
overcome novelty and obviousness objections, it also makes the sufficiency hurdle 
more difficult to overcome. The result is a constant threat that a pharmaceutical 
innovator must be vigilant against when attempting to secure patent protection.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
207 In Ariad Pharmaceuticals Inc v Eli Lilly and Co 598 F 3d 1336 (Fed Cir 2010), a method of binding 
NF-KB was claimed, which is a protein that regulates gene expression in human cells. Invalidating the 
patent for insufficiency and overturning a USD 65.2 million verdict for patent infringement, the 
Federal Circuit held [at 1357-1358] that while the applicant disclosed three categories of inhibitors of 
NF-KB, they provided no ‘working or prophetic’ examples or evidence of functionality.   
208 Holman, above n 185, at 662.  
209 35 USC § 112(a).  
210 35 USC § 282(b)(3)(A). 
211 This may facilitate patent ‘evergreening’ by allowing claims over new uses for a drug after the 
original patent is nearing expiry. The effectiveness (or lack thereof) of patent ‘evergreening’ techniques 
will be discussed in more detail in Chapter Three. 
212 Holman, above n 185, at 648.   
213 At 657-663. 
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While this chapter has so far considered the major legal requirements for 
obtaining patent protection over medical therapies, it will now discuss the 
circumstances where such therapies may be excluded from patentability under law. 
 
E  Exclusions from Patentability 
 
In addition to the requirements for patentability, there are various specific exclusions 
under law which relate to medical therapies. Notably, the United States has few 
exclusions, being a relatively ‘pro-patent’ jurisdiction.214 Therefore, the following 
sections will mainly discuss the law as it applies to New Zealand, although the United 
States position will also be referenced where applicable. Under section 15 of the 
Patents Act, an invention is excluded from patentability if its commercial exploitation 
would be contrary to public order or morality.215 Section 16 of the Act includes 
additional exclusions, namely: (1) humans, the biological processes involved in their 
generation, and (2) methods of treatment of human beings by surgery or therapy.216 
These exclusions will be discussed in turn.  
 
1 Section 15: Inventions contrary to public order or morality 
 
Article 27 of TRIPS provides that “[m]embers may exclude from patentability 
inventions, the prevention within their territory of the commercial exploitation of 
which is necessary to protect ordre public or morality.” The commentary to section 15 
of the Patents Act includes several examples of inventions which are deemed contrary 
to public order or morality, such as processes of cloning human beings, modifying the 
germ line genetic identity of human beings, using human embryos for industrial or 
commercial purposes, and modifying the genetic identity of animals in a manner 
which is likely to cause them suffering without any substantial medical benefit to 
humans.217 Notably, the United States does not have a public order or morality 
exception to patentability. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
214 Interestingly, in the recent Prometheus and Myriad decisions [discussed above n 50 and n 54, 
respectively], the Supreme Court of the United States has reversed the global trend of expanding patent 
rights.  
215 Patents Act 2013, s 15.  
216 Section 16 of the Patents Act 2013 contains other exclusions: section 16(3) denies patentability to 
methods of diagnosis practiced on human beings, and section 16(4) denies patentability of plant 
varieties. These exclusions are not directly related to the commercialisation of medical therapies, and 
will not be considered further.   
217 This reflects the position already taken by IPONZ under the Patents Act 1953. See IPONZ 
Guidelines, 5.1 “Contrary to morality: Raising objections under section 17(1)” (8 December 2012) 
<www.iponz.govt.nz>. 
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Only some of these examples are relevant to the commercialisation of medical 
therapies. Human cloning is subject to legal prohibitions,218 which would interfere 
with any commercial application, apart from any patentability issues.219 However, 
human embryos can be used in the production of stem cells,220 which can be used as 
medicines. The patentability of human stem cells is somewhat controversial,221 and 
while the United States currently grants patents over stem cells, the position may 
change in the future.222 The effect of patentability issues on private incentives to 
develop stem cell therapies will be considered in Chapter Three.  
 
Genetically modified animals are also used in drug development. Since the 
landmark case of Diamond v Chakrabarty 223  which allowed patents for micro-
organisms, the patentability of higher forms of life has been upheld in various 
jurisdictions. For example, the USPTO has allowed patents over the Harvard 
oncomouse, which is genetically engineered to develop cancer, and therefore is very 
useful for screening cancer drugs.224 IPONZ has also granted the oncomouse patent in 
New Zealand.225 It is likely that the current Patents Act will not change the ability to 
patent genetically modified animals, provided that it does not cause them suffering 
without substantial medical benefit to humans.226 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
218 See Human Assisted Reproductive Technology Act 2004, s 8, sch 1. Human cloning is also banned 
in 15 states in the United States: see “Human Cloning Laws” (January 2008) National Conference of 
State Legislatures <www.ncsl.org>. 
219 A consideration of the ethics of commercially exploiting human cloning is beyond the scope of this 
thesis.  
220 Stem cells are ‘pluripotent’, which means they can transform into any cell in a body. For this reason, 
stem cells are being actively researched as a therapeutic means of regenerating body parts damaged by 
disease. Notably, recent breakthroughs may allow the generation of stem cells without use of human 
embryos: see LJ Schroth “Researchers create embryonic stem cells without embryo” Harvard Gazette 
(online ed, Cambridge (Mass), 29 January 2014).   
221 See TA Caulfield “From human genes to stem cells: new challenges for patent law?” (2003) 21(3) 
Trends in Biotechnology 101 at 101-102; Gerard Porter and others “The patentability of human 
embryonic stem cells in Europe” (2006) 24 Nature Biotechnology 653 at 653;  
222 U Storz “The Limits of Patentability: Stem Cells” In A Hübel, U Storz and A Hüttermann Limits of 
Patentability: Plant Sciences, Stem Cells and Nucleic Acids (Springer, Berlin, 2013) 9 at 21-22. 
223 Diamond v Chakrabarty 447 US 303 (1980). In this case, the Supreme Court held [at 308] that 
“Congress intended statutory subject matter to ‘include anything under the sun that is made by man’”.  
224 US Patent No. 4,736,866 claimed ‘a transgenic non-human mammal whose germ cells and somatic 
cells contain a re-combinant activated oncogene sequence introduced into said mammal’.  Patent No. 
5,087,571 claimed a method of producing a cell culture from the oncomouse. Patent No 5,925,803 
claimed a method of testing a substance suspected to be a carcinogen on the oncomouse. The validity 
of these patents were not challenged in the United States, and they are deemed to have expired as of 
2005.  
225 New Zealand Patent No 243908. Compare in Harvard College v Canada (Commissioner of Patents) 
[2002] 4 SCR 45, 2002 SCC 76, where the Supreme Court of Canada denied patentability of the 
oncomouse.  
226 A related issue, although outside the scope of this thesis, is whether the patenting of living 
organisms may be objected to as offensive to Māori. See Patents Act 2013, ss 225-228, which provide 
for the appointment of a Māori Advisory Committee, whose advice the Commissioner must consider 
before granting a patent.  
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2 Section 16: Other exclusions 
 
(a) Patentability of humans, human cloning, and the biological processes 
involved in their generation.  
 
Under section 16(1) of the Patents Act “[h]uman beings, and biological processes for 
their generation, are not patentable inventions.” As noted above, patents for human 
cloning are also excluded under the grounds of public order or morality. In addition, 
pursuant to Section 33(a) of the AIA, human beings are not patentable in the United 
States.227 
 
(b) Methods of medical treatment by surgery or therapy 
  
The patentability of methods of medical treatments by surgery or therapy is 
controversial, as it is argued they could interfere with a doctor’s freedom to provide 
the best treatment to their patients due to the fear of infringement.228 Under Article 
27(3)(a) of TRIPS, WTO member countries are permitted to exclude methods of 
medical treatment from patentability.229  
 
Section 16(2) of the Patents Act specifically excludes methods of medical 
treatment by surgery or therapy practised on human beings from the definition of 
patentable invention,230 which reflects the position at common law.231 Under Pfizer 
Inc v The Commissioner of Patents232 the Court of Appeal held that methods of 
medical treatment are not patentable inventions, due to being “generally 
inconvenient”233 in terms of the so-called ‘proviso’ in section 6 of the Statute of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
227 Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, s 33(a):‘Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no patent 
may issue on a claim directed to or encompassing a human organism.’ See also MPEP § 2105. 
228 See O Mitnovetski and D Nicol “Are patents for methods of medical treatment contrary to the ordre 
public and morality or ‘generally inconvenient’?” (2004) 30 Journal of Medical Ethics 470 at 473. It 
should be noted that patents over medicines also impact on a doctor’s choice of treatment, by 
preventing access to cheap medicines where the patient or government cannot afford the monopoly 
price.  
229 TRIPS, art 27(3). 
230 Patents Act 2013, s 16(2).  
231 Pfizer Inc v The Commissioner of Patents [2005] NZLR 362 at [7]. Compare the position in 
Australia, which allows patents over methods of medical treatment at common law. See Anaesthetic 
Supplies Pty Ltd v Rescare Ltd (Rescare) (1994) 50 FCR 1.  
232 Pfizer at [7].  
233 At [7] per Anderson P: ‘…this Court once more unanimously holds that in terms of the present law, 
methods of medical treatment of humans are not patentable. Such methods may be inventions, but in 
terms of longstanding authority it is generally inconvenient to protect them with letters patent or grants 
of privilege.’  
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Monopolies.234 Notably, medical treatments which are deemed ‘non therapeutic’, such 
as cosmetic treatments, are still patentable in New Zealand.235 
 
In the United States, claims over methods of medical treatment have been 
permitted since 1954.236 Nonetheless, under 35 USC § 287(c), there is a specific 
exclusion in the definition of patent infringement for medical practitioners that 
perform ‘medical activity’ on a human or animal. This exclusion is limited to ‘purely’ 
surgical or diagnostic methods which do not involve the use of a patented device, 
medicine or biotechnology process.237  
 
Summary 
 
As noted above, there are various categories of invention related to medical therapies 
that are excluded from patentability. Although patents over methods of medical 
treatment by therapy are permitted in the United States, patents over methods of 
medical treatment by surgery are unavailable and unenforceable, in New Zealand and 
the United States respectively. The possible effect of these exclusions on private 
incentives for development of socially valuable medical therapies will be discussed 
further in Chapter Three.  
 
In recognition of the adverse policy implications of patentability exclusions to 
methods of medical treatment on private incentives for medical research, there has 
been a development of judicial inroads that overcome these exclusions in New 
Zealand. This will be discussed in the next section.   
 
F Judicial Inroads into Exclusions of Methods of Medical Treatment 
 
Judicial commentators have noted how excluding patents over methods of medical 
treatment may disincentivise medical research.238 The following sections will discuss 
various exceptions that have developed to overcome the exclusions of methods of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
234 Statute of Monopolies 1623, s 6. The proviso reads: “so they be not contrary to the Law, nor 
mischievous to the State, by raising prices of commodities at home, or hurt of trade, or generally 
inconvenient.” See also Frankel, above n 9, at 405-407 and 409-412.   
235 Re Handleman’s Application PO P02/1993, 23 February 1993. See also Joos v Commissioner of 
Patents [1973] RPC 59. 
236 Ex Parte Scherer 103 USPQ (BNA) 107 (Pat Off Bd App 1954) at 109.  
237 35 USC S 287(c)(2)(A).  
238 See dicta of Jacob J in Merck & Co Inc’s Patents [2003] FSR 29 at [80]: ‘I conclude that the claim 
is in substance to a method of treatment of the human body by therapy. I do so with regret. For patents 
are provided to encourage research. If new and non-obvious improved methods of administration of 
known drugs for known diseases are not patentable in principle…there will be less of a research 
incentive to find such methods.’ 
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medical treatment from patentability, namely, ‘Swiss’ claims, novel dosage regimens, 
methods of administration, and patient groups.  
 
1 ‘Swiss’ claims  
 
Because methods of medical treatment per se are not patentable in most 
Commonwealth and European jurisdictions, a dilemma arose in respect of known 
compounds for treating a different or new disease. If a compound was known, it 
would be unpatentable for lack of novelty under the General Tyre test for anticipation. 
In addition, the ‘use’ of a known compound to treat a disease would be an 
unpatentable method of medical treatment.  
 
This dilemma was overcome in the landmark case, ESAI/Second medical 
indication G0005/83, when the Enlarged Board of Appeal of the European Patent 
Office (EPO) first allowed so-called ‘Swiss claims’.239 Swiss claims are directed to 
the ‘manufacture of a medicament’, a substance used for a particular treatment, which 
avoids a claim over the method of treatment itself.240 Such claims allow the patent 
holder to sue a pharmaceutical company that manufactures a drug for an infringing 
use, but preserves the exemption for the doctor or pharmacist who prescribes the drug 
for that use.241   
 
The patentability of ‘Swiss’ claims was upheld in New Zealand pursuant to the 
landmark decision of the Court of Appeal in Pharmaceutical Management Agency Ltd 
v Commissioner of Patents.242 There is a subtle difference between Swiss claims and 
second medical use claims,243 whereby the latter may be interpreted as having a 
slightly broader scope of coverage.244 Despite this, second medical use claims are 
deemed an unpatentable method of medical treatment in New Zealand.245 By contrast, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
239 ESAI/Second medical indication G 0005/83 [1985] OJ EPO 64. ‘Swiss claims’ originated from the 
practice of the Swiss Intellectual Property Office to allow claims over the use of a known compound 
‘in the manufacture of a medicament’ for a novel and inventive therapeutic use. The terms ‘Swiss 
claims’ and ‘Swiss-type’ claims are used interchangeably.  
240 An example of a Swiss claim format is as follows: ‘Use of [drug X] in the manufacture of a 
medicament for the treatment of [disease Y].’  
241 In any case, the difficulty with enforcing a patent against doctors or pharmacists is a characteristic 
of an unmonopolisable therapy, as will be discussed in Chapter Three.  
242 Pharmaceutical Management Agency Ltd v Commissioner of Patents [2000] 2 NZLR 529 
[PHARMAC].  
243 An example of a second medical use claim format is as follows: ‘Use of [drug X] for the treatment 
of [disease Y]’.  
244 See ESAI/Second medical indication, above n 238. Notably, the European Union has now approved 
second medical use claims pursuant to amendments to article 52(4) and article 53(c) under the EPC 
2000. The EPO will no longer accept claims in the ‘Swiss-type’ format: see ABBOTT 
RESPIRATORY/Dosage regime G 02/08 [2010] OJ EPO 456.   
245 See Pfizer Inc v The Commissioner of Patents [2005] 1 NZLR 362 at [7]. See also discussion of s 
16(2) Patents Act 2013, above n 229.  
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in the United States, under 35 USC § 100(b) specifically allows a patentable ‘process’ 
to include “a new use of a known process”.246 
 
2 Novel dosage regimen, methods of administration, and patient groups 
 
After a new drug is developed, it is often discovered that novel and inventive dosing 
regimen247 or methods of administering a drug248 have better outcomes for particular 
patient groups due to their unique genetic or physiological profile. This is an active 
area of research that falls within the promising field of ‘personalised medicine’. 
Claims over such innovations use the same language as Swiss claims. However, 
unlike Swiss claims, it is possible to claim a novel method of using the known drug 
for its original disease rather than a new disease.   
 
Despite the prohibition against patenting methods of medical treatment, these 
types of claims have been allowed in New Zealand. For example, in the IPONZ 
hearings Merck & Co v Arrow Pharmaceuticals249 and Genentech’s Application,250 
the Commissioner of Patents approved Swiss-type claims where novelty and 
inventiveness resided in a novel dosing regimen. The Commissioner has also allowed 
claims drafted in the Swiss-type format for treatment of a group of patients with early-
stage breast cancer with a drug that was originally used to treat patients with 
advanced-stage breast cancer.251 IPONZ have issued new guidelines supporting the 
patentability of such claims.252 However, commentators have questioned whether it is 
appropriate for IPONZ to make this determination rather than Parliament.253 It is also 
unclear how the courts will treat this issue in light of the specific exclusion of 
methods of medical treatment under s 16(2).  
 
The patentability of dosing regimens in the United States is also uncertain. 
While dosing regimens fall within the scope of method claims, such claims may be 
excluded as non-statutory abstract ideas, as already discussed above with reference to 
the Prometheus case.254  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
246 35 USC § 100(b). 
247 For example, dosing a medicine at particular time intervals and at particular concentrations.  
248 For example, administering a medicine to a patients via different routes, including intravenous, oral, 
vaporised, inhaled, topical, and sublingual.  
249 Merck & Co v Arrow Pharmaceuticals P3/2006.  
250 Genentech’s Application P1/2007.  
251  AstraZeneca AB’s Application 533106 P23/2007 and AstraZeneca AB’s Application 539603 
P24/2007.  
252 See IPONZ Guidelines 5.2 “Guidelines for the examination of Swiss-type claims” (8 December 
2012) <www.iponz.govt.nz>. 
253 S Frankel “Lord Cooke and Patents: The Scope of Invention” (2008) 39 VUWLR 73 at 94.  
254 See Prometheus, above n 50.  
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Further, as will also be discussed in the regulatory law section below and in 
Chapter Three, the commercial value of ‘Swiss’ claims and second medical use 
claims is doubtful. Generic drug companies can manufacture ‘off-patent’ or ‘generic’ 
drugs when the original patents expire, and are able to ‘carve out’ any patented 
second uses from their labels and sell them to the market, thereby avoiding claim of 
infringement.255 This is referred to as ‘skinny labeling’. Case law from various 
jurisdictions shows how difficult it is for innovator companies to prove infringement 
of such claims, as they must usually show that the generic manufacturers supplying 
the generic drugs to the market knew the drugs would be used in an infringing 
manner.256 An innovator drug company would also be unlikely to sue individual 
doctors or pharmacists who supply the generic drug for a patented use, as this would 
be uneconomic and impractical.257  
 
 Summary 
 
Despite the difficulties with obtaining and enforcing Swiss claims and second medical 
use claims, the fact that pharmaceutical companies are actively prosecuting such 
patents before the courts demonstrates that they must provide some incentives for 
drug development. However, there is a lack of evidence that the absence of such 
claims would have an adverse effect on incentives for research.258 Further, as will be 
discussed in Chapter Three, it is difficult or impossible to enforce such claims where a 
drug is available on the market for a non-infringing use.   
 
The previous sections have discussed the major patentability requirements and 
exclusions from patentability. While obtaining adequate patent protection is a critical 
step in the process of drug development, the requirement to obtain regulatory 
approval is much more onerous, and like a patent, has the ability to exclude 
competitors from the market for a certain period of time. This regulatory environment 
will now be discussed.  
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
255 See A Rai “Use Patents, Carve-Outs, and Incentives - A New Battle in the Drug-Patent Wars” 
(2012) 367(6)  New England Journal of Medicine 491 at 491.  
256 See Bristol-Myers Squibb v Shalala 91 F 3d 1493 (DC Cir 1996); Actavis v Merck [2008] RPC 26 at 
para [10]; Grimme Landmaschinenfabrik GmbH & Co KG v Derek Scott (trading as Scotts Potato 
Machinery) [2010] EWCA Civ 1110 at [131]; compare the decision of the High Court of Australia in 
Apotex Pty Ltd v Sanofi-Aventis Australia Pty Ltd v (No. 2) [2012] FCAFC 102 which found 
infringement of a method of medical use claim for a generic drug which was listed for use in a related 
indication to the patented use.  
257 Second uses of generic drugs fall within the category of ‘unmonopolisable therapies’, which will be 
discussed in Chapter Three.  
258 Frankel, n 9 above, at 412.   
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G Regulatory Environment  
 
Compared to other industries, the pharmaceutical industry has a complex and onerous 
regulatory environment, which requires pharmaceutical companies to undertake 
significant costs before launching a new product. An important consideration to note 
for the purpose of this thesis is that obtaining a patent and obtaining regulatory 
approval to market a drug are entirely separate events, with the former typically 
preceding the latter by five or more years.259  
 
The requirement to obtain regulatory approval has an important public health 
function. In particular, a medicine must be demonstrated as safe and effective in 
clinical trials before it can be marketed for sale.260 This section of the chapter will 
describe the process for obtaining regulatory approval of a drug from the New 
Zealand Medicines and Medical Devices Safety Authority (Medsafe) and the United 
States Food and Drug Administration (FDA).  
 
While the stringency of requirements differ between New Zealand and the 
United States - with the latter perceived as the most stringent in the world - both 
regulatory agencies require evidence of safety and efficacy from clinical trials in 
humans. These clinical trials are divided into Phase I, Phase II, and Phase III,261 with 
technical requirements having been standardised internationally pursuant to the 
International Conference on Harmonisation of Technical Requirements for 
Registration of Pharmaceuticals for Human Use.262  
 
Regulatory agencies separate medicines into two groups: small molecule drugs 
and biologics. The former are ‘standard’ drugs which are chemically synthesised, and 
usually taken in a pill form, and the latter are a new class of drugs, usually injected, 
which comprise proteins created through a biological process such as recombinant 
DNA technology.263 The main function of regulatory agencies is the oversight of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
259 JA DiMasi, RW Hansen and HG Grabowski “The price of innovation: new estimates of drug 
development costs” (2003) 22(2) Journal of Health Economics 151 at 164 and 166. The adverse 
consequence of this gap on private incentives to develop unpatentable therapies will be explored 
further in Chapter Three.  
260 By contrast, dietary supplements do not have to be proven as safe and effective before being sold on 
the market. The lack of regulatory oversight over supplements has consequences for private incentives 
to conduct clinical trials that will be discussed in Chapter Three. 
261 Phase I clinical trials administer the medicine on up to 100 volunteers in order to test the safety of 
the drug at various dosing levels. Phase II trials test therapeutic efficacy on between 100-300 patients. 
Phase III trials test safety and efficacy on 1000 or more patients. Medicines can fail at any stage of 
clinical trials, although Phase II is the most difficult hurdle, as will be discussed in Chapter Three.  
262  ICH Guidelines (International Conference on Harmonisation of Technical Requirements for 
Registration of Pharmaceuticals for Human Use, November 2005).   
263 Recombinant DNA technology involves genetically modifying bacteria to produce novel proteins, 
which are subsequently extracted and purified into a biologic drug.  
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small molecule drugs, biologics, and any other substances over which therapeutic 
claims are made and are sold to the public.264  
 
1 Generic competition 
 
Another important function of regulatory agencies is to facilitate entry of cheaper 
medicines when a drug goes ‘off-patent.’ As mentioned above, ‘off-patent’ drugs are 
also referred to as ‘generic drugs’. An innovator’s drugs which are still ‘on-patent’ are 
referred to as ‘branded drugs’.265 Generic drug manufacturers do not have to conduct 
the same Phase I-III clinical testing, but only have to prove their generic drug has an 
equivalent structure to a ‘branded’ drug.266 This means they can quickly and cheaply 
launch their generic drug on the market once the innovator’s patent protection expires. 
This is known as the ‘patent cliff’, because of the steep decline in the innovator’s 
profits due to generic entry after patent expiry.267 Generic drug companies also have 
specific defences to patent infringement that allow them to prepare to launch the drug 
prior to patent expiry.268  
 
Because they are more cost effective, generic drug prescriptions have grown to 
almost 80 per cent of total prescriptions in the United States by 2010.269 It is notable, 
however, that sales of expensive ‘branded’ medicines still comprised over 74 per cent 
of the total spending on pharmaceuticals during the same period.270 According to the 
Congressional Budget Office, generic competition saved the United States 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
264 As will be discussed in Chapter Three, any substances can be subject to regulatory oversight, 
including dietary supplements, if they are advertised as having a therapeutic effect, although certain 
specified health claims can be made.  
265 Notably, however, some highly profitable ‘branded’ drugs are off-patent, such as Aspirin, which is a 
brand name owned by Bayer, and has the generic name of acetylsalicylic acid. In the context of this 
thesis, ‘branded’ drugs will refer to patented drugs,  and ‘innovators’ will refer to biopharmaceutical 
companies which develop new patented drugs as part of their business model. This can be contrasted 
with generic drug companies whose business model involves relying on clinical trial data generated by 
innovators.  
266 As will be discussed below at n 303, it is cheaper to obtain generic approval for small molecule 
drugs as opposed to biologics, because the latter are manufactured according to biological processes 
that are difficult to replicate consistently without significant investment.  
267  B Hirschler “Drugmakers face $140 bln patent ‘cliff’ – report” (1 May 2007) Reuters  
<www.reuters.com>.  
268 In particular, it is a defence to patent infringement to manufacture a patented drug for the purpose of 
obtaining regulatory approval. These defenses are known as ‘Bolar exemptions’ after the decision of 
the United States Federal Circuit in Roche Products, Inc v Bolar Pharmaceutical Co 733 F 2d 858 (Fed 
Cir 1984). New Zealand has a similar exemption to infringement under s 145 of the Patents Act 2013, 
along with most other countries.  
269  The Use of Medicines in the United States: Review of 2010 (IMS Institute for Healthcare 
Informatics, April 2011) at 3.  
270 At 6. In particular, in 2010 the United States spent USD 229 billion on ‘branded’ drugs in 2010 out 
of total spending of USD 307 billion on medicines.  
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government USD 33 billion in 2007.271 Another report by the Generic Pharmaceutical 
Association estimated that generic drugs resulted in over USD 1 trillion in savings 
between the year 2002 and 2011.272 
 
Despite the social benefits of such cost savings, generic competition 
significantly reduces the ability of an innovator to profit from new ‘branded’ drugs. 
For this reason, regulatory agencies do not approve generic drugs for a minimum 
period, so that the innovator can use this ‘regulatory exclusivity’ to recoup their 
development costs. The importance of protecting the clinical trial data of innovators 
against “unfair” generic competition has been recognised in TRIPS.273 However, as 
will be discussed below, regulatory exclusivity is shorter and weaker than the 
protection provided by patents. In absence of such protection, it is unlikely that drug 
companies would develop new medicines, the consequences of which will be 
explored in Chapter Three.  
 
The process whereby regulatory agencies manage the regulatory approval of 
new medicines by innovators and provide regulatory exclusivity against generic 
competition will now be discussed with reference to New Zealand and the Unites 
States.  
 
2 Regulation of medicines by Medsafe  
 
In New Zealand, the regulation of medicines is overseen by Medsafe in accordance 
with the Medicines Act 1981 and Medicines Regulations 1984. In order to obtain 
regulatory approval, the innovator drug company must file a “new medicine 
application” with the Minister of Health or their delegate, and include clinical trial 
data that demonstrates quality, safety and efficacy of the new medicine.274 The 
Minister will refer this information to the Medicines Assessment Advisory Committee 
for a recommendation,275 and will not provide consent to regulatory approval under s 
20 of the Medicines Act 1981, unless “he or she is satisfied that the likely therapeutic 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
271 Effects of using generic drugs on Medicare’s prescription drug spending (Congressional Budget 
Office, September 2010) at 7.  
272 Generic Pharmaceutical Association “New Study finds Generic Prescription Drugs Saved 
Consumers and the US Health Care System $1 Trillion over Past Decade” (press release, 21 September 
2011). Similarly, in Europe, lower prices due to generic competition were estimated to save EUR 30 
billion per annum for small molecule drugs and EUR 1.4 billion per annum for biologics. See Vision 
2015: The EGA’s Thoughts on how to Improve the Legal and Regulatory Framework for Generic and 
Biosimilar Medicines (European Generic Medicines Association, October 2010) at 3.  
273 TRIPS, art 39.3 provides for protection of clinical trial data submitted to obtain regulatory approval 
against ‘unfair commercial use’.  
274 Medicines Act 1981, s 21(1)-(2). See also New Zealand Regulatory Guidelines for Medicines - Part 
B (Edn 6.15, Medsafe, November 2011) at 3.   
275 s 22(2).  
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value of the medicine outweighs the risk”.276 The approval process is similar for small 
molecule and biologic drugs.277 
 
New Zealand currently provides five years of ‘data exclusivity’ for clinical 
trial data submitted in an innovative medicine application which have achieved 
regulatory approval.278 Data exclusivity means that generic drug companies cannot 
rely on an innovator’s clinical trial data in order to obtain regulatory approval for their 
generic drug. New Zealand does not provide additional data exclusivity for new 
indications or formulations of approved medicines, unlike the FDA.  This will be 
discussed in more detail in the next section. 
 
After expiry of patent protection and data exclusivity, generic drugs can obtain 
regulatory approval if they can demonstrate ‘bioequivalence’ with the New Zealand 
Reference Product, which is normally the innovator’s ‘branded’ drug.279  
 
The Medicines Act 1981 also permits the ‘off-label’ use of medicines by 
doctors.280 An off-label use of a medicine means that it has been prescribed to treat a 
disease for which it has not received regulatory approval.281 Off-label use is relatively 
widespread in the medical profession, with New Zealand hospitals prescribing 
medicines off-label in up to 40% of adult and 90% of paediatric patients.282 Potential 
competition through off-label use is relevant to the lack of private incentives to 
develop new uses for generic drugs, an issue which will be discussed further in 
Chapter Three.  
 
3 Regulation of medicines by the FDA  
 
The process of obtaining regulatory approval for a new drug in the United States is 
overseen by the FDA. Once Phase I-III clinical trials are performed, the innovator will 
file a New Drug Application to seek approval for a small molecule drug283 or a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
276 Medicines Act 1981, s 20A.  
277 New Zealand Regulatory Guidelines for Medicine – Part B, at 3.  
278 Medicines Act 1981, s 23B.  
279 New Zealand Regulatory Guidelines for Medicines - Part D (ed 6.15, Medsafe, November 2011) at 
11.  
280 Medicines Act 1981, s 25. See also “Regulatory Issues - Use of Unapproved Medicines and 
Unapproved uses of Medicines” (April 2012) Medsafe <www.medsafe.govt.nz>.  
280 Medicines Act 1981, s 25(1)(b).  
281 An example would be the use of a painkiller drug for treating depression when it only has regulatory 
approval to treat pain. 
282 R Newson “Take care when prescribing unapproved and off-label medicines” Pharmacy Today 
(online ed, Auckland, 18 October 2012).  
283 Federal Food Drug and Cosmetics Act, s 505(b).  
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Biologic License Application to seek approval for a biologic drug.284 These different 
approval pathways will be discussed in turn.  
 
(a) New Drug Application (NDA)  
 
In order for an NDA for a small molecule drug to be approved, the sponsor must 
submit “full reports of investigations which have been made to show whether or not 
such drug is safe for use and whether such drug is effective in use”. 285  The 
Abbreviated New Drug Application (ANDA) generic approval process was enacted 
pursuant to the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984 
(Hatch-Waxman Act).286 The purpose of the Hatch-Waxman Act was to facilitate 
generic competition while balancing the rights of innovators by providing minimum 
periods of data exclusivity.287 In particular, under the Hatch-Waxman Act, for a small 
molecule drug that is deemed a New Chemical Entity (NCE), it is not possible to 
submit an ANDA until five years from the date of regulatory approval.288 An NCE is 
a drug with an active ingredient that has not previously received regulatory approval. 
For modifications or new uses of a previously approved NCE, the Hatch-Waxman Act 
also provides three years data exclusivity.289 
 
In order for a generic drug company to obtain regulatory approval it only need 
show that its drug is “bioequivalent” to the innovator’s drug, the latter referred to as 
the Reference Listed Drug (RLD), without the generic company having to provide 
data from human clinical trials. 290  Bioequivalent drugs are provided an ‘A’ 
therapeutic equivalence code, which means they may be automatically substituted for 
the RLD under state reimbursement schemes or substitution laws.291 As will be 
discussed in Chapter Three, automatic substitution of a branded drug with a cheaper 
generic is also relevant to the lack of private incentives to develop new uses for 
generic drugs.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
284 Public Health Service Act, s 351.  
285 21 USC § 355(b)(1)(A). 
286 Federal Food Drug and Cosmetics Act, s 505(j)(2). 
287 21 USC § 355(c)(3)(E). See also AB Mehl “The Hatch-Waxman Act and Market Exclusivity for 
Generic Drug Manufacturers: an entitlement or an incentive?” (2006) 81 Chicago-Kent Law Review 
649 at 653-654.  
288  Federal Food Drug and Cosmetics Act, ss 505(c)(3)(D)(ii) and (j)(5)(D)(ii); 21 USC § 
355(c)(3)(D)(ii) and (j)(5)(D)(ii).  
289 21 CFR § 314.108(a). Allowable modifications include new or amended formulations, indications, 
dosing regimens, patient populations, salts, or other label changes. 
290 21 CFR § 320.1(e).  In particular, bioequivalence of a generic drug must be between 80% and 125% 
of the innovator’s reference listed drug, having regard to its pharmacokinetic properties. See Approved 
Drug Products with Therapeutic Equivalence Evaluations (“Orange Book”) (34th ed, Food and Drug 
Administration, 16 May 2014) at Preface.  
291 See HG Grabowski and JM Vernon “Substitution Laws and Innovation in the Pharmaceutical 
Industry” (1979) Law and Contemporary Problems 43 at 49.  
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Notably, these data exclusivity provisions do not prevent a generic drug 
company from generating their own clinical data to file an NDA or ANDA during the 
exclusivity period. In practice, however, a generic drug company is unlikely to do this 
because the expense would negate their competitive advantage, although they may be 
willing to do so for a highly lucrative drug.  
 
Generic drug companies are also prevented from filing an ANDA until expiry 
of any patents which may cover the RLD. These patents along with their relevant 
RLDs are listed in an FDA publication: the Approved Drug Products with Therapeutic 
Equivalence Evaluations (‘Orange Book’). 292  Therefore, in the United States, 
approval of generic small molecule drugs is linked to patent expiry.293  
 
In particular, a generic drug company that wishes to apply for an ANDA 
before patent expiry can file a so-called ‘paragaraph IV’ certification within 4 years of 
the NDA, alleging that the generic will not infringe any valid patent covering the 
RLD.294 If the innovator’s patent is invalidated, the generic company will gain a 180-
day period of exclusivity,295 which provides a strong incentive for generic companies 
to challenge an innovator’s weak patents. However, provided that the patent owner 
files a patent infringement lawsuit within 45 days of the generic’s paragraph IV 
certification, the approval of the ANDA will be delayed for 30 months, unless the 
Court determines that the patent is either invalid or not infringed at an earlier date.  
This 30-month delay of ANDA approval means that the innovator company gets an 
effective exclusivity period of up to 7.5 years. 296  Notably, until reforms were 
implemented in 2003 which abolished the practice, innovator companies could list 
new patents on the Orange Book which they alleged covered their drugs in order to 
obtain multiple 30-month delays.297  
 
Another important point is that where an innovator company only has patent 
protection covering a second use or indication of a medicine, and the patent over the 
original use of the drug has expired, a generic company may file a so-called ‘section 
viii’ statement under the ANDA procedure to approve a ‘skinny labeled’ version of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
292 21 CFR § 314.53.  
293 These are referred to as ‘patent linkage’ provisions.  
294 21 USC § 355(j)(2).  
295 Federal Food Drug and Cosmetics Act §  505(j)(5)(B)(iv). 
296 21 USC § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii).  
297 See 21 USC § 355 (j)(2) and (5), as amended pursuant to the Medicare Prescription Drug 
Improvement and Modernisation Act 2003. See also Generic Drug Entry Prior to Patent Expiration: 
An FTC Study (Federal Trade Commission, 2002) at 40. This practice is referred to as ‘linkage 
evergreening’. See TA Faunce and J Lexchin “‘Linkage’ pharmaceutical evergreening in Canada and 
Australia” (2007) 4(1) Australia and New Zealand Health Policy 8 at 8. 
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the generic drug that ‘carves out’ the protected use.298 However, this does not allow 
the generic company to benefit from the 180-day period of exclusivity. It will be 
argued in Chapter Three that such ‘skinny labeling’ also reduces incentives for 
finding new uses for drugs once initial patent protection has expired, particularly as 
the FDA does not restrict ‘off-label’ prescription by doctors,299 who are also unlikely 
to be sued for infringement by the innovator.   
 
(b) Biologic License Application (BLA) 
 
Obtaining regulatory approval for a biologic drug requires a BLA, which is regulated 
by section 351(k) of the Public Health Service Act. As with the NDA approval 
process, a BLA also requires submission of full clinical trial data demonstrating safety 
and efficacy of the biologic drug for treating a particular disease.300   
 
There was no generic approval process for biologics in the Unites States until 
the enactment of the Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act of 2009 
(‘BPCI’) as part of Title VII of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act.301 The 
BPCI created an abbreviated pathway for generic approval of ‘biosimilar’ generics,302 
which allows at least partial reliance on the safety and efficacy data of the innovator’s 
“reference brand product” after the expiry of a 12-year period of data exclusivity for 
the innovator.303   
 
Unlike small molecule drugs, due to the inherent variability of biologics, the 
establishment of ‘biosimilarity’ requires evidence from clinical studies. 304 
Accordingly, biosimilar approval is much more expensive than small molecule 
generic drugs, which reduces the likelihood of biosimilar competition upon patent 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
298 21 USC § 355(j)(2)(A)(viii); 21 CFR § 314.94(a)(12)(iii)(A). 
299 Federal Trade Commission v Simeon Mgmt Corp 391 F Supp 697 (ND Cal 1975) at 706-707.  
300 21 CFR § 601.2(a).  
301 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Title VII.  
302 Section 351 of the Public Health Service Act defines a ‘biosimilar’ or ‘biosimilarity’ to mean that 
‘the biological product is highly similar to the reference product notwithstanding minor differences in 
clinically inactive components,’ and that ‘there are no clinically meaningful differences between the 
biological product and the reference product in terms of the safety, purity, and potency of the product.’ 
303 42 USC § 262(k)(7)(A).  
304 42 USC § 262(k)(2)(A)(i).  
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expiry.305  Notably, at the date of writing, no biosimilars have been approved in the 
United States under the BPCI.306 
 
If a biosimilar can be deemed ‘interchangeable’, this means that it can be 
substituted with the innovator’s biologic drug without any change in clinical result.307 
This is a higher standard than ‘biosimilarity’, therefore, interchangeable biologics are 
granted one year of exclusivity or an increased exclusivity period (18 months or 42 
months) if the applicant is sued for patent infringement and the action is dismissed.308 
 
Under the BPCI provisions, a drug company may file an application to market 
a biosimilar version of the innovator’s biologic within four years of regulatory 
approval.309 This triggers a formal negotiation and dispute resolution process which is 
mandated before initiating patent litigation.310 The aim of these provisions is to clarify 
and resolve any patent related disputes by the time the 12-years data exclusivity 
period has expired.311 
 
The BPCI also includes an ‘anti-evergreening’ provision which provides that 
an additional 12-years of data exclusivity is not available for a “new indication, route 
of administration, dosing schedule, dosage form, delivery system, delivery device, or 
strength”, or new structural modifications that do not “result in a change in safety, 
purity, or potency”.312 This helps reduce opportunities for gaming by innovators, who 
may otherwise obtain a new 12-year period of data protection by making minor 
modifications to their biologic drug.313  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
305 In particular, seeking regulatory approval for a generic small molecule drugs costs approximately 
USD 2 million while biosimilar approval is estimated to cost USD 100-150 million due to the need for 
specialised equipment: see “Big generic pharma” The Economist (online ed, New York, 28 July 2005); 
L Burger “Battle over Biosimilar Drugs is Only for the Brave” (2 July 2010) Reuters 
<www.uk.reuters.com>; Roin, above n 100 at 511.  
306 However, Novartis recently filed the first Biologic License Application at the FDA: see D Garde  
“FDA opens the door for a Novartis biosimilar of Amgen's Neupogen” (24 July 2014) Fierce Biotech 
<www.fiercebiotech.com>. Further, sixteen biosimilars have been approved in Europe and four 
biologics have been approved in the United States under the previous ‘generic’ pathway: see EA 
Blackstone and JP Fuhr “Innovation and Competition: Will Biosimilars Succeed?” (2012) 9(1) 
Biotechnology Healthcare 24 at 24.  
307 42 USC § 262(k)(4).  
308 42 USC § 262(k)(6). 
309 42 USC § 262(k)(7)(B). 
310 42 USC § 262(l). 
311 H Grabowski, G Long and R Mortimer “Implementation of the Biosimilar Pathway: Economic and 
Policy Issues” (2011) 41 Seton Hall Law Review 511 at 554.  
312 42 USC § 262(k)(7)(C).  
313 As will be discussed in Chapter Five, it is important that optimal incentive mechanisms reduce such 
opportunities for gaming.  
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H Conclusion 
 
As has been demonstrated in this chapter, there are significant hurdles to obtain patent 
protection and regulatory approval for a new medicine. New Zealand and the United 
States provide for periods of data exclusivity to incentivise drug companies to 
overcome these regulatory hurdles, however, data exclusivity is weaker than patent 
protection as it does not prevent competitors from conducting their own clinical trials 
and it is shorter in length, particularly for small molecule drugs.  
 
In the next chapter it will be argued that the pharmaceutical industry relies 
primarily on patent protection to recover the high costs of drug development, and will 
discuss the significant problems with such reliance.  
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III The Problem with the Pharmaceutical Industry’s Reliance on 
Patents  	  
A Introduction 
 
Chapter Three will analyse whether reliance on the patent system by the 
pharmaceutical industry, as currently designed, causes a lack of private incentives to 
develop certain categories of socially valuable medical therapies. First, it will be 
argued that the high costs and high risks of drug development cause pharmaceutical 
companies to screen out ‘unpatentable therapies’ with insufficient patent protection. 
Second, the impact of five ‘unpatentability factors’ on the risk of creating an 
unpatentable therapy will be considered, namely: (1) lack of novelty, (2) lack of 
inventive step, (3) lack of utility/sufficiency, (4) insufficient patent length, and (5) 
unpatentability under law. Third, it will be considered whether so-called ‘patent 
evergreening’ strategies can be used successfully by pharmaceutical companies to 
‘regain’ patentability over an unpatentable therapy. Fourth, the chapter will provide 
evidence of ‘unmonopolisable therapies’, which lack private incentives for 
development because market exclusivity cannot be practically enforced. Fifth, a 
catch-all category of ‘unprofitable therapies’ that lack a profitable market will be 
discussed.  Finally, the chapter will outline several other problems with the current 
patent system in the context of the pharmaceutical industry.  
 
B Deadly Gaps in the Patent System  
 
It is widely-recognised that the patent system plays an essential role in motivating 
drug development.1 Accordingly, the pharmaceutical industry has been described as 
the ‘poster child’ for a strong patent system,2 with each new small molecule and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 See PW Grubb and PR Thomsen Patents for Chemicals, Pharmaceuticals, and Biotechnology: 
Fundamentals of Global Law (5th ed, Oxford University Press, New York, 2010) at 426; BN Roin 
“Unpatentable drugs and the standards of patentability” (2009) 87 Tex L Rev 503 at 504; RS Eisenberg 
“The Problem of New Uses” (2005) 5 Yale J Health Policy L & Ethics 717 at 721; H Grabowski 
“Patents, Innovation and Access to New Pharmaceuticals” (2002) 5(4) J Int Economic Law 849 at 850.  
2 LL Ouellette “How Many Patents Does It Take To Make a Drug? Follow-On Pharmaceutical Patents 
and University Licensing” (2010) 17 Mich Telecomm Tech L Rev 299 at 300 citing WM Landes and 
RA Posner The Economic Structure of Intellectual Property Law (Harvard University Press, 
Cambridge (Mass), 2009) at 316; S Basheer “The Invention of an Investment Incentive for 
Pharmaceutical Innovation” (2012) 15(5-6) The Journal of World Intellectual Property 305 at 305; J 
Bessen and MJ Meurer Patent failure: How judges, bureaucrats, and lawyers put innovators at risk 
(Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2008) at 27; compare generally, M Boldrin and DK Levine 
Against Intellectual Monopoly (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2008) at Chapter 9.  
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biologic drug brought to market protected by several patents on average. 3 
Pharmaceutical companies rely on patents so they can recover their development 
costs. However, the consequences of this may be severe; pharmaceutical companies 
will screen out medicines which they consider to have insufficient patent protection or 
commercial viability irrespective of whether they might have been lifesaving 
treatments or even cures.  
 
The next sections will discuss how the high costs and risks of drug 
development combined with the low marginal costs of production encourage the 
screening of ‘unpatentable therapies’ by pharmaceutical companies.  
 
1 High Costs of Drug Development 	  
Various studies have supported the fact that the costs of developing new medicines 
are extremely high. One of the most oft-cited is a 2003 study by DiMasi, Hansen and 
Grabowski,4 which estimated the cost of developing a new small molecule drug5 at 
USD 802 million. A subsequent 2007 study by DiMasi and Grabowski6 estimated 
costs of USD 1.241 billion to develop a new biologic drug7 versus USD 1.318 billion 
for a new small molecule drug. Notably, however, approximately half of these 
estimates relate to costs of obtaining long-term finance8 over a nine to 12 year average 
development time.9 For example, excluding the costs of obtaining long-term finance 
provides an out-of-pocket expense estimate of USD 559 million per biologic drug and 
USD 672 million per small molecule drug.10 These estimates also factor in the cost of 
failed drugs.11 The majority of development costs are spent on clinical trials,12 rather 
than pre-clinical studies.13  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Ouellette, above, at 300. A notable exception is paclitaxel (brand name Taxol), an anti-cancer drug 
developed mostly from public funds without patent protection. However, the innovator company relied 
on 5-year data exclusivity in the FDA, subsequently filed patents, and controversial settlements with 
generic drug companies in order to prevent competition: see K Garber “Battle Over Generic Taxol 
Concludes, But Controversy Continues” (2002) 94(5) J Natl Cancer Inst 324 at 324.  
4 JA DiMasi, RW Hansen and HG Grabowski “The price of innovation: new estimates of drug 
development costs” (2003) 22(2) Journal of Health Economics 151 at 151.  
5 As discussed in Chapter Two under Regulatory Environment, small molecule drugs are ‘standard’ 
pharmaceutical drugs, which are chemically synthesised.  
6 JA DiMasi, HG Grabowski “The Cost of Biopharmaceutical R&D: Is Biotech Different?” (2007) 28 
Manage Decis Econ 469 at 475.   
7 As discussed in Chapter Two under Regulatory Environment, biologic drugs are newer drugs based 
on proteins, which manufactured from genetically modified cells using recombinant DNA technology.  
8 This is referred to as the ‘cost-of-capital’, which is the opportunity cost of not investing in other areas 
for the period that a medicine is in development. DiMasi used a relatively conservative ‘cost of capital’ 
figure of 11 per cent: see Dimasi, Hansen and Grabowski, above n 4, at 164.  
9 M Dickson and JP Gagnon “The cost of new drug discovery and development” (2009) 4(22) 
Discovery Medicine 172 at 172.  
10 At 469.  
11 DiMasi and Grabowski, above n 6, at 470.  
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Other commentators have supported these high cost estimates,14 which are 
often cited by the pharmaceutical industry to justify the multi-billion dollar revenues 
earned from so-called ‘blockbuster’ drugs.15 However, the estimates have also been 
strongly criticised by various commentators, mainly because of alleged conflicts of 
interest due to the studies being partially funded by the industry and because 
pharmaceutical companies have not released their actual development costs for public 
auditing.16  For example, an opposing study by Light and Warburton estimated 
expenditure at a median cost of USD 43 million to develop a new drug.17 It is 
arguable, however, that the Light estimates are misleading because they do not take 
into account the cost of finance and failed drugs. Despite valid points made on both 
sides, in the absence of publicly audited data on drug development expenditure, it is 
unlikely that any study can be relied on as a “gold standard”.18  
 
Nevertheless, determining the precise development cost per new drug is not 
required to support the central argument of this thesis. As long as an innovator’s 
initial development costs are significantly greater than the ‘reverse engineering’ costs 
of achieving regulatory approval for a generic small molecule drug19 or biosimilar 
biologic,20 it will be uneconomic for an innovator to develop new medical therapies, 
without means of recovering their costs using a patent or some alternative incentive 
mechanism.  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Clinical studies refer to the Phase I-III human studies required for regulatory approval of a new 
medicine, as discussed in Chapter Two under Regulatory Environment.  
13 See DiMasi and Grabowski, above n 6 at 476, Figures 3 and 4. Pre-clinical studies are studies 
performed before clinical trials, such as animal testing and ‘high-throughput screening’ that are used to 
determine which molecules are the best drug candidates and optimise them.  
14 SM Paul and others “How to improve R&D productivity: the pharmaceutical industry's grand 
challenge” (2010) 9 Nature Reviews Drug Discovery 203; see also CP Adams and VV Brantner 
“Estimating The Cost Of New Drug Development: Is It Really $802 Million?” (2006) 25(2) Health 
Affairs 420; M Herper “The Truly Staggering Cost Of Inventing New Drugs” Forbes (online ed, 10 
February 2012).  
15 A ‘blockbuster’ drug is a term used by the pharmaceutical industry to refer to a drug that earns more 
than USD 1 billion per annum in sales.  
16 See DW Light and RWarburton “Demythologizing the high costs of pharmaceutical research” (2011) 
6(1) BioSocieties 34 at 34; Rx R&D Myths: The Case Against the Drug Industry’s R&D ‘Scare Card’ 
(Public Citizen, Washington DC, 2001); M Goozner The $800 Million Pill: The Truth Behind the Cost 
of New Drugs (University of California Press, Berkeley, 2004); R Collier “Drug development cost 
estimates hard to swallow” (2009) 180(3) CMAJ 279;  
17 Light and Warburton, at 47.  
18 S Morgan and others “The cost of drug development: A systematic review” (2011) 100(1) Health 
Policy 4 at 4.   
19 As noted in Chapter Two, achieving regulatory approval for a generic drug is estimated at a few 
million dollars: see “Big generic pharma” The Economist (online ed, New York, July 28, 2005); see 
also Roin, above n 1, at 511. 
20 As noted in Chapter Two, it can cost between USD 100-150 million to develop a ‘biosimilar’ drug: 
see L Burger “Battle over Biosimilar Drugs is Only for the Brave” (2 July 2010) Reuters 
<www.uk.reuters.com>.  
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It is also notable that due to increasing costs under the current system, the 
pharmaceutical industry is facing a productivity crisis. A report by the United States 
Government Accountability Office (GAO) highlighted an overall decline of FDA 
submissions for new drugs since 1995, despite that fact that inflation-adjusted 
research and development (R&D) costs have increased by 147 per cent between 1993 
and 2004.21 Another study by Scannell estimated that the number of new drugs 
developed per USD 1 billion spent on R&D is halving every 9 years.22 Various 
commentators have recognised this decline in productivity as a threat to the 
sustainability of the pharmaceutical industry as a whole.23  
 
2 High Risks of Drug Development 	  
 As discussed above, the estimated costs of developing a new drug take into account 
the drugs that failed to achieve regulatory approval. It is practically impossible to 
predict whether a new drug will be safe and effective in advance of expensive clinical 
trials. Therefore, regulatory hurdles, while arguably serving to protect the public from 
potentially dangerous drugs, significantly increase the financial risks of undertaking 
drug development.  
 
According to a 2010 study by DiMasi, success rates for drugs which entered 
clinical trials between 1993 and 2009 were at 13 per cent for small molecule drug 
versus 32 per cent for biologics, with a success rate of 19 per cent overall.24 Amongst 
disease types, cancer drugs have the lowest chance of approval at 11 per cent.25  
 
 
 
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 New Drug Development: Business, Regulatory, and Intellectual Property Issues Cited as Hampering 
Drug Development Efforts (Government Accountability Office, November 2006) at 4.  
22 See JW Scannell and others “Diagnosing the decline in pharmaceutical R&D efficiency” (2012) 
11(3) Nature Reviews Drug Discovery 191 at 191, Figure 1. This steady decline in productivity of 
pharmaceutical R&D has been coined ‘Eroom’s Law’, which is an anadrome of the more familiar 
‘Moore’s Law’, the latter being the observation that the processing speed of computer circuits is 
doubling approximately every two years. 
23 Paul and others, above n 14, at 203; F Pammolli, L Magazzini and M Riccaboni “The productivity 
crisis in pharmaceutical R&D” (2011) 10(6) Nature Reviews Drug Discovery 428 at 428; Grubb and 
Thomsen, above n 1, at 425; but see EF Schmid and DA Smith “Keynote review: Is declining 
innovation in the pharmaceutical industry a myth?” (2005) 10(15) Drug Discov Today 1031 at 1031. 
24 JA DiMasi and others “Trends in risks associated with new drug development: success rates for 
investigational drugs” (2010) 87(3) Clin Pharmacol Ther 272 at 272.  
25 M Hay and others “BIO / BioMedTracker Clinical Trial Success Rates Study” (paper presented to 
BIO CEO & Investor Conference, New York, 15 February 2011) at 7.  
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Figure 1: R&D model showing costs (in millions) to successfully develop and launch a single new 
molecular entity at each phase in pre-clinical and clinical development26 
 
 
Figure 1 is a useful illustration of the ‘attrition rate’27  and expenditure 
requirements at each stage of drug development, from pre-clinical (brown) to Phase I-
III clinical trials (blue). According to Paul and others, of approximately 24 drug 
candidates28  that generate a ‘hit’ on the drug target in the pre-clinical phase,29 just 
over 8 are tested in humans at Phase I,30 and only one passes Phase III to achieve 
regulatory approval. The most difficult hurdle for drug approvals is Phase II which 
has only a 34 per cent chance of success, compared to 54 per cent for Phase I and 70 
per cent for Phase III.31 Notably, while Phase III trials have the greatest chance of 
success, the financial consequences of failure at this stage are the most severe, often 
causing hundreds of millions of dollars in losses.32 Many clinical trials are also 
abandoned due to “strategic reasons”, unrelated to a drug’s safety or efficacy.33  
 
In addition to the risk of failure, there is a significant risk that the drug will not 
achieve commercial success after regulatory approval. For example, according to a 
2002 study by Grabowski, Vernon, and DiMasi, only a third of drugs launched 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 Paul and others, above n 14, Figure 2. Costs are in USD.  
27 See Figure 1: the ‘attrition rate’ is expressed as a percentage next to the symbol  p(TS), which shows 
the percentage chance that a particular drug candidate will pass into the next development phase.  
28 Referred to as ‘Work-in-process’ or ‘WIP’ in Figure 1 above.  
29 In the context of drug development, a ‘hit’ refers to a compound that increases or decreases the 
activity of a therapeutically relevant protein target.   
30 See Paul, above n 14, Figure 2.  
31 At Figure 2. Other studies have shown even lower rates of success for Phase II trials: see J 
Arrowsmith “Trial watch: Phase II failures: 2008-2010” (2011) 10 Nat Rev Drug Discov 328 at 328, 
showing that Phase II success rates dropped from 28 per cent in 2006-2007 to 18 per cent in 2008-
2009.  
32 For example, Pfizer’s cholesterol drug torcetrapib failed in Phase III after USD 800 million was 
spent on development: see M Martino, LJ Hollis and E Teichert “Torcetrapib - Pharma's Biggest 
Flops” (18 October 2010) Fierce Pharma <www.fiercepharma.com>. 
33 Arrowsmith, above n 31, at 328. As will be discussed below, this may be indirect evidence of late-
stage patentability screening. 
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between 1990 and 1994 matched or exceeded their USD 500 million average R&D 
costs.34 Notably, however, the highest earning ‘blockbuster’ drugs earned over 5 times 
the R&D cost on average.35 This finding suggests that the pharmaceutical industry 
relies on ‘blockbuster’ drugs36 to compensate for failed or commercially unsuccessful 
drugs.  
 
Summary 	  
The high costs and risks of drug development combined with the relatively low 
marginal costs of production means that patents - or some form of exclusivity or 
alternative incentive mechanisms - are the sine qua non for incentivising 
pharmaceutical R&D.37 As a result, it is arguable that pharmaceutical companies will 
screen out potentially socially valuable therapies with insufficient patent protection 
irrespective of medical value or social need.  
 
3  ‘Patentability screening’ of socially valuable therapies  	  
The ability to guarantee market exclusivity using patents is less critical in industries 
outside the pharmaceutical industry. For example, other industries are not required to 
conduct expensive clinical trials before market entry.38 Other industries also tend to 
rely on a ‘first-mover’ advantage, because of the ease in which competitors can design 
around patents.39   
 
By contrast, as discussed in Chapter Two, innovators in the pharmaceutical 
industry rely on monopoly rights to recover the costs of obtaining regulatory 
approval, with generic competitors being prevented from entering the market until the 
patent over the drug is invalidated or expires, subject to any applicable ‘regulatory 
exclusivity’. Consequently, innovators will routinely screen medicines for 
patentability at all stages of drug development. For example, according to industry 
sources, such ‘patentability screening’ occurs at least twice during pre-clinical trials, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 H Grabowski, J Vernon and J DiMasi “Returns on Research and Development for 1990s New Drug 
Introductions” (2002) 20 Pharmacoeconomics 11 at 17-18.  
35 At 17-18.  
36 See above n 15.  
37 AJ Devlin “Systemic Bias in Patent Law” (2012) 61 DePaul Law Review 57 at 57, 59.  
38 For example, a new software or electronic product can be put on the market without having to spend 
hundreds of millions of dollars to obtain regulatory approval.  
39 MB Lieberman and DB Montgomery “First-­‐mover advantages” (1988) 9 Strategic Management 
Journal 41 at 43. 
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and once again as a “gate-keeping event” before significant funds are committed 
towards Phase I clinical trials.40  
 
Roin summarised this previously uncharacterised phenomenon in his 2009 
article, “Unpatentable Drugs and the Standards of Patentability”: 41 
 
Despite the seemingly great magnitude of this injury, [the screening of 
socially valuable unpatentable drugs] has gone largely unnoticed by the 
public because of the early stage at which most un-patentable drugs are 
screened out of development. Pharmaceutical companies do not announce 
the drug candidates that they choose not to develop, including the ones 
dropped on account of a prior disclosure that undermined their patent 
protection. While industry insiders acknowledge that many such drugs 
exist, the decisions to discard them are made behind closed doors. 
 
Unfortunately, the high level of secrecy in the industry has made it difficult or 
impossible to empirically verify these claims.42 Nevertheless, even if the proportion of 
therapies screened or abandoned due to patentability issues is relatively low, it 
represents a lost opportunity, given the above-mentioned decline in productivity 
levels for pharmaceutical R&D,43 and the fact the therapeutic value of a drug is 
mostly irrelevant to patentability.44  
 
Given that up to 90 per cent of clinical trials are funded by the for-profit 
pharmaceutical industry,45 it is arguable that an inefficient private funding bias exists 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 Roin, above n 1, at 546-547. Patentability screening would typically involve a ‘prior art search’ in 
the academic literature, the Chemical Abstracts Registry, and previous patent applications by a 
pharmaceutical company’s in-house legal counsel or external patent attorney. A ‘freedom-to-operate’ 
search will also be performed to determine whether a drug candidate is subject to an in-force patent 
held by a competitor. In both circumstances, an unfavourable report would mean that a drug candidate 
would be likely to be screened irrespective of potential or actual therapeutic efficacy.  
41 At 552.  
42 The author attempted to obtain empirical data on this issue by sending out over 200 targeted emails 
to researchers, patent attorneys, and pharmaceutical industry executives requesting participation in an 
anonymous survey on the level of patentability screening which occurs, however, unfortunately, only 
one response was received. The author had also made a separate online appeal for participants, to no 
avail: see S Barazza “Dormant and unmonopolisable therapies: can you help: Part One/Part Two” (6 
June 2013) The IPKat <www.ipkitten.blogspot.com>. Human Ethics Committee approval and related 
documentation has been attached to this thesis as Appendix One.  
43 See BN Roin “Solving the Problem of New Uses” (1 October 2013) Social Science Research 
Network <www.ssrn.com> at 50.  
44 For example, as discussed in Chapter Two under Criteria for Patentability of Medical Therapies, only 
the utility criterion requires some nominal evidence of potential clinical benefit, whereas the potential 
or actual clinical benefit of a drug is not relevant to the tests for novelty or inventive step.  
45 O Vragovic “Developing Budgets for Research Projects with a Focus on Phase III Clinical Trials” 
(seminar presented at OCR Seminar Series Presentations: Boston University Medical Campus, Boston, 
17 June 2009) at 5. For example, the largest public funders of clinical research in the United States 
(National Institutes of Health, Department of Defense, and the Department of Veterans Affairs) have 
an annual spend of approximately USD 2.9 billion on clinical trials versus USD 26 billion by the 
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towards ‘highly excludable’ therapies where a monopoly price can be enforced using 
patents, and an underfunding of other categories of therapies that could be of 
significantly greater social value.46   
 
 Summary 
 
Due to the high costs and risks of drug development, it is alleged that the 
pharmaceutical industry will regularly screen promising medical therapies due to 
insufficient patent protection. Evidence of this ‘patentability screening’ is difficult to 
observe due to the high level of secrecy in the industry and the fact that such therapies 
are typically screened at the pre-clinical stage of development. The consequences of 
this screening on public health could be severe, as will be demonstrated further below.  
 
The next section will analyse such ‘unpatentable therapies’, and how they are created 
as a result of the presence of five ‘unpatentability factors,’ namely: (1) lack of 
novelty, (2) lack of inventive step, (3) lack of utility/sufficiency, (4) insufficient 
patent length, and (5) unpatentability under law.  
 
C The impact of ‘Unpatentability Factors’ on the Problem of ‘Unpatentable 
Therapies’  
 
In this section, it will be argued that due to the impact of certain ‘unpatentability 
factors’, otherwise viable medicines can become ‘unpatentable therapies’ that lack 
private incentives for development. The following analysis will focus on examples 
from the United States, because entry into the United States market is essential for the 
overall commercial viability of a medicine. 47  Accordingly, the presence of 
unpatentability factors in the United States will significantly increase the likelihood 
that a medicine will be screened during development, regardless of where an 
innovator company is located.  
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
private industry. See also T Bodenheimer  “Uneasy alliance: Clinical investigators and the 
pharmaceutical industry” (2000) 342 New England Journal of Medicine 1539 at 1539 which quotes the 
figure at 70 per cent private funding of clinical trials; See also Roin, above n 43, at 25.  
46 A Kapczynski and T Syed “The Continuum of Excludability and the Limits of Patents” (2013) 
122(7) Yale Law Journal 1900 at 1942. 
47 T Bartfai and GV Lees Drug Discovery from Bedside to Wall Street (Elsevier, Burlington, 2006) at 
138: ‘…unless the American marketing arm of a multinational company says: ‘It will be marketed in 
the States,’ there is no real point even to make the drug.’  
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1  Lack of novelty 	  
As discussed in Chapter Two, in most cases, the mere disclosure of a potential 
medicine’s chemical formula prevents a ‘composition of matter’ claim over that 
medicine. It may be possible to patent a narrower ‘species’, derivative version, or new 
uses of a known chemical48 in order to distinguish a claim from the prior art. 
However, if claims are so narrow that they can be easily ‘designed around’ by generic 
drug companies, the patent might as well be non-existent. Further, disclosure of a 
‘species’ will anticipate any subsequent attempt to patent a broader ‘genus’ class of 
drugs.49 Some common causes of a lack of novelty now will be discussed.  
 
(a) Prior publications by the pharmaceutical industry 
 
The major cause of a lack of novelty are previously filed broad patent applications by 
the innovators themselves. For example, in the case In re Metoprolol Succinate Patent 
Litigation,50 the Federal Circuit invalidated a patent claiming a hypertension drug in 
light of an earlier patent application filed by the innovator which claimed nine drug 
formulations with two ‘slow release’ layers.51 While only one of the formulations in 
the prior art included the subsequently claimed chemical formula, it was enough to 
invalidate the claim that could have prevented generic competition.52  
 
In other cases, obscure references in patent applications can destroy 
patentability when discovered many years later. Roin used the example of Ultracet, a 
combination of tramadol and paracetamol – the latter known as acetaminophen in the 
United States - which was launched in 2001 by Othro-McNeil Pharmaceutical Inc.53 
Othro-McNeil had initially obtained a broad patent over the drug combination.54 
However, a few years after launch, it was discovered that a patent specification filed 
in 1972 disclosed the drug combination in a ratio of 1:10, although the 1972 
specification did not state that the combination would work synergistically for pain 
relief.55 It is likely the prior art specification was not discovered during patentability 
screening or examination at the USPTO because it used an “obscure synonym” for 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48 For example, as discussed in Chapter Two under Judicial Inroads into Exclusions of Methods of 
Medical Treatment, the United States allows a claim over the second use of a known drug. It is also 
possible to use ‘Swiss’ claim language in New Zealand.  
49 In re Slayter 276 F 2d 408 (CCPA 1960) at 411. Broad claims may be commercially necessary to 
prevent the dilution of monopoly profits from ‘me-too’ drugs which act on a similar drug target. The 
problem of ‘me-too’ drugs will be discussed below.  
50 In re Metoprolol Succinate Patent Litigation 494 F 3d 1011 (Fed Cir 2007).  
51 US Patent No 4,780,318.  
52 In re Metoprolol Succinate Patent Litigation at 1020-1021; see Roin 2009 at 523, n 102.  
53 Roin, above n 1, at 521.  
54 US Patent No 5,336,691.  
55 US Patent No 3,652,589. 
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acetaminophen: “p-acetamino phenal”. 56  Othro-McNeil ‘reissued’ their patent, 57 
claiming a narrower drug combination in a ratio of “about 1:5”, in order to distinguish 
it from the ratio of 1:10 disclosed in the obscure prior art reference.58 However, in 
Ortho-McNeil Pharm, Inc v Caraco Pharm Labs, Ltd,59 the Federal Circuit held that 
the reissued patent could not block a generic drug launched by Caraco 
Pharmaceuticals which contained the drug combination in a ratio of 1:8.67.60 By 
contrast, in Ortho-McNeil Pharmaceutical, Inc v Kali Laboratories, Inc,61 the reissued 
patent claims were at least partially effective in preventing generic competition, 
blocking a generic drug launched by Kali Laboratories, which had a drug combination 
ratio of 1:6.41.62  
 
Roin’s Ultracet example was critiqued by Outterson, who argued the prior 
publication did not prevent the drug from getting to market.63 However, Ultracet may 
be the exception to the rule; a rare example of a prior art reference that escaped 
detection by Othro-McNeil’s patent attorneys and the USPTO examiner. It is also 
difficult to determine the public harm that has resulted from the screening of 
medicines due to prior art disclosures, because that would require making an 
inference based on medicines which do not exist - or only exist on a laboratory bench. 
While unlikely that prior art would prevent all claims from issuing, a very narrow 
claim that avoids the prior art could have the same value as no patent at all if it would 
not prevent competition – as noted above. Ultimately, the decision by pharmaceutical 
executives whether to launch a drug requires a consideration of multiple uncertain 
factors, such as: the scope of enforceable claims, the likelihood of generic competitors 
being able to ‘design around’ those claims, and the drug’s commercial potential 
having regard to other drugs on the market or in development. Unfortunately, there is 
no public record of these commercially sensitive decisions, which means that any 
evidence of the extent of patentability screening would have to be indirect.  
 
Nevertheless, USPTO tribunal decisions of the Board of Patent Appeals and 
Interferences (BPAI)64 provide some evidence of patent claims invalidated at an early 
stage of development. For example, in Ex parte Feldmann65, the inventor claimed a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56 Roin, above n 1, at 521.  
57 US Reissue Patent No RE39221E.  
58 Above, claim 6.  
59 Ortho-McNeil Pharm, Inc v Caraco Pharm Labs, Ltd 476 F 3d 1321(Fed Cir 2007).  
60 At 1328–1329. 
61 Ortho-McNeil Pharmaceutical, Inc v Kali Laboratories, Inc 482 F Supp 2d 478 (D NJ 2007).  
62 At 497 per Lifland DJ. In particular, the ratio of ‘about 1:5’ was construed to encompass ‘ratios up to 
and including 1:7.1 and ratios down to and including 1:3.6.’  
63 K Outterson “Death from the Public Domain?” (2009) 87 Texas Law Review 45 at 48.   
64 The BPAI has now changed its name to Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB) as part of reforms 
under the America Invents Act of 2011.  
65 Ex parte Feldmann No 2002-0253 (BPAI Mar  21, 2003).  
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method of treating rheumatoid arthritis using a combination of a tumour necrosis 
factor antagonist and cyclosporin, an immunosuppressant.66 The BPAI held that this 
was anticipated by a prior patent application, 67  which disclosed the claimed 
compounds among a number of drug combinations.68 In particular, the claims were 
held invalid as they “read on” disclosures in the prior patent.69    
 
Another source of prior art is that innovators may deliberately publish their 
research findings in order to prevent competitors from obtaining patents where they 
do not wish to pursue research. These are referred to as “defensive publications”.70 
 
(b) Prior publications in academia 
 
Academic publications by medical researchers are another major source of prior art. 
For example, in SmithKline Beecham Corp v Copley Pharmaceutical, Inc,71 the 
Federal Circuit had invalidated patent claims over the drug nabumetone pursuant to a 
‘paragraph iv’ challenge by a generic drug company, Copley Pharmaceutical.72 The 
prior art was a 1973 research publication, Chatterjea & Prasad, which disclosed the 
compound and a method for its synthesis in a liquid form, but did not disclose the 
solid form of the drug or its medicinal use.73  
 
There is other evidence that academic publications can contribute to 
‘unpatentability factors’ that may reduce levels of private investment.74 A survey of 
universities with large medical-research programs found that 82 per cent could not 
secure a patent in the previous year and 71 per cent were unable to find a commercial 
partner because “research outcomes were already published”.75 Lack of novelty 
caused by academic publications may have a dire effect on medical progress because 
of the fundamental contribution of academic research to the development of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
66 At 2-4. In medicinal chemistry, an antagonist is a compound which inhibits the activity of the drug 
target protein. This can be contrasted with an agonist compound, which increases the activity of the 
drug target.  
67 US Patent No 5,672,347. 
68 At 6.  
69 At 7. The concept of claims ‘reading on’ the prior art is equivalent to the General Tyre ‘reverse 
infringement’ test which applies in New Zealand. 
70 See G Parchomovsky “Publish or perish” (2000) Michigan Law Review 926 at 928-929. 
71 SmithKline Beecham Corp v Copley Pharmaceutical, Inc No 01-1611 (Fed Cir Aug 15 2002).  
72 As discussed in Chapter Two under Regulatory Environment, a ‘paragraph IV’ challenge is filed by a 
generic drug company alleging that the innovator’s patent claims over their drug are invalid.  
73 SmithKline Beecham Corp v Copley Pharmaceutical, Inc, at 1-2.  
74 Roin, above n 1, at 527. 
75 At at 528, n 125 citing EG Campbell and E Bendavid “Data-sharing and data-withholding in genetics 
and the life sciences: Results of a national survey of technology transfer officers” (2002) 6 J Health 
Care L & Policy 241.  
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medicines.76 For example, 72 of 478 drugs approved in the United States between 
1988 and 2005 had academic inventors.77 Another study analysing all 478 drugs 
approved in the same period, concluded that over half involved publicly-funded 
academic research, including two thirds of drugs that received “priority review” 
status.78 
 
However, it could be argued that lack of novelty is not a true unpatentability 
factor if it is avoidable. In particular, academic centres can ensure that they file 
patents before disclosing their research. This argument can be rebutted on several 
grounds.  
 
Firstly, it is established there has been a significant increase in patenting by 
universities in the United States, from 390 per annum in 1980 to 3088 in 2009, as a 
result of the Baye-Dole Act of 1980,79  which allowed the patenting of taxpayer-
funded research in order to encourage its commercialisation by private industry.80 
However, increased patenting requires up-front financial commitments, and not all 
universities have well-funded technology transfer offices (TTOs) that can afford to 
file patents over all medical research with therapeutic potential.81 Therefore, TTOs 
may not file many patents due to funding priorities.  
 
Secondly, TTOs must make decisions about which research to patent before its 
commercial potential may be known by the academic researchers themselves. The 
selection of potentially viable drug candidates has been described as “part science and 
part art”,82  with frequent mistakes made both by scientists and pharmaceutical 
industry executives.83 Accordingly, any potentially lifesaving medicines mistakenly 
overlooked by TTOs, become unpatentable therapies upon publication.84  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
76 AJ Stevens and others “The role of public-sector research in the discovery of drugs and vaccines” 
(2011) 364(6) New England Journal of Medicine 535 at 537.  
77 BN Sampat “Academic patents and access to medicines in developing countries” (2009) 99(1) 
American Journal of Public Health 9 at 11.  
78 BN Sampat and FR Lichtenberg “What are the Respective Roles of the Public and Private Sectors in 
Pharmaceutical Innovation?” (2011) 30(2) Health Affairs 332 at 332. Priority review of a drug allows 
an accelerated regulatory approval for drugs deemed the most innovative and which address unmet 
medical needs.  
79 Baye-Dole Act 35 USC § 200-212.   
80 WH Schacht The Bayh-Dole Act: Selected Issues in Patent Policy and the Commercialization of 
Technology (Congressional Research Service, 3 December 2012) at 8-9. 
81 A notable exception is Stanford University’s Office of Technology Licensing, which generated USD 
87 million in gross licensing royalties in 2012-2013: see “Research Facts” (23 April 2014) Stanford 
University <www.facts.stanford.edu>.  
82 Bartfai and Lees, above n 45, at 258.  
83 Roin, above n 1, at 530, n 137, citing GA Showell and JS Mills “Chemistry Challenges in Lead 
Optimization: Silicon Isosteres in Drug Discovery” (2003) 8 Drug Discovery Today 551 at 551.  
84 As will also be discussed below, even if a patent is filed, before publication, patent length runs from 
the date of filing, and the patent might have insufficient length by the time it is ready to achieve 
regulatory approval.  
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Thirdly, the almost exponential increase in research publications over time,85 
along with scientific norms encouraging early publication and open sharing of data, 
increases the chance of a discovery being unpatentable due to a prior academic 
publication. Moreover, academia tends to reward the publication of research results 
rather than the number of patents filed, and there is a corresponding pressure to 
publish results as soon as possible.86  
 
(c) Inherent anticipation 
 
The doctrine of ‘inherent anticipation’ is another example of how lack of novelty may 
be unavoidable. As discussed in Chapter Two, the fact that a compound possesses an 
inherent property or benefit that was not recognised until later, is not in itself 
sufficient to make the compound distinct from the prior art.87  
 
For example, in Abbott Laboratories v Baxter Pharmaceutical Products Inc,88 
the Federal Circuit invalidated a patent for an inhalation anaesthetic that was found to 
have lower toxicity in storage when combined with water. A prior art reference 
described combining the drug with water to remove impurities. However, at the time, 
it was not realised that this would result in lower toxicity. Despite the 
acknowledgment by the Federal Circuit that “knowledge of the beneficial nature of a 
water-sevoflurane mix was wholly lacking”, it was held that “a [prior art] reference 
may anticipate even when the relevant properties of the thing disclosed were not 
appreciated at the time.”89 
 
Similarly, the case SmithKline Beecham Corp v Apotex Corp90 involved the 
invalidation of a patent for a blockbuster antidepressant, Paxil, which was produced in 
undetected trace amounts during the manufacture of an older version of the drug. The 
Federal Circuit held that “inherent anticipation does not require a person of ordinary 
skill in the art to recognize the inherent disclosure in the prior art at the time the prior 
art is created.”91 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
85 M Pautasso “Publication growth in biological sub-fields: patterns, predictability and sustainability” 
(2012) 4(12) Sustainability 3234 at 3237-3238.  
86 Roin, above n 1, at 527.  
87 In re Dillon, 919 F 2d 688 (Fed Cir 1991); Schering v Geneva 339 F 3d 1373 (CAFC 2003) at 1377; 
see also Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals v H N Norton & Co Ltd [1996] RPC 76.  
88 Abbott Laboratories v Baxter Pharmaceutical Products Inc 471 F 3d 1363 (Fed Cir 2006). 
89 At 1365-1367.  
90 SmithKline Beecham Corp v Apotex Corp 403 F 3d 1331 (Fed Cir 2005).  
91 At 1343-1345.  
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In Ex parte Levin,92 the BPAI considered the validity of a claim over a method 
of administering an artificial sweetener, tagatose, in order to raise the level of high-
density lipoprotein to promote cardiovascular health.93 The BPAI stated this was 
inherently anticipated by a published specification that disclosed a method of 
administering of tagatose to a mouse to try and slow the aging process.94 It was held 
to be irrelevant that the cardiovascular benefits of administering tagatose would have 
been unappreciated by a person skilled in the art at the time.95  
 
As discussed in Chapter Two, commentators have noted the inherent 
anticipation doctrine’s potential to stifle incentives for drug development, particularly 
by removing the ability to patent useful drug metabolites.96 
 
(d) Prior use 
 
Lack of novelty due to prior use can also be an unpatentability factor. For example, in 
Dey, LP v Sunovion Pharmaceuticals, Inc,97 it was argued that a clinical trial where 
participants could take the medicine without signing a confidentiality agreement 
constituted public prior use. However, an application for summary judgement was 
reversed by the Federal Circuit on the basis that while no formal secrecy obligation 
was imposed, “the study was conducted with a reasonable expectation of 
confidentiality as to the nature of the formulations being tested.” 98  Therefore, 
arguably, a clinical trial where confidentiality is not reasonably expected, such as one 
sponsored by an academic investigator, would constitute invalidating public use.  
 
 Summary 
 
In general, prior publication through previous patent applications or academic 
research is a major contributor to the lack of novelty unpatentability factor. While 
anticipation by prior art may be overcome by redrafting narrower claims, these may 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
92 Ex parte Levin No 2004-1391 (BPAI Jan 1, 2004).  
93 High-density lipoprotein (HDL) is referred to as ‘good cholesterol’, because it clears low-density 
lipoprotein, or ‘bad cholesterol’ from the cardiovascular system.  
94 At 7. The prior art reference was US Patent No 5,356,879 (Zehner). 
95 At 7, citing Schering v Geneva. 
96 A De La Rosa “A Hard Pill To Swallow: Does Schering v Geneva Endanger Innovation Within The 
Pharmaceutical Industry” (2008) 8 Colum Sci & Tech L Rev 37 at 42 citing Eli Lilly & Co v Barr 
Labs, Inc 251 F 3d 955 (Fed Cir 2001) at 976 per Judge Newman: ‘[E]very biological property is a 
natural and inherent result of the chemical structure from which it arises, whether or not it has been 
discovered. To negate the patentability of a discovery of biological activity because it is ‘the natural 
result’ of the chemical compound can have powerful consequences for the patentability of biological 
inventions.’ 
97 Dey, LP v Sunovion Pharmaceuticals, Inc No 12-1428 (Fed Cir May 20, 2013).  
98 At 1439.  
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not effectively prevent competition. It may also not be possible to avoid lack of 
novelty by filing patents before disclosure. Academic centres have insufficient 
funding and expertise to file patents over every potentially valuable medicine, and the 
doctrine of inherent anticipation means that medicinal properties that were 
unrecognised in the prior art can still invalidate subsequent patentability. Prior use of 
medicines in experimental clinical trials may be a further source of lack of novelty.  
 
Finally, even if it were possible to modify claims to avoid direct anticipation, 
the aforementioned prior art would still contribute to the most significant 
‘unpatentability factor’: lack of inventive step.  
 
2 Lack of inventive step  
 
Lack of inventive step is an ‘unpatentability factor’ with far greater impact on the 
patentability of medicines compared to lack of novelty because it allows the 
combination of multiple prior art references to invalidate a patent. Moreover, as 
technology progresses and it becomes easier to predict the effects of new drugs, lack 
of inventive step becomes a more difficult hurdle to overcome.99 For example, many 
pharmaceutical companies already use computer-modelling techniques to ‘virtually’ 
screen drug compounds to predict efficacy against a target molecule even before they 
are synthesised.100  
 
(a) Denying patentability of medicines with predictable effects   
 
According to Roin, one of the stated reasons that the patent system does not allow 
patents for inventions which lack an inventive step, is because it is assumed that 
obvious inventions do not have significant development costs.101 However, this 
assumption is misplaced in the context of the pharmaceutical industry. Medicines with 
‘obvious’ therapeutic potential will still have to undertake expensive clinical trials 
‘post-invention’ in order to reach the market, and innovators will not assume those 
costs without an enforceable patent.  
 
As noted in Chapter Two, the leading decision of the Supreme Court of the 
United States in KSR v Teleflex denies patentability to inventions created “according 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
99 Roin, above n 1, at 543.  
100 This process is referred to as ‘rational drug design’. See Soma Mandala, Mee'nal Moudgila and S K 
Mandal “Rational drug design” (2009) 625 European Journal of Pharmacology 90 at 91.  
101 Roin, above n 1, at 533. It is assumed that the public already has ‘possession’ of inventions which 
lack novelty, and therefore do not require a monopoly right as incentive.  
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to known methods... [that] yield predictable results.”102 Commentators have argued 
that this test is in conflict with the scientific method, which involves using known 
techniques to make predictions, and will ultimately reduce incentives to innovate.103  
 
In addition, the test for non-obviousness lacks bright line rules that would 
allow simple determination of patentability ex ante. When billions of dollars in sales 
can hinge on the opinion of a patent examiner or judge as to whether the therapeutic 
effect of a drug is ‘unexpected’ enough to a ‘person skilled in the art’ prior to 
commencement of clinical trials,104 the existence of any similar prior art may be 
enough to dissuade investment in otherwise socially valuable medicines. 
 
(b) ‘Composition of matter’ claims and the relevance of structural 
similarity  
 
As mentioned in Chapter Two, ‘composition of matter’ claims are perceived as the 
most valuable as they can restrict the manufacture of a medicine for any medical use. 
Another reason that composition of matter claims are sought-after is because they are 
perceived as less susceptible to invalidity challenges than so-called ‘secondary 
patents’ over derivatives, formulations, combinations, or methods of use of medicines. 
However, this assumption may not be justified. For example, a recent Federal Court 
case Bristol-Myers Squibb Company v Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc105 was notable 
for invaliding a composition of matter patent over Bristol-Myers Squibb’s hepatitis B 
drug, entecavir. There was a finding of obviousness due to the fact that entecavir only 
differed from the prior art ‘lead compound’ 2'-CDG by the addition of a single carbon 
atom.106 Traditionally, generic entry is delayed until ‘composition of matter’ patents 
expire, and this case may cause a change in the industry’s perception.107  
 
Structural similarity to a prior art compound was also a cause of obviousness 
in the case In re Merck & Co.108 The Federal Circuit denied patentability over 
amitriptyline to treat depression, due to its ‘close structural similarity’ to imipramine, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
102 KSR International Co v Teleflex Inc 550 US 398 (2007) at 416; see also Portable Sawing Systems 
Ltd (in liq) v Lucas [2006] 3 NZLR 721 at [54]; Windsurfing International Inc v Tabur Marine (GB) 
Ltd [1985] RPC 59. 
103 R Greendyke “No Patent for You: How KSR v Teleflex's Nonobviousness Test Conflicts with the 
Scientific Method and Removes the Incentive to Innovate” (2010) 35 U Dayton L Rev 413 at 430.  
104 Roin, above n 1, at 539.  
105 Bristol-Myers Squibb Company v Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc No 2013-1306 (Fed Cir June 12, 
2014). 
106 At 13. 
107 E Silverman “Not So Obvious: A Bristol-Myers Patent Defeat May Change Wall Street Views” 
Forbes (online ed, New York, 12 February 2013).   
108 In re Merck & Co 800 F 2d 1091 (Fed Cir 1986).  
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a known anti-depressant. 109  Despite the fact that anti-depressant properties of 
amitriptyline were not disclosed in the prior art, the Court held:110  
 
…one of ordinary skill in the medicinal chemical arts, possessed of the 
knowledge of the investigative techniques used in the field of drug design and 
pharmacological predictability, would have expected amitriptyline to resemble 
imipramine in the alleviation of depression in humans. 
 
Accordingly drug companies may be less willing to develop a promising drug where 
its molecular structure is very close to a prior art compound.  
 
(c) Examples of lack of inventive step invalidating patent claims over 
medicines 
 
As noted above with regard to lack of novelty, it is difficult to observe evidence of 
drugs which may have got to market, but for lack of inventive step. Again, records of 
BPAI decisions at the USPTO contain some examples of claims over medical 
therapies that were deemed to lack inventive step, resulting in narrower claims that 
may have been unable to effectively prevent competition.   
 
In Ex parte Williams,111 there was an attempt to claim a method of treating 
HIV using leflunomide combined with a pyramidine compound. The BPAI cited prior 
art which suggested it would be beneficial to combine leflunomide with antiviral 
agents, which included pyramidine compounds. The patent proceeded to grant, but 
only with a narrower claim combining leflunomide with a pyramidine compound 
“without antiviral activity”. 112 There are no records of this treatment receiving 
regulatory approval.113  
 
Ex parte Linnenbach,114 involved a cancer vaccine targeting GA733-2, which 
is a protein expressed in various human cancers. The original broadest claim 
comprised a truncated protein GA733-2E, which was a suitable ‘antigen’ used to 
stimulate a patient’s own immune system to target cancer cells expressing GA733-2. 
However, the BPAI denied patentability for obviousness in light of a combination of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
109 At [42].  
110 At [42].  
111 Ex parte Williams No 2005-0902 (BPAI June 22, 2005).  
112 US Patent No 7,691,890, Claim 11.   
113 However, it is difficult to draw any inferences on the impact of narrower claims on the decision not 
to commercialise the treatment, as perhaps it was not commercially viable for other reasons, such as 
lack of efficacy or a small market size.  
114 Ex parte Linnenbach No 2001-1258 (BPAI Jan 1, 2004).  
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four prior art references: Szala,115 Bumol,116 Hussey,117 and Johnson.118 In particular, 
Szala taught the production of the full-length GA733-2 protein, but not a truncated 
sequence,119 Bumol disclosed a truncated version necessary to facilitate production in 
bacteria,120 and Hussey and Johnson taught producing a truncated protein in animal 
cells, but not GA733-2E specifically. The BPAI held that it would have been obvious 
to a person skilled in the art to combine the prior art to produce a truncated version of 
GA733-2 in animal cells.121 In the patent that was granted, the broadest claim 
combined the GA733-2E antigen with least one other cancer treating compound in a 
pharmaceutically acceptable carrier.122 There are no records of this vaccine achieving 
regulatory approval.123 It is conceivable that narrower claims may have had a role. For 
example, a generic drug company could avoid infringement by manufacturing a 
vaccine containing the GA733-2E antigen but omitting the combination with a cancer 
treating compound.  
 
In Ex parte Childers,124 patent claims 1-3 over neuroprotective serotonin 
receptor-binding compounds were rejected as being obvious in light of a previously 
filed patent by Abou-Gharbia and others. The BPAI held: “[h]ere, the applied prior art 
establishes that one of ordinary skill in the art would have reasonably expected the 
compounds of Abou-Gharbia having the ethyl bridging moiety modified by a phenyl 
group would continue to exhibit the property of binding to the [serotonin] 
receptor”.125 Although a patent with narrower claims was granted in 2004,126 it has 
since lapsed due to non-payment of fees. 127  There are no records of this 
neuroprotective compound being developed as a drug.128 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
115 S Szala and others “Molecular cloning of cDNA for the carcinoma-associated antigen GA733-2” 
(1990) 87 Proc Natl Acad Sci Vol 3542.   
116 European Patent Application No 0 326 423. 
117 RE Hussey “A soluble CD4 protein selectively inhibits HIV replication and syncytium formation 
cells” (1988) 311 Nature 79.  
118 PW Johnson “Synthesis of soluble myelin-associated glycoprotein in insect and mammalian cells” 
(1989) 77 Gene 287.   
119 Ex parte Linnenbach, at 4.  
120 At 5. In particular, the sequence in Bumol was missing the first 81 amino acids.  
121 At 8-12.  
122 US Patent No 6,645,498.  
123 This was verified by the author by accessing Cortellis by Thomson Reuters. Cortellis is a 
proprietary database that holds patent and clinical trial data for new drugs. From Cortellis records 
(accessed 27 January 2014), OncoVax-CL containing the GA733-2E antigen was developed by Jenner 
Biotherapies Inc but failed to achieve regulatory approval. 
124 Ex parte Childers No 2003-0890 (BPAI Dec 22, 2003).  
125 At 7.  
126 US Patent No 6,831,084.  
127 The author confirmed this by accessing USPTO ‘Public Pair’ records on 30 January 2014.  
128 According to Cortellis records (accessed 27 January 2014), the drug was ultimately not developed 
by Pfizer [originally owned by Wyeth and American Home Products].   
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Roin provided many other examples of BPAI decisions which were 
invalidated for lack of non-obviousness,129 including claims covering potentially 
viable drugs for cancer,130 tuberculosis,131 HIV,132 hypertension, 133 and diabetes.134  
Such drugs could have had significant social value, however, a drug company would 
be unlikely to pursue development without strong patent claims that can prevent 
generic competition. Further, a narrower valid patent claim may mean that only a 
medicine having a certain chemical structure covered by that claim will be developed, 
which may be worse than the version that was covered by an invalidated patent claim. 
In other words, under the current system, ‘patentable’ medicines may not be the most 
safe or effective medicines.  
 
Summary 
 
Lack of inventive step is a significant hurdle for drug development. Paradoxically, 
society loses medicines that would be predicted to have superior benefits,135 even if 
they are the only treatment for a disease. Society also loses medicines that would have 
performed unexpectedly better during clinical trials but had insufficient patentability 
to attract private funding.  Lastly, ‘patentable’ medicines will be developed that may 
be worse than the ‘public domain’ versions, which lack private incentives for 
development.  
 
3 Lack of utility and sufficiency 
 
As discussed in Chapter Two, lack of utility and sufficiency relate to the level of 
disclosure in a patent application, and are frequently used as grounds for challenging a 
patent over a medicine because the pressure to file a patent early in development can 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
129 Roin, above n1, at 552, n 262.  For example see Ex parte Selzer No 2006-0760 (BPAI Feb 28, 2007) 
at 4;Ex parte Arbiser No 2007-0091(BPAI Feb.6, 2007) at 1; Ex parte Skurkovich No 2006-0624 
(BPAI Jan 1, 2006) at 1; Ex parte Gormley No 2004-0543 (BPAI Dec 29, 2004) at 4; Ex parte 
Lapeurta No 2003-1745 (BPAI Jan. 1, 2004) at 2; Ex parte Bodmer No 2001-1044 (BPAI Jan 1, 2004) 
at 3. 
130 Roin, above n 1, at 544, n 215: Ex parte Cuthbertson No 2007-1140 (BPAI May 24, 2007) at 2; Ex 
parte Rajopadhye No 2007-0856 (BPAI May 21, 2007) at 1; Ex parte Chen No 2006-3290 (BPAI Mar 
16, 2007) at 1; Ex parte Barbera-Guillem No 2006-2466 (BPAI Nov 30, 2006) at 1; Ex parte Shawver 
No 2004-0005 (BPAI Mar 4, 2004) at 2; Ex parte Rosenblatt No 2004-1505 (BPAI Jan 1, 2004) at 1; 
Ex parte Bianco No 1996-0756 (BPAI Jan 1, 1996) at 1. 
131 Ex parte Horwitz No 2002-1740 (BPAI June19,2003) at 5-7.  
132 Ex parte Maury No 2007-1621 (BPAI July 24, 2007) at 2-7; Ex parte Stapleton No 2005-1797 
(BPAI Jan 1, 2006) at 3-6; Ex parte Williams No 2005-0902 (BPAI June 22, 2005) at 4-6.  
133 Ex parte Pershadsingh No 95-0885 (BPAI Oct 14, 1997) at 2-5. All but one of the claims was 
rejected on obviousness grounds.  
134 Ex parte Schmitke No 2007-0854 (BPAI July 24,2007) at 5-6.  
135 Roin, above n 1, at 540. See also T Syed “Should a Prize System for Pharmaceuticals Require 
Patent Protection for Eligibility?”(IGH Discussion Paper No 2, Incentives for Global Health, June 10, 
2009) at 4.  
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make it vulnerable to attack on this basis. As such, lack of utility and sufficiency may 
comprise major unpatentability factors. Commentators have noted that uncertainty 
regarding satisfaction of the utility and sufficiency requirement “disincentivizes 
investment and thereby hampers innovation.”136  
 
One problem is that if particular disease aetiology is not well-understood there 
may not be any target proteins or animal models that can be used to generate the pre-
clinical evidence necessary to satisfy utility.137 As mentioned in Chapter Two, this is 
particularly the case for mental disorders, which often have unknown causes. 
Advantageously, however, the United States allows the applicant to supply more 
clinical evidence after filing to support utility, if necessary.138 Therefore, it might be 
argued that lack of utility can be easily overcome by filing more evidence when it 
becomes available in order to overcome these objections.  
 
Regardless, there is another problem that can frustrate the strategy of filing 
more evidence when it becomes available. It is well-settled United States case law 
that a disclosure within a specification may anticipate an invention, while at the same 
time having insufficient written description or sufficiency to be granted a patent.139 
While a more stringent ‘enablement’ requirement in New Zealand140 may alleviate 
this effect somewhat, the United States is the crucial market for deciding whether to 
fund a new drug.141 This means that lack of utility and insufficiency overlap with the 
previous two unpatentability factors in the United States.  
 
Roin has provided several examples of this phenomenon. 142  The case 
Rasmusson v SmithKline Beecham Corp,143 involved a patent for the use of the hair-
loss drug, finasteride, for the treatment for prostate cancer. In that case, it was held 
that although an earlier attempt to patent the use had “failed to demonstrate the effects 
of finasteride in treating prostate cancer”, this nonetheless invalidated a subsequent 
attempt to patent its use for treating prostate cancer once more data became 
available.144 In Bristol-Myers Squibb Co v Ben Venue Laboratories, Inc,145 patents for 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
136 CM Holman “Unpredictability in Patent Law and Its Effect on Pharmaceutical Innovation” (2011) 
76 Mo L Rev 645 at 657.  
137 At 660 discussing Eli Lilly &Co v Actavis Elizabeth LLC 731 F Supp 2d 348 (DNJ 2010) at 352.  
138 See Eli Lilly & Co v Actavis Elizabeth LLC, No 2010-1500 (Fed Cir 2011). 
139 Roin, above n 1, at 522 citing In re Hafner 410 F 2d 1403 (CCPA 1969) at 1405; In re Schoenwald, 
964 F 2d 1122 (Fed Cir 1992) at 1123-1124; In re Samour 571 F 2d 559 (CCPA 1978) at 563-564.  
140 For example, the Synthon case which requires ‘disclosure’ and ‘enablement’ for anticipation.  
141 Bartfai and Lees, above n 45, at 138.  
142 Roin 2009 above at 522-524.  
143 Rasmusson v SmithKline Beecham Corp 413 F 3d 1318 (Fed Cir 2005).  
144 At 1322. See also Roin, above n 1, at 523, n 101.  
145 Bristol-Myers Squibb Co v Ben Venue Laboratories, Inc 246 F 3d 1368 (Fed Cir 2001). 
76	  	  
a chemotherapy drug were invalidated in light of prior publications which discussed 
the patented uses, but described them as being ineffective.146  
 
Insufficiency also can prevent claims over ‘downstream’ innovations, which 
are known as ‘reach-through’ claims, such as claiming any drugs which may bind to a 
particular receptor. These usually also fail on the enablement or written description 
requirement, particularly where ‘undue experimentation’ is required to achieve a 
practical result.147 Further, as will be discussed below, such ‘upstream’ patent claims 
may stifle innovation by creating ‘patent thickets.’148 
 
Summary 
 
Due to the commercial pressure to file a patent before competitors, lack of utility and 
sufficiency is a gap that many socially valuable drugs can fall through and become 
‘unpatentable therapies’. Further, in the United States, a patent application which is 
deemed to lack utility or sufficiency can still invalidate a subsequent attempt to patent 
the same medicine.  
 
The pressure to file a patent early in the development stage can increase the likelihood 
that there is insufficient patent length to justify the time and expenditure required for 
clinical trials. The consequences of insufficient patent length will now be discussed. 
 
4 Insufficient patent length 
 
The ‘translation’ of basic research from discovery to a clinically effective treatment 
can take an average of 17 years.149 Patent applications are usually filed before the 
commencement of clinical trials in humans, which typically last at least 7 to 14 years 
from patent filing until regulatory approval.150 A 2012 study by Hemphill and Sampat 
indicated that medicines enjoy market exclusivity for an average of 12.2 years until 
generic drug entry.151 This is consistent with reports that a period of at least 10 years 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
146 At 1377–81. See also Astra Akteibolag v Andrx Pharmaceuticals, Inc. 222 F Supp 2d (SDNY 2002) 
at 596–598.  
147 See University of Rochester v GD Searle & Co 358 F 3d 916 (Fed Cir 2004); In re Fisher 421 F 3d 
1365 (Fed Cir 2005).  
148 M Heller The gridlock economy: How too much ownership wrecks markets, stops innovation, and 
costs lives (Basic Books, New York, 2008) at 4-6.  
149 R Pozen and H Kline “Defining success for translational research organizations” (2011) 3(94) Sci 
Transl Med 1 at 1.  
150 Grubb and Thomsen, above n 1, at 424-425; KI Kaitin “Deconstructing the drug development 
process: the new face of innovation” (2010) 87(3) Clinical Pharmacology and Therapeutics 356, Figure 
1. See also DiMasi and Grabowski, above n 6, at 475.  
151 Scott C Hemphill and BN Sampat “Evergreening, patent challenges, and effective market life in 
pharmaceuticals” (2012) 31(2) Journal of Health Economics 327 at 330; see also H Grabowski, G Long 
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of exclusivity is required to justify investment in a new drug.152 Therefore, having less 
than 10 years of patent life remaining could be viewed as a major ‘unpatentability 
factor’ that will disincentivise development of many new drugs.153 The public will not 
be aware of such drugs if they are abandoned before development commences.  
 
Abramowicz recognised the problem of diminishing incentives to develop an 
invention as a patent’s length runs out, particularly for biotechnological inventions 
with long development times. 154  Accordingly, pharmaceutical companies try to 
minimise clinical trial development times in order to maximise the length of patent 
exclusivity remaining after market approval.155  
 
Unfortunately, a number of factors can increase development times, which are 
outside the control of pharmaceutical companies. Firstly, the inherent unpredictability 
of drug development means that a medicine may initially be tested for the wrong 
disease indication or dosage during pre-clinical or clinical trials. These largely 
unavoidable errors can take several years off the life of a patent. Secondly, it may not 
be possible to manufacture a drug in bulk due to technological limitations. This was 
an issue for dozens of medically useful proteins that were patented in the mid-1980s, 
but for which the patents have now expired.156 By the time these manufacturing issues 
are resolved, useful drugs may have insufficient patent duration left. Thirdly, some 
medicines require long clinical trial development times, such as treatments for chronic 
diseases with gradual increases in morbidity. For example, this includes Alzheimer’s 
disease, multiple sclerosis, or early interventions in cancer. This could skew private 
funding towards medicines with shorter development times, but which may have less 
of an impact on disease burden. A recent paper by Budish, Roin and Williams showed 
that this funding bias could have a major impact on public health.157 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
and R Mortimer “Recent trends in brand-name and generic drug competition” (2013) 17(3) Journal of 
Medical Economics 207 at 207, which found the average period of market exclusivity to be 12.9 years 
overall. 
152 Roin, above n 1, at 557, n 290 citing Anonymous Director of Intellectual Property at a mid-sized 
pharmaceutical company.  
153  It may be possible to effectively ‘extend’ patent protection over a medicine using patent 
‘evergreening’ techniques however, the ‘strength’ of such ‘secondary patents’ is weaker, as will be 
discussed in the next section.  
154 M Abramowicz “The Danger of Underdeveloped Patent Prospects” (2007) 92 Cornell L Rev 1065 
at 1097: ‘[O]ne danger of granting patents in gene sequences is that, by the time researchers see a 
therapeutic use on the horizon, the patent term might have expired or too little patent term will remain 
to make the research financially worthwhile.’ 
155 Paul and others, above n 14, at 210.  
156 S Lyman “Rescuing Patent-Less Proteins from the Drug Development Dustbin” (November 6, 
2012) Xconomy <www.xconomy.com>. Lyman describes 37 known interleukins, growth factors, 
chemokines and various receptor agonists and antagonists patented by the biotechnology industry 
between 1985 and 1995. Most ‘composition of matter’ and ‘method of use’ patents over these useful 
proteins have now expired. 
157 See E Budish, BN Roin and H Williams “Do fixed patent terms distort innovation? Evidence from 
cancer clinical trials” (NBER Working Paper No 19430, September 2013) at 5.  By analysing United 
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Another factor which can reduce effective patent length is a judge-made legal 
doctrine unique to the United States called ‘non-statutory obviousness-type double-
patenting.’ The doctrine applies where “claims in a later patent that are not patentably 
distinct from claims in a commonly owned earlier patent”. 158  Typically, a 
pharmaceutical company will file several patents over small improvements at each 
stage of a drug development life cycle, which can be cited as prior art upon 
publication. For example, in Ex parte Picard,159 various patent claims filed in 1993 
over promising novel sulfonyl urea compounds for the lowering of blood 
cholesterol,160 were deemed unpatentable due to obvious-type double-patenting in 
light of an earlier patent filed in 1991 by the same inventor.161  
 
In the United States, an objection for non-statutory obviousness-type double-
patenting can be overcome by filing a ‘terminal disclaimer’, which is an 
acknowledgement by the applicant that the subsequently filed patents will expire 20-
years from the priority date of the first patent application filed.162 For example, in Ex 
parte Picard, filing a terminal disclaimer would have resulted in a shortening of 
patent protection by two years.163   
 
As with other ‘unpatentability factors’ it is difficult to empirically verify the 
numbers of drugs abandoned before completion of clinical trials due to insufficient 
patent length as opposed to lack of safety or efficacy. However, it may be possible to 
make some inferences from the proportion of clinical trials abandoned due to 
undisclosed strategic or commercial reasons. 164  For example, a 2011 study by 
Arrowsmith analysed the reasons for 108 Phase II failures between 2008 and 2010, 
and found that 29 per cent were for ‘strategic reasons’ and 19 per cent, were for 
unreported reasons.165 Similarly, a 2001 study by DiMasi stated that 33.8 per cent of 
R&D terminations between 1987 and 1992 were for economic reasons, for example, 
because the “commercial market [is] too limited” or there is “insufficient return on 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
States cancer patients who were diagnosed in 2003, this paper found that distortions in R&D incentives 
due to fixed term patents have resulted in approximately 890,000 lost life years, with a social cost of 
approximately USD 89 billion per annum. 
158 Eli Lilly & Co v Barr Labs, above n 94, at 967-968. See also 35 USC 102(a)(2) and 102(b)(2)(C). 
159 Ex parte Picard No 95-2879 (BPAI Jan 1, 1995). 
160 US Patent No. 5981595.  
161 US Patent No 5,254,589.  
162 See Manual of Patent Examining Procedure § 804.  
163 A similar process can occur in New Zealand whereby an applicant can file a ‘patent of addition’ 
with improvements that lack inventive step in light of their previously filed patent, but the latter patent 
of addition is limited to the length of the ‘parent’ patent.  However, it is necessary that both patents 
have common ownership. See Patents Act 2013, s 106.   
164 For example, the drug might be less cost-effective than other drugs already on the market, or other 
drugs in the same class are further advanced in development or comparatively better.  
165 Arrowsmith, above n 31, at 328.   
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investment.”166 It is arguable that some of these terminations may have been due to 
insufficient patent length. Notably, however, termination due to insufficient patent 
length at the clinical trial stage may be rare, given that most ‘patentability screening’ 
occurs at the pre-clinical trial stage.  
 
Summary 
 
Insufficient patent length may be an important ‘unpatentability factor’ which can 
discourage private incentives to develop useful medicines. Insufficient patent length 
may be unavoidable for various reasons, including unpredictable and long clinical 
trials, manufacturing issues, and earlier filed patents. The optimal length of 
exclusivity is outside the scope of this thesis, although it is likely that at least 10 years 
is required to be an adequate incentive. Extensions to patent and regulatory 
exclusivity periods as alternative incentives for medical therapies will be discussed in 
Chapter 6A. The next section will consider the scenario where patentability over a 
medical therapy is excluded by law.  
 
5 Unpatentability under law   
 
The final ‘unpatentability factor’, unpatentability under law, has limited overlap with 
the previous unpatentability factors. As discussed in Chapter Two, there are various 
categories of medical therapies that include features which could make them 
unpatentable under law.  
 
First, medical therapies are excluded from the definition of patentable subject 
matter if they consist of naturally occurring products, pure discoveries, or abstract 
ideas.167  For example, medical therapies that involve mental steps, such as a method 
for determining the appropriate dose of a medicine, may be deemed abstract ideas.168 
There is also potential uncertainty regarding the patentability of genes to the extent 
they are identical to that which exists in nature, which may impact on patentability of 
medicines isolated from natural products. However, it is arguable that isolated and 
purified biological material will remain patentable, provided that it is not naturally 
occurring.169  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
166 JA DiMasi “Risks in new drug development: approval success rates for investigational drugs” 
(2001) 69(5) Clinical Pharmacology and Therapeutics 297 at 304.  
167 See discussion in Chapter Two regarding the first patentability criterion, ‘Patentable Subject 
Matter’. 
168 See Chapter Two discussion of Prometheus Laboratories v Mayo Collaborative Services 132 S Ct 
1289 (2012).  
169 See generally, RS Gipstein “The Isolation and Purification Exception to the General Unpatentability 
of Products of Nature” (2003) 4 Colum Sci & Tech L Rev 1 at 1. But compare Association for 
80	  	  
 
Second, certain medical inventions may be excluded on the basis of public 
order or morality.170 For example, patents over genetically modified animals that 
model disease processes can be denied where the animal may suffer without 
substantial medical benefit to humans.171 Commentators have also noted the uncertain 
position on patent protection for stem cells.172 This is particularly the case in New 
Zealand, which prevents the use of human embryos for commercial purposes173 and 
biological processes for generation of humans,174 both of which relate to potential 
therapeutic applications of stem cells.  
 
However, despite the uncertainty around patentability, the first stem cell 
therapy, Remestemcel-L, was recently approved in New Zealand and Canada as a 
treatment for steroid refractory graft-versus-host disease using mesenchymal stem 
cells as the active ingredient.175 According to the developer, Osiris Therapeutics, Inc, 
the therapy has over 50 US and 156 foreign patents as well as 10 years regulatory 
exclusivity as an Orphan Drug in the European Union.176 Arguably, however, this 
reliance on regulatory exclusivity and a large portfolio of patents reflects the uncertain 
legal position behind the patentability of stem cells. This may deter private investment 
into many promising applications of stem cells,177 which will have an adverse effect 
on public health.   
 
Third, as discussed in Chapter Two, patents over surgical methods are 
excluded from patentability in New Zealand.178 There is also a statutory defence to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Molecular Pathology v Myriad Genetics 569 US__(2013) denying patentability to isolated DNA 
because it is not distinct from how it is found in nature.  
170 Notably, the United States does not have a morality exclusion.  
171 However, this would only be to the extent that suffering of an animal was not justified on the basis 
of substantial medical benefit to society. Patents Act 2013, s 15(1). See discussion in Chapter Two.  
172 M Little, W Hall, and A Orlandi “Delivering on the promise of human stem-cell research. What are 
the real barriers?” (2006) 7(12) EMBO Reports 1188 at 1191.  
173 Patents Act 2013, s 15.   
174 Patents Act 2013, s 16.  
175 see “Summary Basis of Decision (SBD) for PROCHYMAL®” (10 May 2012) Health Canada, 
Office of Regulatory Affairs <www.hc-sc.gc.ca>; see Medsafe Data Sheet “Prochymasol” (1 June 
2012) Medsafe <www.medsafe.govt.nz>. 
176 Osiris Therapeutics, Inc “Osiris Therapeutics Receives Title of European Orphan Drug Designation 
for Prochymal” (press release, 19 February 2013). Orphan Drug exclusivity will be discussed under 
regulatory exclusivity mechanisms in Chapter 6A.  
177 For example, hematopoietic stem cell transplantation (HCT) has the potential to permanently cure 
various autoimmune disorders, which otherwise require a lifetime of immunosuppressant medications 
and outpatient care: see Keith M Sullivan, Paolo Muraro and Alan Tyndall “Hematopoietic cell 
transplantation for autoimmune disease: updates from Europe and the United States” (2010) 16(1) 
Biology of Blood and Marrow Transplantation S48 at S48. 
178 Patents Act 2013, s 16(2).  
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infringement in the United States.179 Despite this, there are many innovative surgical 
methods which could address unmet medical needs, including circumcision for 
preventing transmission of HIV,180 gastric bypass surgery for reversing Type II 
diabetes,181 and increasing blood outflow from the brain for treatment of multiple 
sclerosis.182 In the latter case, larger clinical trials183 would not have occurred without 
extensive media coverage and political pressure.184 This could be interpreted as 
evidence of the lack of private incentives to develop therapies based on surgical 
methods because they are unpatentable under law. 
 
Lastly, in New Zealand, the recently-enacted section 16(2) of the Patents Act and the 
Pfizer decision deny patentability to methods of medical treatment. Further, with legal 
uncertainty regarding the public policy justification of ‘Swiss’ claims,185 there is 
arguably an unpatentability factor present for methods of medical treatment in New 
Zealand.186 The inability to protect new uses over known drugs may reduce private 
incentives to obtain regulatory approval for medicines when a composition of matter 
patent has expired.187 However, methods of medical treatment are patentable in the 
United States.188 Due to the small size of the New Zealand pharmaceutical market, 
this unpatentability factor is unlikely to have a significant effect on private incentives 
to develop medical therapies, although enforceability issues are more problematic in 
both jurisdictions, as will be discussed below.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
179 See 35 USC § 287(c). It also may be arguable that surgical methods are ‘unmonopolisable therapies’ 
due to the difficulties for detecting infringement. ‘Unmonopolisable therapies’ will be discussed in this 
chapter below.  
180 RC Bailey and others “Male circumcision for HIV prevention in young men in Kisumu, Kenya: a 
randomised controlled trial” (2007) 369(9562) The Lancet 643 at 643.   
181 SA Brethauer and others “Can Diabetes Be Surgically Cured? Long-Term Metabolic Effects of 
Bariatric Surgery in Obese Patients with Type 2 Diabetes Mellitus” (2013) 258(4) Annals of Surgery 
628 at 628.  
182 P Zamboni and others “Chronic cerebrospinal venous insufficiency in patients with multiple 
sclerosis” (2009) 80(4) J Neurol Neurosurg Psychiatr 392 at 392.  
183 AH Siddiqui and others “Percutaneous transluminal venous angioplasty (PTVA) is ineffective in 
correcting chronic cerebrospinal venous insufficiency (CCSVI) and may increase multiple sclerosis 
(MS) disease activity in the short term: Safety and efficacy results of the 6-month, double-blinded, 
sham-controlled, prospective, randomized endovascular therapy in ms (PREMiSe) trial” (paper 
presented to 65th Annual Meeting of American Academy of Neurology, San Diego, CA, 20 March 
2013).  
184 See D Pullman, A Zarzeczny and A Picard ‘‘Media, politics and science policy: MS and evidence 
from the CCSVI Trenches” (2013) 14(6) BMC Medical Ethics 1 at 1 
185 S Frankel “Lord Cooke and Patents: The Scope of Invention” (2008) 39 VUWLR 73 at 78-79.  
186 Refer to discussion of ‘Swiss-claims’, ‘Swiss-type claims’ and other Legal Doctrines to Overcome 
Exclusions for Methods of Medical Treatment in Chapter Two.  
187 This problem will be discussed further in the next section on evergreening.  
188 Ex Parte Scherer 103 USPQ (BNA) 107, 109 (Pat Off Bd App 1954). 
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Summary 
 
The lack of patentability under law can be a significant unpatentability factor, 
particularly for surgical methods. For other therapies such as second uses for known 
drugs, flexibilities within patent law may allow innovator companies to work around 
any relevant exclusions to obtain patent protection over their medicines. However, it 
may not be possible to overcome the other unpatentability factors so easily.   
 
An important question therefore arises: whether existing patent law can be 
leveraged to ‘rescue’ unpatentable therapies, for example, by patenting minor 
modifications to drugs, selection inventions, or methods of medical treatment, in order 
to overcome the unpatentability factors based on lack of novelty or inventive step.  
 
 
D Can ‘Unpatentable Therapies’ be ‘Rescued’ using Patent ‘Evergreening’ 
Techniques? 
 
Despite the presence of ‘unpatentability factors’ described above, it could be argued 
that pharmaceutical companies could still utilise creative patent claiming strategies to 
‘rescue’ patentability over socially valuable unpatentable therapies. In this context, 
‘rescue’ means to file a new patent that can block competition from generic drug 
companies and allow a monopoly price to be enforced. The next sections will discuss 
these so-called ‘patent evergreening’ techniques, and the circumstances in which they 
may be ineffective or effective.  
 
1 What is patent evergreening? 
 
The core implication behind the concept of ‘patent evergreening’ is that it is possible 
to effectively ‘extend’ patent protection by filing narrower claims over a drug, such as 
a new formulation or method of use. This term is frequently used by critics of the 
pharmaceutical industry, which allegedly uses such techniques to unjustifiably obtain 
a new period of patent protection over their medicines. 189  Accordingly, if 
‘evergreening’ works, it could allow patentability over a formerly unpatentable 
therapy to be regained. For example, Outterson argues190 that companies can re-patent 
unpatentable therapies that have fallen into the public domain by using evergreening 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
189 Grubb and Thomsen, above n 1, at 428; G Dwivedi, S Hallihosur and L Rangan “Evergreening: A 
deceptive device in patent rights” (2010) 32(4) Technology in Society 324 at 324. 
190 Outterson, above n 63 at 50. 
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techniques, such as ‘method-of-use’ patents, 191  patenting formulations, 192  and 
patenting drug combinations. 
 
However, it has been argued that patent evergreening is a misnomer.193 
Specifically, it is not possible to extend the length of a patent claim.194 For example, 
assume that a patent having a ‘composition of matter’ claim over a drug, comprising 
active ingredient A195 plus an inactive ingredient B196 (A + B), is about to expire. A 
pharmaceutical company can subsequently obtain a patent over a new formulation of 
a drug which includes a composition of matter claim having the same active 
ingredient plus a slightly modified inactive compound B’ (A + B’), assuming that the 
new formulation is novel and non-obvious. Whilst the latter patent can prevent a 
generic company from manufacturing the new formulation (A + B’), it cannot prevent 
manufacture of the original ‘off-patent’ drug (A + B), which has the same active 
ingredient. This means that, assuming the original drug has regulatory approval, 
patenting a new formulation cannot extend the effective period of market exclusivity 
against generic competition, because a generic drug company is free to manufacture 
the original version - although it can be prevented from manufacturing the new 
formulation.197 The impact of this on incentives to find second uses for generic drugs 
will be discussed in the next section on ‘unmonopolisable therapies’. 
 
By contrast, if a drug candidate has not yet achieved regulatory approval, then 
‘evergreening’ can effectively extend the effective period of market exclusivity 
against generic competition for the duration of the new patent. In particular, as 
discussed in Chapter Two, a generic drug must be ‘bioequivalent’ to the formulation 
which has obtained regulatory approval.198 This essentially means that it must have 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
191 For example, new uses of known drugs, dosing regimens, and new methods of drug delivery and 
administration. See discussion in Chapter Two.  
192 Section 3(d) of the Indian Patents Act 1970 provides a useful description of new drug formulations 
typically used for ‘patent evergreening’: ‘salts, esters, ethers, polymorphs, metabolites, pure form, 
particle size, isomers, mixtures of isomers, complexes, combinations and other derivatives of known 
substance[s].’ Due to a strong local generics industry, India restricts the patentability of new 
formulations. A consideration of the effect of this ‘anti-evergreening’ legislation on incentives for drug 
development is outside the scope of this thesis.  
193 See JJ Darrow “Debunking the Evergreening Patents Myth” (2010) 131(6) Harvard Law Record 6 at 
6.  
194 Other than patent extensions provided for by law under applicable legislation, which will be 
discussed in Chapter 6A.  
195 The active ingredient of a drug is the part that modifies the activity of the target protein and is 
responsible for its therapeutic effect.  
196 Inactive ingredients combined with the active ingredients of a drug are referred to as ‘excipients’. 
Excipients can help stabilise the drug or help more of the active ingredient reach its protein target. 
Excipients may also be used to make the manufacturing process more efficient.  
197 Assuming the new formulation patent will not be successfully challenged, an issue which will be 
discussed in the next section.  
198 21 CFR § 320.1(e); see also New Zealand Regulatory Guidelines for Medicines - Part D (ed 6.15, 
Medsafe, November 2011). 
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the same chemical formula. Therefore, an enforceable composition of matter claim 
over a new formulation (A + B’), could prevent generic competition because the 
generic drug company can only obtain regulatory approval using the same chemical 
formula, which means it cannot ‘design around’ the new patent claim. Similarly, a 
recently-filed method of use claim over a known composition can prevent generic 
competition if the branded drug has not yet obtained regulatory approval, because a 
generic drug company could only obtain regulatory approval for the same use.199  
 
Therefore, arguably, it may be possible to use evergreening to prevent generic 
competition over unpatentable therapies by claiming new formulations or methods of 
use, particularly where the medicine has not yet obtained regulatory approval. For 
example, study of 1304 listed patents in the FDA’s ‘Orange Book’200 between 1988 
and 2005 found that new formulation patents added an average of 6.5 years of patent 
life, and new method of use patents added 7.4 years, “at least nominally”.201  
 
2 When is patent evergreening ineffective? 
 
Although evergreening may be effective in some circumstances, as mentioned above, 
and discussed in more detail below, this section will provide several reasons why 
patent evergreening is largely ineffective. 
 
Firstly, patents used in evergreening such as new formulations and new 
methods of use are referred to as “secondary” or “second-generation” patents, due to 
an increased likelihood of successful obviousness challenges.202 For example, new 
formulations or derivative drugs are unpatentable for obviousness if their therapeutic 
properties were not unexpected to the relevant person skilled in the art.203 The 
combination of an active ingredient with a new inactive substance, but with known 
properties, is unlikely to be patentable unless there was some unexpected synergy.204  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
199 Technically, the generic drug company could obtain regulatory approval by submitting its own 
clinical trial data supporting a new indication. However, as discussed above, this defeats the 
competitive advantage of the generic drug company.  
200 The FDA’s Orange Book is an informal publication listing each medicine that has received 
regulatory approval in the United States and any in-force patents over them. See discussion in Chapter 
Two.  
201  A Kapczynski, C Park, BN Sampat “Polymorphs and Prodrugs and Salts (Oh My!): an Empirical 
Analysis of ‘Secondary’ Pharmaceutical patents” (2012) 7(12) PLoS One 1 at 1.  
202 See T Cook “How IPRs, like Nature, Abhor a Vacuum, and What Can Happen When They Fill it - 
Lacunae and Overlaps in Intellectual Property” (2012) 17 JIPR 296 at 299; Grubb and Thomsen, above 
n 1, at 427.   
203 See discussion of tests for inventive step in Chapter Two: KSR International Co v Teleflex Inc 550 
US 398 (2007) at 421; Portable Sawing Systems Ltd (in liq) v Lucas [2006] NZSC 20 at [54].  
204 In re Kerkhoven 626 F 2d 846 (CCPA 1980) at 850. See also Assa Abloy New Zealand Ltd v 
Aluminium Systems NZ Ltd HC Wellington CIV-2010-485-2, 7 March 2011 at [38].  
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Research has shown that secondary patents that do not claim a composition of 
matter are more likely to be challenged by generic drug companies.205 These patent 
challenges are particularly common for ‘blockbuster’ drugs because of the potential to 
take a share of the highly-profitable market.206 For example according to a study by 
the United States Federal Trade Commission, 73 per cent of patent challenges that go 
to trial are determined in favour of generic drug companies.207 Therefore, investors 
may be unwilling to develop a medicine that can only be protected with ‘secondary 
patents’.  
 
Pfizer, Inc v Apotex, Inc208 illustrates the above point. Apotex successfully 
invalidated a patent over Pfizer’s lucrative hypertension drug, amlodipine besylate.209 
A previous patent filed by Pfizer was cited as prior art,210 because it disclosed 
amlodipine maleate, a different ‘salt’ formulation of amlodipine. 211  The Court 
suggested it would be obvious to combine that patent with an academic publication 
which disclosed, inter alia, benzene sulphonate, which could be used to make 
amlodipine besylate.212 Pfizer argued that there was no motivation for a skilled person 
to combine the prior art citations because benzene sulphonate was rarely used.213 
However, the Federal Circuit held that “Pfizer has simply failed to prove that the 
results are unexpected” and “engaged in routine, verification testing to optimize 
selection of one of several known and clearly suggested pharmaceutically-acceptable 
salts”.214 
 
In Alza Corp v Mylan Labs, Inc,215 the Federal Circuit invalidated a patent 
over a new controlled-release formulation of a urinary incontinence drug, because “a 
person of ordinary skill in the art would ... have perceived a reasonable likelihood of 
success”.216  Similarly, in Abbott Labs v Andrx Pharms, Inc,217 an injunction to 
prevent manufacture of a controlled-release antibiotic was denied by the Federal 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
205  W Tang “Revitalizing the Patent System to Incentivize Pharmaceutical Innovation: The Potential of 
Claims with Means-Plus-Function Clauses” (2013) 62 Duke Law Journal 1069 at 1094 citing SC 
Hemphill and BN Sampat “When Do Generics Challenge Drug Patents?” (2011) 8(4) Journal of 
Empirical Legal Studies 613at 643.   
206 Hemphill and Sampat  above n 145, at 327  
207 Generic Drug Entry Prior to Patent Expiration: An FTC Study (Federal Trade Commission, 2002) 
at 13.  
208 Pfizer, Inc v Apotex, Inc 480 F3d 1348 (Fed Cir 2007).  
209 U.S. Patent No 4,879,303.  
210 U.S. Patent No 4,572,909. 
211 Modifying an existing drug to create different pharmaceutical ‘salts’ is a common strategy in patent 
‘evergreening’. See generally, R Chalmers “Evergreen or Deciduous? Australian Trends in Relation to 
'Evergreening' of Patents” (2006) 30(1) Melbourne University Law Review 29.   
212 Pfizer, Inc v Apotex, at 1363,  
213 At 1368.  
214 At 1396.  
215 Alza Corp v Mylan Labs, Inc 464 F3d 1286 (Fed Cir 2006).  
216 At 1295.  
217 Abbott Labs v Andrx Pharms, Inc 452 F 3d 1331 (Fed Cir 2006).  
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Circuit on the basis of obviousness because “the reduction of systemic side effects [of 
the drug] would not be surprising and would not be unexpected.”218 
 
With regard to new drug combinations, in Merck & Co v Biocraft Labs, Inc,219 
the Federal Circuit held that the properties of a combination of two diuretics “was to 
be expected from the known natriuretic properties of the two diuretics.”220 
 
Secondly, due to the inherent unpredictability of drug development, it is 
possible that the reformulated drug will be less effective than the ‘public domain’ 
version, which means society does not get the benefit of the best drug. This is more 
likely where an innovative drug is discovered through ‘phenotypic screening’ using 
animal models, which means that the mechanism of action is usually not known.221   
 
The third fundamental reason why ‘evergreening’ can be ineffective relates to 
the concept of free riding on the R&D costs of the innovator once they have validated 
the ‘proof of concept’.  As an illustration, assume the original design for the Wright 
brothers’ airplane was in the public domain and could not be patented.222 A patent 
attorney may point out that it is possible to obtain a patent over a minor improvement 
by modifying the aerofoils in a certain way, which is analogous to an ‘evergreening’ 
modification. As the aviation regulator will only allow the exact design plane to be 
built, once it has been proven as safe and effective, it will not be possible for 
competitors to ‘design around’ the patent that claims the original design and the 
improved aerofoils. However, the problem is that the Wright brothers have 
undertaken the significant risk of showing that aeroplanes having the original design 
are viable.223 Other companies will be able to make their own minor modifications 
and get to market at a much reduced risk, knowing that the basic design of the plane is 
functional. In an analogous way, an innovator which validates a drug target using a 
novel active ingredient may find that they cannot guarantee market exclusivity against 
free-riders developing ‘me-too’ drugs after they have spent considerable financial 
resources on validating the proof of concept.224  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
218 At 1345–1347. 
219 Merck & Co v Biocraft Labs, Inc 874 F.2d 804 (Fed Cir 1989).  
220 At 809.  
221 ‘Phenotypic screening’ occurs where the activity of a drug is assessed by ‘trial and error’ against 
living cell lines or animal models. See Chapter Two, n 157.  
222 In this illustration, the basic design of the airplane is analogous to a novel active ingredient of a 
drug. 
223 By analogy to the drug development process, by researching a novel active ingredient, the first 
innovator has taken on a higher risk of failure of Phase I-III trials.   
224 Notably, it has been argued that most drugs approved by the FDA are ‘me-too’ drugs that work in a 
similar way to existing drugs, and are not truly novel. The problem of innovators developing ‘me-too’ 
drugs to get a proportion of monopoly rents of a lucrative drug will be discussed further in this chapter 
below.   
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3 When can patent evergreening be effective? 
 
Notwithstanding the above, ‘evergreening’ strategies can be very effective when 
combined with aggressive marketing campaigns. Esomeprazole (Nexium), a popular 
antacid, is a textbook example. Esomeprazole is a more recently-patented derivative 
of an older drug, omeprazole (Prilosec).225 As the patent over omeprazole was 
expiring, AstraZeneca began one of the largest marketing campaigns in the history of 
the United States, spending over USD 500 million per annum on direct-to-consumer 
advertising regarding ‘the purple pill’, which resulted in 40 per cent of patients 
switching over from generic omeprazole to Nexium.226 This was despite the fact that 
Nexium was ten times the price of generic omeprazole, and had similar efficacy. 227 
 
However, it is arguable that such evergreening strategies are only useful for 
commodified ‘high volume’ or ‘over-the-counter’ drugs which can be marketed 
directly to the public.228 For the same reason, Ultracet’s successful launch, considered 
above by Outterson,229 may have only been possible because it is an ‘over-the-
counter’ painkiller drug. Patents may not even be necessary for such drugs. For 
example, Bayer’s Aspirin has been off-patent for 80 years, and still generates 
hundreds of millions of dollars in annual revenues because of strong branding.230  
 
The recent emergence of a drug ‘repurposing’ industry - also referred to as 
drug ‘repositioning’ – is further evidence that evergreening techniques can indeed 
rescue patentability in some circumstances. In particular, drug repurposing companies 
may be willing to take either a failed or generic drug to market on the strength of a 
method of use or reformulation patent alone.231 Repurposing failed or generic drugs is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
225  Omeprazole is a racemic mixture comprising L and R isomers of the active ingredient. 
Esomeprazole is an L-isomer. These isomers are referred to as enantiomers or ‘mirror-images’ of a 
drug molecule. Typically, a drug contains both L and R isomers, which is referred to as a ‘racemic’ 
drug. Frequently one drug isomer has improved pharmacological properties over the other, therefore, 
patenting enantiomers is a common ‘evergreening’ technique.  
226 Dwivedi, Hallihosur  and Rangan, above n 189, at 328. 
227 See B Goldacre Bad Pharma: how drug companies mislead doctors and harm patients (Fourth 
Estate, London, 2012) at 148.  
228 Similarly, see discussion below regarding the profitable reformulation of a dietary supplement for 
fish oil, ‘Lovaza’.  
229 Outterson, above n 63, at 48.  
230 See N Kresge “Bayer Aspirin is Feeling Plenty Healthy” Bloomberg Businessweek (online ed, New 
York, 23 June 2011).  
231 AM Thayer “Repurposing Drugs” (2012) 90(40) Chemical and Engineering News 15 at 15; M 
Wadman “New Cures Sought from Old Drugs” (2012) 490 Nature 15 at 15; TT Ashburn and KB Thor 
“Drug repositioning: identifying and developing new uses for existing drugs” (2004) 3(8) Nature 
reviews Drug Discovery 673 at 673. Some publicly funded research agencies and charities are also 
involved in drug repurposing: see TI Oprea and others “Drug Repurposing from an Academic 
Perspective” (2011) 8(3-4) Drug Discov Tod Ther Strat 61 at 61; M Allison “NCATS launches drug 
repurposing program” (2012) 30(7) Nature Biotechnology 571 at 571.  
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approximately half the cost of typical drug development, because expensive pre-
clinical and safety testing has already been completed.232  
 
Large pharmaceutical companies also undertake drug repurposing,233 although 
typically only if the initial indication over a drug has failed.234 Notably, however, 
failed drug candidates have only 2.5 per cent chance of success for a second 
indication if the first indication fails versus 59.4 per cent chance of success for a 
second indication if the first indication achieves regulatory approval.235     
 
Despite the higher risk of repurposing failed drugs, various drugs achieved 
financial success on the basis of a new method of use patent. One of the most famous 
examples is sildenafil, known as Viagra. This compound was originally developed by 
Pfizer as a hypertension medication and was subsequently repurposed to treat erectile 
dysfunction (ED). A method of use patent filed in 1994 was upheld by the District 
Court for the Eastern District of Virginia in Pfizer, Inc v Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, 
Inc,236 on the basis that, having regard to the prior art, it was not expected that oral 
administration of sildenafil would be useful to treat ED. 237 
 
Another famous repurposed drug is azidothymidine (AZT), a failed cancer 
drug synthesised in the mid-1960s, which was subsequently developed as a 
groundbreaking treatment for HIV. 238  In Burroughs Wellcome Co v Barr 
Laboratories,239 five patents filed between 1985 and 1987 over the method of treating 
HIV with AZT were challenged by generic drug companies on the basis that 
government scientists conceived of the invention and were fraudulently omitted as 
inventors.240 Although a challenge on the basis of inventorship was not considered in 
the previous discussion of unpatentability factors, this is another example of 
‘unpatentability under law’. The Federal Circuit upheld the patents on the basis that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
232 Roin, above n 43, at 47.  
233 For example, the New Indications Discovery Unit at Novartis, the Common Mechanism Research at 
Bayer, and the Indications Discovery Unit at Pfizer.   
234 Thayer, above n 228, at 16-17. This is because clinical trials for repurposing may uncover adverse 
effects which impact on the sales of the drug for the primary indication, as happened with Merck’s 
painkiller Vioxx when it was tested for use in colon cancer. Merck initiated the recall of Vioxx after the 
increase in adverse cardiovascular events was uncovered.  
235 JA DiMasi and others “Clinical Approval Success Rates for Investigational Cancer Drugs” (2013) 
94(3) Clinical Pharmacology & Therapeutics 329 at 329.  
236 Pfizer, Inc v Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc No 10-CV-00128 (ED Va Aug 12, 2011).  
237 At 78.  
238 S Broder “The development of antiretroviral therapy and its impact on the HIV-1/AIDS pandemic” 
(2010) 85(1) Antiviral Research 1at 4.  
239 Burroughs Wellcome Co v Barr Laboratories 40 F 3d 1223 (Fed Cir 1994).  
240 35 USC § 102(f). 
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the scientists only “confirmed the operability of the inventions”241 The method of use 
patents eventually expired in 2005 and were not invalidated.   
 
Therefore, notwithstanding the weakness of ‘secondary patents’, it is possible 
to use evergreening techniques to ‘rescue’ failed drugs, particularly where the drug 
has not already achieved regulatory approval. However, in absence of empirical data, 
it is almost impossible to predict how many therapies for unmet medical needs have 
not been funded because secondary patents are considered too weak to withstand 
challenge.  
 
 Summary 
 
Although empirical data is largely absent, the proportion of promising drug candidates 
that are screened or abandoned due to insufficient patent protection may be very high. 
To the extent these otherwise medically viable but unpatentable therapies cannot be 
‘rescued’ using flexibilities within the patent system, they represent a significant 
problem. It may not be possible to obtain an enforceable patent over a repurposed 
drug if its properties are not sufficiently novel and unexpected in light of the prior art. 
While evergreening techniques are better at preventing generic competition over 
drugs that initially failed to achieve regulatory approval, these are less likely to 
become useful drugs. 
 
Further, when a drug has become available as a generic, evergreening 
techniques are unlikely to be effective. In particular, unless a method of use or 
reformulation patent can effectively block ‘off-label’ competition by the generic drug, 
it will not be possible to enforce a monopoly price. Accordingly, finding new uses for 
generic drugs falls within a broader category of ‘unmonopolisable therapies’, which 
will now be discussed.  
 
E The Problem of ‘Unmonopolisable Therapies’  
 
For certain types of medical therapies, it is not possible to enforce the market 
exclusivity necessary to recover innovators’ costs, because patients can access the 
therapy at a cheap or nonexistent cost from multiple sources. The author refers to 
these as ‘unmonopolisable therapies’. The inability to practically enforce property 
rights over a therapy creates a situation referred to by economists as “the tragedy of 
the commons”, which occurs when a resource cannot be effectively or efficiently 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
241 Burroughs Wellcome Co v Barr Laboratories, above n 237, at [35].  
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exploited. 242  In the present case, the ‘commons’ would be medically valuable 
information regarding which unmonopolisable therapies are safe and effective 
treatments, and the ‘tragedy’ is the lack of private incentives to generate this 
medically valuable information because of the inability to exclude others from using 
it. Commentators have noted the pharmaceutical industry’s bias towards 
monopolisable therapies at the expense of unmonopolisable therapies creates an 
environment where the latter are systematically marginalised.243  
 
However, similarly to unpatentable therapies, the concept of unmonopolisable 
therapies does not imply an absolute standard. Rather, such therapies exist along a 
continuum from ‘less unmonopolisable’ to ‘highly unmonopolisable’ therapies. 
Kapczynski and Syed recognised this “continuum of excludability” for certain 
informational goods with medical value. 244  Accordingly, various types of 
unmonopolisable therapies’ starting from the least to the most ‘unmonopolisable’, 
will be discussed below in turn: second uses of generic drugs, dietary supplements, 
diets, uses of readily available chemicals, lifestyle interventions and negative 
information about drugs. 245 
 
1 Second uses of generic drugs 
 
Various scholars have considered how finding new uses for generic drugs lack private 
incentives for clinical trials because doctors are free to prescribe generic drugs for 
new indications ‘off-label’.246 The next sections will analyse the reasons why patents 
over methods of use and new formulations or combinations cannot prevent such ‘off-
label’ competition in many cases.  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
242 See generally, G Hardin “The Tragedy of the Commons” (2009) 1 Journal of Natural Resources 
Policy Research 243. See also M Abramowicz “Perfecting Patent Prizes” (2001) 56 Vanderbilt Law 
Review 114 at 181-183 and BD Wright “The Economics of Invention Incentives: Patents, Prizes, and 
Research Contracts” (1983) 73 Amer Econ Rev 691 at 694, discussing the “common pool problem”. 
Compare MA Heller and RS Eisenberg “Can Patents Deter Innovation?: The Anticommons in 
Biomedical Research” (1998) 280 Science 698 at 698.  
243 Kapczynski and Syed, above n 44, at 1947; see also M Brezis “Big pharma and health care: 
unsolvable conflict of interests between private enterprise and public health” (2008) 45(2) Israel 
Journal of Psychiatry and Related Sciences 83 at 83.  
244 Kapczynski and Syed, above n 44, at 1915-1916. Kapczynski and Syed refer to ‘highly non-
excludable’ therapies, which is broadly synonymous with the term ‘unmonopolisable therapies’, coined 
by the author.  
245 While surgical methods are also ‘unpatentable therapies’ subject to lack of patentability under law, 
they share many characteristics with unmonopolisable therapies, such as the impracticality of enforcing 
a monopoly price. As the author has already discussed examples of surgical methods which lack 
private incentives under the current system in the previous section, surgical methods will not be 
discussed in this section.  
246 Eisenberg, above n 1, at 729; Syed, above n 133, at 3; H Grabowski and others “Does Generic Entry 
Always Increase Consumer Welfare” (2012) 67 Food & Drug LJ 373 at 382.  
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   (a) The problem with using method of use patents to enforce a monopoly 
 
As noted in Chapter Two, generic drug companies can use ‘skinny labelling’ to ‘carve 
out’ a patented use from their labels. This means that method of use patents cannot 
stop the generic companies from supplying the drug to the market, provided that the 
patent over the original indication has expired.247  
 
In New Zealand, the Pharmaceutical Management Agency (PHARMAC) 
helps indirectly enforce second medical use patents by not permitting the 
reimbursement of generic drugs which are prescribed for an indication covered by an 
innovator’s method of use patent. Pharmaceutical reimbursement will be discussed 
further in Chapter Four. However, the legal position in the United States does not 
encourage finding second uses for generic drugs. In particular, many state laws 
require mandatory substitution with a cheaper generic drug where it is available.248 
Moreover, generic drug companies have successfully challenged attempts by 
innovator companies to leverage ‘method of use’ patents to prevent competition. 249  
 
Roin suggests solving this problem by imposing restrictions on ‘off-label’ 
prescribing by doctors and allowing limited access to electronic medical records in 
order for pharmaceutical companies to monitor infringement.250 However, this is 
likely to raise privacy issues, and as noted in Chapter Two, pharmaceutical companies 
are generally reluctant to sue doctors and patients,251 as opposed to suing generic drug 
manufacturers.  
 
Accordingly, as discussed above, carve-out labeling has become a common 
way for generics to enter the United States market, with 11 such drugs approved by 
the FDA in 2010.252 Innovator companies struggle to enforce method of use patents 
against generic drug companies, even when it is known they can be used in an 
infringing manner. In Warner-Lambert Co v Apotex,253 the Federal Circuit held that 
mere knowledge by a generic drug company that its drugs are being used for a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
247 See discussion of ‘skinny labeling’ in Chapter Two; see also A Rai “Use Patents, Carve-Outs, and 
Incentives - A New Battle in the Drug-Patent Wars” (2012) 367(6) New England Journal of Medicine 
491; Bristol-Myers Squibb v Shalala 91 F 3d 1493 (DC Cir 1996).  
248 HG Grabowski and JM Vernon “Substitution Laws and Innovation in the Pharmaceutical Industry” 
(1979) Law and Contemporary Problems 43 at 49, 56.  
249 Caraco Pharmaceutical Laboratories, Ltd. v Novo Nordisk A/S 566 US__(2012).  
250 Roin, above n 41, at 59-65.  
251 Similar problems with enforceability occur for preventing widespread copyright infringement of 
music and film on the Internet. For this reason, while Roin’s proposal is worthy of merit, it will not be 
considered further in this thesis.  
252 Rai, above 244, at 491.  
253 Warner-Lambert Co v Apotex 315 F 3d 1348 (Fed Cir 2003).  
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patented use is not sufficient to show ‘inducement’ to infringe, unless there is 
evidence the drug was being specifically promoted for the carved out use.254 It is 
unclear whether the Court would reach a similar position in New Zealand in light of 
broader grounds for contributory infringement under s 141 of the Patents Act,255 but 
in any case, it is likely that the generic drug company could take precautions to reduce 
the chance of contributory infringement.  
 
(b) The problem with using reformulation and combination patents to 
enforce a monopoly 
 
As noted in the previous section, patents over reformulations or combinations of 
generic drugs can prevent generic competition in some circumstances. However, 
according to Smith:256  
 
The success of such composition of matter patents in protecting the repositioned 
drug product will depend in large part on the availability of generic products that 
can be substituted through off-label use to achieve the same therapeutic result as 
the repositioned product. 
 
It is notable that where drug companies have attempted to create business models 
based on treating new diseases using combinations of generic drugs, these have 
generally not been successful.257 However, it is difficult to know whether a significant 
contributor to this failure was a lack of adequate support from investors due to the 
potential for ‘off-label’ generic competition, rather than lack of medical viability. It is 
likely that both factors would be relevant.  
 
Further, any attempt to establish a business model using drug combinations or 
formulations is frustrated by the large number of pharmacies that provide 
‘compounding’ services. This is a process whereby pharmacies can mix drug 
compounds in particular ratios or prepare specific formulations for their customers.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
254 At 1363.  
255 Patents Act 2013, s 141. In Australia, ‘contributory infringement’ of method of use claims by 
generic drug companies was successfully made out under the similarly-worded s 117 of the Patents Act 
1990 (Cth): see Apotex Pty Ltd v Sanofi-Aventis Australia Pty Ltd v (No 2) [2012] FCAFC 102.  
256 RB Smith “Repositioned drugs: integrating intellectual property and regulatory strategies” (2011) 8 
Drug Discovery Today: Therapeutic Strategies 131 at 133.  
257 For example, NitroMed developed a new drug based on a combination of two generic drugs, which 
was found to be more effective in one racial group, African-Americans, but failed to achieve 
profitability: see D Armstrong “NitroMed Halts Marketing of Drug” Wall Street Journal (online ed, 
New York, 16 January 2008). Another company, CombinatoRx, based its business model on 
combining generic drugs to find new indications, but ultimately failed to produce any viable drugs: see 
A Pollack “CombinatoRx matches old generic drugs for powerful new medications” New York Times 
(online ed, New York, 1 July 2007); M Wadman “The Right Combination” (2006) 439 Nature 390; L 
Timmerman “CombinatoRx Reckoning Arrives: Stock Crashes on Failed Arthritis Trial” Xconomy 
<www.xconomy.com>.  
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This issue has been subject to controversy. In Thompson v Western States 
Medical Center258 the Supreme Court declared that an attempt by the FDA to restrict 
advertising for compounding services was unconstitutional. Currently the FDA 
permits the compounding of drugs provided that there are no public safety concerns 
and they are not “manufacturing” the drug in large quantities.259 Arguably, reluctance 
by the FDA to regulate compounding services will interfere with the ability of 
innovators to invest in this space.260  
 
Therefore, the only way drug reformulations can defend the risk of ‘off-label’ 
competition from generic drugs is to demonstrate significantly increased safety, 
efficacy or convenience in the new patented formulation.  As noted by Smith above, 
repositioning will not be successful if cheap generics can be substituted with the same 
clinical result.261 The risk that the generic can be prescribed or compounded in a 
manner which achieves the same clinical result means that most drug companies have 
a significant private disincentive to repurpose ‘off-patent’ generic drugs.262  
 
(c) Examples of second uses of generic drugs which lack private funding 
incentives 
 
As noted above, doctors are legally allowed to prescribe medicines for ‘off-label’ 
uses.263 Accordingly, doctors play a major role in the discovery of new off-label uses 
for drugs.264 Roin notes the large potential social benefits from developing second 
uses for generic drugs.265 Medicines have many ‘off-target’ effects on the body, which 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
258 Thompson v Western States Medical Center 535 US 357 (2002).  
259 See Compliance Policy Guidance for FDA Staff and Industry Sec 460.200 Pharmacy Compounding  
(United States Food and Drug Administration, May 2002) at 3.  
260 An example is the case of Makena (hydroxyprogesterone caproate). K-V Pharmaceutical had 
achieved FDA approval over Makena in 2011 as a treatment for reducing risk of preterm births. The 
FDA initially indicated that pharmacies were not able to compound the drug, which had previously 
been available for approximately USD 300. As a result, K-V Pharmaceutical Company increased prices 
for the medicine to USD 30,000, resulting in a public backlash and retraction by the FDA: see 
generally J Armstrong “Unintended consequences — the cost of preventing preterm births after FDA 
approval of a branded version of 17OHP” (2011) 364(18) N Engl J Med 1689. As a result of the FDA’s 
change in policy, the future of K-V Pharmaceutical is in doubt: see E Silverman “FDA Statement about 
Makena Compounding Clouds KV Pharma’s Future” Forbes (online ed, New York, 18 June 2012).  
261 Smith, above n 256, at 136.  
262 See T Agres “New Life for Old Drugs” Drug Discovery & Development (online ed, 29 July 2011): 
‘Some large drug companies are not completely convinced of the value of drug repurposing. This is 
particularly true when drugs have gone off-patent and generics are available. While the FDA will give 
marketing exclusivity for a new indication, there is little to prevent physicians from prescribing a 
generic version in its place. ‘Highlighting new uses for off-patent drugs may be exciting, but it is a 
challenge for companies to get enough value out of it to fund clinical trials’.   
263 Federal Trade Commission v Simeon Mgmt Corp 391 F Supp 697 (N.D. Cal. 1975) at 706-707; 
Section 25 Medicines Act 1981.  
264 See HJ Demonaco and others “The Major Role of Clinicians in the Discovery of Off-Label Drug 
Therapies” (2006) 26 Pharmacotherapy 323 at 323.   
265 Roin, above n 43, at 42-46. 
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means they are typically useful to treat more than one disease.266 A 2009 study 
suggested that the average drug has over 18 off-label indications which are prescribed 
by doctors in practice.267 However, the lack of private incentives for clinical trials of 
‘off-label’ uses means that such therapies will often lack clinical trial data supporting 
safety and efficacy.268 The harm to the public caused by this lack of data could be 
considerable.  
 
As noted in Chapter Two, approximately 80 per cent of current drug 
prescriptions are generic.269 The number of generic drugs on the market expands 
every time a drug loses patent protection, which increases the number of drugs that 
lack private incentives for finding new uses. For example, Roin notes how recent 
computational screening technology has identified many off-patent drugs that can be 
used as potential treatments for various diseases including cancer, Alzheimer’s 
disease, diabetes, stroke, tuberculosis, and malaria.270 The author has also identified a 
large number of unmonopolisable therapies involving off-patent generic drugs.271 
However, it is beyond the scope of this thesis to analyse each of these therapies in 
depth, although a couple will be mentioned.  
 
Firstly, dichloroacetic acid, received considerable media attention as a 
potential cancer treatment, but no interest from the pharmaceutical industry, allegedly 
because the drug compound is off-patent.272 Notably, this is despite the fact that a 
method of use patent was granted to the researchers.273  
 
Secondly, the 1950s nonsteroidal anti-inflammatory drug oxyphenbutazone 
has demonstrated effectiveness against Mycobacterium tuberculosis, which typically 
requires many years of multi-drug therapy.274 The principal investigator stated: “[n]o 
drug firm will pay for clinical trials if they don’t expect to make a profit on the agent. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
266 I Nobeli, AD Favia and JM Thornton “Protein promiscuity and its implications for biotechnology” 
(2009) 27(2) Nature biotechnology 157 at 157. 
267 SM Walton and others Developing Evidence- Based Research Priorities for Off-Label Drug Use 
(Effective Health Care Research Report No. 12, May 2009) at 5.  
268 M Oates “Facilitating Informed Medical Treatment through Production and Disclosure of Research 
into Off-Label Uses of Pharmaceuticals” (2005) 80 NYU L Rev 1272 at 1283.  
269  The Use of Medicines in the United States: Review of 2010 (IMS Institute for Healthcare 
Informatics, April 2011) at 3; Roin, above n 43, at 45.    
270 At 44-45. See, for example, MJ Keiser and others “Predicting new molecular targets for known 
drugs” (2009) 462(7270) Nature 175. 
271 Examples of such therapies, along with other unmonopolisable therapies identified by the author are 
available at <www.crowdfundedcures.org/about>.  
272 A Coghlan “Cheap, safe drug kills most cancers” (2007) 2857 New Scientist 13. 
273 US Patent No 8,609,724.  
274 B Gold and others “Nonsteroidal anti-inflammatory drug sensitizes Mycobacterium tuberculosis to 
endogenous and exogenous antimicrobials” (2012) 109(40) Proceedings of the National Academy of 
Sciences 16004 at 16004.  
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And that would be the case for an off-patent drug that people can buy over the counter 
for pain in most of the world.”275 
 
2 Dietary supplements 
 
Dietary supplements are also good candidates for unmonopolisable therapies, as they 
can legally be sold to any member of the public without conducting clinical trials, 
provided that they are not advertised as medicines. This is a regulatory ‘grey area’ 
with limited oversight, which can frustrate attempts to enforce a monopoly price.   
 
(a)  Regulation of dietary supplements 
 
New Zealand defines dietary supplements as anything comprising an amino acid, 
edible substance, herb, mineral, synthetic nutrient, or vitamin.276 Under the Dietary 
Supplements Regulations 1985 of the Food Act 1981, dietary supplements can be 
placed on the market without clinical trials provided that therapeutic claims are not 
made.277  
 
The United States has a similar definition for dietary supplements278 and 
allows them to be marketed without having to obtain regulatory approval, provided 
that such marketing is not false and misleading. The FDA has a list of pre-approved, 
carefully worded statements that can be made in respect to supplements or food, but 
do not allow health claims relating to the prevention or treatment of any disease.279  
 
Despite this, there is a large amount of information, regarding the use of 
supplements in the treatment and prevention of disease.280 However, the unique 
regulatory environment means there is a lack of private incentives to conduct large 
clinical trials. In particular, because dietary supplements can be put on the market 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
275 “1950s NSAID Kills Resistant Tuberculosis” Genetic Engineering and Biotechnology News (online 
ed,  New York, 11 September 2012).   
276 Dietary Supplement Regulations 1985, reg 2A.  
277 Reg 11. See also Medicines Act 1981, s 4,  s 58(1).  
278Dietary Supplement Health and Education Act of 1994  21 USC § 321.  
279 “Health Claims Meeting Significant Scientific Agreement (SSA)” (19 July 2013) Food and Drug 
Administration <www.fda.gov>. For example, dietary supplements are permitted to make claims that 
the product supports the structure of function of the body, for example, ‘calcium supplements help 
build strong bones’), which are called ‘structure/function’ claims. These can be contrasted with medical 
claims, for example, ‘calcium supplements can be used to treat osteoporosis’.  
280 “Integrative Medicine. About Herbs, Botanicals, and other products” Memorial Soan Kettering 
Cancer Centre <www.mskcc.org>. This website has a comprehensive list of dietary supplements and 
herbs with scientific evidence regarding their efficacy for treatment and prevention of disease.  
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without requiring regulatory approval,281 method of use patents will not be able to 
enforce a monopoly price against competition. Paradoxically, these regulations can 
further disincentivise finding new medical uses for dietary supplements, because of 
the risk they would be considered licensed drugs. For example, any claim that a 
dietary supplement is “intended for use in the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment, 
or prevention of disease in man or other animals”, will mean that it will be considered 
a drug that requires regulatory approval.282 Therefore, the more clinical evidence 
available that dietary supplements may be useful as treatments for disease, the more 
likely they will attract adverse attention from regulatory authorities.  
 
(b) Problems with monopolising dietary supplements 
 
Notably, in some cases, regulatory oversight triggered by scientifically demonstrating 
medicinal use of dietary supplements can be leveraged by companies that wish to 
monopolise them. In particular, in some circumstances, the FDA has removed 
competing dietary supplements from the market that contain a naturally occurring 
active ingredient that has received regulatory approval for treatment of a disease on 
the basis that the supplements contain an ‘unlicensed drug’.  
 
A notable example is red yeast rice (RYR), used traditionally in China for 
circulatory disorders, which was discovered to contain a naturally occurring form of 
the cholesterol lowering drug lovastatin. As a result, in 1998, the FDA controversially 
banned RYR dietary supplements containing lovastatin.283   
 
In another example, dietary supplements containing pyridoxamine, a form of 
vitamin B6, were removed by the FDA pursuant to a ‘citizen petition’ by Biostratum, 
which had filed a patent application over pyridoxamine to treat diabetic neuropathy.284 
The FDA petition was successful on the basis that it was considered a drug under 
investigation.285 The outcome of clinical trials is still uncertain and pyridoxamine has 
not received regulatory approval.286 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
281 In fact, the FDA can only remove a dietary supplement from the market if it is adulterated with an 
ingredient that ‘presents a significant or unreasonable risk of illness or injury’: see 21 USC § 342(f).  
282 Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, s 201(g)(1)(B).  
283 See M McCarthy “FDA bans red yeast rice product” (1998) 351(9116) The Lancet 1637.  
284 US Patent Application No 20130011379. This patent was filed on 13 April 2012, but was 
abandoned on 9 January 2013 due to failure to respond to an examination report.  
285 Letter from MA Chappel (Acting Associate Commissioner for Regulatory Affairs, Food and Drug 
Administration) to KM Sanzo (External legal counsel, Biostratum) regarding FDA Response to 
Biostratum, Inc Citizen Petition (12 January 2009) at 6.  
286 “NephroGenex acquires rights to the diabetic nephropathy drug” (10 May 2006) Renal Business 
Today <www.renalbusiness.com>. 
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Similarly, colchicine is a natural plant extract that was available as a cheap 
dietary supplement to treat gout, however, it had not been proven safe and effective. 
Controversially, URL Pharma paid for the clinical trials required to obtain regulatory 
approval for using colchicine to treatment of familial Mediterranean fever, obtaining 7 
years market exclusivity as an orphan drug designation.287 Subsequently, the FDA 
removed all the unlicensed versions of colchicine, resulting in the price rising from 
$0.09 to $4.85 per tablet.288  
 
Despite this, for many dietary supplements, it is impossible for the FDA to 
remove them from the market. In particular, under the ‘grandfathering’ provisions of 
the Dietary Supplement Health and Education Act of 1994, the FDA cannot remove a 
supplement which was available in the United States before 1994.289 Colchicine was 
an exception because it is a rare example of a supplement that was already deemed an 
‘unlicensed drug.’ However, the grandfathering provisions would apply to many 
vitamins and common supplements that may be promising treatments for many 
diseases. Some examples include Vitamin C in treatment of cancer, 290 HIV, 291 drug 
resistant tuberculosis292 and Alzheimer’s disease,293 vitamin B to prevent dementia294 
and colon cancer,295 vitamin D for treatment and prevention of breast cancer296 and 
Crohn’s disease, 297  and Vitamin E for treating Alzheimer’s disease. 298  These 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
287 Orphan drug exclusivity will be discussed in Chapter 6A.  
288 See AS Kesselheim and DH Solomon “Incentives for drug development--the curious case of 
colchicine” (2010) 362 (22) N Engl J Med 2045 at 2046.  
289 See 21 USC § 321(ff)(3)(B). 
290 C Kuiper and others “Low Ascorbate Levels Are Associated with Increased Hypoxia-Inducible 
Factor-1 Activity and an Aggressive Tumor Phenotype in Endometrial Cancer” (2010) 70 Cancer Res 
5749; LJ Hoffer and others “Phase I clinical trial of i.v. ascorbic acid in advanced malignancy” (2008) 
19(11) Annals of Oncology 1969. 
291 S Harakeh, RJ Jariwalla and L Pauling “Suppression of human immunodeficiency virus replication 
by ascorbate in chronically and acutely infected cells” (1990) 87(18) Proc Natl Acad Sci 7245. 
292 C Vilchèze and others “Mycobacterium tuberculosis is extraordinarily sensitive to killing by a 
vitamin C-induced Fenton reaction” (2013) 1881 Nature Communications 4.   
293 DJ Foley and LR White “Dietary intake of antioxidants and risk of Alzheimer disease: food for 
thought” (2002) 287(24) JAMA 3261.  
294 G Douaud and others “Preventing Alzheimer’s disease-related gray matter atrophy by B-vitamin 
treatment” (2013) 110(23) PNAS 9523.  
295 SC Larsson, N Orsini, A Wolk “Vitamin B6 and risk of colorectal cancer: a meta-analysis of 
prospective studies” (2010) 303(11) JAMA 1077; SC Larsson, E Giovannucci, and A Wolk “Vitamin 
B6 Intake, alcohol consumption, and colorectal cancer:  A longitudinal population-based cohort of 
women” (2005) 128 Gastroenterology 1830; E Theodoratou and others “Dietary vitamin B6 intake and 
the risk of colorectal cancer” 17(1) Cancer Epidemiol Biomarkers Prev 171.  
296 Saint Louis University Medical Center “Vitamin D holds promise in battling a deadly breast cancer” 
(22 January 2013) ScienceDaily <www.sciencedaily.com>; K Robien, GJ Cutler, and D Lazovich 
“Vitamin D intake and breast cancer risk in postmenopausal women: the Iowa Women's Health Study” 
(2007) 18(7) Cancer Causes Control 775; ML Neuhouser and others “Vitamin D insufficiency in a 
multiethnic cohort of breast cancer survivors” (2008) 88(1) Am J Clin Nutr 133. 
297 SP Jørgensen and others “Clinical trial: vitamin D3 treatment in Crohn's disease - a randomised 
double-blind placebo-controlled study”  (2010) 32(2) Aliment Pharmacol Ther 377.  
298 MW Dysken and others “Effect of vitamin E and memantine on functional decline in Alzheimer 
disease: the TEAM-AD VA Cooperative randomized trial” (2014) 311(1) JAMA 33. 
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supplements are ubiquitous, and an attempt to enforce patent protection over them 
would be futile. It would be like an attempt to ‘patent the sun’, even if this were 
possible.299  
 
(c) Problems with patenting dietary supplements 
 
Despite the above, the primary way to enforce a monopoly price over a supplement is 
to patent a new composition of matter which will not be susceptible to competition. 
Many drugs were developed by medicinal chemists by extracting and concentrating 
active chemicals from natural products and turning them into ‘drug-like’ 
compounds.300  However, in practice, it is difficult to obtain a patent over the active 
chemical of a natural product due to anticipation or obviousness, especially if their 
properties are already known in traditional medicine or have been prior published in 
academic research.  
 
In Ex parte Pfizer, Inc,301 the BPAI cancelled a claim by Pfizer over	   the	  use	  of	  phosphodiesterase inhibitors to treat ED302 in light of the traditional use of the herb 
Yin Yang Huo (Horny Goat Weed). The latter contained an ingredient (icariin) that 
was a weak selective phosphodiesterase inhibitor. As a result, Pfizer could not prevent 
competition from other ‘me-too’ phosphodiesterase inhibitor drugs developed by Eli 
Lilly (makers of Cialis) and Bayer (makers of Levitra).303 
 
In Creagri, Inc v Pinnaclife Inc,304 the District Court of the Northern District 
of California invalidated Cre-Agri’s patents over a dietary supplement containing the 
phenolic compounds hydroxytyrosol and oleuropein, which are naturally present in 
olive oil.305 In particular, one of its patents was anticipated by a patent and academic 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
299 In fact, a major source of vitamin D for humans is from sunlight, in particular, exposing the skin to 
ultraviolet light. Accordingly, the use of vitamin D to treat disease could also be an unmonopolisable 
‘lifestyle intervention’ discussed below.  
300 For example, an ingredient from willow bark, salycilic acid, was modified and chemically 
synthesised as acetylsalicylic acid (Aspirin) in 1897 by Bayer into a less-irritating version: see RL 
Mueller RL and S Scheidt “History of drugs for thrombotic disease. Discovery, development, and 
directions for the future” (1994) 89 Circulation 432 at 436. Examples of more modern drugs developed 
from natural sources include digoxin (brand name Lanoxin), which is derived from the foxglove plant 
(Digitalis lanata), and is approved for treatment of various heart conditions and capsaicin (brand name 
Qutenza), which is a chemical isolated from chili peppers, and approved as a dermal patch for 
treatment of neuropathic pain.   
301 Ex parte Pfizer, Inc No 2009-004106 (BPAI February 12, 2010).  
302 US Patent 6,469,012 (filed Mar 4 1996, issued Oct 22 2002). 
303 See Pfizer Inc., et al v Lilly ICOS LLC et al No 02-1561 (D Del Oct 22, 2002). 
304 Creagri, Inc v Pinnaclife Inc  No 11-CV-6635-LHK (ND Cal January 1, 2013).  
305 At 6.  
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publication306 and the other was held invalid due to lack of written description and 
utility.307  
 
Accordingly, pharmaceutical companies that attempt to develop dietary 
supplements for mainstream medicinal uses struggle to become financially viable. 
Scotia Pharmaceuticals Limited failed to successfully promote development of 
gamma-linolenic acid - which is a fatty acid contained in evening primrose oil - as a 
pharmaceutical product.308 It has been recognised that the difficulty in obtaining 
patent protection for gamma-linolenic acid created a barrier to development.309 
Ultimately, the failure may have been due to a lack of demonstrated efficacy,310 
although conceivably, lack of funding may have contributed to this.311 
 
Despite this, some dietary supplements that have been patented as new 
formulations have generated ‘blockbuster’ revenues. An example is Lovaza, a new 
formulation of fish oil used for treatment of cardiovascular disease, with a ‘me-too’ 
competitor, Vascepa, on the horizon, despite the fact that these treatments may offer 
nominal benefits.312  
 
Another example of a ‘blockbuster’ dietary supplement is Niaspan, available 
on prescription for treatment of cardiovascular disease. Niaspan generated over USD 
5.11 billion in sales between 1997 and 2012, 313  despite being a slow release 
formulation of a common dietary supplement, niacin, and recent comparative trials 
showing no benefit from taking this ‘drug’.314  
 
However, notably, these cases are similar to the ‘evergreening’ of Ultracet and 
Nexium above, where a broad, high volume market - heart disease - and strong 
marketing has helped achieve commercial success.315 It is questionable whether the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
306 At 7.  
307 At 20. See also S Barazza “Slipping on (olive) oil: key patents on olive-derived phenolic 
supplements declared invalid” (17 January 2014) PatLit <www.patlit.blogspot.com>. 
308 P Lapinskas “The development of gamma-linolenic acid (GLA) as a pharmaceutical product”  
(paper presented to Speciality Chemicals for the 21st Century (International Seminar), Valbonne, 
France, 16-17 September 1999) .  
309 At [29].  
310 HC Williams “Editorial: Evening primrose oil for atopic dermatitis - Time to say goodnight”  (2003) 
327(7428) BMJ 1358 at 1358.   
311 There is a ‘catch-22’ situation for therapies which lack a viable market; these often have limited 
evidence of safety and efficacy due to a lack of incentive to fund large clinical trials.  
312 M Herper “Could A Fish Oil Backlash Wash Out Amarin Pharmaceuticals?” Forbes (online ed, 
New York, 19 November 2012).  
313 D Armstrong “Abbott Doubled Niaspan U.S. Sales Before Trials Cut Use” (11 June 2013) 
Bloomberg <www.bloomberg.com>. 
314 H Krumholz “Five Lessons From Niaspan's Disappointing Study” Forbes (online ed, New York, 31 
May 2011).  
315 Herper, above n 312.  
100	  	  
same approach would work for a dietary supplement used to treat a disease with high 
social costs, but low marketing potential.  
 
However, with regard to reformulations of generic drugs, already discussed 
above, unless a reformulated supplement will perform significantly better than the 
supplement already available on the market and taken ‘off-label’, it is unlikely that a 
private company will fund clinical trials.  
 
3 Diets  
 
Diets are examples of ‘highly unmonopolisable therapies’. Obviously, it is not 
possible to enforce a monopoly price over whole foods if they are readily available. 
Various studies have shown the potential efficacy of foods for the prevention and 
treatment of disease including osteoarthritis, 316  cancer, 317 and cardiovascular 
disease.318 However, large, well-controlled clinical trials regarding diets are typically 
rare or non-existent. 
 
Research suggests that many of the medicinal benefits of fruits and vegetables 
are due to the complex additive and synergistic combination phytochemicals present 
in whole foods.319 Even if extracting and patenting these phytochemicals as a drug 
were possible, it may not be as safe or effective as whole foods.  
 
According to the World Health Organization, cardiovascular disease and 
cancer are the leading causes of death worldwide, 17 million and 7.6 million 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
316 FMK Williams and others “Dietary garlic and hip osteoarthritis: evidence of a protective effect and 
putative mechanism of action” (2010) 11(1) BMC Musculoskeletal Disorders 280; M Roberts 
“Broccoli slows arthritis, researchers think” (27 August 2013) BBC News <www.bbc.com>. 
317  NP Seeram “Berry fruits for cancer prevention: current status and future prospects” 
 (2008) 56(3) Journal of Agricultural and Food Chemistry 630; RW Owen and others “The 
antioxidant/anticancer potential of phenolic compounds isolated from olive oil” (2000) 36(10) 
European Journal of Cancer 1235; T Kim and others “Ethyl alcohol extracts of Hizikia fusiforme 
sensitize AGS human gastric adenocarcinoma cells to tumor necrosis factor-related apoptosis-inducing 
ligand-mediated apoptosis” (2009) 12(4) Journal of Medicinal Food 782; V Benetou and others 
“Conformity to traditional Mediterranean diet and cancer incidence: the Greek EPIC cohort” (2008) 
99(1) British Journal of Cancer 191. 
318 V Kapil and others “Inorganic Nitrate Supplementation Lowers Blood Pressure in Humans: Role for 
Nitrite-Derived NO” (2010) 56 Hypertension 274; K Ried and others “Effect of garlic on blood 
pressure: a systematic review and meta-analysis” (2008) 8 BMC Cardiovasc Disord 13; K Ried and 
others “Does chocolate reduce blood pressure? A meta-analysis” (2010) 8 BMC Med 39; SA 
Mortensen and others “The effect of coenzyme Q10 on morbidity and mortality in chronic heart failure. 
Results from the Q-SYMBIO study” (2013) Heart Failure Congress 2013 Final Programme Number 
440; S Tokunaga and others “Green tea consumption and serum lipids and lipoproteins in a population 
of healthy workers in Japan” (2002) 12(3) Ann Epidemiol 157. 
319 RH Lui “Health benefits of fruit and vegetables are from additive and synergistic combinations of 
phytochemicals” (2003) 78(3) Am J Clin Nutr 517S.  
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respectively, in 2008.320  In New Zealand, cardiovascular disease and cancer caused 
35 per cent of all health losses.321 The large number of potentially cost-effective 
treatments for cardiovascular disease and cancer based on diets and dietary 
supplements highlight the significant impact on society’s disease burden, and 
increased pressure on its healthcare budget, due to a lack of private incentives to fund 
larger clinical trials.  
 
4 Uses of readily available chemicals 
 
There are highly unmonopolisable therapies involving readily available chemicals that 
can have significant health impact. For example, the discovery of oral rehydration 
therapy (ORT), which involves the administration of a salt, sugar and water solution 
for the treatment of cholera, has been stated as “potentially the most important 
medical advance [of the 20th] century”.322 Between 1980 and 2006, ORT has reduced 
deaths from cholera from 5 million to 2 million per annum, the majority of which are 
children under the age of five.323 Ruxin notes the failure to adopt this cheaper and 
superior treatment in the United States is a result of the perverse incentives for 
hospitals to use an expensive therapy 324  in order to “maximise insurance 
reimbursement”. 325 Another example of using readily available chemicals is the 
injection of methylene blue for the effective treatment of lower back pain.326   
 
5 Lifestyle interventions 
 
Lifestyle interventions are also highly unmonopolisable therapies that may have 
significant medical benefits, but lack private incentives for clinical trials. For 
example, studies have shown that exercise can be as effective as anti-depressants, 327 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
320 A Alwan (ed) “Global status report on noncommunicable diseases” (World Health Organization, 
2011) at 9.  
321 Health Loss in New Zealand: A report from the New Zealand Burden of Diseases, Injuries and Risk 
Factors Study, 2006–2016 (Ministry of Health, Wellington, 2013).  
322 (ed) “Water with Sugar and Salt” (1978) 312 (8084) The Lancet 300 at 300. In particular, the 
treatment protocol requires 30mls of sugar with 2.5mls of salt in 1 litre of water, administered to the 
patient in the same quantities as fluid is lost.  
323 At 300.   
324 The alternative to ORT is the intravenous administration of fluid, which requires a longer recovery 
time.  
325 JN Ruxin “Magic bullet: the history of oral rehydration therapy” (1994) 38(4) Medical History 363 
at 397. See Chapter Four discussing pharmaceutical reimbursement in the United States.  
326 B Peng and others “Intradiscal methylene blue injection for the treatment of chronic discogenic low 
back pain” (2007) 16(1) European Spine Journal 33; B Peng and others “A randomized placebo-
controlled trial of intradiscal methylene blue injection for the treatment of chronic discogenic low back 
pain” (2010) 149(1) Pain 124. Notably, this treatment was shown to have a success rate of over 91 per 
cent.  
327 ME Donaghy “Exercise can seriously improve your mental health: Fact or fiction?” (2007) 9(2) 
Advances in Physiotherapy 76 at 76. 
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and lowers future risk of depression. 328 Other studies have shown the significantly 
adverse health effects of prolonged sitting.329 Commentators have noted the adverse 
health consequences of the pharmaceutical industry’s bias away from cheap, health 
promoting therapies such as cardiac rehabilitation which lack adequate support.330 
 
6 Negative information  
 
Negative information, such as information about the harmful effect or inferiority of 
certain drugs331 and the extent that environmental chemicals or certain foods may 
have a causative link to disease, 332  is highly unmonopolisable. 333  Similarly, 
pharmaceutical companies are unlikely to fund research which shows that less 
medication is required to achieve the same or better effect as this will adversely affect 
sales.334 
 
This problem is not unique to pharmaceuticals, and various studies have 
shown that supplements may also cause harm. For example, a recent study showed 
that high intake of omega-3 fatty acids either from supplements or fish results in over 
twice the risk of developing aggressive prostate cancer.335 A large scale study of over 
35,000 men in 2011 found that vitamin E supplementation also significantly increased 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
328 G Mammen and G Faulkner “Physical Activity and the Prevention of Depression: A Systematic 
Review of Prospective Studies” (2013) 45(5) American Journal of Preventive Medicine 649 at 649.  
329 R Seguin and others “Sedentary Behavior and Mortality in Older Women: The Women’s Health 
Initiative” (2014) 46(2) American Journal of Preventive Medicine 122 at 122; MT Hamilton and others 
“Role of low energy expenditure and sitting in obesity, metabolic syndrome, type 2 diabetes, and 
cardiovascular disease” (2007) 56(11) Diabetes 2655. 
330 Brezis, above n 243, at 88.   
331 BR Davis and others “Major outcomes in high risk hypertensive patients randomized to angiotensin-
converting enzyme inhibitor or calcium channel blocker vs diuretic: The Antihypertensive and Lipid 
Lowering treatment to prevent Heart Attack Trial (ALLHAT)” (2002) 288(23) JAMA 2981. This well-
known clinical trial demonstrated that more expensive patented ‘ACE-inhibitor’ hypertensive 
medicines were actually inferior to cheaper generic diuretic pills. Even excluding the cost of potential 
harm to patients from ACE-inhibitors, the ALLHAT researchers [at 2994] estimated that USD 3.1 
billion could have been saved between 1982 and 1992 if doctors had not switched to the newer 
patented medicines.  
332 For example, exposure to environmental pollutants and chemicals, nutritional deficits, and smoking 
have been found to play a role in development of heart disease: see TE O'Toole “Environmental risk 
factors for heart disease” (2008) 23(3) Reviews on Environmental Health 167 at 167. Further, 
according to the World Health Organization over 30 per cent of cancer deaths can be prevented by 
avoiding certain environmental risk factors: see “Cancer: Fact sheet No 297” (February 2014) World 
Health Organisation <www.who.int>. 
333 Kapczynski and Syed. above n 46, at 1923-1925.   
334 For example, in New Zealand, PHARMAC recently funded a clinical trial to compare efficacy of a 
9-week regimen of Herceptin versus 12 months: see S Metcalfe and J Evans “PHARMAC responds on 
Herceptin assumptions and decisions” (2007) 120(1260) NZMJ 1.  
335 TM Brasky and others “Serum Phospholipid Fatty Acids and Prostate Cancer Risk: Results From 
the Prostate Cancer Prevention Trial” (2011) 173(12) Am J Epidemiol 1429.  
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the risk of prostate cancer.336 Finally, a 2012 study by the well-respected Cochrane 
Collaboration found “[b]eta-carotene and vitamin E seem to increase mortality, and so 
may higher doses of vitamin A”.337  
 
 Summary  
 
The sections above have highlighted the social need for incentivising large clinical 
trials to validate the health impact of unmonopolisable therapies. Although patents 
have been used over reformulated generic drugs and dietary supplements that treat 
high-volume therapies such as cardiovascular disease, this is likely due to the power 
of direct marketing. This can be contrasted with therapies that are not easily 
commodified. It is impossible to enforce patents over highly unmonopolisable 
therapies such as diets, readily available chemicals, lifestyle interventions and 
negative information about drugs. Crucially, the inability to enforce property rights 
over unmonopolisable therapies has no correlation to the medical value of the 
information generated. This represents a significant gap in the current patent system 
as a mechanism to incentivise the development of socially valuable therapies.  
 
 
F  The Problem of ‘Unprofitable Therapies’ 
 
There are certain therapies that are inherently ‘unprofitable’, irrespective of whether 
exclusivity can be enforced, as there will be insufficient return on investment to 
justify development. While ‘unprofitable therapies’ is a catch-all category in the sense 
that unpatentable and unmonopolisable therapies are also unprofitable, the author uses 
this term to refer to distinct types of therapies.  
 
Under the current system, the social value of a therapy does not always reflect 
its private value. However, the latter is the most important consideration when a 
pharmaceutical executive is making a ‘Go/No-Go’ funding decision. For example, 
when deciding which projects will be funded, the pharmaceutical executive calculates 
the ‘net present value’ (NPV) of the project, which takes into account risk of failure 
and likely future profits.338  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
336 EA Klein and others “Vitamin E and the risk of prostate cancer: the Selenium and Vitamin E Cancer 
Prevention Trial (SELECT)” (2011) 306(14) JAMA 1549 at 1549.   
337  G Bjelakovic and others “Antioxidant supplements for prevention of mortality in healthy 
participants and patients with various diseases” (2012) 2 Cochrane Database Syst Rev 1 at 1-2.  
338 JJ Stewart, PN Allison and RS Johnson “Putting a price on biotechnology” (2001) 19(9) Nat 
Biotechnol 813 at 813.  
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Projan illustrates how the NPV of medicines can vary by therapeutic class, as shown 
in Table 1 below.339  
 
Table 1: Table showing risk adjusted NPV (in millions of USD) of a new drug by therapeutic 
class340 
 
 
With reference to Table 1, it can be seen that musculoskeletal diseases which require 
ongoing maintenance medication for many years, such as arthritis, have the highest 
NPV. Neurological diseases such as depression, schizophrenia, Alzheimer’s disease 
and dementia also have a high NPV, because of the need to take ongoing medication.  
 
By contrast, ‘one off’ treatments, such as vaccines, are much less 
commercially attractive to pharmaceutical companies, despite their potential to have a 
large health impact.341 Similarly, there are limited private incentives to develop 
antibiotics due to the fact that they are more effective, the less they are used.342 A 
course of antibiotics is also short, because a patient typically recovers quickly, and 
when resistance develops, the drug becomes obsolete. 343 Therefore, antibiotics are 
‘unprofitable’ to the extent that regulatory exclusivity or patent protection may not be 
enough to incentivise development.344  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
339 SJ Projan “Why is big Pharma getting out of antibacterial drug discovery?” (2003) 6 Current 
Opinion in Microbiology 427.  
340 At 428.  
341 PA Offit “Why are pharmaceutical companies gradually abandoning vaccines?” (2005) 24(3) Health 
Affairs 622 at 622.  
342 In fact, the current system incentivises the innovator to encourage the overprescribing of antibiotics 
because they have a limited time under patent.  
343 See Projan, above n 337, at 428; see also Brezis, above n 241, at 85.  
344 ML Katz and others “Where have all the antibiotic patents gone?” (2006) 24 Nature Biotechnology 
1529 at 1531.  
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According to a 2004 report by the Infectious Diseases Society of America, of 
more than 506 drugs in development, only five were for new antibiotics.345 The same 
report indicated that over 70 per cent of pathogenic bacteria were resistant to at least 
one antibiotic.346 The lack of new antibiotics is recognised as a major global health 
issue, especially in light of the emergence of antibiotic-resistant superbugs such as 
Methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus.347  
 
Moreover, there is little private incentive to develop medicines specifically for 
third world or so-called ‘neglected diseases’, which would have the greatest impact on 
global health. For example, it is estimated that only 10 per cent of global R&D 
spending is spent on treatments that relate to 90 per cent of the global disease 
burden.348 Drugs for neurological disorders or cancers are 13 times more likely to 
achieve market approval than drugs for neglected diseases.349 The overall numbers of 
approved drugs for neglected diseases bear witness to this market failure for 
unprofitable therapies. For example, of the 1393 new chemical entities achieving 
regulatory approval between 1975 and 1999, only 16, or 1.1 per cent were for 
neglected diseases.350 Similarly, between 2000 and 2011, of 850 approved therapeutic 
products, only 37, or 4 per cent, were for neglected diseases.351  
 
In respect of stimulating R&D for neglected diseases, the Commission on 
Intellectual Property Rights established by the British government, noted that 
intellectual property protection “hardly plays any role at all, except for those diseases 
where there is a large market in the developed world (for example, diabetes or heart 
disease)”.352  Because drug companies are unlikely to recoup their investment from 
developing countries, under the current patent system, there is a significant lack of 
incentive to create medicines for neglected disease.  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
345 Bad bugs, no drugs: as antibiotic R&D stagnates... a  public health crisis brews (Infectious 
Diseases Society of America, 2004) at 14.  
346 At 9. 
347 The evolving threat of antimicrobial resistance: Options for Action (World Health Organization 
2012) at 4.  
348 A Kapczynski and others “Addressing global health inequities: An open licensing approach for 
university innovations” (2005) 20 Berkley Technology Law Journal 1031 at 1037; R Hecht, P Wilson 
and A Palriwala “Improving Health R&D Financing for Developing Countries: A Menu of Innovative 
Policy Options” (2009) 28 Health Affairs 974 at 975; P Stevens Diseases of poverty and the 10/90 Gap 
(International Policy Network, November 2004).  
349 P Trouiller and others “Drug development for neglected diseases: a deficient market and a public-
health policy failure” (2002) 359(9324) Lancet 2188 at 2188. 
350 At 2188.  
351 B Pedrique and others “The drug and vaccine landscape for neglected diseases (2000–11): a 
systematic assessment” (2013) 1The Lancet Global Health 371 at 374.  
352 JH Barton and others Integrating intellectual property rights and development policy: report of the 
commission on intellectual property rights (Commission on Intellectual Property Rights (UK), 2002) at 
33.  
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The 2012 Global Funding for Innovation in Neglected Diseases (G-FINDER) 
report confirmed the R&D funding disparity under the current system. 353  For 
example, in 2011, two-thirds of funding for research of neglected diseases came from 
high-income countries (USD 1.9 billion), and the rest from charities (USD 570.6 
million) and pharmaceutical companies (USD 525.1 million).354  
 
Another category of ‘unprofitable therapies’ are ‘orphan drugs’, which are 
therapies for very rare diseases. Because of the small commercial market, companies 
were unwilling to invest in these therapies.355 However, since orphan drug reforms 
were implemented in the United States in 1983, which provided seven years of market 
exclusivity and 50 per cent tax breaks, they have become very profitable. Chapter 6A 
will consider these orphan drug reforms in more detail.  
 
 Summary 
 
To the extent the above-mentioned ‘unprofitable therapies’ lack incentives for private 
funding under the current system, it is unlikely that anything but publicly funded 
clinical trials will be available to validate them. The absence of additional private 
incentives for development of such therapies causes a significant impact on disease 
burden, particularly in the developing world.   
 
 
G Other Problems with the Patent System  
 
In the remaining sections of this chapter, problems with the patent system other than 
the aforementioned gaps in private funding incentives for unpatentable, 
unmonopolisable and unprofitable therapies will be discussed.  
 
1 The use of litigation and settlement agreements to prevent competition by 
generic drug companies 
 
As discussed in Chapter Two, the Hatch-Waxman Act of 1984 was implemented in 
the United States to facilitate generic competition while balancing the needs of 
innovators by providing a minimum period of exclusivity. In particular, after a data 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
353 M Moran and others G-FINDER 2012 Neglected disease R&D: A five-year review (Policy Cures, 
2012) at 10.  
354 At 11. Funding from private pharmaceutical companies here is likely to be on the basis of corporate  
social responsibility.  
355 L Rin-Laures and D Janofsky “Recent developments concerning the Orphan Drug Act” (1991) 4 
Harv J Law & Tec 4 269 at 269.  
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exclusivity period of five years, a generic drug company can file a ‘Paragraph IV’ 
challenge to the validity of the innovator’s patent. The first generic drug company that 
successfully invalidates an innovator’s patent is provided 180-days of exclusivity. 
This has led to a significant increase in litigation, with the chance of a patent 
challenge to an innovator’s drug increasing from 17 per cent in 1995 to 81 per cent in 
2012.356 
 
Since then, commentators have noted that innovator companies and generic 
companies are entering into lucrative ‘pay-for-delay’ agreements to keep generic 
drugs off the market, which results in higher monopoly prices.357 In Federal Trade 
Commission v Actavis,358 the Supreme Court of the United States held that while such 
‘pay-for-delay settlements’ are not presumptively illegal, they can be challenged by 
the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) for being anti-competitive.  
 
There has also been an increase in the launch of ‘authorised generics’ by 
innovator companies. Authorised generics are when the innovator enters the market 
with cheap versions of its own medicine, which undermines the profits of a generic 
company during their 180-day exclusivity period, and their incentives to challenge 
patents.359 Such developments are controversial, and the FTC has noted that innovator 
companies may use the threat of launching authorised generics as a bargaining chip 
when entering ‘pay-for-delay settlements’ with generic drug companies.360  
 
As noted in Chapter Two, according to the Generic Pharmaceutical 
Association, increases in generic competition pursuant to patent challenges under the 
Hatch Waxman Act has resulted in USD 1.1 trillion in savings over the past 10 
years.361 However, according to the FTC, pay-for-delay settlements are estimated to 
add USD 3.5 billion in costs every year.362 Therefore, it is arguable that the patent 
system incentivises both wasteful litigation and ‘gaming’ by way of ‘pay-for-delay’ 
settlements, which increases costs to society overall.  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
356 Grabowski, Long and Mortimer, above n 151, at 211.  
357 AS Kesselheim “Using Market Exclusivity Incentives to Promote Pharmaceutical Innovation” 
(2010) 363(19) New England Journal of Medicine 1855 at 1858.  
358 Federal Trade Commission v Actavis 570 US 756 (2013).  
359 An analysis by the United States Federal Trade Commission determined that competition by 
innovators launching AGs within reduced generic revenues by 53 to 62 per cent within 30 months of 
the 180-day exclusivity: see Authorized Generic Drugs: Short-Term Effects and Long-Term Impact 
(Federal Trade Commission, August 2011) at iii.  
360 At iv.   
361  Generic Pharmaceutical Association “New Study finds Generic Prescription Drugs Saved 
Consumers and the US Health Care System $1 Trillion over Past Decade” (press release, 21 September 
2011). 
362  Pay-For-Delay: How Drug Company Pay-offs Cost Consumers Billions (Federal Trade 
Commission, 2010) at 2.  
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2  Whether the increased cost of drugs due to patent monopolies justifies the 
benefit to society and whether pharmaceutical companies are incentivised to 
conduct excessive marketing  
 
 An important question is whether the patent system ensures that fair prices are 
charged for medicines. The mechanism of determining pricing under the current 
system will be discussed further in Chapter Four. However, as noted in Chapter One, 
patents over medicines cause a significant financial burden on society, increasing 
global drug costs by approximately USD 500 billion per annum due to monopoly 
prices.363 As will be discussed in Chapter Four, monopolies can result in deadweight 
losses, which is the situation where patients lose access to a medicine, because the 
price is not affordable.364 Chapter Four will also discuss how governments and health 
insurers can use their purchasing power to negotiate lower prices for medicines.  
 
The large monopoly markup for patented drugs also has the counterproductive 
effect of encouraging the manufacture of counterfeit drugs. This is the situation where 
a drug is fraudulently manufactured to pass off as a branded drug, but does not have 
the same active ingredient. 365 
 
Further, due to the large monopoly profits available, pharmaceutical 
companies are incentivised to develop medicines for diseases that require ongoing 
treatment, as noted above with regard to unprofitable therapies. For example, the 
biologic drugs adalimumab (Humira) and infliximab (Remicade), both maintenance 
treatments for incurable chronic illnesses such as arthritis and Crohn’s disease, were 
the top selling drugs in the world in 2012, earning USD 9.2 billion per annum and 
USD 8.2 billion per annum respectively.366 This can be compared to treatments for 
‘one-off’ treatments such as vaccines367  or treatments that cure the underlying 
condition rather than merely treating the symptoms.368  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
363 See Chapter One, n 14 citing J Love and T Hubbard “The Big Idea: Prizes to Stimulate R&D for 
New Medicines” (2007) 82 Chi-Kent L Rev 1519 at 1522 and The Global Use of Medicines: outlook 
through 2016 (IMS Institute for Healthcare Informatics, July 2012) at 8.   
364 See, for example, C Parahi “Pharmac won't fund prostate cancer drug” (1 May 2014) One News 
<www.tvnz.co.nz>; N Triggle “NHS says no to new breast cancer drug Kadcyla” (7 August 2014) 
BBC News <www.bbc.com>. 
365 D Bagozzi “Fact Sheet No 275: Substandard and Counterfeit Medicines” (November 2003) World 
Health Organization <www.who.int>. 
366. “Top 20 Best Selling Drugs of 2012” (5 March 2013) Genetic Engineering and Biotechnology 
News <www.genengnews.com>. 
367 Offit, above n 341, at 622.  
368 For example, see CA Black “The Cure for Deadly Patent Practices: Preventing Technology 
Suppression and Patent Shelving in the Life Sciences” (2003) 14 Alb LJ Sci & Tech 397 at 421 
regarding the finding in 1982, by two Australian researchers, that the bacterium Helicobacter pylori, 
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Black argues, controversially, that under the current system, pharmaceutical 
companies are incentivised to engage in “patent shelving” by purchasing the rights to 
a potential cure and abandoning the project, or “suppression” of a potential cure 
through aggressive marketing, in order to safeguard monopoly profits from 
maintenance medications. 369  Although Black provides limited evidence of such 
practices, it is noted that, as with regard to evidence of patentability screening 
discussed above, the public would never find out if research is ‘shelved’ or 
‘suppressed’ at an early stage, as the majority of promising drug candidates do not 
achieve regulatory approval.370   
 
Another issue is that pharmaceutical companies may actually attempt to block 
attempts by government healthcare agencies to use cheaper treatments that threaten 
monopoly profits. For example, it was discovered that an anti-cancer drug, 
bevacizumab (Avastin) could be used ‘off label’ to treat age-related macular 
degeneration (AMD).371 Various hospitals in the United Kingdom decided to fund 
Avastin at a cost of GBP 60 per monthly injection compared to GBP 740 per monthly 
injection for the licensed drug, ranibizumab (Lucentis).372 Novartis, the license holder 
for Avastin in the United Kingdom, filed for judicial review of this decision the on 
basis that it was inconsistent with government policy and possibly compromises 
patient safety.373 However, studies have shown that the cheaper Avastin is equivalent 
to Lucrentis for treating AMD.374 This issue has generated significant controversy in 
the United States, where Genentech - the manufacturer of Avastin and Lucrentis - 
provided confidential payments to eye specialists who prescribed Lucrentis.375 This 
issue can be seen as part of the broader problem of lack of incentives to find second 
uses for cheap drugs, discussed above.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
caused peptic ulcer disease, and that it could be cured with an antibiotic regimen. Despite this, it took 
14 years from the discovery to obtain regulatory approval for antibiotic treatment, compared with the 
industry-endorsed regimen which involved regular use of the patented blockbuster antacid medication 
omeprazole (Prilosec), which had to be taken daily and arguably only addressed the symptoms of 
ulcers, not the cause.  
369 At 418-422.  
370 See Figure 1, above n 26, showing that of an average of 24 drug candidates in pre-clinical trials only 
8 enter clinical trials in humans, and only one achieves regulatory approval.  
371 The CATT Research Group “Ranibizumab and Bevacizumab for Neovascular Age-Related Macular 
Degeneration” (2011) 364 N Engl J Med 1897 at 1897.  
372 B Jeffreys “NHS faces judicial review from Novartis over Avastin” (12 April 2012) BBC News 
<www.bbc.com> at 1.  
373 At 1.   
374 The CATT Research Group, above n 368, at 1897; A Tufail and others “Bevacizumab for 
neovascular age related macular degeneration (ABC Trial): multicentre randomised double masked 
study” (2010) 340 BMJ 1 at 1.  
375 A Pollack “Genentech Offers Secret Rebates for Eye Drug” The New York Times (online ed, New 
York, 3 November 2010). It was found that in 2008, despite fewer injections of Lucrentis to treat 
macular degeneration, it cost United States government health insurance (Medicare) over USD 537 
million compared to only USD 20 million for Avastin injections. 
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The current patent system also encourages excessive marketing costs in order 
to maximise profits for the duration of exclusivity. For example, spending on 
‘continued medical education’ seminars targeting doctors, usually conducted at exotic 
locations,  has increased from USD 301 million per annum in 1998 to USD 1.2 billion 
per annum in 2007.376 As discussed above with reference to ‘evergreening’, drug 
companies conduct massive advertising campaigns in order to get patients and doctors 
to switch to a new patented formulation of a drug once a generic version is 
available. 377  Sales representatives are specifically trained in how to influence 
doctors 378  and the benefits of meeting with such representatives have been 
questioned.379 
 
Arguably, under the current system it is highly profitable for a company to 
spend money on the advertising and marketing of its branded drugs, which may 
actually mislead doctors and harm patients by distorting evidence from clinical 
trials.380 For example, it is estimated that approximately twice as much is spent on 
marketing branded drugs than medical R&D.381  
 
Pharmaceutical companies are also incentivised to ‘game’ the system by 
obtaining regulatory approval for treating one disease or ‘indication’, and then 
illegally marketing their branded drugs ‘off label’.382 This is evidenced by record-
breaking fines issued in recent years to major pharmaceutical companies. For 
example, inter alios, Pfizer was fined USD 2.3 billion in 2009 for illegally marketing 
an anti-psychotic drug and painkiller drug and GlaxoSmithKline was recently fined 
USD 3 billion in 2012 for improper off-label marketing and failing to report safety 
data regarding Paxil, Wellbutrin, Avandia and the other drugs.383 A USD 3 billion fine 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
376 MA Steinman, CS Landefeld and RB Baron “Industry support of CME - are we at the tipping 
point?” (2012) 366 N Engl J Med 1069 at 1069.  
377 See Dwivedi, Hallihosur  and Rangan, above n 187, at 328, and discussion of Nexium advertising 
campaign.  
378 A Fugh-Berman and S Ahari “Following the Script: How Drug Reps Make Friends and Influence 
Doctors” (2007) 4(4) PLoS Med 621 at 621.  
379 MA Fischer “Prescribers and Pharmaceutical Representatives: Why Are We Still Meeting?” (2009) 
24(7) J Gen Intern Med 795 at 795.  
380 Goldacre, above n 227, at 246. 
381 M Gagnon and J Lexchin “The Cost of Pushing Pills: A New Estimate of Pharmaceutical Promotion 
Expenditures in the United States” (2008) 5(1) PLoS Med 29 at 29; Goldacre, above n 227, at 245.  
382 S Grossman “Off-Label Promotion: Best Resolved by Congress, Not Courts” (12 December 2012) 
FDA Matters <www.fdamatters.com>. 
383 See K Thomas and MS Schmidt “Glaxo Agrees to Pay $3 Billion in Fraud Settlement” New York 
Times (online ed, New York, 2 July 2012) at 1. Abbott Laboratories also settled for USD 1.6 billion 
regarding the marketing of an anti-seizure drug Depakote, and Johnson & Johnson could be fined USD 
2 billion for off-label marketing of its anti-psychotic Risperdal; see also G Harris “Pfizer Pays $2.3 
Billion to Settle Marketing Case” The New York Times (online ed, New York, 2 September 2009) 
which stated that in 2009, Eli Lilly agreed to pay USD 1.4 billion over the marketing of its 
antipsychotic Zyprexa; see also United States Department of Justice “Bristol-Myers Squibb to Pay 
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may seem like a significant deterrent; however, GlaxoSmithKline earned USD 27.9 
billion from the sale of the same drugs during the relevant period covered by the 
fine.384  
 
3  Whether patent exclusivity causes an ‘anti-commons’ effect due to ‘patent 
thickets’  
 
If there are multiple individual patent holders over a particular invention, this creates 
cross-licensing inefficiencies referred to as a “patent thicket”.385 Heller and Eisenberg 
have argued that this is a potential barrier to biotechnology and medical research, 
which was coined the “tragedy of the anti-commons”.386 As noted above with regard 
to unmonopolisable therapies, the ‘tragedy of the commons’ is caused by the inability 
to enforce property rights. Here is the opposite problem; if multiple parties hold 
property rights, namely, patents with overlapping claims over a certain medicine, 
nobody has the freedom to operate without inefficient cross-licensing negotiations 
with each party, which impedes innovation.387 For example, Heller claims that a 
pharmaceutical executive told him that patents held by multiple parties has prevented 
a cure for Alzheimer’s disease - so-called “Compound X” - from getting to market.388  
 
Other academics have doubted that increased patenting activity has led to an 
‘anti-commons’ for biomedical research, at least in the area of gene patenting and 
research tools.389 Broad patent claims over research tools, genes, and drug targets, are 
referred to as “upstream patents”, which may be infringed in the process of 
developing medicines “downstream”.390 However, it has been argued that historically, 
‘upstream patents’ over inventions have slowed scientific progress, particularly 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
More Than $515 Million to Resolve Allegations of Illegal Drug Marketing and Pricing” (press release, 
28 September 2007) stating that in 2007, Bristol-Myers Squibb paid USD 515 million to resolve 
allegations of illegal drug marketing and pricing.  
384 Thomas and Schmidt, at 1.  
385 C Shapiro “Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licences, Patent Pools and Standard Setting” In 
AB Jaffe, J Lerner and S Stern Innovation Policy and the Economy, Volume 1 (MIT Press, Cambridge 
(Mass), 2001) 119 at 119. 
386 Heller and Eisenberg, above 242, at 698.  
387 A Kingsbury “Patent Collaboration: Licensing, Patent Pools, Patent Commons, Open Source and 
Communities of Innovation” (2013) 7 NZIPJ 3 at 4; G Van Overwalle Gene Patents and Collaborative 
Licensing Models: Patent Pools, Clearinghouses, Open Source Models, and Liability Regimes 
(Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2009) at 383.  
388 M Heller The gridlock economy: How too much ownership wrecks markets, stops innovation, and 
costs lives (Basic Books, New York, 2008) at 4-6. It is unfortunate that this is only hearsay, although it 
is understandable in light of the author’s problems with obtaining evidence for his survey.  
389 See T Caulfield and others “Evidence and Anecdotes: An Analysis of Human Gene Patenting 
Controversies” (2006) 24 Nature Biotechnology 1091 at 1092; RA Epstein and BN Kuhlik “Is There a 
Biomedical Anticommons?” (2004) 27 Regulation 54 at 56.  
390 Heller and Eisenberg, above n 242, at 698.  
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incremental innovation, and that an ‘open source’ approach is preferable.391 These 
problems highlight the need for reforms which may incentivise development of new 
therapies but prevent the inefficiencies due to patent thickets. For example, ‘open 
source’ approaches as incentives for medical research will be discussed in Chapter 
6C. 
 
4  Whether the patent system incentivises development of ‘me-too’ drugs rather 
than breakthrough medicines 
 
As discussed above, the business model for pharmaceutical companies involves the 
pursuit of lucrative blockbuster drugs. 392 The high monopoly profits earned by such 
blockbusters encourages other pharmaceutical companies to develop ‘me-too’ 
drugs393 which can share in the lucrative market.  
 
It has been argued that the majority of drugs are actually ‘me-too’ drugs with 
little therapeutic advantages over existing drugs.394 Typically, me-too drugs either 
have the same or similar active ingredient, or act on the same or similar drug target to 
the original drug.395 Light cited various independent reviews as evidence that 85-90 
per cent of new drugs offer little or no clinical benefit to patients.396 Another study 
showed that of the 1035 new drugs approved by the FDA between 1989 and 2000, 76 
per cent offered no significant clinical improvement over currently marketed 
products.397 
 
The problem is exacerbated as there is no specific regulatory incentive to 
develop better drugs than what already exist. As regulatory approval requirements for 
‘efficacy’ only require ‘substantial evidence’, this can be established by comparison 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
391 M Boldrin, D Levine and A Nuvolari “Do patents encourage or hinder innovation? The case of the 
steam engine” (2008) 58 The Freeman 12 at 12. The article described the technological progress of 
improved steam engines in Cornwall, England, between 1772 and 1852, which were pivotal to the 
industrial revolution. The authors argue that patents suppressed incremental innovation, and that an 
‘open source’ approach was more useful as it encouraged periods of rapid innovation.  
392 As discussed above, these are drugs which achieve more that USD 1 billion in sales per annum.   
393 A ‘me-too’ drugs is defined as a drug with enough differences to be patentable and to avoid an 
innovator’s patents, but having limited benefits over existing drugs. ‘Me-too’ drugs generally work by 
modulating the same drug target as existing drugs.  
394 See M Angell The Truth About the Drug Companies: How They Deceive Us and What to Do About 
It (Random House, 2004) at 74; DW Light and JR Lexchin “Pharmaceutical research and development: 
what do we get for all that money?” (2012) 345(1) BMJ 1 at 1.   
395  For example, the blockbuster drug sildenafil (Viagra) is an inhibitor of cGMP-specific 
phosphodiesterase type 5 (PDE5). Me-too variations of PDE5 inhibitors were  subsequently developed 
by competitors such as tadalafil (Cialis) and vardenafil (Levitra). Other examples of me-too drugs are 
the eight cholesterol-lowering statin drugs on the market: see JJ Gagne and NK Choudhry “How many 
“me-too” drugs is too many?” (2011) 305(7) JAMA 711 at 711.  
396 Light and Lexchin, above n 394 at 1-2.  
397 Changing patterns of pharmaceutical innovation (National Institute for Health Care Management,  
2002) at 8.  
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to placebo.398 Some commentators have argued that this standard is too low and that 
new drugs should be tested against the latest ‘first-in-class’ treatments.399  
 
However, commentators have noted that me-too drugs are helpful as they offer 
more treatment options for doctors when a patient has failed to tolerate or respond to a 
previous drug,400 and also help reduce costs of drugs through price competition.401 To 
the extent me-too drugs offer incremental improvements, they are also beneficial.402  
 
Arguably, however, the current system lacks incentives to develop drugs for 
unmet medical needs and over-incentivises me-too drugs that have an established 
market.  
 
H Conclusion 
 
Unfortunately, the reliance on patents by pharmaceutical companies means that 
expenditure on medical research is biased towards ‘monopolisable therapies’ at the 
expense of socially valuable unpatentable, unmonopolisable and unprofitable 
therapies, which is likely to have an adverse effect on disease burden as well as 
contribute to the current productivity crisis facing the industry. The current patent 
system also encourages pharmaceutical companies to engage in excessive litigation 
and excessive marketing to maximise monopoly profits, even when this could harm 
patients. Furthermore, there is a potential anti-commons effect due to the possibility 
of competitors holding overlapping patents.  Finally, there is an incentive to develop 
me-too drugs in order to obtain a share of lucrative monopoly rents in a proven 
market.  
 
The next chapter will discuss the ways that governments and health insurers 
currently try to exercise control of monopoly prices over pharmaceuticals in order to 
ensure value for money. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
398 Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, s 505(d)  
399 AB O’Connor “Building Comparative Efficacy and Tolerability Into the FDA Approval Process” 
(2010) 303(10) JAMA 979 at 979.  
400 A Wertheimer, R Levy and T O'Connor “Too Many Drugs? The Clinical and Economic Value of 
Incremental Innovations” in I Farquhar, K Summers and A Sorkin (eds) Investing in Health: The Social 
and Economic Benefits of Health Care Innovation (Volume 14, JAI Press, United Kingdom, 2001) 77 
at 78-79.  
401 Government Accountability Office, above n 21, at 29.  
402 J Cohen, L Cabanilla and J Sosnov “Role of follow-­‐on drugs and indications on the WHO Essential 
Drug List” (2006) 31(6) Journal of Clinical Pharmacy and Therapeutics 585.	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IV Pricing and Reimbursement of Medicines  
A Introduction 
 
Chapter Four will provide an overview of how the pricing and reimbursement of new 
medicines is determined under the current incentive system, which, as discussed in the 
previous chapter, relies on patent exclusivity to incentivise innovators to develop new 
medical therapies. The chapter will first discuss pharmacoeconomic analysis, which is 
a process used by governments and health insurers to assess cost-efficacy of 
medicines. As part of that discussion, the use of health metrics as pharmacoeconomic 
tools will be considered. Subsequently, the process of using these tools to determine 
pharmaceutical reimbursement in New Zealand and the United States will be 
compared.  
 
B Pharmaceutical Pricing and Reimbursement by Payers 
 
Global sales for patented medicines exceeded USD 596 billion in 2011.1 Under the 
current system, the majority of the cost of patented medicines is reimbursed by 
government agencies and private health insurers, which are referred to in this thesis as 
‘payers’. Price discovery in the pharmaceutical market is atypical because payers have 
a major role of determining price and overall rewards, as opposed to typical markets 
where the consumer decides what to pay.  
 
As will be discussed in Chapter Five, payers reduce deadweight losses that 
would otherwise occur if the medicine was only available to consumers at the high 
monopoly price. For this reason, a negative or unfavourable reimbursement decision 
by a payer will effectively mean that the drug will not be available to the majority of 
patients. In a sense, because the reimbursement price allows the medicine to be 
available to consumers at a marginal cost, the decision to reimburse a medicine shares 
a lot in common with a government prize, discussed further in Chapter 6B, although 
the latter does not allow a ‘market-based’ negotiation of price after the medicine has 
been developed.2 Accordingly, it is important to understand what factors are taken 
into account when payers negotiate reimbursement pricing, as this will affect 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 The Global Use of Medicines: outlook through 2016 (IMS Institute for Healthcare Informatics, July 
2012).at 8. Total global spending on both branded on-patent and generic pharmaceuticals in 2011 was 
USD 956 billion.  
2 In particular, as will be discussed in Chapter Five, a market-based mechanism involves a negotiation 
of price between a willing buyer and seller regarding a product. By contrast, for prizes, criteria for 
calculating the price are ‘pre-determined’.  
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incentives for development of medical therapies, and is useful for considering how 
rewards may be calculated under alternative reimbursement mechanisms.  
 
In general, the payer’s task is to maximise the health benefits gained within a 
limited pharmaceutical budget. Payers accomplish this by evaluating the cost-
effectiveness of drugs and leveraging their bulk buying power to negotiate lower 
prices. However, the responsibility of payers to obtain the most cost-effective price 
must be balanced against the need to ensure pharmaceutical companies are adequately 
incentivised to undertake research into new medicines. The mechanism used by 
payers to determine pricing and reimbursement decisions is called pharmacoeconomic 
analysis.   
  
1 Pharmacoeconomic analysis 
 
Pharmaceoeconomics is a sub-discipline of health economics, which is used by payers 
to determine the optimal price for a medicine.3 The use of so-called health metrics is 
one of the major tools used in pharmacoeconomic analysis, as they are a means to 
measure the health impact provided by a particular medical intervention.  
 
(a) Health metrics 
 
Health metrics are used to estimate the health impact of medical therapies. There are 
various types of health metrics,4 however, the Quality-Adjusted Life Year is the 
preferred metric used by most payers in developed countries with public-healthcare 
systems to determine drug pricing and reimbursement decisions.  
 
(i) Quality-Adjusted Life Years 
 
Quality-Adjusted Life Years (QALYs) are a measure of health-related quality of life. 
They are calculated by adding the life expectancy gained as a result of a medical 
intervention, and multiplying a health ‘utility’ value that accounts for severity of 
disease, where zero is equivalent to death and 1 is perfect health.5 In order to account 
for the inherent uncertainty of future events, a discount rate,6 is applied to any future 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 A Prescription for Pharmacoeconomic Analysis (Pharmaceutical Management Agency, 2012) at 9.  
4 S Whitehead and S Ali “Health outcomes in economic evaluation: the QALY and utilities” (2010)  96 
British Medical Bulletin 5 at 18-19. Alternative health metrics to Quality-Adjusted Life Years 
[QALYs] include the Disability-adjusted-life year (DALY), the Healthy-years equivalent (HYE) and 
Willingness-to-pay (WTP). A discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of these alternative 
health metrics is outside the scope of this thesis. 
5  L Prieto and JA Sacristán “Problems and solutions in calculating quality-adjusted life years 
(QALYs)” (2003) 1(80) Health Qual Life Outcomes 1 at 2.   
6 For example, between three to five per cent per annum.  
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estimate of QALYs.7 For example, if a medical intervention is estimated to add three 
years of life at a health utility value of 0.2, then, the total health impact provided by 
that intervention will be 0.6 QALYs, minus the discount rate applied to the second 
and third year.  
 
While it is easy to measure the length of time a patient survives, an estimate of 
health utility is difficult because it requires a subjective assessment of disease severity 
or quality of life.8 A benefit of using QALYs is that collecting data is not cognitively 
challenging, only requiring a few minutes to complete a questionnaire.9 However 
QALYs can be criticised, primarily because the assumption they can be added 
together is an oversimplication, and that they may discriminate against older and 
sicker patients that may benefit less from an intervention.10 Despite this, QALYs are a 
useful ‘universal’ health metric that allow a meaningful comparison between 
therapeutic interventions in different disease classes.  
 
Theoretically, it is possible for payers to use QALYs to enforce a threshold 
above which they will be unlikely to subsidise a medicine.11 For example, this could 
be $50,000 per QALY gained. This ensures that expenditure on a less cost-effective 
intervention does not displace expenditure on a more cost-effective intervention. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 E Nord, N Daniels and M Kamlet “QALYs: some challenges” (2009) 12 Value Health S10 at S13.  
8 The basic QALY standard, EQ-5D-5L, asks a patient to rate the severity of their disease state within 
five health domains (mobility, self-care, usual activities, pain/discomfort, and anxiety/depression) by 
selecting one of five levels of severity ((1) no problem, (2) slight problems (3) moderate problems, (4)  
severe problems (5) extreme problems or unable). This generates a combination of 3127 possible health 
states (55 = 3125 plus unconscious and dead) which is used to provide an estimate of health utility from 
zero to 1. Another measurement used to estimate health utility is referred to as the Visual Analogue 
Scale (VAS). The patient is asked to rank their health from zero to 100 with zero representing worst 
imaginable health and 100 representing the best imaginable health. QALYs are used globally by 
researchers and many of the largest pharmaceutical companies to monitor outcomes in clinical trials, 
with the most popular measurement standard, EQ-5D, having been translated into most languages. See 
R Rabin and F de Charro “EQ-5D: a measure of health status from the EuroQol Group” (2001) 33 Ann 
Med  337.   
9 A standard 5Q-5D-5L questionnaire is available from <www.euroqol.org>.  
10 A detailed analysis of the criticisms of QALYs is beyond the scope of this thesis. However, some 
brief comments can be made. First, the presumption of ‘additivity’ for QALYs is an oversimplification, 
in that certain health states may be perceived as having more severity, the longer they are experienced: 
see HJ Sutherland and others “Attitudes toward quality of survival—the concept of ‘maximal endurable 
time” (1982) 2 Med Decis Making 299 at 299; BJ O'Brien and others “Is there a kink in consumers' 
threshold value for cost-effectiveness in health care?” (2002) 11 Health Econ 175. Second, QALYs 
may be perceived as discriminating against interventions for older and sicklier people who would 
benefit less from interventions compared with younger and healthier persons: see PJ Neumann and MC 
Weinstein  “Legislating against use of cost-effectiveness information” (2010) 363 N Engl J Med 1495 
at 1496. Nevertheless, it is possible to use different ‘weightings’ to QALYs in order to make 
adjustments that reflect society’s values and can balance the interests of various stakeholders. For 
example, if society rates health changes in certain groups as more important than others, such as if a 
person starts life in poorer health or is a member of a vulnerable group, this can be reflected by an 
increased weighting to changes in those health states: see Nord, above n 7, at S13. 
11See C McCabe, K Claxton and AJ Culyer “The NICE cost-effectiveness threshold: what it is and 
what that means” (2008) 26 Pharmacoeconomics 733. 
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Wealthier societies may apply an increased QALY threshold, which reflects a 
willingness to pay a higher price to add one year of healthy life. In practice, however, 
the application of QALY thresholds by payers is controversial and not officially 
endorsed by payers.12  
 
(ii) Condition-specific metrics 
 
The general applicability and relative simplicity of measuring QALYs means they can 
lack the specificity required to delineate incremental improvements in health, 
particularly for certain conditions.13 In that event, it may be more appropriate to use 
the condition-specific health metrics typically used to measure clinical trial outcomes 
which are submitted to the FDA or Medsafe in order to obtain regulatory approval.14  
For example, these can include progression-free-survival or overall survival, which 
are used in clinical trials of cancer therapeutics,15 the Crohn’s Disease Activity Index 
used in clinical trials for Crohn’s disease,16 and biomarkers such as cholesterol levels 
used in clinical trials of cardiovascular disease.17 The use of condition-specific health 
metrics to determine rewards under a proposed optimal prize-based incentive 
mechanism will be discussed in Chapter Seven. 
 
 Summary 
 
Health metrics are an important tool to compare efficacy of new medical therapies 
and determine the appropriate level of rewards for innovators. QALYs attempt to 
quantify abstract concepts like ‘health status’ and ‘quality of life’. The main benefits 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 KL Rascati "The $64,000 question - What is a quality-adjusted life-year worth?" (2006) 28 Clinical 
therapeutics 1042 at 1042.  Some commentators in the United States have argued that QALY 
thresholds could result in inefficiencies. It in particular, if the threshold is below the economic value of 
the health benefit to society, this can result in underinvestment in R&D, whereas if the threshold is too 
high, this may result in inefficient wastage of R&D spending: see JA Vernon, R Goldberg and J Golec 
“Economic evaluation and cost-effectiveness thresholds: signals to firms and implications for R & D 
investment and innovation” (2009) 27 Pharmacoeconomics 797 at 797, 804. 
13 Whitehead, above n 4, at 10.  
14 Guidance for Industry Clinical Trial Endpoints for the Approval of Cancer Drugs and Biologics 
(Food and Drug Administration, May 2007) at 5. It should be noted that QALYs are also used globally 
by researchers and many of the largest pharmaceutical companies to monitor outcomes in clinical 
trials: Rabin  and de Charro, above n 8, at 341.  
15 Progression-free survival (PFS) is the length of time after treatment which a cancer tumor does not 
increase in size. This is correlated with the length of overall survival (OS). OS is more important but 
takes longer to measure than PFS: see Guidance for Industry Clinical Trial Endpoints for the Approval 
of Cancer Drugs and Biologics at 5, 8.  
16 Crohn’s disease Activity Index is a composite of various clinical and non-clinical measurements 
which assign a score to rate the severity of a flare of Crohn’s disease, an autoimmune disorder. A score 
above 250 points is indicative of active disease while a score below 150 is indicative of remission.   
17  Biomarkers are measured characteristics which are linked to the presence of disease. High 
cholesterol levels are useful biomarkers for predicting the risk of cardiovascular disease, therefore, a 
drug which lowers cholesterol would conceivably lower disease risk.  
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of QALYs are that they are administratively simple to measure and can be used as a 
‘universal health metric’ to assess the efficacy of different therapies across various 
disease states. However, QALYs are a blunt tool for measuring incremental 
improvements, therefore other condition-specific health metrics may be used to 
measure incremental health impact, although these are less useful for comparing 
efficacy of a therapeutic intervention between different diseases.  
 
(b) Pharmacoeconomic analysis 
 
QALYs are a fundamental part of pharmacoeconomic analysis. For example, ‘Cost-
Utility-Analysis’ (CUA) uses QALYs to determine the cost-effectiveness of medical 
interventions. In particular, CUA compares medical interventions by using an 
incremental cost-effectiveness ratio (ICER).18 ICER is calculated as the difference 
between the cost of two treatments divided by the difference between their 
effectiveness. This can compare an old and new medicine to determine whether the 
incremental health improvements provided by a new medicine falls within a particular 
cost per QALY threshold.19 
 
Because regulatory approval in most countries is only based on demonstrating 
superiority to placebo, pricing and reimbursement decisions by payers based on ICER 
are an important market-based mechanism to incentivise drug companies to develop 
new drugs which are superior or cost-effective compared to existing medicines. As 
will be discussed below, this particularly reduces incentives to develop ‘me-too’ 
drugs, especially where the equivalent pioneer drug is close to becoming available as 
a generic.  
 
2 Pharmaceutical Payers 
 
Countries with single payer public-healthcare systems rely more on QALYs in 
pharmacoecomonic analysis to determine prices of new medicines. These countries 
include New Zealand, Australia,20 the United Kingdom,21 some European Union 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 ICER = (C1 – C2) / (E1 – E2) where C1 is the cost of the first intervention and C2 is the cost of the 
second intervention, and E1 and E2 are the effectiveness of the first and second medicine respectively. 
The cost can be expressed in dollars and the effectiveness in QALYs gained.  
19 For example, if a payer adopts a QALY threshold of $50,000, a therapy X, which costs $5,000 and 
adds 1 year of life at a utility of 0.4 (1 x 0.4 = 0.4 QALYs) can be compared to therapy Y which costs 
$35,000 and adds 1.5 years of life at a utility of 0.6 (1.5 x 0.6 = 0.9 QALYs). The difference in cost 
between X and Y ($30,000) divided by the difference in QALY benefits (0.9 – 0.4 = 0.5 QALYs) 
equates to an ICER of $60,000 per QALY, which is above the adopted $50,000 threshold. In that 
situation, a payer is unlikely to reimburse a medicine unless its price can be reduced so that the cost per 
QALY is below $50,000. 
20 J Raftery “Paying for cost pharmaceuticals: Regulation of new drugs in Australia, England and New 
Zealand” (2008) 188 Med J Aust 26 at 26.  
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countries,22 and Canada.23 This analysis is typically referred to as “health technology 
assessment”. 24 Notably, Australia, New Zealand and the United Kingdom were 
among the first countries to use QALYs to determine cost-effectiveness, although the 
specific appraisal criteria can differ.25  
 
By contrast, pharmaceutical reimbursement decisions in the United States are 
not made by a publicly-funded single payer, and tend to avoid the use of QALYs in 
pharmacoeconomic analysis.26 The following sections will discuss and compare the 
approach to pharmaceutical reimbursement by payers in New Zealand and the United 
States.  
 
(a) Pharmaceutical reimbursement in New Zealand 
 
PHARMAC is a Crown entity with the role of determining pricing and reimbursement 
of new medicines in New Zealand. PHARMAC is funded from the Combined 
Pharmaceutical Budget (CPB), which is set by the Minister of Health, after 
consultation with the District Health Boards and the Ministry of Health.27 Under 
section 47 of the New Zealand Public Health and Disability Act 2000, PHARMAC’s 
primary objective is “to secure for eligible people in need of pharmaceuticals, the best 
health outcomes that are reasonably achieved from pharmaceutical treatment and from 
within the amount of funding provided.”  
 
PHARMAC uses its ‘monopsony’ power to negotiate a lower price for 
reimbursement. The official reimbursement list is referred to as the ‘Pharmaceutical 
Schedule’, which complies with the requirement under s 6 of the Act for a:28   
 
... list of pharmaceuticals for the time being in force that states, in respect of each 
pharmaceutical, the subsidy that the Crown intends to provide for the supply of that 
pharmaceutical to a person who is eligible for the subsidy. 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 At 26.  
22 See L Garattini, D Cornago and PD Compadri “Pricing and reimbursement of in-patent drugs in 
seven European countries: A comparative analysis” (2007) 82 Health policy 330 at 330. The seven 
countries referred to are Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, and the United 
Kingdom.  
23 Patents Act RSC 1985 c P-4, s 83(1).   
24 See D Menon and D Marshall “The internationalization of heath technology assessment” (1996) 12 
IJTAHC 45 at 45. Health technology assessment includes diagnostics and surgical interventions in 
addition to pharmaceuticals. 
25  Raftery, above n 20 at 26.   
26 Rascati, above n 12, at 1043.  
27 Infosheet 08: Setting and managing the combined pharmaceutical budget (CPB) (Pharmaceutical 
Management Agency, 2013) at 1. One of PHARMAC’s roles is to ensure the combined pharmaceutical 
expenditure does not exceed the combined pharmaceutical budget.   
28 New Zealand Public Health and Disability Act 2000, s 6.  
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PHARMAC, acting in accordance with its advisory committee,29 makes use of 
CUA30 and QALYs to determine funding choices for pharmaceuticals.31 Notably, 
however, cost-effectiveness is only one of nine criteria used by PHARMAC to make 
funding decisions.32  In addition, PHARMAC uses a range of strategies to reduce 
costs. For example, reference pricing fixes the price of a new drug at the lowest cost 
pharmaceutical in the same therapeutic class.33Another strategy is to use rebates, 
whereby pharmaceutical companies offer to reimburse the cost of a pharmaceutical if 
a spending cap is exceeded or a particular clinical outcome is not met.34 PHARMAC 
also uses a competitive tender process with generic drug suppliers which can reduce 
the cost of generic drugs by over 90 per cent.35  
 
PHARMAC monitors existing patent rights and will not fund a generic drug 
for an indication which is covered by a patent.36 This is an illustration of how 
PHARMAC provides an effective indirect ‘enforcement’ of ‘weaker’ second medical 
use patents, as doctors would usually only prescribe drugs to patients that are 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 New Zealand Public Health and Disability Act 2000, s 50(1)(a). In particular, this section provides 
for the appointment of the Pharmacology and Therapeutics Advisory Committee (PTAC), ‘to provide 
objective advice to Pharmac on pharmaceuticals and their benefits’.  In accordance with the PTAC 
Appointment Protocol 2010, ‘PTAC comprises senior health practitioners from multiple specialities 
selected for their expertise in critical appraisal as well as broad experience and knowledge of 
pharmaceuticals and their therapeutic indications’: see Protocol for the Appointment of Pharmacology 
and Therapeutics Advisory Committee (PTAC) Members by the Director-General of Health 
(Pharmaceutical Management Agency, 2010) at 3.  
30 See discussion above regarding ‘Cost-Utility-Analysis’. 
31 A Prescription for Pharmacoeconomic Analysis, above n 3 at 10.  
32 At 10. In particular, PHARMAC’s nine decision criteria are: 
(1) the health needs of all eligible people within New Zealand; 
(2) the particular needs of Maori and Pacific peoples;  
(3) the availability and suitability of existing medicines, therapeutic medical devices and related 
products and related things; 
(4) the clinical benefits and risks of pharmaceuticals;  
(5) the cost-effectiveness of meeting health needs by funding pharmaceuticals; rather than by using 
other publicly funded health and disability support services;  
(6) the budgetary impact (in terms of the pharmaceutical budget and the Government's overall health 
budget) of any changes to the Pharmaceutical Schedule;  
(7) the direct cost to health service users;  
(8) the Government's priorities for health funding, as set out in any objectives notified by the Crown to 
PHARMAC, or in PHARMAC's Funding Agreement, or elsewhere; and  
(9) any other criteria that PHARMAC thinks are relevant.  
PHARMAC will carry out the necessary consultation whenever it intends to take any 'other criteria' 
into account.  
33 See Purchasing Medicines Information Sheet (Pharmaceutical Management Agency, 16 September 
2011) at 2. Notably, reference pricing decisions by PHARMAC are subject to judicial review: see 
Pharmaceutical Management Agency Ltd v Roussel Uclaf Australia Pty Ltd [1998] NZAR 58 (CA). 
34 Purchasing Medicines Information Sheet, above at 2.  
35 At 1.  
36 For example, see Request for Proposals – Supply of Imatinib (Pharmaceutical Management Agency, 
23 August 2012). Although PHARMAC has approved funding for a generic version of Glivec 
(Imatinib), it will not fund the generic for use in gastrointestinal tumors, because of a patent held by 
Novartis.  
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reimbursed by the government. However, this would not be effective for over-the-
counter medication, which is not subsidised.  
 
Even though PHARMAC has denied using a specific QALY threshold in 
practice, 37  and uses multiple alternative strategies, QALY calculations provide 
important scientific evidence for PHARMAC to use in negotiations with innovators 
and ensure that funded medicines maximise health impact.38  
 
(b) Pharmaceutical reimbursement in the United States 
 
The United States does not use single payer pharmaceutical reimbursement. 
Reimbursement occurs via multiple payers which include government-funded 
Medicare39 and private health insurers. The latter reimburse the majority of medical 
costs in the United States, and are funded by significant premiums paid by employers 
on behalf of employees.40 Medicare is funded by tax levies payable to the Federal 
Government,41 however, it is restricted to American citizens over 65 and certain 
vulnerable groups of patients,42 therefore, in 2012, 48 million people lacked health 
insurance coverage.43 
 
Rather than using a single pharmaceutical schedule, pharmaceutical 
reimbursement in the United States involves a complex system of tiered ‘formulary’ 
lists, with patients being liable for increasing co-payments for drugs that are deemed 
less cost-effective. Pharmacy Benefit Managers (PBMs) act as intermediaries between 
insurers and drug companies to generate the formulary lists and negotiate with drug 
companies to lower their prices. The most cost-effective drugs (usually generics) are 
on the lowest tier, which encourages their use, with less cost effective drugs being 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 S Metcalfe and others “PHARMAC has no cost effectiveness threshold” (2012) 135 NZ Med J 99 at 
99; A Prescription for Pharmacoeconomic Analysis, above n 3, at 14.  
38 For example, according to the PHARMAC 2012/2013 annual report, funded medicines cost an 
average of NZD 37,000 per QALY [expressed as 27 QALYs per NZD 1 million], compared to NZD 
52,600 per QALY [expressed as 19 QALYs per NZD 1 m] for all proposals assessed. See 
Pharmaceutical Management Agency Annual Report For the year ended 30 June 2013: Presented to 
the House of Representatives pursuant to Section 150(3) of the Crown Entities Act 2004 
(Pharmaceutical Management Agency, 2013) at 23. 
39 Medicare is a national health insurance program established under the Social Security Amendments 
of 1965 Pub L No 89-97.  
40 Approximately 57 per cent of employers in the United States offer health insurance benefits to 
employees: see Employer Health Benefits 2013 Annual Survey (Kaiser/HRET, 2013) at 5. Private 
health insurance premiums are expensive, with average annual premiums of USD 5,884 for single 
coverage and USD 16,351 for family coverage in 2013 [at 22]. 
41 See Medicare and you (Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, 2014) at 27.  
42 At 15.  
43 D DeNavas-Walt, BD Proctor and JC Smith  Income, Poverty, and Health Insurance Coverage in the 
United States: 2012  (US Census Bureau, 2013) at 22.  
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placed on higher tiers requiring a greater co-payment percentage.44 PBMs use cost-
effectiveness analysis, including a form of reference pricing to determine whether to 
list a drug in a specific formulary and tier,45 although they do not tend to use 
QALYs.46  Medicare has also been reluctant to use QALYs in making reimbursement 
decisions. 47  The Social Security Act specifically prohibits using QALYs “as a 
threshold” for analysing the cost-effectiveness of health care interventions.48 The 
United States has also resisted price controls in light of arguments that it would result 
in a significant reduction in private R&D expenditure.49 Despite this, the use of 
QALYs to measure public health outcomes is recommended by the US Public Health 
Service Panel on Cost-Effectiveness in Health and Medicine.50 Therefore, concern 
about rising healthcare costs and unsustainability may encourage more widespread 
adoption of QALYs in the United States.51 
 
Higher prices over pharmaceuticals in the United States have also created a 
lucrative ‘grey market’ for pharmaceuticals imported from countries such as 
Canada.52 This opportunity for arbitrage reduces profits available to innovators, and 
impacts on their willingness to supply medicines to low income countries at a reduced 
price.53  However, it may be impossible to prevent exports due to the Internet 
facilitating sale of medicines by online pharmacies. There is also considerable 
political pressure in the United States to allow importation of patented drugs from 
Canada because of large number of Americans without any health insurance.54  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 D Blumenthal “Employer Sponsored Insurance – Riding the Health Care Tiger” (2006) 355 New 
Eng J Med 195 at 199.   
45 H Grabowski and CD Mullins “Pharmacy benefit management, cost-effectiveness analysis and drug 
formulary decisions”(1997) 45 Social Science & Medicine 535 at 538.  
46 M Drummond and others “Toward a consensus on the QALY” (2009) 12 Value in Health S31 at 
S34. 
47 A Brower “Is It Time To Take a Harder Look at the QALY?” (2008) 5(3) Biotech Healthc 47 at 48.  
48 Social Security Act 42 USC §1182(e): ‘The Patient-Centered Outcomes Research Institute … shall 
not develop or employ a dollars per quality adjusted life year (or similar measure that discounts the 
value of a life because of an individual's disability) as a threshold to establish what type of health care 
is cost effective or recommended. The Secretary shall not utilize such an adjusted life year (or such a 
similar measure) as a threshold to determine coverage, reimbursement, or incentive programs under 
title XVIII.’ See also Neumann and Weinstein, above n 10, at 1495.  
49 See JA Vernon “Drug research and price controls” (2002) 25 Regulation 22 at 22.  
50 See generally, MR Gold and others “Identifying and valuing outcomes” in Gold MR and others Cost-
Effectiveness in Health and Medicine (Oxford University Press, New York, 1996) at 82.  
51 Drummond, above n 46 at S34.   
52 K Outterson “Pharmaceutical arbitrage: balancing access and innovation in international prescription 
drug markets” (2005) 5 Yale J Health Pol'y L & Ethics 193 at 275.   
53 P Kanavos and others “The economic impact of pharmaceutical parallel trade in European Union 
member states: A stakeholder analysis” (Special Research Paper, London School of Economics and 
Political Science, 2004) at 25, 27.  
54  PW Grubb and PR Thomsen “Patents for Chemicals, Pharmaceuticals and Biotechnology: 
Fundamentals of Global Law, Practice and Strategy” (5th ed, Oxford University Press, New York, 
2010) at 431.  
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Outterson argues that the existence of pharmaceutical arbitrage under the grey 
market may still allow innovators to obtain optimal patent rents between high income 
countries such as the United States and Canada.55 However, there would likely be a 
significant reduction of patent rents if drugs could be imported from developing 
countries at low prices without restriction.56 On the other hand, if payers can subsidise 
medicines so they can be purchased at the marginal cost, this will reduce incentives 
for arbitrage.  
 
C Conclusion 
 
While QALYs have been criticised as an oversimplication, and their use as part of 
enforcing a strict threshold is avoided, in practice, they are a useful tool to link 
innovator rewards to health impact. Payers in New Zealand and other jurisdictions 
with publicly-funded healthcare systems have embraced the use of QALYs and the 
United States may be likely to follow suit if healthcare costs increase to an 
unsustainable level.  
 
Having considered the methods used by payers to determine rewards payable for 
medicines, the next chapter will discuss the goals and criteria of an ideal system that 
would incentivise innovators to develop therapies that maximise human health.
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55 Outterson, above 52, at 197.  
56 Grubb, above n 54, at 430.  
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V Goals and Criteria of the Ideal Incentive System  
 
A Introduction 
 
Chapter Five will first discuss the international obligations and goals to implement the 
highest standards of health, which should arguably be the purpose of the ideal 
incentive system. Subsequently, the chapter will propose eight criteria which the ideal 
system would satisfy. Finally, the current incentive system,1  which relies on patents, 
will be assessed against these ideal criteria.  
 
B International Obligations and Goals to Implement the Highest Standards of 
Health 
 
It is arguable that various international agreements compel New Zealand to adopt 
incentive mechanisms to implement the highest standards of health. The most relevant 
is the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESR) 
which entered into force in 1976.2 Article 12 of the ICESCR refers to the “right of 
everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental 
health.”3 ICESCR signatories have agreed to take the steps required to “achieve the 
full realization of this right”, including those necessary for “[t]he prevention, 
treatment and control of epidemic, endemic, occupational and other diseases.”4  
 
The ICESCR has been ratified by 160 countries (including New Zealand),5 
although it has only been signed, but not ratified by the United States.6 Each signatory 
must report to the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, which 
monitors compliance.7 However, New Zealand has not yet ratified the Optional 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 As noted in Chapter One, the current system refers to the patent system, regulatory environment, and 
reimbursement mechanisms that incentivise development of new medicines in New Zealand and the 
United States. 
2 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 993 UNTS 3 (Opened for signature 
16 December 1966, entered into force 3 January 1976) [ICESR].  
3 art 12.   
4 art 23.   
5 “International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights” (accessed 7 August 2014) 
Ministry of Justice <www.justice.govt.nz>. 
6 A Piccard “The United States’ Failure to Ratify the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights: Must the Poor Be Always with Us?” (2010) 13(2) St Mary's L Rev Min Iss 231 at 231.  
7 ICESCR, above n 2, art 16.  
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Protocol to the ICESCR,8 an enforcement mechanism that would allow filing of 
individual and inter-state complaints.9  
 
According to a Statement by the Committee on Economic Social and Cultural 
Rights, article 15(2) of the ICESCR requires that States “undertake steps necessary 
for the conservation, development and diffusion of science and culture” and that 
“intellectual property regimes should be conducive to realizing these goals.” 10 
Further, under Article 15(4), signatories “recognize the benefits to be derived from the 
encouragement and development of international contacts and cooperation in the 
scientific and cultural fields.”11 The General Assembly also recognised: 12 
 
the need for further international cooperation and research to promote the 
development of new drugs, vaccines and diagnostics tools for diseases causing 
a heavy burden in developing countries …taking into account that the failure of 
market forces to address such diseases.  
 
Therefore, it is arguable that states have an obligation to cooperate internationally to 
implement incentive mechanisms that achieve the full realisation of the right to 
health, including addressing neglected diseases.13  
 
Various academic commentators have also recognised the obligations of 
governments to implement incentive systems that do not obstruct the human right to 
health, 14  and that the patent system should not impede affordable access to 
medicines.15 For example,	  compulsory licenses and international arbitrage by parallel 
importing can reduce the cost of medicines by up to 90 per cent.16  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights GA Res 
63/117 (2008). 
9 Above n 5.  
10 Substantive Issues Arising in the Implementation of the International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights. Statement on Human Rights and Intellectual Property, E/C.12/2001/15 (2001).  
11 art 15(4). 
12 Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 22 December 2003 GA Res 58/173, A/58/508 
(2004).  
13 At [11]: ‘General Legal Obligations: … parties are urged to ensure that intellectual property regimes 
contribute, in a practical and substantive way, to the full realization of all the [ICESCR] rights.’ See 
also P Hunt “Neglected diseases: A human rights analysis” (Social, Economic and Behavioural (SEB) 
Research Special Topics No 6, World Health Organization, 2007) at 38.  
14 WW Fisher and T Syed “Global justice in healthcare: developing drugs for the developing world” 
(2006) 40 UC Davis L Rev 581 at 645 citing T Pogge World Poverty and Human Rights (Polity Press, 
Cambridge (UK), 2002) at 50-51.  
15 P Cullet “Patents and medicines: the relationship between TRIPS and the human right to health” 
(2003) 79 International Affairs 139 at 151-152.  
16   L Ferreira “Access to Affordable HIV/AIDS Drugs: The Human Rights Obligations of 
Multinational Pharmaceutical Corporations” (2002) 71 Fordham L Rev 1133 at 1135.  
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Accordingly, in November 2001, the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS 
Agreement and Public Health (Doha Declaration) was adopted by the WTO 
Ministerial Conference.17 Paragraph 4 of the Doha Declaration provides that TRIPS 
“can and should be interpreted and implemented in a manner supportive of WTO 
Members' right to protect public health and, in particular, to promote access to 
medicines for all.”18 Specifically, paragraph 5 allows governments to disregard patent 
rights and issue compulsory licences in order to achieve this purpose, and paragraph 6 
allows member countries to export to countries with insufficient or no pharmaceutical 
production capabilities. 19  For example, section 171 of the Patents Act allows 
compulsory licenses to export pharmaceuticals required to address a serious public 
health problem to WTO members and other eligible countries (for example, an 
epidemic of HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis or malaria). 20  However, notably, 
pharmaceuticals subject to a compulsory license under this provision must have 
distinguishing features such as special packaging, colouring or shaping “if including 
those features is feasible and does not impact on price”,21 which presumably is to 
address the risk of arbitraged re-sale in developed countries.  
 
It is important to note, however, that permitting compulsory licensing will not 
solve the problem of inadequate incentives for development of unprofitable therapies 
for neglected diseases in the first place. In particular, allowing compulsory licences 
will reduce ex ante incentives for innovators to develop these medicines.  Therefore, it 
is apparent that new incentives are needed in order to maximise the right to health.  
 
	   Summary 
 
Pursuant to ICESCR, it is arguable that UN Member States are obligated to 
implement mechanisms to support the full realisation of the right to health both 
amongst its citizens and citizens of developing countries. Intellectual property 
regimes are recognised as having an important role in securing the human right to 
health. For example, the Doha Declaration allows compulsory licenses to be issued 
for patents when necessary to protect public health.  However, permitting compulsory 
licenses may actually result in reduced private investment for addressing unmet 
medical needs. Therefore, it is arguable that in order to fulfill international 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, Fourth Ministerial Conference of the WTO, 
WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2, 20 November 2001 [Doha Declaration]. 
18 At [4].  
19 At [6]. However, formal adoption requires an amendment to TRIPS. The proposed amendment has 
not been ratified by two thirds of WTO members. See Amendment of the TRIPS Agreement – Fourth 
Extension of the Period for the Acceptance by Members of the Protocol Amending the TRIPS 
Agreement WT/L/899 (27 December 2013). 
20 Patents Act 2013, s 171(1)(b), s 172.  
21 s 173(2)(b).  
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obligations, UN member states must go beyond the patent system and support the 
implementation of alternative incentive mechanisms that can maximise the human 
right to health, both locally and internationally.  
 
C Criteria for the ideal incentive system 
 
This thesis will propose eight criteria for an ideal incentive system against which the 
current and various alternative incentive mechanisms can be assessed.  Each criterion 
will be rated from one (lowest) to five (highest). Baker22 used a similar type of 
analysis to rate four alternatives to the patent system23 using a five-point scale against 
seven criteria.24 However, Baker’s analysis was lacking in several respects. Firstly, 
Baker did not consider the problem of unpatentable, unmonopolisable, and 
unprofitable therapies under the patent system. Secondly, Baker provided no 
explanation of what each point on the scale meant with reference to each criterion. By 
contrast, the criteria below will specify the reason for awarding a particular score. 
Where there is some overlap or uncertainty regarding the appropriate score that 
should be provided, the author will award a half point increment, for example 3.5 or 
2.5. Thirdly, Baker only considered four alternatives to the patent system using seven 
criteria,25 whereas this thesis will analyse six alternatives against eight criteria. Thus, 
it is anticipated that this thesis will permit a more in-depth and robust analysis of 
alternative incentive systems.  
 
1 Incentivising unpatentable therapies 
 
The ideal incentive system should ensure that socially valuable unpatentable therapies 
are developed, despite the presence of ‘unpatentability factors’.26 A rating of five 
means that no unpatentable therapies will be subject to ‘patentability screening’27; 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 See D Baker “Financing drug research: What are the issues?” (Center for Economic and Policy 
Research, 2008).  
23 At 3. 
24 At 4. The seven criteria are: (1) Marginal Cost Pricing (2) Excessive Marketing (3) Adequate 
Financing for Biomedical Research (4) Incentives for Copycat Research (5) Political Interference with 
Research Priorities (6) Secrecy of Research Findings and (7) International Co-ordination.  
25 In particular, Baker considered (1) a proposal by Tim Hubbard and James Love for funding medical 
research using an employer-based research fee distributed via intermediaries, (2) a proposal by Aidan 
Hollis, for the Health Impact Fund, discussed in Chapter 6B (3) a proposal for patent auction by 
Michael Kremer, and (4) a proposal by Congressman Dennis Kuchinich for public funding of drug 
development via competing research centers.  
26 It is important to note that, unpatentable does not imply an absolute standard, rather, patentability 
exists along a continuum from strong to relatively weak patentability, having regard to the presence of 
one or more ‘unpatentability factors’ from Chapter Three.  
27 As discussed in Chapter Three under Deadly Gaps in the Patent System, pharmaceutical companies 
will assess drug candidates for patentability during pre-clinical and clinical development. Any drug 
candidates which are determined to have insufficient patentability (for example, due to the presence of 
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four means that most (75 per cent or less) will not be screened; three means that a 
majority (between 50 and 75 per cent) will not be screened; two means a significant 
amount (between five and 50 per cent) will not be screened; and one means only an 
insignificant amount (less than five per cent) will not be screened. Unfortunately, as 
noted in Chapter Three, due to the high levels of secrecy in the pharmaceutical 
industry, there is limited empirical data available on the levels of patentability 
screening.28 Therefore, a ranking under this criterion will necessarily require the 
author’s subjective assessment, based on what can be logically inferred from available 
information and a comparison with the rankings provided to similar incentive 
mechanisms.  
 
2 Incentivising unmonopolisable therapies 
 
The ideal incentive system will also address the lack of private funding incentives for 
unmonopolisable therapies.29 Rating scores will be assigned as per the first criterion, 
but with reference to screening of unmonopolisable therapies, mutatis mutandis. As 
noted above, scoring is necessarily a subjective assessment due to the lack of 
empirical data.  
 
3 Incentivising unprofitable therapies 
 
The ideal incentive system will help incentivise development of unprofitable 
therapies. Rating scores will be assigned as per the first and second criteria above, but 
with reference to screening of unprofitable therapies.  
 	  
4 Balancing dynamic and static efficiency. 
 
The fourth criterion requires the ideal system to balance long term benefits from the 
development of new and more effective medical therapies with short term incentives 
to lower prices and minimise deadweight loss by allowing competition. In economic 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
an unpatentability factor such as lack of novelty or inventive step) will be screened out of the 
development pipeline.  
28 As noted in Chapter Three, the author did not receive sufficient level of response to a survey of 
members of the pharmaceutical industry in order to an empirical assessment. This survey is attached in 
Appendix One.  
29 As discussed in Chapter Three under The Problem of Unmonopolisable Therapies, the name should 
not imply an absolute threshold, as they exist along a ‘continuum of excludability’.  
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theory, this can be described as the process of balancing dynamic and static 
efficiency.30  
 
For example, the current patent system achieves dynamic efficiency by 
allowing an innovator to charge a monopoly price for a limited time. In particular, as 
illustrated by Figure 2 below, charging a monopoly price allows an innovator recover 
an amount significantly greater than the marginal cost of producing the medicine. 
This area is referred to as the ‘producer surplus’.   
 
Figure 2: Producer surplus, deadweight loss and consumer surplus at the monopoly price.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Unfortunately, a temporary monopoly creates two suboptimal effects. First, it 
reduces the amount of ‘consumer surplus’, which represents consumers who would 
have been willing to pay a greater amount than the current price. Second, it increases 
the amount of ‘deadweight loss’, which represents consumers that would have been 
willing to pay for the drug at below the current monopoly cost, but above the marginal 
cost of production. Notably, it is theoretically possible to eliminate deadweight loss 
by using differential pricing, which means charging each customer what they can 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 TB Cueni “International Price Referencing Is there a “right“ way to perform?” (seminar presented to 
ISPOR, 15th Annual European Congress, Second Plenary Session, Berlin, 6 November 2012) at 2; JE 
Stiglitz and CE Walsh Economics (4th Ed, WW Norton, London, 2006) at A-3.   
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afford, provided that arbitrage does not occur.31 However, this will also eliminate 
consumer surplus.32 Payers can also reimburse the innovator at the monopoly price by 
subsidising the medicine, which can eliminate deadweight loss and maximise 
consumer surplus.33 However, this assumes that payers can afford the monopoly price, 
which may be unlikely in developing countries,34 and even developed countries.35   
 
In addition, differential pricing and payer reimbursement do not permit static 
efficiency, which is brought about through generic competition. As discussed in 
Chapter Two, generic entry causes the monopoly profits of an innovator to rapidly 
drop a process referred to as the ‘patent cliff’.36 Static efficiency increases as more 
generic competitors enter the market until it reaches the marginal cost with eight or 
more generic competitors.37  
 
It should be noted that long-term dynamic efficiency, to incentivise 
development of new and improved medicines, and short-term static efficiency, 
allowing price competition to minimise deadweight loss, are not necessarily mutually 
exclusive. For example, it is possible to incentivise development of new medical 
therapies without preventing competition with exclusivity, such as using prize-based 
‘pull’ incentives38 or ‘push’ incentives such as grant funding.39 These incentive 
mechanisms will be analysed in Chapters 6.2 and 6.3.   
 
For rating purposes, this criterion will take the following four elements into 
account: 
 
(1) private incentives for new and improved R&D (dynamic efficiency);  
(2) competition (static efficiency);  
(3) minimising deadweight loss; and  
(4) maximising consumer surplus.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 P Yadav “Differential Pricing for Pharmaceuticals: Review of current knowledge, new findings and 
ideas for action” (Department for International Development, 2010) at 39.  
32 M Abramowicz “Perfecting patent prizes” (2003) 56 Vand L Rev 115 at 159.  
33 W Fisher “Intellectual Property and Innovation: Theoretical, Empirical and Historical Perspectives” 
(seminar on Intellectual Property and Innovation in the Knowledge-Based Economy, The Hague, 2001) 
at 12; D Lakdawalla and N Sood “Health Insurance as a Two-Part Pricing Contract” (NBER Working 
Paper No 12681, 2006) at 2.  
34 Fisher, at 12.  35	  See, for example, C Parahi “Pharmac won't fund prostate cancer drug” (1 May 2014) One News 
<www.tvnz.co.nz>; N Triggle “NHS says no to new breast cancer drug Kadcyla” (7 August 2014) 
BBC News <www.bbc.com>.	  36	  B Hirschler “Drugmakers face $140 bln patent ‘cliff’ – report” (1 May 2007) Reuters  
<www.reuters.com>.	  
37 D Reiffen and MR Ward “Generic drug industry dynamics” (2005) 87(1) Rev of Econ & Stat 37 at 
37. 
38 See discussion of prize-based ‘pull incentives’ in Chapter 6B.   
39 See discussion of ‘push’ funding in Chapter 6C.  
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A rating of five means that the system provides all (1)-(4) without delay. A rating of 
four means providing at least three of (1)-(4) without delay, and a rating of three 
means providing at least two of (1)-(4) without delay. A rating of two means 
providing only one of (1)-(4) without delay, and a rating of one means providing (1)-
(4) with delay.  
 
5 Linking rewards to improved health outcomes 
 
The ideal system will link rewards to improved health outcomes in a manner that 
maximises health impact, irrespective of the treatment modality or class of disease, 
for example, whether it is monopolisable, unpatentable, unmonopolisable, or 
unprofitable. A score of five means that the system can maximise health impact 
gained for the rewards paid, irrespective of the therapy type or class of disease; four 
means that the system can maximise health impact for rewards in respect of more than 
one type of therapy or classes of disease; three means the system can maximise health 
impact, but only in respect of one type of therapy or class of disease, or alternatively, 
links rewards to health impact for more than one type of therapy, but does not 
maximise the same; two means the system is capable of linking rewards to health 
impact but is unlikely to maximise the same; and one means the system links rewards 
paid to health impact poorly or not at all.  
 
6 Minimising administration costs to determine rewards 
 
The ideal incentive system would minimise the administration costs required to 
determine the appropriate level of rewards by using a market-based mechanism 
through voluntary negotiations between a willing buyer (payer) and seller 
(innovator).40 It would ideally ‘piggyback’ on an existing reimbursement mechanism, 
because it would be more expensive to establish a new framework and guidelines. 
This can be contrasted with the use of a non-market or sui-generis mechanism used to 
determine rewards. Hemmel and Ouellete note that a non-market mechanism such as 
a government-set award is less efficient because it requires the government to foresee 
the value of a potential invention in advance, which may result in significant over or 
underpayment.41 It is important that costs do not exceed the social surplus gained 
from implementing the incentive system.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 Although the innovator has a monopoly right and the payer generally has monopsony power, this is 
deemed a market mechanism for the purpose of this thesis because both parties are free to negotiate 
pricing. This may also be referred to as a ‘quasi-market’ mechanism.  
41 DJ Hemel and LL Ouellette “Beyond the Patents--Prizes Debate” (2013) 92 Texas Law Review 303 
at 327.  
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A score of five means that determination of the appropriate level of rewards 
has minimal costs42 by using a market-mechanism or existing mechanism; four means 
using a market mechanism or non-market mechanism which has minimal costs but 
requires a sui generis mechanism; three means using a market or non-market 
mechanism which has significant costs to administer;43 two means using a market or 
non-market mechanism which has high costs to administer;44 and one means using a 
mechanism with extremely high costs to administer.45 
 
7 Minimising waste/inefficiency 
 
The ideal system will have an absence of the following waste/inefficiency factors 
namely: (1) incentives for excessive marketing, (2) risk of costly litigation, for 
example, between generics and innovators or between innovators over conflicting 
patent rights,46 (3) opportunities for gaming, (4) arbitrage due to grey markets, (5) 
incentives to counterfeit drugs, (6) incentives for low transparency and duplication of 
R&D efforts due to races to be first to file a patent, (7) incentives to develop me-too 
drugs, (8) anti-commons effect, (9) rent-seeking, and (10) free-riding. The first eight 
factors have already been discussed in the previous chapters with reference to 
problems with the current patent system. Rent-seeking means the use of political 
manipulation to increase private rewards such as the ‘regulatory capture’ of a 
government agency to serve certain private interests.47 Free riding means benefiting 
from new therapies without contributing, either directly or indirectly to their 
development by innovators through the payment of rewards.  
 
A score of five means the absence of all waste/inefficiency factors; four means 
the absence of all but one or two factors, three means absence of all but three or four 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 Minimal costs are defined as costs which are not likely to exceed 10 per cent of the potential social 
surplus gained as a result of administering the incentive system. Social surplus is calculated as the sum 
of producer and consumer surplus, which represents the total welfare gain as a result of administering 
the incentive system. 
43 Significant costs means costs which are likely to exceed 10 per cent of the potential social surplus 
gained.  
44 High costs means higher than significant costs, but that are not likely to exceed 100 per cent of 
potential social surplus gained.  
45 Extremely high costs means costs that are likely to exceed 100 per cent of the potential social surplus 
gained.  
46 See PW Grubb and PR Thomsen Patents for Chemicals, Pharmaceuticals, and Biotechnology: 
Fundamentals of Global Law (5th ed, Oxford University Press, New York, 2010) at 434. This is 
particularly an issue for biotechnology companies, where litigation regarding conflicting patents can 
often exceed 15 years, by which time there may be limited patent length remaining.  
47 See A Krueger “The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society” (1974) 64 American Economic 
Review 291; ME Levine and JL Forrence “Regulatory Capture, Public Interest, and the Public Agenda: 
Toward a Synthesis” (1990) 6 J of L Econ and Org 167.  
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factors, two means the absence of all but five to seven factors, and a score of one 
means the absence of all but eight or more factors.  
 
8 Incentivising incremental innovation and breakthroughs 
 
Lastly, while the ideal system should not encourage ‘me-too’ drugs, it would still 
reward incremental innovations, 48  as most technological advances occur in this 
manner.49 For example, slight improvements in ‘me-too’ drugs can sometimes provide 
large social benefits.50 However, there should be a correspondingly greater reward for 
fundamental breakthroughs, such as a drug with a new mechanism of action, 
particularly where other innovators have benefited from such breakthroughs. Despite 
this encouragement, the ideal system should not compromise patient safety. 
 
A score of five means that the system incentivises incremental innovation and 
breakthroughs optimally51; four means incentivising either incremental innovation or 
breakthroughs optimally and either incremental innovation or breakthroughs 
significantly; 52 three means incentivising both incremental innovation and 
breakthroughs significantly or incentivising incremental innovation or breakthroughs 
optimally; two means incentivising either incremental innovation or breakthroughs 
significantly; and one means incentivising neither incremental innovation nor 
breakthroughs significantly. Compromising safety, such as increasing the likelihood 
of harm or adverse events occuring to patients, will reduce the score by one point.   
 
Evaluating the criteria scores  
 
The eight criteria can be used to provide an overall score to each incentive system by 
averaging the scores received for each criterion. This provides a benchmark to 
facilitate a comparison of the strengths and weaknesses of the different incentive 
systems.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48 See O Tur-Sinai “Cumulative Innovation in Patent Law: Making Sense of Incentives” (2010) 50 
IDEA 723 at 736-740. 
49 AI Wertheimer and TM Santella “Pharmacoevolution: the advantages of incremental innovation” 
(IPN Working Papers on Intellectual Property, Innovation and Health, 2004) at 6.  
50 See discussion of ‘me-too’ drugs in Chapter Three, citing A Wertheimer, R Levy and T O'Connor 
“Too Many Drugs? The Clinical and Economic Value of Incremental Innovations” in I Farquhar, K 
Summers and A Sorkin (eds) Investing in Health: The Social and Economic Benefits of Health Care 
Innovation (Volume 14, JAI Press, United Kingdom, 2001) 77 at 78-79. 
51 Optimally means that over 75 per cent will not be screened for ‘commercial reasons’. Because of the 
lack of empirical data on this issue, as with the first three criteria, this will be a subjective assessment 
based on what the author can infer from available information.  
52 ‘Significantly’ means over 25 per cent of therapies will not be screened for ‘commercial reasons’. As 
above, this will be the author’s subjective assessment, based on what can be inferred from available 
information.  
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Excluding criteria 
 
It is arguable that if the purpose of a particular incentive mechanism is not to 
incentivise either unpatentable, unmonopolisable or unprofitable therapies, it would 
be unfair to include them in the calculation of the overall score. In that case, the 
overall score will be obtained by averaging the scores of the number of criteria 
analysed. For example, the purpose of an incentive mechanism may only be to 
incentivise unprofitable therapies such as neglected diseases. Where the purpose of an 
incentive mechanism is not disclosed, it can be inferred from relevant legislative 
records or academic commentary.  
 
D Comparison of the Current Incentive System with the Ideal Criteria 
 
This thesis defines the current incentive system as comprising of several aspects, with 
the primary incentive being the patent system, but also including the regulatory 
environment and limited data exclusivity, and the pharmaceutical reimbursement 
system, as it applies to New Zealand and the United States. It is apparent that the 
current system provides significant private incentives to develop patentable therapies, 
as demonstrated by the USD 135 billion spent annually on R&D.53 However, as will 
now be discussed, it performs sub-optimally for many of the ideal criteria.  
 
 
 Should any criteria be excluded? 
 
As noted above, the current incentive system includes the patent and pharmaceutical 
reimbursement mechanisms. Section 3 of the Patents Act 2013 states that one of its 
purposes is to provide an “efficient and effective patent system” that “promotes 
innovation and economic growth while providing an appropriate balance between the 
interests of inventors and patent owners and the interests of society as a whole”.54 
During parliamentary debates of the Patents Bill, the central role of the patent system 
for incentivising development of medicines was emphasised.55 Section 3 of the New 
Zealand Public Health and Disability Act 2000, which establishes the pharmaceutical 
reimbursement system, states of its purposes is to “achieve for New Zealanders… the 
improvement, promotion, and protection of their health”. Therefore, it is arguable that 
the current incentive system should not exclude incentivising development of socially 
valuable unpatentable, unmonopolisable and unprofitable therapies, as this would not 
incentivise therapies that would improve overall health of New Zealanders.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53 The Pharmaceutical Industry and Global Health Facts and Figures 2012 (International Federation of 
Pharmaceutical Manufacturers and Associations, 2012) at 10, Chart 2.  
54 Patents Act 2013, s 3(a)(i).  
55 (27 August 2013) 693 NZPD 12948.  
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1 Incentivising unpatentable therapies 
 
As discussed in Chapter Three, drug candidates are subject to multiple patentability 
checks during pre-clinical and clinical development. Therapies which are deemed to 
be unpatentable are screened out, regardless of social value. ‘Evergreening’ 
techniques, such as filing new formulations or method of use patents may be used to 
‘rescue’ patentability, particularly where a medicine has not yet received regulatory 
approval.56 However, evergreening is only effective in limited circumstances where 
off-label competition is not possible. Despite the lack of empirical data due to the 
level of secrecy in the industry, an arguably conservative estimate is that only 
between five and 50 per cent of socially valuable unpatentable therapies will not be 
screened. Therefore, the patent system receives a score of two under this criterion.  
 
2 Incentivising unmonopolisable therapies 
 
Chapter Three discussed the lack of incentives to fund unmonopolisable therapies 
including second uses of generic drugs, supplements, and therapies based on diet, 
readily available chemicals, lifestyle interventions, and negative information about 
drugs. The latter categories are highly unmonopolisable because infringement is 
practically impossible to detect. It is also difficult or impossible to prevent new uses 
of generic drugs, even with a patent over the new use.57 However, on rare occasions, 
generic drugs and supplements may be successfully monopolised if off-label 
substitution can be restricted58 or where it is possible to rely on marketing. Therefore, 
recognising these significant obstacles, it is likely that less than 5 per cent of socially 
valuable unmonopolisable therapies will be developed, and the patent system receives 
a score of one under this criterion.  
 
3 Incentivising unprofitable therapies 
 
As discussed in Chapter Three, there is a large bias in R&D spending against 
neglected diseases59 and antibiotic research.60 Incentives under the current system are 
based on the ability to extract high monopoly profits from sales. As this is not 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56 See discussion of ‘evergreening’ in Chapter Three.  
57 See discussion of ‘skinny labelling’ and unmonopolisable second uses for generic drugs in Chapter 
Two and 3; Bristol-Myers Squibb v Shalala 91 F 3d 1493 (DC Cir 1996).  
58 See discussion of ‘evergreening’ and the feasibility of preventing ‘off-label’ competition from 
generic drugs in Chapter Three.  
59 See discussion of unprofitable therapies in Chapter Three.  
60 SJ Projan “Why is big Pharma getting out of antibacterial drug discovery?” (2003) 6 Current 
Opinion in Microbiology 427. 
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possible for unprofitable therapies under the patent system, alternative incentives are 
required. Therefore, it is likely that far less than 5 per cent of socially valuable 
unprofitable therapies will be developed, and the current patent system receives a 
score of one in respect of this criterion.  
 
4 Balancing dynamic and static efficiency  
 
The patent system is often considered “a trade-off between static and dynamic 
efficiency”.61 Publicly-funded healthcare systems such as New Zealand can avoid 
deadweight losses of monopoly prices by subsidising medicines, but only to the extent 
the payer can bear the monopoly price of new pharmaceuticals.62 For example, New 
Zealand ranks 14th globally in the uptake of new medicines, which are the most 
expensive, compared to the United States which ranks first.63 However, in a non-
publicly funded healthcare system such as the United States, while more medicines 
are available, deadweight losses are greater because higher costs are borne by 
patients. These deadweight losses were estimated as between USD 3 to 30 billion in 
1995,64 and between USD 60 to 105 billion in 2013.65 Notably, the latter exceeds the 
USD 48.5 billion that pharmaceutical companies in the United States spend annually 
on researching new medicines.66 
 
Once exclusivity expires, the static efficiency goal of price competition is 
achieved when generic competitors enter the market. As noted above, pharmaceutical 
prices drop rapidly upon generic entry, eventually reaching the marginal cost of 
production with eight or more competitors67  which eliminates deadweight loss. 
However, as discussed in Chapter Three, generic competition can be frustrated by 
‘pay-for-delay’ settlements. 
 
It is also possible for pharmaceutical companies to use differential pricing to 
minimise deadweight loss by charging payers a lower price according to per capita 
income level. However, this does not tend to occur in the international markets, likely 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61 JA Ordover “A Patent System for Both Diffusion and Exclusion” (1991) 5(1) J of Econ Persp 43 at 
43.   
62 AM Jones (ed) The Elgar Companion to Health Economics (2nd ed, Edward Elgar Publishing, 
Cheltenham (UK), 2012) at 117; above n 39.  
63 Did You Know? (Medicines New Zealand, 2013) at 8.  
64 RC Guell and M Fischbaum “Toward Allocative Efficiency in the Prescription Drug Industry” 
(1995) 73 Milbank Q 213 at 226.  
65 Baker, n 22, above at 14-15. 
66 Biopharmaceutical Research Industry Profile (Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of 
America, July 2013) at 31, Figure 10.  
67 Reiffen and Ward, above n 41, at 37.   
137	  	  
due to the risk of arbitrage.68 It is preferable to use payer reimbursement to minimise 
deadweight loss and maximise consumer surplus, assuming it is affordable to the 
payer.  
 
Therefore, the current patent system provides (1) private incentives and allows 
(2) competition. However, both of these occur with some delay as monopoly rents can 
only be obtained from sales after regulatory approval over the length of the 
exclusivity period, and competition is only possible when the patent expires. It is 
possible to (3) minimise deadweight loss and (4) maximise consumer surplus with 
payer reimbursement without delay. Differential pricing can minimise deadweight 
loss but this will eliminate consumer surplus. Therefore, because the current system 
can provide (3) and (4) without delay, the current system is provided a rating of three 
under this criterion.  
 
5 Linking rewards to improved health outcomes 
 
The use of pharmacoeconomic principles and QALYs by payers has the potential to 
maximise health impact in accordance with rewards paid to innovators. However, as 
discussed in Chapter Three, the current system is biased towards monopolisable 
therapies at the expense of other safe and effective therapies. As noted by Cook, 
patents are poorly suited to protect socially valuable clinical trial data.69 Patents are 
the primary incentive to produce clinical trial data under the current system, and do 
not incentivise research into unpatentable, unmonopolisable and unpatentable 
therapies. Therefore, because the current system has the potential to maximise health 
impact of rewards only for one type of therapy, namely ‘monopolisable therapies’, it 
achieves a rating of three under this criterion.  
 
6 Minimising administration costs to determine rewards 
 
The current patent system has long-established legal precedents to allow the grant and 
enforcement of patents. Payers negotiate with pharmaceutical companies under an 
established market-mechanism allowing payers to use pharmacoeconomic principles. 
Litigation between innovators and generic companies, while expensive, is borne by 
the private industry and not part of the direct administration costs of determining 
rewards. Therefore the current incentive system achieves a rating of five under this 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
68 For example, Chile and Mexico apparently pay similar pharmaceutical prices to European countries, 
despite lower income per capita. See PM Danzon and MF Furukawa “Prices and Availability of 
Pharmaceuticals: Evidence from Nine Countries” (2003) Health Affairs W3-521 at 527.  
69 T Cook “How IPRs, like Nature, Abhor a Vacuum, and What Can Happen When They Fill it - 
Lacunae and Overlaps in Intellectual Property” (2012) 17 JIPR 296 at 299.  
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criterion, because it has minimal administration costs and uses an existing and 
established mechanism to determine rewards. 
 
7 Minimising waste/inefficiency 
 
Regarding criterion seven, as already discussed in Chapters 3 and 4, the following 
waste/inefficiency factors are arguably not absent in the current system: (1) incentives 
for excessive marketing, (2) risk of excessive litigation (such as patent challenges 
between generics and innovators), (3) opportunity for gaming70 (4) arbitrage due to 
grey markets, (5) incentives to counterfeit drugs, (7) incentives to develop me-too 
drugs, and (8) anti-commons effect.  
 
However, the patent system has various aspects which reduce 
waste/inefficiency. The sufficiency requirement under the patent system encourages 
transparency via full public disclosure in the patent specification, which is published 
18 months after filing. Awarding exclusivity rights from the date the patent is filed 
can also prevent ‘races’ to commercialisation.71 These effects negate (6) incentives for 
low transparency and duplication of R&D efforts due to races. Regarding (9) rent-
seeking, there is limited evidence of political influence on the process of granting 
patents, or that regulatory approval and payer reimbursement is subject to significant 
political influence. Finally, (10) free-riding is minimised under the current patent 
system, except to the extent that countries may be able to issue compulsory licenses 
pursuant to the Doha Declaration without adequately compensating the innovator. 
However, compulsory licensing has rarely occurred in practice.72   
 
Accordingly, because of the absence of all but seven waste/inefficiency 
factors, the current patent system is awarded a score of two under this criterion.  
 
8 Incentivising incremental innovation and breakthroughs 
 
With regard to criterion eight, the current patent system has the flexibility to allow 
broad ‘genus’ claims which reward breakthroughs,73 and narrow ‘species’ claims 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
70  Examples of gaming include ‘patent evergreening’ and ‘off-label’ promotion, as discussed 
throughout Chapter Three. 
71 M Abramowicz “The inducement standard of patentability” (2011) 120 Yale LJ 1590 at 1647-1648. 
discussing Kitch’s prospect theory. See also discussion in Chapter Two.  
72  According to a 2012 paper by Kuhn and Beall, government officials have only threatened 
compulsory licensing 24 times since 1995, with a significant drop since 2008. See R Beall and R Kuhn 
“Trends in Compulsory Licensing of Pharmaceuticals Since the Doha Declaration: A Database 
Analysis” 9 PLoS Med 1 at 3.  
73 For example, a broad claim over a class of drugs which modulate a newly discovered protein target 
that has been implicated in a disease process. 
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which promote incremental innovation.74 However, to the extent a broad claim over a 
pioneering drug cannot prevent competition from me-too drugs, the latter may 
cannibalise rents and arguably reduce incentives to develop breakthrough medicines, 
which may have novel mechanisms of action.75 Pharmacoeconomic principles such as 
reference pricing may help alleviate this effect by reducing profits for me-too drugs 
when the pioneering drug becomes available as a generic. Arguably, therefore, the 
current system is flexible enough to significantly incentivise breakthroughs and 
optimally incentivise incremental innovation. Further, the current system does not 
encourage breakthroughs that compromise public safety because of the requirement to 
obtain regulatory approval to obtain rewards, and the fact that the patent holder will 
be liable if the marketed drug is unsafe. The current system is therefore granted a 
rating of four in respect to fulfilment of this criterion.  
  
Summary  
 
Assuming it is appropriate to include the first three criteria, the rating achieved by the 
current patent incentive system is 2.63 out of five.76 It is apparent that the current 
system is not optimal, particularly in respect of the first three criteria and the seventh 
criterion.  As discussed above, and as will be discussed in the next two chapters, this 
means that the ideal incentive system is likely to involve alternative incentive 
mechanisms that can address the lack of incentives for unpatentable, 
unmonopolisable, and unprofitable therapies, while also achieving the highest 
possible scores under the other criteria.  
 
E Conclusion 
 
This chapter has argued that international legal obligations compel the 
implementation of alternative incentives that will address inadequacies in the current 
incentive system to maximise the right to health. The criteria and ratings devised in 
this chapter will now be used to assess various alternative incentive mechanisms 
proposed in Chapter Six, some of which have already been implemented in the United 
States and in other countries. As a consequence of this analysis, an optimal incentive 
system will be proposed in Chapter Seven.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
74 For example, a claim over a specific formulation of a previous drug which has an improved safety or 
efficacy profile.  
75  Refer to discussion of ‘me-too’ drugs in Chapter Three.  
76 21 total points divided by the 8 criteria.  
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VI Alternative Incentives for Medical Therapies  
 
A  Introduction 
 
Chapter Six will introduce alternative incentive mechanisms for medical therapies and 
compare these to the ideal criteria from Chapter Five. These incentive mechanisms 
are divided into three broad categories. Chapter 6A will address exclusivity-based 
‘pull’ incentives1 that provide exclusivity rights as the primary incentive to reward 
innovators: patent extensions, extended regulatory exclusivity, and Orphan Drug 
reforms.2 Chapter 6B addresses various prize-based ‘pull’ incentives that reward 
innovators with payment of money for developing a therapy: fixed prizes, flexible 
prizes, and advance market commitments.  Chapter 6C will address ‘push’ incentives, 
that support innovators during development of a therapy, such as public funding for 
clinical trials and open source approaches.  
 
Some of the following incentive mechanisms have already been implemented, 
whereas others have only been proposed. Nevertheless, their existence supports the 
notion that the current patent system is not performing adequately, and that alternative 
mechanisms are required, particularly for incentivising unpatentable, 
unmonopolisable, and unprofitable therapies.3 
VIA Exclusivity-based ‘Pull’ Incentives  
 
In a similar manner to the patent system, exclusivity-based ‘pull’ incentives 
incentivise development of new medicines, by extending the period of exclusivity 
against competition for an innovator that obtains a particular goal, such as regulatory 
approval of a new medicine.  
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 A ‘pull’ incentive rewards the achievement of a particular goal after it has been fulfilled. These can 
be contrasted with ‘push’ incentives, which assist in the achievement of the goal during development: 
see F Mueller-Langer “Neglected infectious diseases: are push and pull incentive mechanisms suitable 
for promoting drug development research?” (2013) 8(2) H Econ Pol L 185 at 187, Fig 1.  
2 Notably, orphan drug reforms include tax breaks and other grants, and is therefore a ‘hybrid’ 
mechanism containing ‘push’ incentives. However, as will be discussed below, the primary incentive is 
exclusivity.  
3 It will be observed – and expanded upon in Chapter Seven - that in general, exclusivity-based ‘pull’ 
incentives in Chapter 6A more suited to incentivise unpatentable therapies, whereas the prize-based 
‘pull’ mechanisms in Chapter 6B and government-funded ‘push’ mechanisms in Chapter 6C are more 
suited for incentivising unmonopolisable and unprofitable therapies. 
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A Patent Extensions  
 
Patent extension regimes allow pharmaceutical patents to be extended beyond their 
20-year length guaranteed by TRIPS. The ostensible rationale for patent extension is 
to compensate innovators for the reduction in patent length due to long development 
times and delays in obtaining regulatory approval. As discussed in Chapter Three, a 
medicine can take an average of 9 to 12 years to develop and achieve regulatory 
approval, which means that innovators may have less than 10 years of patent 
exclusivity left to recover their costs.4 Accordingly, there is a significant private 
funding cooling effect for medical therapies with insufficient patent length. An 
intuitively attractive solution is to provide patent extensions to compensate.   
 
As discussed in Chapter Two, the United States passed the Hatch-Waxman 
Act in 1984, which established the generic approval pathway to incentivise generic 
drug companies to challenge patents and rapidly enter the market upon patent expiry. 
As a counterbalance to these pro-generic reforms, 35 USC § 156(c) provided 
pharmaceutical patent extensions of up to five years for time lost during clinical trials 
and regulatory approval, to a maximum of 14 years after FDA approval.5 Whilst 
generally, only one patent extension is available per new active ingredient, 6 the 
Federal Circuit has more recently interpreted the Act to allow patent extensions over 
derivative “drug products” such as salts, enantiomers, and drug combinations.7  
Arguably, this interpretation would reward “evergreening” attempts by drug 
companies.8  
 
Other jurisdictions have also adopted five-year patent extensions for 
pharmaceuticals including Europe,9 Australia10 and Japan.11 However, neither Canada 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 JA DiMasi, HG Grabowski “The Cost of Biopharmaceutical R&D: Is Biotech Different?” (2007) 28 
Manage Decis Econ 469 at 475; See also M Dickson and JP Gagnon “The cost of new drug discovery 
and development” (2009) 4(22) Discovery Medicine 172 at 172.  
535 USC § 156(c), (g)(1)(B), (g)(6). The patent term extension is calculated by adding half of the time 
spent by a drug in clinical development to the time taken up by regulatory submissions to the FDA: 35 
USC § 156(c) (2).  See also Astra v Lehman, 71 F 3d 1578 (Fed Cir 1995). 
6 Fisons v Quigg, 876 F 2d 99 (Fed Cir 1989).  
7 Ortho-McNeil Pharm., Inc v Lupin Pharms, Inc, 603 F 3d 1377 (Fed Cir 2010) and Photocure v 
Kappos 603 F 3d 1372 (Fed Cir 2010).  
8 Compare the position in Australia, which allows patent extensions on composition of matter claims 
but not method of use or process claims: Boehringer Ingelheim International v Commissioner of 
Patents [2000] FCA 1918 at [16].  
9 Regulation 1768/92 concerning the creation of a supplementary protection certificate for medicinal 
products [1992] OJ L1821. By contrast with the approach of the United States Federal Circuit to 
“evergreening”, patent extensions are only available where a drug “product” falls within the claims of 
the earliest “basic patent”, which would generally exclude derivative drugs: see Case C-431/04 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology [2006] ECR I-4089; but see Neurim Pharmaceuticals (1991) 
Limited v Comptroller-General of Patents [2010] EWHC 976 (Pat).  
10 Patents Act 1990 (Cth), ss 70, 77(1)-(2).  
11 Patent Act No 121 of 1959 (JP), art 76(2).  
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nor New Zealand has reciprocated with their own patent extension regimes to date.12 
Significantly, Canada filed a complaint to the WTO alleging that the European patent 
extension provisions were a breach of Article 27.1 of TRIPS because they 
discriminate the scope of protection by reference to a particular industry (albeit in a 
positive manner).13   
 
In New Zealand, the Ministry of Economic Development released a paper in 
2003 recommending patent extensions for pharmaceutical patents.14 However, this 
was not implemented by the Labour cabinet, likely due to increased burden on 
healthcare costs.15 The reluctance to implement patent extensions in New Zealand is 
understandable, given that it would increase healthcare costs for a country that is a net 
importer of new medicines. Arguably, for countries that primarily import new 
medicines, the main reason to adopt patent extension reforms is to prevent allegations 
of ‘free riding’16 or as part of concessions under a free trade agreement.17 These trade 
agreements, such as the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement currently being 
negotiated in secret with New Zealand and 11 other countries, are colloquially 
referred to as ‘TRIPS-Plus’ because they attempt to expand patent protection over the 
minimum standards guaranteed by TRIPS, often as a result of intensive lobbying by 
industry representatives in the United States.18 The proliferation of such ‘TRIPS-Plus’ 
agreements is often subjected to criticism by foreign aid organisations on the basis of 
restricting access to generic medicines.19  
 
Various academics have proposed flexible patent extension mechanisms. For 
example, Civan proposes extending patent lengths to compensate for unmet medical 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 T Harris, D Nicol and N Gruen Pharmaceutical Patents Review Report (Pharmaceutical Patents 
Review Committee, Canberra, 2013) at ix.  
13  European Communities - Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agricultural Products, 
complaint by Canada WT/DS153/1, 2 December 1998.  
14 Review of the Patents Act 1953: The Pharmaceutical Patent Term in New Zealand: A Discussion 
Paper (Ministry of Economic Development, June 2003).  
15 S Frankel "Intellectual Property in New Zealand and the TPPA" in J Kelsey (ed) No Ordinary Deal. 
Unmasking The Trans-Pacific Partnership Free Trade Agreement (Bridget Williams Books, 
Wellington, 2010) 163 at 172. The Australian government also recently convened  the Pharmaceutical 
Patents Review Committee, which recommended reducing the maximum length of patent extension 
after regulatory approval to 10 or 12 years: see T Harris, D Nicol and N Gruen at xv, Recommendation 
4.1.  
16 Ministry of Economic Development, above n 14, at 10.  
17 For example, New Zealand may yet introduce patent extensions as part of the controversial Trans-
Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPP) being negotiated in secret between various Asia-Pacific 
countries, currently including the United States, Japan, Canada, Australia, Singapore, Brunei, Chile, 
Malaysia, Mexico, Peru, Vietnam, and New Zealand: see R Wyber and W Perry The Trans-Pacific 
Partnership: An analysis of the impact on health in New Zealand (Nyes Institute, 2013) at 4, 10.  
18 TA Faunce and R Townsend “The Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement: challenges for Australian 
health and medicine policies” (2011) 194(2) Med J Aust 83 at 84, Box 1.   
19 K Bhardwaj and C Oh “The Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement: Implications for Access to 
Medicines and Public Health (UNITAID, World Health Organization, March 2014) at 32; See also 
“TRIPS, TRIPS Plus and Doha” (July 2011) Médecins Sans Frontières <www.msfaccess.org>. 
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need involving drugs for neglected diseases. 20  Abramowicz proposes the 
implementation of patent extension auctions,21 which would counteract the incentives 
under the patent system to file for patent protection as early as possible.22 Patent 
extension proposals will now be analysed against the ideal criteria.  
 
1 Comparison of the patent extension regimes with the ideal criteria.  
 
Should any criteria be excluded? 
 
The purpose of patent extensions is linked to the purpose of the patent system, which, 
as discussed in Chapter Five, is arguably to incentivise innovation that benefits 
society as a whole. Therefore, incentivising unpatentable, unmonopolisable, and 
unprofitable therapies should not be excluded from the following analysis.  
 
(a) Criterion one: incentivising unpatentable therapies 
 
The main benefit of patent extension regimes is their ability to compensate for the 
unpatentability factor caused by lack of patent length. Although patent extensions 
would not address the other four unpatentability factors,23 they would help facilitate 
‘evergreening’ if they are available for ‘secondary’ patents.24  
 
As discussed in Chapter Three, there is limited empirical evidence regarding 
how many therapies are screened due to insufficient patent length. However, a five 
year patent extension would increase patent length by 25 per cent. Arguably, this 
would lower the rate of screening compared to the current patent system, and between 
50 to 75 per cent of unpatentable therapies will not be screened out.25 For that reason, 
patent extensions receive a score of three out of five in respect of this criterion.   
 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 A Civan “An Alternative Patent Mechanism for Pharmaceutical Drugs for Tropical Diseases” (2009) 
2(1) EJEPS 21 at 27.    
21 See M Abramowicz “The Danger of Underdeveloped Patent Prospects” (2007) 92 Cornell L Rev 
1065 at 1112-1116.  The innovator would propose an auction for a patent extension length and allow 
third parties to make bids on purchasing the patent extension. The innovator would then be required to 
purchase the patent extension at a certain markup over the highest bid (for example 25 per cent), or will 
be liable to pay a fine.  
22 At 1065.  
23 Namely, lack of novelty, lack of inventive step, insufficiency/inutility, and unpatentability under law.  
24 See above, n 8.  
25 Compare the score of two provided for criterion one under the current patent system discussed in 
Chapter Five.   
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(b) Criterion two: incentivising unmonopolisable therapies 
 
To the extent that the current patent regime fails to incentivise unmonopolisable 
therapies, patent extensions would also fail. As discussed when comparing the ideal 
criteria to the current patent system, patents can only enforce a monopoly price if is 
possible to prevent ‘off-label’ substitution of the therapy with a cheap ingredient. This 
problem would not be solved by a patent extension regime per se, therefore, it 
receives a score of one under this criterion.  
 
(c) Criterion three: incentivising unprofitable therapies 
 
As discussed in Chapter Three and Chapter Five, patent exclusivity does not provide 
adequate incentives for unprofitable therapies. Studies have already shown that the 
availability of patent protection has not increased the level of investment in neglected 
diseases.26 This is not surprising, given that developing countries cannot afford to pay 
the monopoly price required for an innovator to recoup their investment.27  For 
example, the above proposal by Civian to extend patents regarding treatment of 
neglected diseases would have relatively little value as the market for neglected 
diseases is non-lucrative. For that reason, patent extensions also receive a score of one 
out of five with respect to this criterion. 
 
 (d) Criterion four: balancing dynamic and static efficiency 
 
Patent extensions share the advantages and disadvantages of the current patent regime 
under the fourth criterion. Increasing the length of exclusivity will provide greater 
private incentives for development, but will also delay competition and potentially 
increase the amount of deadweight losses and reduce consumer surplus, to the extent 
that payers cannot afford to subsidise the monopoly price.  
 
Notably, exclusivity-based incentives may be self-correcting as innovators 
may charge a lower monopoly price due to a longer period of exclusivity, assuming 
only such a price will be reimbursed by payers. However, in practice, pharmaceutical 
companies will charge the highest price the market can bear, and may refuse to supply 
the drug to a country which cannot afford the monopoly price. This is no different to 
the position under the current patent system.  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 MK Kyle and AM McGahan “Investments in Pharmaceuticals Before and After TRIPS” (2012) 
94(4) Review of Economics and Statistics 1157 at 1157; see also J Lanjouw and I Cockburn “New Pills 
for Poor People? Empirical Evidence After GATT” (2001) 29 (2) World Development 265 at 265.  
27 As discussed below, while increasing the length of exclusivity may allow a lower price to be 
charged, the net amount payable is unchanged, because an extension would merely push monopoly 
costs into the future.  
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Flexible patent extensions could allow length of market exclusivity to exactly match 
the incentive required to motivate R&D expenditure required for commercialisation, 
However, this would be administratively difficult to accomplish. Further, as noted 
above with regard to Canada’s complaint to the WTO, attempts to vary patent length 
could be objected to under the anti-discrimination provisions in article 27.3 of 
TRIPS.28  
 
Ultimately, patent extensions provide (1) private incentives because of a 
longer period of exclusivity rights, although there is delay as rewards are only 
obtained from sales over the period of exclusivity. There is also a longer delay before 
(2) competition. However, payer reimbursement can (3) minimise deadweight loss 
and (4) maximise consumer surplus, assuming the medicine is affordable. 
Accordingly, patent extension regimes are equivalent to current patent system, and are 
awarded a score of three.  
 
(e) Criterion five: linking rewards to improved health outcomes  
 
As noted in Chapter Five, pharmacoeconomic principles used by payers to negotiate 
prices have the potential to maximise health impact, at least with respect to 
monopolisable therapies. For example, innovators are less likely to secure a premium 
for a me-too drug unless its incremental health benefit is justified, especially where 
cheaper generics are available. However, as with the current patent system, patent 
extensions do not reward unmonopolisable and unpatentable therapies. Therefore, 
because patent extensions, like the patent system, have the potential to maximise 
health impact for only one type of therapy, namely, monopolisable therapies, they 
also receive a score of three with respect to this criterion. 
 
(f) Criterion six: minimising administration costs to determine rewards 
 
Administration costs for patent extensions are relatively low compared with prize-
based ‘pull’ incentives and ‘push’ incentives discussed below. While some 
controversy exists regarding patent extensions for patents covering previously 
approved drugs, the determination of which patents qualify for extensions and 
calculation of patent length is straightforward. The enforcement of monopolies under 
the patent system also has significant legal precedent. While disputes between 
innovators and generic drug companies are expensive, these are not costs borne by 
administrators of the extension mechanism to determine rewards per se.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 TRIPS, art 27.3.  
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Similarly to the current patent regime, patent extensions also operate within 
the current quasi-market model for determining pharmaceutical prices, which 
resemble a negotiation between a willing buyer and seller, although each seller has 
exclusivity over their product and there is a limited number of buyers. On the other 
hand, flexible patent mechanisms, such as those proposed by Civian and 
Abramowicz, would require a sui generis mechanism of determining patent length. 
Assuming that flexible patent regimes require a sui generis mechanism, a rating of 
four is provided. Otherwise, patent extention mechanisms achieve a score of five, as 
the current patent system is subject to minimal administration costs. Averaging these 
gives a score of 4.5.  
 
(g) Criterion seven: minimising waste/inefficiency 
 
Patent extensions have many of the same waste/inefficiency factors as the patent 
system, namely, (1) incentives for excessive marketing, (2) litigation between 
generics and innovators, (4) arbitrage due to grey markets, (5) incentives to 
counterfeit, (7) incentives to develop me-too drugs, and (8) an anti-commons effect.  
 
In addition, there is a potential for fixed patent extensions to encourage (9) 
rent seeking because, as discussed above, their implementation is typically imposed as 
a result of political pressure under “TRIPS-plus” agreements. 29  Flexible patent 
extension mechanisms would have an even greater risk of ‘rent-seeking’ behavior if 
the amount of extension is at the discretion of a government agency.  
 
As with the patent system, there is an (3) opportunity for gaming due to 
‘evergreening’. Further, (10) free-riding may be an issue, especially where other 
jurisdictions have chosen to implement patent extension legislation. The only 
waste/inefficiency factor absent is (6) incentives for low transparency and races to 
regulatory approval, because exclusivity is provided from the date of filing the patent.  
 
Therefore, as patent extensions have nine waste/inefficiency factors that are not 
absent, a score of one is provided under this criterion. By contrast, there are seven 
waste/inefficiency factors under the current patent system.  
 
(h) Criterion eight: Incentivising incremental innovation and 
breakthroughs 
 
As discussed in Chapter Five with regard to the existing patent system, patent 
extensions mechanisms allow broad ‘genus’ claims to reward pioneer innovators, and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 Faunce, above n 18.  
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‘species’ claims to reward incremental innovation. However, there is a potential for 
me-too drugs to cannibalise profits from pioneering drugs to the extent it is possible 
to design around a broad claim.30 Therefore, a patent extension mechanism can 
significantly incentivise breakthroughs and optimally incentivise incremental 
innovation; a rating of four can be granted.  	  
Summary 
 
Patent extension regimes receive an average score of 2.56 out of five, slightly worse 
than the current patent system. Most of the major benefits and drawbacks provided by 
patent extensions are shared with the existing patent regime. While the patent 
extension regime improves private incentives to develop medicines due to insufficient 
patent length, there are more opportunities for waste and inefficiency due to increased 
rent-seeking (particularly for flexible patent extension proposals) and free-riding.   
 
B Extended Regulatory Exclusivity  
 
Chapter Two discussed how regulatory agencies grant limited periods of data 
exclusivity from the date of regulatory approval of a new medicine. The United States 
and New Zealand provide different lengths of data exclusivity for small molecule 
drugs and biologics.31 These rights fall outside the known categories of intellectual 
property rights. 32 
 
Chapter Two described how data exclusivity prevents competitors from using 
clinical trial data results to obtain regulatory approval for their generic drug upon 
demonstration of “bioequivalence” with a branded drug irrespective of patent 
protection. 33  However, data exclusivity does not prevent a competitor from 
conducting their own trials, although this rarely occurs in practice.34 The importance 
of securing data exclusivity is recognised in Article 39.3 of TRIPS, which requires 
signatories to protect data required to be submitted for regulatory approval against 
“unfair commercial use”. 35 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 For example, a claim to any medicine that modulates a drug target could not be designed around. 
However a claim to a medicine with an active ingredient that acts on a drug target could potentially be 
designed around to the extent the drug target can be modulated with another active ingredient.  
31 Refer to discussion of regulatory environment in Chapter Two.  Medsafe New Zealand provides five 
years of data exclusivity for all new medicines, whereas the FDA provides five years for small 
molecule drugs and 12 years for biologics.  
32 Namely, patents, trademarks, copyrights, and trade secrets. 
33 New Zealand Regulatory Guidelines for Medicines - Part D (ed 6.15, Medsafe, November 2011) at 
11; see also 21 CFR § 320.1(e).   
34 This would defeat the competitive advantage of generic drug companies relying on the innovators’ 
clinical trial data.  
35 TRIPS, art 39.3.  
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Market exclusivity differs from data exclusivity in that it prevents competitors 
from obtaining regulatory approval over a drug for the exclusivity period regardless 
of whether the competitors undertake their own clinical trials.  
 
In general, regulatory exclusivity has distinct advantages over patent 
exclusivity. It runs from the date of regulatory approval regardless of clinical 
development times, whereas patents run from the date of filing. Unlike patents, 
exclusivity periods are also not susceptible to invalidity challenges. As noted in 
Chapter Two, generic drug companies are incentivised to challenge an innovator’s 
patents, particularly for failure to satisfy any of the patentability criteria.  
 
Certain academic commentators36 have highlighted the discrepancy between 
the requirements for a valid patent and the more onerous requirements for regulatory 
approval. The advantages of regulatory exclusivity over patents in this regard have led 
to various proposals for reform. For example, Eisenberg,37 Morgan38 and Roin39 
propose that fixed length exclusivity regimes could be used as a replacement for 
patent monopolies. Basheer40 proposes a variable length exclusivity regime which 
depends, inter alia, on the health value of a drug.  
 
However, the flexibility of regulatory extension regimes is also the source of 
its main disadvantage: exclusivity may be adjusted according to the political whims of 
the current government. By contrast, the minimum standards of patent protection 
under TRIPS cannot be amended without risk of WTO sanctions. Despite this, 
notwithstanding TRIPS, governments are also permitted to issue compulsory licenses 
to protect public health in accordance with the Doha Declaration, as discussed in 
Chapter Five.  
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 T Cook “Regulatory Data Protection in Pharmaceuticals and Other Sectors” in A Krattiger and others 
(eds) Intellectual Property Management in Health and Agricultural Innovation: A Handbook of Best 
Practices (MIHR, Oxford, United Kingdom, 2007) at 438-439; S Benjamin and A Rai “Who’s Afraid 
of the APA? What the Patent System Can Learn from Administrative Law” (2007) 95 Geo L R 269 at 
278; M Lemley and D Burk “Patent Policy Levers” (2003) 89 Va L Rev 1575 at 1678.  
37 R Eisenberg “The Shifting Functional Balance of Patent and Drug Regulation” (2001) 20(5) Health 
Aff 119 at 123-124; see also R Eisenberg “The Problem of New Uses, 5 Yale J. Health Pol’y. L. & 
Ethics 717 (2005) and R Eisenberg “The Role of the FDA in Innovation Policy” (2007) 13 Mich 
Telecomm & Tech L Rev 345 at 364.  
38 MR Morgan “Regulation of Innovation Under Follow-On Biologics Legislation: FDA Exclusivity as 
an Efficient Incentive Mechanism” (2010) 11 Columbia Science and Technology Law Review 93 at 
98.  
39 BN Roin “Unpatentable Drugs and the Standards of Patentability” (2009) 87Texas Law Review 503 
at 564.  
40 S Basheer “The Invention of an Investment Incentive for Pharmaceutical Innovation” (2012) 15(5-6) 
The Journal of World Intellectual Property 305.  
	  	   149	  
1 The MODDERN Cures Act 
 
Accordingly, extended regulatory reforms can address many problems with the patent 
system, particularly for incentivising unpatentable therapies. The MODDERN Cures 
Act of 2013 (MODDERN Cures Bill),41 is a bill that has recently been re-introduced 
into the 113th United States Congress.42 The MODDERN Cures Bill provides a 15-
year “protection period” of extended regulatory exclusivity upon regulatory approval 
of a “dormant therapy”. 43  A dormant therapy and unpatentable therapies are 
synonymous, and the purpose of the regime is to address the lack of incentives under 
the patent system for such therapies. MODDERN Cures Bill defines dormant 
therapies as a drug or biological product for an unmet medical need.44 An unmet 
medical need is defined as a life threatening disease for which no therapy exists, or 
which can be combined with other therapies to offer better outcomes on diseases not 
known to be affected by alternative therapies.45 
 
The MODDERN Cures Bill also grants patent extensions over a medicine 
comprising the ‘dormant therapy’ for a minimum protection period of 15 years after 
regulatory approval.46 Further, the innovator has ‘clinical exclusivity’47 from the date 
they apply for dormant therapy status, unless a follow-on innovator’s medicine would 
have “clinical superiority”, 48  meaning greater effectiveness, safety or otherwise 
demonstrating a “major contribution to patient care”.49 However, in order to retain 
clinical exclusivity, the innovator must supply regular “development certifications”.50 
In light of soaring healthcare costs, it is uncertain whether a reform calling for 
additional guaranteed exclusivity for new drugs will enter into law, despite the unmet 
medical need.  
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 MODDERN Cures Act of 2013, HR 3091 [MODDERN Cures Bill]. Relevant extracts from the Bill 
are attached as Appendix Two.  
42  Leonard Lance “Lance Legislation Designed to Help Patients with Chronic Diseases and 
Disabilities” (press release, 12 September 2013). This Bill was originally introduced into the 112th 
Congress as the MODDERN Cures Act of 2011, HR 3497.  
43 MODDERN Cures Bill, s 201(i)(4). 
44 s 201(i)(3).  
45 s 201(i)(1).  
46 s 201(e)(2).  
47 Clinical exclusivity means that another innovator may not seek ‘dormant therapy’ designation for the 
same medicine in advance of regulatory approval. As discussed below, this helps prevent wasteful 
‘races’ to regulatory approval.  
48 s 201(e)(1)(C)(ii).  
49 s 201(e)(1)(C)(ii)(I)-(III).  
50 Section 201(g). No details are provided as to the information that must be provided in such 
‘development certifications’.  
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2 The GAIN Act  
 
Exclusivity-based reforms have been proposed to provide incentives for specific types 
of unprofitable therapies. For example, as discussed above in Chapter Three, 
antibiotics are good examples of unprofitable therapies that lack private incentives for 
development but with large potential health impact and unmet medical needs.51 In an 
attempt to address this problem, the United States passed the Generating Antibiotic 
Incentives Now Act (GAIN Act), which was signed into law in July 2012 as part of 
title VIII of the Food and Drug Administration Safety and Innovation Act.52 The 
GAIN Act grants five years of data exclusivity (in addition to the current five years) 
for a new drug classified as a "qualified infectious disease product", being a drug that 
treats listed antibiotic or antifungal resistant pathogens, in addition to fast track status 
and priority review. 53  
 
3 Pediatric exclusivity 
 
Pediatric exclusivity is another regulatory exclusivity mechanism that attempts to 
incentivise an unprofitable therapy, namely, testing safety and efficacy of new 
medicines in children, which is a small and unprofitable market. For example, in the 
United States, pursuant to a written request from the FDA, an additional 6 months of 
regulatory exclusivity can be granted over a drug, if the drug company conducts 
requested clinical trials testing safety and efficacy of the drug in children.54 The 
exclusivity only applies to the active ingredient of the drug, and the clinical trials do 
not need to show any increase in safety or effectiveness (which recognizes the 
inherent value of negative data). 55  The European Union 56  and Canada 57  have 
implemented similar pediatric exclusivity regimes.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51 See Shaoyu Chang and Anthony So “Fostering Innovation to Combat Antimicrobial Resistance” In 
World Health Organisation The evolving threat of antimicrobial resistance: options for action (WHO 
Press, Geneva, 2012) 77 at 82.  
52 The Food and Drug Administration Safety and Innovation Act Pub L No 112-144.  
53 See KF Morron, G Yu “The Gain Act: Providing Additional Market Exclusivity for Antibiotics to 
Treat Drug-Resistant Infections” (11 October 2012) Schiff Hardin LLP <www.schiffhardin.com>.  
54 Best Pharmaceuticals for Children Act of 2007 Pub L No 110-85, codified under 21 USC § 355(a).  
55 WH Schacht and JR Thomas Patent Law and Its Application to the Pharmaceutical Industry: An 
Examination of the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984 (Congressional 
Research Service, 10 January 2005) at CRS-29.  
56 Regulation 1901/2006 on medicinal products for pediatric use [2006] OJ L378/1; Regulation No 
1902/2006 amending Regulation 1901/2006 on medicinal products for paediatric use [2006] OJ L 
378/20. The European Union Pediatric Regulations provide for a 6-month extension in addition to the 
current five-year patent extension. The Pediatric Regulations also provide 10 years of Pediatric Usage 
Marketing Authorisation exclusivity for drugs that have already received previous market authorization 
but do not have patent or SPC coverage, and are developed exclusively for use for pediatric patients: 
see Regulation No 1901/2006, art 30.  
57 Food and Drug Regulations CRC c 870, C08.004.1(4). Canada provides a 6-month pediatric 
extension to a drug which would qualify for an 8 year period of data protection, provided that the 
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4 Comparison of extended regulatory exclusivity regimes with the ideal criteria 
 
Should any criteria be excluded? 
 
The purpose of extended regulatory exclusivity under the MODDERN Cures Bill is to 
compensate for unpatentable therapies that have insufficient patent protection.58 
Therefore, the first criterion will not be excluded. By contrast, unmonopolisable 
therapies are, by definition, non-excludable. Hence, exclusivity proposals are 
arguably not suited to address such therapies and this criterion should be excluded. 
However, exclusivity mechanisms have been proposed to incentivise specific 
unprofitable therapies, such as antibiotic and pediatric exclusivity. Accordingly, 
incentivising unprofitable therapies will be included the following analysis.  
 
 
(a) Criterion one: incentivising unpatentable therapies 
 
Patentability is not a requirement for regulatory approval, which means that 
regulatory exclusivity can incentivise development of unpatentable therapies 
irrespective of the presence of ‘unpatentability factors’ identified in Chapter Three. 
As noted by Hemphill and Sampat, the average length of patent exclusivity post-
regulatory approval is 12.2 years.59  Arguably, if the length of regulatory exclusivity 
is equivalent to the average length of effective patent protection, this will ensure that 
otherwise viable medicines will not be subject to patentability screening.60 The 
MODDERN Cures Bill anticipates a “protection period” of 15 years from regulatory 
approval,61 which would exceed the average level of protection under the patent 
regime. Accordingly, there would be no reason to screen unpatentable therapies, and a 
score of five is achieved for this criterion.  
 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
innovator files the results of clinical trials which increase knowledge about the use of the drug in 
pediatric populations. 
58 MODDERN Cures Bill, s 3(7): ‘In addition, there is reason to believe that potential treatments with 
tremendous value to patients are never developed or are discontinued during research and development 
due to insufficiencies in the intellectual property system.’ See Appendix Two.  
59 SC Hemphill and BN Sampat “Evergreening, patent challenges, and effective market life in 
pharmaceuticals” (2012) 31(2) Journal of Health Economics 327 at 330. See discussion in Chapter 
Three.  
60 Antibiotic exclusivity and pediatric exclusivity reforms provide less than 12 years of exclusivity, and 
therefore are unlikely to provide incentives under this criterion.  
61 MODDERN Cures Bill, s 201(i)(4)(B).  
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 (b) Criterion three: incentivising unprofitable therapies 
 
Exclusivity-based incentives are less than ideal for unprofitable therapies because the 
size of the market is small. Notably, however, pediatric exclusivity reforms have been 
broadly successful, with over 300 studies funded in the United States.62 This is likely 
because of the potential for ‘gaming’, by seeking pediatric exclusivity for drugs which 
have a large and profitable adult market.63 It is too early to determine the success of 
the GAIN Act due to the long development cycle for new medicines.  
 
As it may be possible for exclusivity to incentivise unprofitable therapies in some 
circumstances, it is arguable that between five and 50 per cent of unprofitable 
therapies will not be screened out. For that reason, exclusivity reforms receive a score 
of two out of five in respect of this criterion.   
 
 
(c) Criterion four: balancing dynamic and static efficiency 
 
Both data and market exclusivity are capable of providing dynamic efficiencies, as 
they prevent generic competition for the protection period. It has been noted that data 
and market exclusivity is superior to patent protection for biologics, because of the 
difficulty of proving “literal” infringement, because of naturally high variation 
between biologic drugs.64 Another important advantage is that regulatory exclusivity 
runs from the date of regulatory approval, which means that increased clinical 
development time does not reduce incentives.65  
 
However, because regulatory exclusivity runs from the date of regulatory approval, 
this may also increase delays until competition can be achieved, similarly to patents 
and patent extensions. Moreover, regulatory exclusivity shares the inefficiencies of 
patents caused by deadweight losses, due to monopoly prices charged above marginal 
costs. Price competition or static efficiency can only occur once exclusivity expires 
and generics can gain regulatory approval.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62JS Li and others “Economic return of clinical trials performed under the pediatric exclusivity 
program” (2007) 297 JAMA 480 at 480.  
63 See discussion of waste/inefficiency factors below.  
64 J Freilich “Patent Infringement in the Context of Follow-On Biologics” (2012) 16 Stan Tech L Rev 9 
at 12; see also PW Grubb and PR Thomsen Patents for Chemicals, Pharmaceuticals, and 
Biotechnology: Fundamentals of Global Law (5th ed, Oxford University Press, New York, 2010) at 
286, 298. In particular, biologic drugs can have similar composition, but different therapeutic effects 
because of differences in the manufacturing processes. This creates problems for drafting claims over 
the chemical formula of a biologic as a means to define the scope of a monopoly, which can arguably 
disincentivise private investment.   
65 Compare E Budish, BN Roin and H Williams “Do fixed patent terms distort innovation? Evidence 
from cancer clinical trials” (NBER Working Paper No 19430, September 2013). 
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Arguably, the greater flexibility of regulatory exclusivity means that it could strike an 
effective balance between the interests of innovator and generic drug companies. 
However, this increased flexibility creates a risk of ‘rent-seeking’ by governments 
who may reduce the length of exclusivity as political climates change. 
 
Apart from the increased flexibility, extended regulatory exclusivity regimes are 
similar to patents, in the sense that innovators can price discriminate according to the 
consumer’s ability to pay, which theoretically, can minimise or even prevent 
deadweight loss. On the payer side, reimbursement agencies subsidising medicines 
can minimise deadweight loss and maximise consumer surplus. Therefore, like the 
patent system, regulatory exclusivity still provides (1) private incentives for R&D and 
(2) competition with delay, but also has the potential to (3) minimise deadweight loss 
and (4) maximise consumer surplus without delay. Accordingly, it also receives a 
score of three out of five with respect of this criterion. 
 
 
(d) Criterion five: Linking rewards to improved health outcomes 
 
As with patent regimes, extended regulatory exclusivity will only incentivise 
development of monopolisable therapies, although it has the potential of maximising 
health impact for rewards through the process of negotiation with payers. Therefore, 
regulatory exclusivity receives a score of three under this criterion.  
 
 
(e) Criterion six: minimising administration costs to determine rewards 
 
The administrative costs of providing regulatory exclusivity rewards are low, like 
patents and patent extensions, because there is no requirement for a sui generis regime 
to determine rewards, and there is also a well-established quasi-market model for 
determining price of new therapies through negotiation between the innovator and 
payers, as discussed in Chapter Four. Due to low administration costs, a fixed length 
of regulatory exclusivity receives a score of five with respect to this criterion, 
however, a flexible exclusivity period,66 would require a sui generis mechanism to 
determine exclusivity length, and would receive a rating of four. Therefore an overall 
rating of 4.5 is granted.   	  	  
(f) Criterion seven: minimising waste/inefficiency 	  
A major benefit of a guaranteed period of regulatory exclusivity is that it reduces 
waste due to (2) costly litigation between generics and innovators, as it is less 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
66 See for example, Basheer, above n 40.  
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susceptible to legal challenges compared to patents. Under the proposed MODDERN 
Cures Bill, extended exclusivity can also negate (7) incentives to develop ‘me-too’ 
drugs, to the extent that exclusivity is only granted to therapies for unmet medical 
needs and therapies that are clinically superior. Further, there is unlikely to be (8) an 
anti-commons effect as market exclusivity will only be provided for a single drug 
which achieves regulatory approval and will not be granted over ‘upstream’ 
research.67  
 
However, there are various factors causing waste/inefficiency. Because rewards are 
only obtained through sales at monopoly prices, there are still (1) incentives for 
excessive marketing. Regulatory exclusivity can also provide (3) an opportunity for 
gaming, whereby innovators can wait until just before exclusivity expires on a 
previous product before seeking regulatory approval for an improved product.68 The 
potential for gaming has also been noted with regard to pediatric exclusivity, whereby 
pharmaceutical companies only perform pediatric clinical trials on drugs which have a 
large adult market.69 The high monopoly prices available due to monopoly rents will 
also encourage (4) arbitrage due to grey markets and (5) incentives to counterfeit 
drugs. 70  
 
In respect of the MODDERN Cures Bill, the possibility of obtaining regulatory 
exclusivity over an unpatentable ‘public domain’ drug may (6) incentivise low 
transparency, particularly if it is possible to use a competitor’s publicly available data 
to obtain exclusivity over their drug. Data exclusivity may also encourage wasteful 
‘duplication’ if a market is lucrative enough, because competitors may conduct their 
own clinical trials to gain market entry (at no risk of failure).71 In addition, market 
exclusivity may encourage wasteful ‘races’ to regulatory approval, unless ‘clinical 
exclusivity’ can be secured in advance, as provided for under the MODDERN Cures 
Bill.72 It is arguable, therefore, that this waste/inefficiency factor is only half absent.  
 
There is a possibility for (9) rent seeking, if the length of regulatory exclusivity is 
susceptible to political interference. This may create an unacceptable risk for 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
67 See discussion of ‘patent thickets’ in Chapter Three.  
68 However, it is difficult to assess the impact of this issue without analysing the regulations that would 
prescribe how ‘clinical exclusivity’ will be provided to innovators in advance of regulatory approval. 
69 AS Kesselheim “Using market-exclusivity incentives to promote pharmaceutical innovation” (2010)  
363(19)  New England Journal of Medicine 1855 at 1857.  
70 D Bagozzi “Fact Sheet No 275: Substandard and Counterfeit Medicines” (November 2003) World 
Health Organization <www.who.int>. 
71 See discussion of data exclusivity in Chapter Two.  
72 MODDERN Cures Bill, s 201(e)(1)(C)(ii). “Clinical exclusivity” is an important requirement for 
securing funding at the early stages of a drug development project because trade secrecy is difficult to 
maintain once clinical trials commence. By comparison, there is no provision for “clinical exclusivity” 
under the Orphan Drug Act, discussed below, and there have been occasions where multiple sponsors 
entered wasteful “races” to regulatory approval.  
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investors, because lead times for drug development can be 10-15 years or more.73 
Free riding (10) is a potential issue, unless it is possible to obtain international co-
operation at least from jurisdictions with large pharmaceutical markets.  
 
Therefore, as over seven waste/inefficiency factors are not absent for extended 
regulatory exclusivity, the criterion receives a score of two out of five.  
 
 
(g) Criterion eight: incentivise incremental innovation and breakthroughs 
 
Regulatory exclusivity under proposals such the MODDERN Cures Bill is less 
flexible than patent protection, as it would only cover a specific molecule for treating 
a particular disease upon regulatory approval, and is only available for therapies for 
‘unmet medical needs’. 74  However, this can provide optimal incentives for 
breakthrough innovations by preventing a follow-on drug from obtaining exclusivity 
rights unless it was “clinically superior”, as provided for in the current draft of the 
MODDERN Cures Bill.75 
 
While the lower flexibility is not optimal for incremental innovation, this can be 
significantly incentivised by allowing exclusivity over a modified drug (provided that 
it is ‘clinically superior’).76 By contrast, antibiotic and pediatric exclusivity are 
awarded for fulfillment of specific criteria, which means they would not optimally 
incentivise incremental innovation.  
 
Taking these various regimes into account, extended regulatory exclusivity receives a 
score of four under this criterion.  
 
 Summary 
 
The main benefit of regulatory exclusivity over the patent system is its capacity to 
incentivise unpatentable therapies. It also has the ability to significantly incentivise 
incremental innovations and optimally incentivise breakthroughs. However, the 
benefits of exclusivity (such as antibiotic and pediatric exclusivity) for incentivising 
unprofitable therapies are equivocal.  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
73 As noted above, the possibility of a WTO member bringing an action under Article 27.1 of TRIPS 
would discourage political interference with the 20-year guaranteed length of patent exclusivity.  
74 MODDERN Cures Bill, s 201(i)(1). 
75 MODDERN Cures Bill, s 201(i)(3). 
76MODDERN Cures Bill, s 201(e)(1)(C). There are equivalent ‘clinical superiority’ provisions in the 
Orphan Drug Act, discussed in the next section: see 21 USC § 360bb(a)(2); 21 CFR § 316.3(b)(2) and 
(13)(i)-(ii).  
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Overall, regulatory exclusivity scores an average of 3.36, assuming incentivising 
unmonopolisable therapies is excluded as a criterion. Therefore, it is arguable that 
extended regulatory exclusivity is a significant improvement on both the current 
patent system and patent extension regimes.  
 
The next section will discuss a hybrid incentive system, which has been successful in 
using extended regulatory exclusivity (in conjunction with other ‘push’ incentives) to 
address a market failure for treating rare diseases.  
 
C Orphan Drug Reforms  
 
Orphan Drug reforms provide private incentives for development of so-called ‘orphan 
drugs’, which treat rare diseases that would otherwise be unprofitable due to the small 
market. The principal R&D incentive under orphan drug reforms is a minimum period 
of market exclusivity upon regulatory approval, with tax incentives and government 
assistance providing additional ‘push’ incentives. 77  Orphan drug reforms can 
therefore be considered a hybrid ‘pull’ and ‘push’ mechanism, although exclusivity is 
the primary incentive, as discussed below.78  
 
In the United States, a treatment will be eligible for ‘Orphan Drug designation’ under 
the Orphan Drug Act of 1983 (Orphan Drug Act)79 if it is for a “rare disease or 
condition” which: (a) affects less than 200,000 Americans; or (b) affects greater than 
200,000 Americans, but for which there is no reasonable expectation of recovering 
the cost of making it available in the United States from domestic sales.80 
 
The Orphan Drug Act provides seven years of market exclusivity over the active 
ingredient of a drug81 used to treat a particular rare disease, unless a subsequent drug 
containing the same active ingredient is “clinically superior”.82 Clinical superiority 
means that the drug has greater safety, greater effectiveness, or otherwise makes a 
major contribution to patient care.83 There are similar provisions in the MODDERN 
Cures Bill, which help prevent ‘evergreening’ and ‘me-too’ competition. Notably, 
however, a competitor can obtain market exclusivity over the same drug for treating 
another rare disease, or another drug for treating the same disease.84  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
77 ‘Push’ incentives for medical research will be discussed further in Chapter 6C.  
78 Kesselheim, above n 69, at 1857.  
79 Orphan Drug Act of 1983 Pub L No 97-414.  
80 21 USC § 360bb(a)(2). 
81 This is referred to as the “active moiety” of a drug: see 21 CFR § 316(b)(2).  
82 21 USC § 360bb(a)(2): see also 21 CFR § 316.3(b)(2) and (13)(i)-(ii).   
83 21 CFR § 316.3(b)(3). 
84 Genentech, Inc v Bowen 676 F Supp 301 (DDC 1987); Sigma-Tau Pharms. v Schwetz 288 F3d 141 
(4th Cir 2002). 
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Market exclusivity is the primary incentive of the Orphan Drug Act. 85  Other 
incentives include a 50 per cent R&D tax rebate, grants, clinical research design 
support and a fee waiver.86 Another advantage is that orphan drugs have a better 
chance of obtaining regulatory approval, as smaller and shorter clinical trials are 
permitted due to the rarity of patients.87  
 
Europe also offers 10 years of market exclusivity for orphan drugs,88 while Japan,89 
and Australia offer tax breaks and reduced fees to apply for regulatory approval, but 
not regulatory exclusivity. 90   New Zealand has not implemented an incentive regime 
for orphan drugs.  
 
Pharmaceutical industry commentators have heralded orphan drug reforms as an 
unprecedented success.91 For example, only 10 orphan drugs were approved by the 
FDA in the decade prior to the enactment of the Orphan Drug Act, and over 350 
orphan drugs for rare diseases have been approved since the adoption of the 
reforms.92 However, other commentators have noticed the potential for excessive 
profits and gaming caused by such reforms, 93 which raises the question as to what 
extent they fulfill the optimal criteria.  
 
1 How does the Orphan Drug regime compare against ideal criteria? 
 
Should any criteria be excluded? 
It is arguable that market exclusivity provided by Orphan Drug reforms can 
incentivise unpatentable therapies that happen to be therapies for rare diseases. 
However, the core purpose of Orphan Drug reforms is to incentivise treatments for 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
85  Kesselheim, above n 69, at 1857; R Rogoyski “The Orphan Drug Act and the Myth of the 
Exclusivity Incentive” (2006) 7 Colum Sci & Tech L Rev 1 at 4.  
86 Rogoyski, at 5.  
87 KN Meekings, CSM Williams and JE Arrowsmith “Orphan drug development: an economically 
viable strategy for biopharma R&D” (2012) 17(13) Drug Dis Today 660 at 663. The authors explain 
the economic advantages of orphan drug development due to smaller clinical trials, faster development 
time and increased chance of regulatory approval. 
88 Regulation 141/2000 on orphan medicinal products [2000] OJ L18/1.  
89 DL Scott and others “Orphan Drug Programs/Policies in Australia, Japan and Canada” (2001) 35 
Drug Information Journal 1 at 6.  
90 At 4 and 10.  
91 WArmstrong “Pharma's Orphans” Pharmaceutical Executive (online ed, United States, May 2010). 
See also E Rensi “The Orphan Drug Act Has Been a Huge Success” (23 June 2008) Wall Street 
Journal. <www.online.wsj.com>. 
92 Rensi, above.   
93 Kesselheim, above n 69, at 1857.  
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rare diseases.94 As discussed in Chapter Three, because of the small market, these fall 
within the category of unprofitable therapies. For that reason, incentivising 
unmonopolisable therapies will not be included in the following analysis.  
 
(a) Criterion one: incentivising unpatentable therapies 
 
Orphan Drug reforms provide a minimum period of exclusivity for a therapy, 
irrespective of the presence of unpatentability factors. The main disadvantage is that 
the orphan drug exclusivity period95 is shorter than the average period of 12 years of 
patent protection after regulatory approval. 96  Another disadvantage is that the 
exclusivity only applies to rare diseases. However, as will be further discussed below, 
orphan drug reforms provide the ability to game the system by seeking regulatory 
approval over a sub-category of patients as a ‘rare disease’ while expecting a sales in 
the ‘off-label’ market.97 This means that Orphan Drug exclusivity may incentivise a 
broad range of unpatentable therapies which could be framed as ‘rare diseases’.98 
Other incentives include tax breaks and faster regulatory approval.99 As a result of 
these synergistic incentives, orphan drug reforms can incentivise between five and 50 
per cent of unpatentable therapies, and therefore receive a score of two under this 
criterion.  
 
(b) Criterion three: incentivising unprofitable therapies 
 
As discussed above, the purpose of Orphan Drug reforms is to incentivise 
development of therapies for rare diseases. While it has been very successful in that 
area, it will not incentivise broader categories of unprofitable therapies such as 
neglected diseases and antibiotics that do not have a lucrative ‘off-label’ market. For 
that reason, it is unlikely to incentivise more than 5 per cent of overall unprofitable 
therapies, and therefore achieves a rating of one under this criterion.  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
94 L Rin-Laures and D Janofsky “Recent developments concerning the orphan drug act” (1991) 4  Harv 
J Law & Tec 4 269 at 272.  
95 Seven years in the United States and 10 years in Europe.  
96 SC Hemphill and BN Sampat “Evergreening, patent challenges, and effective market life in 
pharmaceuticals” (2012) 31(2) Journal of Health Economics 327 at 330; H Grabowski, G Long and R 
Mortimer “Recent trends in brand-name and generic drug competition” (2013) 17(3) Journal of 
Medical Economics 207 at 207.  
97 Kesselheim, above n 69, at 1857. However, in an attempt to prevent such ‘gaming’, new FDA 
regulations issued in 2011 state that it is only possible to obtain orphan drug designation over a subset 
of patients with a particular disease if there is a ‘medically plausible’ reason to do so: see 21 CFR § 
316.20(b)(6).  
98 An example is imatinib (Gleevec), which received orphan drug designation for treating a rare blood 
cancer, but is now a blockbuster drug for treating various types of cancer.  
99 Meekings, Williams and Arrowsmith, above n 87, at 663.  
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(c) Criterion four: balancing dynamic and static efficiency 
 
The ability to enforce broad market exclusivity over a particular disease category100 
allows orphan drugs to be very profitable, which provides considerable private 
incentives for development.101 Orphan drugs are typically the most expensive drugs 
on the market, such as the case of Soliris,102 at over USD 400,000 per annum, and 
Myozyme,103 at over USD 300,000 per annum. 104 Notably, PHARMAC has refused 
to fund either of these drugs, arguing the cost is not justifiable relative to the health 
benefits provided.105 However, this position has subjected it to criticism from the 
media and patient groups.106  
 
There are also examples where orphan drug exclusivity in the United States has 
caused previously cheap prices for a drug to become exorbitant.107 Similar examples 
from Europe resulted in the mandatory replacement of cheap unlicensed drugs with 
the expensive licensed orphan drug.108  
 
Despite this, it is apparent that the orphan drug regime provides significant (1) private 
incentives for R&D. However, it only allows (2) competition after the regulatory 
exclusivity period has expired. Notably, while exclusivity incentives are provided 
with delay, incentives such as tax breaks, grants, and clinical trial design assistance 
are provided without delay prior to regulatory approval. Monopoly prices caused by 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
100 This is referred to as a ‘therapeutic indication’.  
101 Meekings, Williams and Arrowsmith, above n 81, at 660. 
102 Soliris (generic name Eculizumab), is a biologic for treating a rare, progressive and sometimes life-
threatening blood disorder, aroxysmal nocturnal hemoglobinuria (PNH). Soliris is recommended to be 
continued for the patients lifetime.  
103 Alglucosidase alfa (Myozyme) is an enzyme replacement therapy for Pompe disease (Glycogen 
storage disease type II).  
104 See M Herper “The World’s Most Expensive Drug” Forbes Magazine (online ed, New York, 22 
February 2010) . See also G Miller“The world's most expensive drugs” (2 March 2010) FiercePharma 
Manufacturing <www.fiercepharmamanufacturing.com>. 
105  See P Moodie Response regarding funding for Myozyme for adult-onset Pompe Disease 
(Pharmaceutical Management Agency, 17 June 2011); PHARMAC decision on eculizumab (Soliris) 
funding (Pharmaceutical Management Agency, 12 December 2013).   
106 See C Harris “Funding system for costly drugs 'unfair'” The Dominion Post (online ed, Wellington, 
21 January 2014); see also M Johnson  “Plea: Give us Miracle Drug” New Zealand Herald (online ed, 
Auckland 24 Jan 2013). Controversially, drug companies hire public relations firms and lawyers to 
manage patient groups in order pressure government payers to fund expensive drugs. See Ben Goldacre 
Bad Pharma: How drug companies mislead doctors and harm patients (Fourth Estate, Great Britain, 
2012) at 254. 
107SM Murphy and others “Unintended effects of orphan product designation for rare neurological 
diseases” (2012) 72(4) Journal Ann Neurol 481 at 482. See also AS Kesselheim and DH Solomon DH 
"Incentives for drug development--the curious case of colchicine" (2010) 362(22) N Engl J Med 2045 
at 2046.  See discussion of FDA removal of colchine from the market in Chapter Three.  
108 F Godlee “Stop exploiting orphan drugs” (2010) 341 BMJ 1; see also A Goldberg “Drug firms 
accused of exploiting loophole for profit” (21 November 2010) BBC News Health <www.bbc.co.uk>. 
The latter article highlighted the case of 3,4 Diaminopyridine (DAP) which formerly had an annual 
cost between GBP 800 and GBP 2,000 whereby the licensed “brand” (Firdapse) costs GBP 40,000 per 
annum, despite being the identical molecule.  
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lack of competition can cause deadweight losses, unless this price is subsidised by 
payers,109 which means it is possible to (3) minimise deadweight loss and (4) 
maximise consumer surplus without delay. Thus, because it is possible to provide at 
least some (1) private incentives without delay, and (3) and (4) without delay, this 
criterion achieves a score of 3.5.   
 
(d) Criterion five: linking rewards to improved health outcomes 
 
As mentioned above, the Orphan Drug Act has been highly successful which suggests 
the reforms have had a significant health impact. However, the reforms only 
incentivise a single class of therapies: rare diseases. Further, orphan drugs are 
typically the most expensive in the world, which means they are likely to exceed a 
payer’s cost per QALY threshold. These very high costs are only possible because of 
market exclusivity and the shortage of therapeutic alternatives for patients with rare 
diseases. For these reasons, it is arguable that orphan drug reforms are unlikely to 
maximise health impact for rewards provided. Accordingly, orphan drug reforms 
achieve a score of two points under this criterion.  
 
 
(e) Criterion six: minimise administration costs to determine rewards 
 
As with extended regulatory exclusivity, administrative costs of orphan drug regimes 
are minor and do not rely on a sui generis mechanism. These regimes fit within the 
current quasi-market model that allows the appropriate price to be negotiated between 
the innovator and payer. Tax rebates are also relatively simple to administer, although 
the allocation of grants may cause a small increase in costs of administration. For that 
reason, a score of 4.5 is provided under this criterion.  
 
 
(f) Criterion seven: minimising waste/inefficiency 
 
Orphan drug reforms have some inherent advantages which reduce 
waste/inefficiency. Firstly, (1) incentives for excessive marketing costs are likely to 
be absent due to the small market for rare diseases. Secondly, (2) costly litigation 
between generics and innovators can be avoided because regulatory exclusivity 
cannot be challenged.110 Thirdly, despite high monopoly mark-ups for orphan drugs, 
(4) arbitrage due to grey markets and (5) incentives to counterfeit drugs is less likely, 
because it will be easier to prevent unauthorised imports and restrict access to the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
109 It is notable that PHARMAC is the last OECD country which is unwilling to fund Soliris. See 
“Pharmac refusing to fund blood disorder drug” (14 December 2013) One News <www.tvnz.co.nz>. 
110 Further, generic drug companies do not compete with orphan drugs because the market is smaller.  
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licensed drug when the patient population is small. Fourthly, the requirement that 
only ‘clinically superior’ orphan drugs can be granted exclusivity reduces (7) 
incentives to develop me-too drugs. Finally, there will not be an (8) anti-commons 
effect because market exclusivity is only granted upon regulatory approval.  
 
Nonetheless, there are several waste/inefficiency factors which are arguably not 
absent. As discussed above, there is (3) opportunity for gaming by seeking orphan 
drug status for drugs for an indication with a small patient population and relying on 
‘off label’ sales to a much broader class of patients,111 despite the fact that off-label 
marketing is illegal.112 As there is no provision for ‘clinical exclusivity’ in advance of 
regulatory approval113 there are (9) incentives for low transparency and duplication of 
R&D efforts due to ‘races’.114  There is also the potential for (10) free-riding by 
countries that do not provide orphan drug exclusivity.   
 
Therefore, mainly because of the specialised market, orphan drug reforms are 
relatively free of all but three waste/inefficiency factors, and receive a score of three 
under this criterion.  
 
 
(g) Criterion eight: incentivising incremental innovation and 
breakthroughs 
 
Orphan drug exclusivity provides optimal incentives to develop new breakthrough 
medicines as it covers a broad class of drugs having the same active ingredient.115 
Subsequent registrations are blocked unless they are clinically superior, which 
prevents competition from me-too drugs that do not improve patient outcomes. To 
some extent, this may also provide significant incentives for incremental innovation 
because of the possibility of follow-on competition. However, it is also arguable that 
the ability to obtain regulatory approval with only small clinical trials and incentives 
for ‘off-label’ promotion may compromise patient safety. Accordingly, orphan drug 
reforms are granted a rating of 3 in respect of this criterion.  
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
111 Kesselheim, above n 69 at 1857. An example is Gleevec (imatinib), which is a blockbuster drug that 
was granted Orphan Drug designation.  
112 21 USC § 333(a)(2).  
113 That is, multiple sponsors may hold orphan drug designation over the same drug in advance of 
regulatory approval.  
114  See C Rabe “Competition Between Orphan Drug Sponsors – Good for Patients, Strategic 
Complexities for Sponsors” (22 December 2011) The Weinberg Group <www.weinberggroup.com>. 
115 21 CFR § 316(b)(2). 
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 Summary 
 
Orphan drug exclusivity has been highly successful in its particular context of rare 
diseases, by allowing innovators to leverage market exclusivity and charge high 
prices due to the lack of viable alternative treatments. In the broader context, it 
achieves an average rating of 2.71 in respect of the seven criteria analysed, which is 
an improvement over the current patent system.  
 
D Conclusion 
 
It can be seen that, in general, pull-based exclusivity reforms are suited towards 
incentivising unpatentable therapies, rather than unmonopolisable and unprofitable 
therapies. For example, patent extensions can address the unpatentability factor 
caused by insufficient patent length. Extended regulatory exclusivity, such as that 
provided by the proposed MODDERN Cures Bill, could optimally incentivise 
unpatentable therapies by negating all of the unpatentability factors.  
 
Reforms such as antibiotic exclusivity, pediatric exclusivity, and orphan drug 
exclusivity have been proposed to address specific unprofitable therapies, but are 
susceptible to gaming, and fail to incentivise unprofitable therapies generally. By 
contrast, prize-based proposals, which will be discussed in the next section, have the 
ability to reward innovators regardless of whether exclusivity can obtain monopoly 
rents.  
 
VIB Prize-based ‘Pull’ Incentives  
 
As discussed above, exclusivity-based ‘pull’ incentivies have various disadvantages 
including deadweight losses, 116  and are less effective for incentivising 
unmonopolisable and unprofitable therapies. By contrast, prize-based ‘pull’ incentives 
can overcome many of these problems.  The replacement of the patent system with 
prizes has been debated since the 19th century,117 with a resurgence of interest in 
more recent scholarship.118  The main advantages of prizes are that they avoid 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
116 Unless payer reimbursement is available and the subsidised price is affordable to patients.  
117 See A Tabarrok The Entrepreneurial Economist: Bright Ideas from the Dismal Science  (Oxford 
University Press, 2002) at 246.  
118 EAA de Laat “Patents or Prizes: Monopolistic R&D and Asymmetric Information” (1996) 15 Int’l J 
Inust Org 369 at 370; BJ Nalebuff and JE Stiglitz “Prizes and Incentives: Towards a General Theory of 
Compensation and Competition” (1983) 14 Bell J Econ 21; S Shavell and T van Ypersele “Rewards 
Versus Intellectual Property Rights” (2001) 44  J L & Econ 525; BD Wright “The Economics of 
Invention Incentives: Patents, Prizes, and Research Contracts” (1983) 73 Amer Econ Rev 691.  
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deadweight losses and do not rely on exclusivity to reward an innovator. Provided 
that the amount of the prize does not exceed amount of social surplus gained, a prize-
based pull incentive regime is worthwhile.119  
 
The next two sections will discuss two different prize mechanisms and compare them 
to the ideal criteria: ex-ante fixed and ex-post flexible prizes.  
 
A Ex-ante Fixed Prizes 
 
An ex-ante fixed prize is a unilateral agreement to pay a specific reward to an 
innovator that fulfils certain criteria for achieving a prize. The use of ex-ante fixed 
prizes to incentivise technological achievements has a long history. In 1714, the 
British government passed the Longitude Act, which authorised the Board of 
Longitude to award 20,000 pounds to the person that developed a practical method of 
accurately determining longitude at sea.120 The prize was ultimately awarded in 1773 
to a watchmaker, John Harrison, who developed a watch that accurately worked at 
sea. Significantly, the full prize was only awarded after a decades-long dispute with 
the Board of Longitude, which was	  anticipating a mathematical solution based on the 
use of astronomical charts, not a mechanical solution.121  
 
In another example, Napoleon’s Society for the Encouragement of Industry offered a 
prize of 12,000 francs in 1795 for a method of food preservation that could be used by 
the French military.122 Further, during the 18th and 19th Century, the Paris Academy 
of Sciences used prizes to fund medical research rather than the current grant-based 
system.123  
 
A more recent example is the USD 10 million Ansari X-Prize, awarded in 2004 for 
developing a reusable spacecraft that could reach 100 kilometer altitude, and repeat 
the trip within two weeks.124 Interestingly, the Ansari X-Prize was estimated to have 
incentivised R&D spending of over USD 100 million,125 despite the prize being one 
tenth of that amount, however, this may have been because the value of publicity 
would exceed the amount of the prize.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
119 M Abramowicz “Perfecting patent prizes” (2003) 56 Vand L Rev 115 at 140.  
120 Lee N Davis “Should We Consider Alternative Incentives for Basic Research? Patents vs. Prizes” 
(Paper presented to the DRUID Summer Conference, Copenhagen/Elsinore, 2002) at 11.  
121  See “John Harrison and the finding of Longitude” (2004) Royal Naval Museum Library 
<www.royalnavalmuseum.org>.  
122 At 12. The winning invention was a method of heating food within sealed champagne bottles.  
123 R Hanson “Patterns of Patronage: Why Grants Won Over Prizes in Science” (University of 
California, Berkeley, 1998) at 10.  
124 “Innovation prizes: And the winner is…” The Economist (online ed, San Francisco, 5 August 2010).  
125 At 1.   
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Stiglitz126, Horrobin127 and others128 have proposed using large prizes to stimulate 
medical R&D and drug development. Unfortunately, these proposals are lacking in 
specificity regarding how the prize would be calculated and administered. Various 
charitable organisations have also used ex-ante prizes to incentivise breakthroughs in 
pre-clinical research.129  
 
Ex-ante fixed prizes have the advantage of providing certainty to an innovator 
regarding the amount of a reward and the criteria to be fulfilled, and do not cost 
anything while the prize is unclaimed. The main disadvantage of prizes is that the 
prize administrator may have insufficient information to determine the optimal prize 
amount. It is also administratively difficult to design criteria for incentivising the most 
socially valuable outcomes, which are also flexible enough to reward unforeseen 
solutions.  
 
1 How do ex-ante fixed prizes compare against ideal criteria?   
 
Should any criteria be excluded? 
 
As noted above, there have been various proposals to replace patents with prizes, 
which makes it arguable that one of the purposes of fixed prizes is to incentivise 
unpatentable therapies. Prizes can also incentivise unmonopolisable and unprofitable 
therapies, because the criteria for receiving rewards can be designed to be 
independent of the monopolisability or profitability of a therapy. Therefore, no 
criteria will be excluded from the following analysis of fixed prizes.  
 
 
(a) Criterion one: incentivising unpatentable therapies 
 
It is possible for an ex-ante fixed prize to incentivise unpatentable therapies generally, 
but only if the prize is greater than the likely R&D expenditure required to secure the 
prize. For example, a fixed prize could be awarded upon a new drug achieving 
regulatory approval. The problem is that a rational prize administrator would set the 
reward at just above the ‘average’ development cost of a new drug, say, between USD 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
126 JE Stiglitz "Prizes, Not Patents" (2007) 42 PA Econ Rev 48 at 49. 
127 DF Horrobin “Glittering Prizes for Research Support” (1986) 324 Nature 221 at 221; see also J 
Stiglitz “Scrooge and Intellectual Property Rights: A medical prize fund could improve the financing of 
drug innovations” (2006) 333 BMJ 1279 at 1279.  
128 See BG Charlton “Mega-prizes in medicine: Big cash awards may stimulate useful and rapid 
therapeutic innovation” (2007) 68 Medical Hypotheses 1.   
129 See Prize4Life Foundation “Prize4Life Awards $1M ALS Biomarker Prize!” (press release, 7 
February 2011); Methuselah Foundation “Methuselah Foundation Launches NewOrgan Prize” (press 
release, 6 April 2010).  
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1 to 3 billion, to avoid the risk of overcompensating an innovator. A solution may be 
to amend the amount of ex-ante prize rewards according to the likely R&D 
expenditure by therapeutic and disease category, but this is likely to be 
administratively difficult. In addition, unless it is possible to obtain an amount 
equivalent to the monopoly profits available for the most lucrative blockbuster drugs, 
prizes are unlikely to incentivise development of all therapies.130 Accordingly, a fixed 
prize is likely to only incentivise between 50 and 75 per cent of unpatentable 
therapies, as therapies with higher than average development costs may be screened. 
For that reason, fixed prizes receive a score of three under this criterion.  
 
(b) Criterion two: incentivising unmonopolisable therapies 
 
Setting the optimal amount of an ex-ante fixed prize to incentivise unmonopolisable 
therapies is also problematic. This creates a risk that the prize amount would not 
incentivise socially valuable unmonopolisable therapies with higher than average 
development costs. For the same reasoning noted above with regard to unpatentable 
therapies, fixed prizes receive a score of three.  
 
 
(c) Criterion three: incentivising unprofitable therapies 
 
The same valuation problems with ex-ante fixed prizes occur with regard to 
incentivising unprofitable therapies, namely, the risk that the prize would be 
insufficient to incentivise unprofitable therapies with greater than average 
development costs. Hence, a score of three is also provided under this criterion.  
 
 
(d)   Criterion four: balancing dynamic and static efficiency 
 
Ex-ante fixed prizes can potentially provide immediate (1) private incentives upon 
satisfying the criteria for being awarded the prize. Nevertheless, there is potential for 
delay if there are protracted disputes over fulfillment of the prize criteria. However, 
the therapy would be released to the public domain upon fulfillment of the prize, 
which would allow (2) competition and static efficiency while also (3) minimising 
deadweight loss and (4) maximising consumer surplus without delay. A perfect score 
may be achievable, but due to the potential for delay in the allocation of prize rewards 
because of disputes, a score of 4.5 is provided under this criterion.  
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
130 For example, Pfizer’s blockbuster drug Lipitor has earned over USD 125 billion in sales since 1997.  
See (ed) “Lessons from Lipitor and the broken blockbuster drug model” (2011) 378 The Lancet 1976. 
	  	   166	  
 
(e) Criterion five: linking rewards to improved health outcomes 
 
Although ex-ante fixed prizes are capable of linking rewards to improved health 
outcomes131 for multiple types of therapies, the inherent lack of flexibility of such 
prizes means that they are unlikely to maximise health outcomes with respect to 
rewards paid. Therefore, fixed prizes receive a score of two under this criterion.  
 
 
(f) Criterion six: minimising administration costs to determine rewards 
 
A major issue with ex-ante fixed prizes is the lack of a true market mechanism to 
determine the prize value. This is problematic, as often the value of a particular 
therapy is not apparent until many years after it is commercialised. In addition, 
generating well-designed prize criteria in advance is technically complex with high 
administration costs, especially if new criteria have to be developed for each new 
disease category or type of therapy. Further, where multiple parties may have fulfilled 
the criteria, it may be difficult for the prize administrator to determine who should 
receive the reward. Because fixed prizes require a non-market mechanism to 
determine rewards, and have significant costs of administration, they receive a score 
of three.  
 
 
(g) Criterion seven: minimising waste/inefficiency 
 
Advantageously, ex-ante fixed prizes lack many of the waste/inefficiency factors 
which are common to exclusivity-based incentives. The payment of an up-front prize 
means that there are no (1) incentives for excessive marketing. As monopoly pricing 
enforced by exclusivity is not necessary, there would also be no opportunities for (4) 
arbitrage due to grey markets, (5) incentives to counterfeit drugs, (7) incentives to 
create me-too drugs and an (8) anti-commons effect.  
 
Despite this, fixed prizes have a number of disadvantages. As noted with reference to 
the Longitude prize, there is a (2) risk of costly litigation due to disputes over 
fulfillment of the prize criteria, which highlights the need for criteria to be 
unambiguous. Conceivably, fixed prizes also create (3) an opportunity for gaming, 
whereby innovators would perform the minimum R&D required to fulfill the criteria 
and receive the reward. The prize administrators may also force innovators to take a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
131 For example, the criteria for winning the prize may tied to the achievement of a specific outcome 
with a high QALY impact, such as a cure for a chronic illness or development of an effective one-off 
vaccine. 
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reduced reward after they have already incurred significant R&D costs.132 This is 
referred to by economists as the “time inconsistency problem”.133   
 
 In addition, without a mechanism to provide ‘clinical exclusivity’ in advance to 
competitors, a fixed prize could (6) incentivise low transparency and produce 
wasteful races.134 Moreover, because a fixed prize is likely to be large, and prize 
administrators are responsible for determining fulfillment of the criteria, there is a 
potential for (9) rent seeking. Also problematic is that the absence of an international 
treaty to make contributions towards a prize fund means that any prize regime could 
be subject to (10) free riding by other countries.135 
 
Therefore, because of the absence of all but five waste/inefficiency factors, a score of 
two is granted under this criterion.  
 
 
(h) Criterion eight: incentivise incremental innovation and breakthroughs 
 
An ‘all or nothing’ fixed prize would be optimally suited towards incentivising 
medical breakthroughs rather than incremental innovations, although the prize criteria 
may involve payment of a lesser sum for incremental innovations, which could 
significantly incentivise the latter. However, the potential to obtain a large reward 
may increase risk that fixed prizes would compromise patient safety. In particular, the 
innovator will not be responsible with how the therapy performs in the wider 
population after the prize is claimed. This can be contrasted with exclusivity rights, 
where a single party will market the drug and will be liable in the event of harm. For 
this reason, a score of three is provided under this criterion.  
 
 Summary  
 
In theory, ex-ante fixed prizes could provide sufficient incentives to ensure the 
majority of unpatentable, unmonopolisable, and unprofitable therapies are not 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
132 See JA DiMasi and H Grabowski “Patents and R&D incentives: Comments on the Hubbard and 
Love trade framework for financing pharmaceutical R&D” (Submission to the Commission on 
Intellectual Property Rights, Innovation and Public Health, 2004) at 12.  Administration agencies 
which game the system in this way can gain in the short term, but lose long-term benefits as innovators 
are discouraged from participating in a prize system in the future.  
133 JA DiMasi and HG Grabowski “Should the patent system for new medicines be abolished?” (2007) 
82(5) Clinical Pharmacology & Therapeutics 488 at 489.  
134 SF Kieff “Property rights and property rules for commercializing inventions” (2000) 85 Minn L Rev 
697 at 710-711. Kieff refers to ‘rent dissipation’ from races of multiple innovators towards a large 
prize causing a reduction in the overall value of the prize.   
135 T Hubbard and J Love “A New Trade Framework for Global Healthcare R&D” (2004) 2 PLOS 
Biology 147 at 150.  It could be argued that such “free-riding” already occurs in countries with weaker 
patent protection or which implement compulsory licensing or price controls for new medicines.  
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screened the majority of the time. However, the lack of flexibility and a suitable 
market mechanism to determine rewards means there is a reliance on the design and 
administration of optimal criteria in advance of the therapy being incentivised, which 
may not be practical. The focus of prizes on achieving breakthroughs, rather than 
incremental innovation, may also compromise patient safety, particularly as 
innovators will not be responsible for putting the therapy on the market. Overall, fixed 
prizes achieve an average score of 2.94, which is an improvement over the current 
patent system.  
 
B Ex-post Flexible Prizes  
 
Ex-post flexible prize regimes calculate an innovator’s reward based on the health 
impact of the therapy after it has been developed, rather than determining rewards ex-
ante. The earliest manifestation of a flexible prize regime involved patent buy-outs, 
whereby the government would pay a reward to an inventor for their patent, which is 
subsequently placed into the public domain. For example, the United States Atomic 
Energy Act of 1954 authorised the Patent Compensation Board to provide rewards for 
patents over inventions relating to atomic energy, because it was illegal to sell such 
inventions.136  The Soviet Union also implemented a flexible prize-based system to 
pay a reward to inventors rather than granting exclusivity rights, such as a percentage 
of costs savings as a result of their invention.137 However, there were significant 
problems, including poor administration, misattribution of inventorship, and under 
compensation.138 
 
The major problem with patent buy-outs is that the amount of the reward may not 
reflect the social or market value. Kremer proposed a private auction mechanism,139 
whilst Abramowicz140, Guell & Fischbaum 141 and Shavell & van Ypersele 142 also 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
136 M Kremer “Patent buyouts: A mechanism for encouraging innovation” (1998) 113(4) The Quarterly 
Journal of Economics 1137 at 1145.  
137 HF Clesner “Payment for Discoveries and Innovations in the Soviet Union” (1961) 5 Pat. 
Trademark & Copy J Res & Ed 52 at 55.   
138 At 60.  
139 Kremer, above n 136. Kremer’s mechanism is a hybrid of a private auction and government 
acquisition. In particular, multiple parties bid to purchase rights to the patent, and have a 10 per cent 
chance of receiving the patent. The other 90 per cent of the time, the government will purchase the 
patent at the highest auction bid, which is arguably the market value of the patent. In order to ensure 
the purchase price reflects the amount of social surplus, Kremer suggests that the government 
multiplies the highest bid by a particular value (for example, times 2.5), although he provides no 
justification regarding why this would be an appropriate multiplier.  
140 Abramowicz, above n 119. Abramowicz suggests a valuation performed by a government agency 
that would distribute rewards in delayed and retrospective fashion. The crucial advantage of delayed 
rewards is that the government will have better information about how to value the patent after the drug 
is already on the market for several years. The main problems with this proposal is that delayed 
rewards would reduce the value of this option to innovators, and a non-market mechanism to determine 
the amount of rewards is likely to be inefficient and/or at a risk of “agency capture”. 
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proposed a patent buyout system as a replacement to the patent system, which used a 
government-set reward, an extrapolated value based on sales on a test market, and a 
mathematical formula, respectively. Finally, Outterson proposes a buy-out of patents 
for neglected diseases,143 based on an estimate of sales.  
 
Despite patent buy-outs technically being a flexible prize mechanism, the amount of 
rewards are tied to the market value of a patent, therefore, they would exclude 
therapies which are not incentivised under the current patent system. For that reason, 
patent buy outs will not be analysed with reference to the ideal criteria. Instead, two 
flexible prize proposals will be considered which allocate rewards based on the health 
impact of a therapy: the Medical Innovation Prize Act, and the Health Impact Fund.  
 
1    The Medical Innovation Prize Act  
 
The Medical Innovation Prize Fund (MIPF)144 is a bill for a flexible prize mechanism 
that was proposed by Senator Bernie Sanders in response to concerns about escalating 
health care costs due to pharmaceutical monopolies. The MIPF is based on a similar 
proposal by Love and Hubbard to abolish patent monopolies for pharmaceuticals and 
replace them with a prize mechanism.145 The MIPF would establish a Board of 
Trustees, comprised of government officials and stakeholders from the public and 
private sector, that allocates rewards based on certain criteria, including incremental 
health benefit and whether a newly approved drug meets certain pre-determined 
disease priorities.146 Under the MIPF, the incremental health benefit is not determined 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
141 RC Guell and M Fischbaum “Toward allocative efficiency in the prescription drug industry” (1995) 
The Milbank Quarterly 213. The Guell and Fischbaum proposal involves determining the value of the 
patent by test marketing the new drug within a small geographical area then buying the patent based on 
an extrapolated calculation of profit in the wider market. There are several problems with this proposal. 
Firstly, while the test marketing occurs, presumably the drug would not be made available in a wider 
geographical area, which means there is a delay in the time that patients would benefit from the 
treatment. In addition, as the amount of the prize would be determined by judges, there is a risk of 
human error or bias. Finally, there is also the risk that the results from the test market cannot be 
extrapolated more broadly. 
142 Shavell and van Ypersele, above n 118, propose a more scientific approach using a specific 
algorithm to estimate the demand curve and social value of a patented drug. The government would 
pay the expected social surplus based on the average of the range of values generated by the algorithm. 
The accuracy of the calculation depends on the quality of information held by the government about 
expected demand. However, Shavell and van Ypersele provide no details of how to make the initial 
calculation of the probability of demand. 
143 K Outterson “Patent Buy-Outs for Global Disease Innovations for Low and Middle-Income  
Countries” (2006) 32 Amer J L & Med 159 at 171.  
144 Medical Innovation Prize Fund Act, S 627; Medical Innovation Prize Act of 2007, S 2210. This 
thesis will refer to provisions from both bills.  
145 J Love and T Hubbard “The Big Idea: Prizes to Stimulate R&D for New Medicines” (2007) 82 Chi 
Kent L Rev 82 1519 at 1532.  
146  Medical Innovation Prize Act of 2007 S 2210, § 9(c)(1), (2) and (3). Disease priorities are currently 
stated as: (A) current and emerging global infectious diseases; (B) severe illnesses with small client 
populations (such as indications for which orphan designation has been granted under section 526 of 
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using QALYs, rather, it involves calculating the number of patients that benefit from 
a drug and its “incremental therapeutic benefit”.147  
 
The MIPF would require a USD 80 billion annual prize fund comprising 0.6 per cent 
of United States gross domestic product. 148 This would be distributed annually to 
‘registered’ FDA-approved drugs for 10 years from registration, proportional to their 
respective health impact.149 Total payments to any one drug ‘registered’ with the prize 
fund would be capped to 5 per cent of the total prize fund,150 and a follow-on drug 
must allocate some of its rewards to a pioneer drug to the extent it was “based on or 
benefitted from” the pioneer drug. 151 Patents would still be used to determine 
eligibility to receive prize rewards, but cannot prevent generic competition.152  
 
2 The Health Impact Fund  
 
The Health Impact Fund (HIF) is another flexible prize incentive mechanism 
proposed by academics Thomas Pogge and Aidan Hollis, and promoted by Incentives 
for Global Health.153 The mechanism is similar to the MIPF, whereby the HIF would 
pay annual rewards from a USD 6 billion annual prize fund over ten years following 
‘registration’ of an innovator’s drug according to its incremental health impact.154 In 
order to be eligible for ‘registration’ it is necessary to either obtain regulatory 
approval for the innovator’s drug or allow the HIF to do so (and subtract this cost 
from the rewards payable).155 It is proposed that health impact can be determined by 
measuring incremental QALYs gained from an innovator’s registered drug against a 
‘baseline’,156 in any given year compared to other registered drugs.157  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act (21 U.S.C. 360bb)), and (C) neglected diseases that 
primarily afflict the poor in developing countries.  
147 At § 9(c)(1),(2).  
148 At § 15(a)(2). 
149 At § 9, 11(c). 
150 At § 9(d)(4), 15(a)(2). 
151 At § 9(d)(1). Specifically, payments would continue to be made to the pioneer drug to “the degree 
that the new . . . product, or manufacturing process was based on or benefited from the development of 
the existing . . . product, or manufacturing process.” 
152 Love and Hubbard, above n145 at 1532.  
153 See A Hollis and T Pogge The Health Impact Fund: Making New Medicines Accessible for All: a 
Report of Incentives for Global Health (Incentives for Global Health, 2008).  
154 At 44.  
155 At 9. 
156 At 15. The ‘baseline’ is set at the expected health of patients at the time or two years prior to when 
the ‘registered’ drug was introduced.  
157 At 9, 29. For example, the incremental QALY impact of a particular drug can be calculated 
according to the following crude formula: Q1 – Q2 x N/D, where Q1 is the average QALY impact for 
each patient treated by the registered drug in clinical trials, Q2 is the average QALY impact for each 
patient undertaking a ‘baseline’ treatment , N is the number of registered drugs sold or distributed, and 
D is the average number of registered drugs taken by each patient. Assuming, on average, a registered 
drug adds 2 QALYs per patient, and the baseline treatment adds 0.5 QALYs per patient, and each 
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Importantly, this provides a self-correcting market mechanism for the determination 
of rewards. In particular, with an increasing number of registered drugs, a firm may 
choose not to participate as the rewards are too low.158 In turn, as fewer firms register 
drugs, this will increase the proportion of rewards payable to the other registrants and 
eventually incentivise more innovators to participate. Ideally, this ensures the reward 
levels are optimal (assuming high turnover possible for registration and re-
registration).  
 
The innovator company would be required to offer the drug at specified low price 
during the ten-year reward period, and then subsequently provide a royalty-free open 
license for other generic manufacturers to produce the drug.159   
 
A smaller ‘pilot’ for the HIF based on one drug within a small geographical area has 
been proposed to determine its feasibility. 160 Another proposed use for the HIF is to 
incentivise the development of antibiotics, which is a known ‘unprofitable therapy’.161 
Barbados, Bolivia, Suriname and Bangladesh also proposed a similar mechanism to 
the HIF, whereby rewards would be paid to developers who openly licensed drugs for 
certain neglected diseases including HIV, tuberculosis, and malaria, to generic drug 
companies in a manner that allows developing countries to have access.162 Thus 
flexible prize mechanisms have been proposed to incentivise a wide variety of 
therapies.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
patient requires two doses on average, the sale of 10,000 drugs would provide an incremental health 
benefit of 7500 QALYs. 
158 At 23.  
159 At 3.  
160 T Pogge “Getting the Incentives Right: the Health Impact Fund, a Concrete Contribution to Global 
Justice and an Innovation in Global Health” (Friedrich Ebert Stiftung International Policy Analysis, 
July 2011) at 7.  
161 K Outterson, A Hollis, and T Pogge “Combatting antibiotic resistance through the Health Impact 
Fund” in Glenn I Cohen (ed) The Globalization of Health Care (Oxford University Press, New York, 
2013).  
162  A Prize Fund to Support Innovation and Access for Donor Supported Markets: Proposal by 
Barbados, Bolivia, Suriname and Bangladesh (World Health Organization, 15 April 2009). In a similar 
manner to the HIF, ‘registered’ drugs would share an annual prize fund according to proportional 
DALY/QALY impact. The prize would be funded using 10 per cent of current development assistance 
by participating countries.  
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3  How do flexible prize regimes compare against ideal criteria? 
 
 Should any criteria be excluded? 
 
One of the stated purposes of the MIPF is “de-linking research and development 
incentives from product prices” and “eliminating legal monopolies”.163 By contrast, 
the HIF has been proposed as an optional supplement to the patent regime.164 
However, under both the MIPF165 and the HIF, 166 patents are not a necessary 
condition to be eligible to receive rewards. Therefore, such prize mechanisms have 
been suggested as a means to incentivise socially valuable therapies based on health 
impact, irrespective of whether they are unpatentable,167 unmonopoliosable168 or 
unprofitable.169 Accordingly, no criteria will be excluded in the following analysis.  
 
 
(a) Criterion one: incentivising unpatentable therapies 
 
Ex-post flexible reward regimes such as the MIPF and HIF would provide rewards for 
ten years according to health impact of a therapy irrespective of the presence of 
unpatentability factors. As noted above, under a fixed prize fund, the amount of 
rewards available are reduced according to the number of ‘registered’ drugs. Annual 
rewards available could provide an adequate return on investment for registrants, 
provided that the size of the overall fund would incentivise registration of at least two 
or more therapies.170 Innovators may also be less likely to screen unpatentable 
therapies with higher R&D costs but higher health impact, because of the chance of 
obtaining a greater proportion of the annual fund.  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
163 Medical Innovation Prize Fund Act of 2013, §2(3).  
164 Hollis and Pogge, above n 153, at 2.  
165 Medical Innovation Prize Fund Act of 2013, §9(b)(1). Rewards may be paid to “the first person to 
receive market clearance with respect to the drug or biological product”.  
166 T Syed “Should a Prize System for Pharmaceuticals Require Patent Protection for Eligibility?”(IGH 
Discussion Paper No 2, Incentives for Global Health, June 10, 2009) at 4-6. Compare Hollis and 
Pogge, above n 153, at 9, where it is noted that to be eligible to receive rewards a company must hold a 
patent over a drug product.  
167 M Wei “Should Prizes Replace Patents? A Critique of the Medical Innovation Prize Act of 2005” 
(2007) 13 Bos Uni J Sci Tech L 25 at 28; Syed at 4-5.  
168 See Hollis and Pogge, above n 153 at 17, 25, noting that the HIF could incentivise funding new uses 
for generic drugs, which are ‘unmonopolisable therapies. 
169 At 5, 55.  
170 If only one therapy was registered, then it is likely that the maximum annual size of rewards are not 
optimal. Also, the smaller the prize fund, the fewer potentially socially valuable therapies being 
incentivised. It may be possible to increase the size of the annual fund until an optimal amount of new 
therapies are ‘registered’ each year. The optimal amount could be benchmarked against the number of 
therapies achieving FDA-approval each year under the current patent system.  For example, the FDA 
approved 39 new molecular entities in 2012. See CDER Drug and Biologic Calendar Year Approvals 
for Calendar Year 2012 (Food and Drug Administration, 2012).  
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Despite the possibility of increased rewards, and a self-adjusting mechanism, it is 
unlikely that flexible prizes would be as attractive to innovators as monopoly rights, 
because the amount of rewards would be (arbitrarily) tied to the number of other 
therapies ‘registered’ with the prize fund at the time and their respective QALY 
impact.171 However, they would likely be more attractive to innovators than fixed 
prizes, and for that reason, capable of incentivising at least 75 per cent of 
unpatentable therapies. Accordingly, flexible prizes achieve a rating of four under this 
criterion.  
 
 
(b) Criterion two: incentivising unmonopolisable therapies 
 
Flexible prize mechanisms are capable of incentivising unmonopolisable therapies 
because rewards are not related to excludability.172 Notably, however, the MIPF is 
silent as to whether it would allocate rewards for second uses for generic drugs, or 
more highly unmonopolisable therapies such as diets, supplements, and lifestyle 
interventions.173 By contrast, the HIF anticipates incentivising second uses for generic 
drugs,174  because the reward mechanism “does not require exclusion” only “evidence 
that the existing drug was in fact used.”175  
 
Syed noted “possibility of fashioning the HIF’s criteria for added health benefits in 
such a way that it can reward the independent generation of further safety and 
efficacy information on already-approved products”.176 Conceptually, it would be 
possible to reward generation of safety and efficacy information on highly 
unmonopolisable therapies such as supplements, diets and lifestyle interventions, 
although it is not clear how this would be implemented under the MIPF and the HIF. 
Ultimately, it is likely that flexible prize mechanisms are an improvement on fixed 
prizes, and could incentivise at least 75 per cent of unmonopolisable therapies to 
achieve a rating of four under this criterion.  
 
 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
171 For example, if a particular therapy ‘registered’ with the prize fund had a particularly large health 
impact in a certain year, this would reduce the proportional rewards available to the other registered 
therapies, irrespective of the total health impact provided overall.  
172 However, there would have to be a practical and reliable way of measuring the number of patients 
treated by a particular therapy in order to determine health impact, such as using survey data.  
173 Wei, above 167 at 33. 
174 Hollis and Pogge, above n 153 at 14. Notably, the HIF only rewards new indications for five years, 
rather than 10 years.  
175 Hollis and Pogge, above n 153 at 17.  
176 Syed, above n 166 at 5.  
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(c) Criterion three: incentivising unprofitable therapies 
 
One of the major advantages of flexible prize regimes such as the MIPF and the HIF 
is their ability to incentivise unprofitable therapies such as neglected diseases, with 
high potential health impact but low profitability. For example, the MIPF proposes to 
set aside 18 per cent of the fund for global neglected diseases (four per cent), orphan 
diseases (ten per cent), and infectious diseases with a global public health priority 
(four per cent). 177  For the reasons outlined above regarding unpatentable and 
unmonopolisable therapies it is arguable that flexible prize regimes could incentivise 
over 75 per cent of unprofitable therapies. Therefore, a rating of four is also provided 
under this criterion.  
 
 
(d) Criterion four: balancing dynamic and static efficiency 
 
Ex-post flexible prize regimes provide (1) long-term private incentives for R&D by 
rewarding innovators upon producing information about the safety and efficacy of 
new therapies. However, under the MIPF and HIF, these rewards are paid over ten 
years, which is similar to delays under exclusivity regimes. The MIPF would 
immediately abolish patent monopolies which would allow (2) competition without 
delay, which would provide static efficiency. By contrast, one of the criticisms of the 
HIF is that an innovator is not obliged to release the drug into the public domain.178 
However, this criticism can be rebutted by noting that sponsors would be incentivised 
to license ‘registered’ drugs to a generic company at a cost which maximised QALYs, 
which may even be at a price below marginal cost.179 
 
The use of prizes rather than exclusivity rights results in (3) minimising deadweight 
losses and (4) maximising consumer surplus without delay. However, due to delays in 
allocation of rewards, a score of four is provided under this criterion.  
 
 
(e) Criterion five: linking rewards to improved health outcomes.  
 
It is possible for flexible prize regimes such as the MIPF and HIF to link rewards to 
health impact irrespective of disease type. Notably, however, as currently drafted it is 
not clear how the MIPF and HIF would practically measure total health impact for 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
177 Medical Innovation Prize Act of 2013, S 627, §10(b). 
178 See S Fukuda-Parr and A Proochista “Health Impact Fund – Raising Issues of Distribution, IP 
Rights And Alliances” (26 September 2011) IP-Watch <www.ip-watch.org>.  
179 T Pogge and J Hirsch-Allen “Inside Views: A Response From The Authors Of The Health Impact 
Fund” (3 October 2011) IP-Watch <www.ip-watch.org>. 
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highly unmonopolisable therapies which are not drugs, such as diets, surgical 
interventions, and lifestyle interventions. 
 
In addition, by linking rewards to improved health outcomes, there are incentives to 
actually commercialise a therapy and ensure it gets to patients. This is referred to as 
overcoming the “last mile problem”.180 Notably, however, developing therapies for 
rare diseases that have small patient populations with high unmet medical needs may 
not be as attractive under mechanisms such as the HIF because total QALY gains will 
be small. By contrast, the MIPF specifically includes orphan drugs in its criteria to be 
considered for determining the amount of prizes,181 although it is not clear how this 
will impact on the payment of rewards.  
 
In light of the above, it is arguable that flexible prize regimes can be used to 
determine rewards that maximise health impact for more than one type of therapy or 
class of disease. Therefore, it is possible to grant a rating of four under this criterion.  
 
 
(f) Criterion six: minimising administration costs to determine rewards 
 
The main disadvantage of flexible prize regimes is that they do not use a market 
mechanism to determine rewards. As noted above, rewards under the MIPF would be 
determined by a Board of Trustees. Under the HIF, the Health Impact Assessment 
Branch would estimate the QALY impact of each ‘registered’ drug.182 Administration 
costs are likely to be high because of the necessity to measure incremental health 
benefit in a robust and fair manner to attract innovators.183 For example, the HIF 
proposes to set aside 10 per cent of the fund as a budget for administering the 
calculation of QALYs. For USD 6 billion in annual rewards, the administration 
budget would be USD 600 million per annum, which would make the HIF the largest 
organisation in the world for measurement of health metrics.184  Another major 
problem is how to determine whether increased health impact in a population was due 
to the innovator’s drug, particularly where patients outside a clinical trial setting may 
be taking different medications and have various co-morbidities.185 As noted by 
commentators, prize administrators would not have access to the ‘perfect’ information 
required to calculate ex-post rewards.186  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
180 Hollis and Pogge, above n 153 at 71.  
181 Medical Innovation Prize Fund Act of 2013, §9(c)(3)(B). 
182 Hollis and Pogge, above n 153 at 40. 
183 Wei, above n 167 at 33.  
184Hollis and Pogge, above n 153, at 31.  
185 Comorbidities are the presence of more than one disease in the same patient.  
186 J Penin “Patents versus ex post rewards: A new look” (2005) 34 Research Policy 641 at 645. 
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On the other hand, the MIPF and HIF allocate annual rewards from a fixed fund in a 
self-adjusting manner, such that if rewards are too low, then fewer innovators will 
register their drugs, and vice-versa. This could ensure the amount of registered drugs 
and corresponding rewards would reach a socially optimal equilibrium over time.187  
 
In summary, although flexible prize regimes have advantages over fixed prizes, such 
as a self-adjusting mechanism to determine rewards, the measurement of health 
metrics requires high administration costs. For that reason, flexible prize regimes 
receive a score of two under this criterion.  
 
 
(g) Criterion seven: minimising waste/inefficiency 
 
In a similar manner to fixed prize regimes, flexible prize regimes can avoid some of 
the waste/inefficiency factors present with exclusivity-based incentives. In particular, 
as rewards are paid independently of the price of the therapy, there are no incentives 
for (4) arbitrage due to grey markets, (5) incentives to counterfeit drugs and (7) 
incentives to create me-too drugs. The absence of exclusivity also means that an (8) 
anti-commons effect will not be present.  
 
However, various waste/inefficiency factors are present with ex-post flexible prize 
regimes. For example, flexible prize regimes may encourage (1) excessive marketing 
costs if measurement of incremental health impact was based on the number of 
treatments provided to doctors or patients.188  
 
There is also a (2) risk of costly litigation with innovators over rewards where it is 
possible to dispute the methodology of calculating health metrics such as QALYs.189 
On the other hand, prize-based rewards will eliminate litigation between generic drug 
companies and innovators.190 However, this is irrelevant if litigation costs regarding 
the allocation of rewards would possibly exceed the costs under the patent system.191 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
187 J Love and T Hubbard “Prizes for innovation of new medicines and vaccines” (2009) 18 Annals 
Health L 155 at 167: “When designing for a single outcome, it is hard to chose the appropriate size of 
the “Prize.” Too small and the incentive will be insufficient to incentivise R&D. Too large and the 
mechanism is inefficient. A “Prize Fund” avoids this issue by allowing different R&D innovations to 
compete against each other. Over time the number of competitors and the scale of their investments in 
R&D innovations will equilibrate to match the overall size of the Prize Fund, ensuring efficient 
allocation.” 
188 DiMasi and Grabowski, above n 132, at 15. Notably, an open source approach may overcome the 
dissemination problem by encouraging sharing of information. 
189 See discussion of difficulties with measuring QALYs in Chapter Four, particularly determination of 
‘health utility’, which is a measure of severity of disease from zero to one.  
190 Hollis and Pogge, above n 153 at 17.  
191 Wei, above n 167 at 45.  
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Flexible prize mechanisms such as the MIPF and HIF may encourage (3) 
opportunities for gaming, depending on how health impact can be measured. For 
example, innovators may develop treatments for diseases where measurement of 
health impact may be highly subjective, such as mental illness. Innovators may also 
exaggerate the number of patients treated,192 or develop therapies with lower health 
impact and large patient population, at the expense of patients with unmet medical 
needs but smaller populations.193 As with fixed prizes, there may also be a “time 
inconsistency problem”, whereby a prize administrator may reduce the rewards after 
an innovator has already committed R&D expenditure, and the innovator would have 
little choice but to accept, even if they were insufficient. 194  
 
The MIPF and HIF could also (6) incentivise low transparency and wasteful races 
because innovators would compete to achieve registration first. However, by using 
patents to determine eligibility for registration,195 it may be possible to secure ‘clinical 
exclusivity’ in advance to prevent races and increase transparency. For example, the 
latest MIFP Bill would provide an “open source dividend” of 5 per cent of the prize 
fund to encourage sharing of knowledge that contributed to the development of new 
drugs. 196  
 
DiMasi and Grabowski point out that having a central authority responsible for 
allocation of rewards may be susceptible to (9) rent seeking and interference by third 
parties, which results in research priorities being directed according to political whims 
as opposed to scientific merit.197 As with fixed prizes, there is also a potential for (10) 
free-riding by other countries who do not contribute to the prize fund. The HIF 
proposes a global contribution according to a 0.03 percent of gross national 
income,198 however, securing and calculating the contributions of each country is 
likely to be politically difficult to implement. The MIFP would be funded by the 
United States Government, which also raises significant free-riding issues.  
 
Having regard to the fact that six waste/inefficiency factors are arguably not absent, 
flexible prizes receive a score of two.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
192 Hollis and Pogge, above n 153 at 30.  
193  As noted above, the MIPF would take rare disease populations into account for the purpose of 
allocating rewards, however, it is unclear how this would impact on allocation of rewards in practice: 
see Medical Innovation Prize Fund Act of 2013, §9(c)(3)(B). 
194 DiMasi and Grabowski, above n 133, at 489.  Compare exclusivity rights, where an innovator can 
refuse to supply the drug if the remuneration is too low.  
195 The MIPF does not require patents for eligibility to receive rewards. The HIF requires that 
‘registered’ drugs have patent protection in at least one specified jurisdiction. See Hollis and Pogge, 
above n 153, at 9.  
196 Medical Innovation Prize Fund Act of 2013, §15.  
197 DiMasi and Grabowski, above n 132; see also DiMasi and Grabowski, above n 133.  
198 Hollis and Pogge, above n 153 at 10.  
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(h) Criterion eight: incentivise incremental innovation and breakthroughs 
 
An ex-post flexible prize mechanism can allocate rewards according to health impact, 
which would incentivise breakthroughs with large health impact and incremental 
breakthroughs to a lesser extent. For example, the MIFP provides for allocation of a 
proportionally greater reward to pioneer drugs compared to follow on drugs,199 
although it does not specify how such allocation will be determined in practice. The 
HIF also bases rewards on incremental health impact which means that smaller health 
benefits receive smaller rewards.200 
 
Under the flexible prize mechanism, the innovator would be solely eligible to receive 
rewards for demonstrating health impact of their ‘registered’ drug. Therefore, the 
innovator would be involved in disseminating the drug to patients, which will reduce 
incentives to compromise patient safety.201  
 
As flexible prize mechanisms would incentivise breakthroughs optimally and 
incremental innovations significantly, without compromising patient safety, a rating 
of four is provided under this criterion.  
 
 Summary 
 
In theory, the ex-post flexible reward regimes could incentivise unpatentable, 
unmonopolisable and unprofitable therapies by linking rewards to health impact. The 
main problem is the high administration costs required to calculate health impact, 
despite the fact that the allocation of rewards under a fixed annual prize fund would 
be self-adjusting. The presence of waste/inefficiency factors is problematic, including 
the potential for disputes over the calculation of health impact, susceptibility of a 
central prize administrator to rent-seeking and ‘agency capture’, and the fact non-
contributing countries can ‘free-ride’ on the information generated by the flexible 
prize mechanism. Accordingly, the flexible prize regimes are unlikely to be politically 
feasible without strong international support and a practical means to overcome these 
problems. Nevertheless, flexible prizes achieve an average score of 3.5, which is an 
improvement over the current patent system, despite increased administration costs, 
due to the possibility of closer alignment between public health impact and private 
rewards.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
199 Medical Innovation Prize Fund Act of 2013, § 9(d)(1). 
200 Hollis and Pogge, above n 153 at 124.  
201 Compare ex-ante fixed prizes where the reward has already been paid at the time the therapy is put 
on the market.   
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C Conclusion 
 
In general, prize-based pull incentives have a significant advantage over exclusivity-
based pull incentives for incentivising unmonopolisable and unprofitable therapies. 
While not optimal, ex-post flexible prize regimes achieve a rating of four in respect of 
those criteria. The main problem with prize-based pull incentives is the lack of a 
market mechanism to determine rewards and the potential for manipulation of 
rewards after R&D has been completed. Fixed-prize are inherently inflexible, because 
criteria have to be set in advance, and should not be subsequently adjusted due to the 
risk of gaming. Prize-based mechanisms also require international contributions to 
prevent free-riding, which is politically difficult to implement. 
 
Flexible prize mechanisms may avoid the problems caused by the lack of a market 
mechanism by allocating rewards according to health impact from an annual prize 
fund such that the amount of rewards reaches ‘equilibrium’, provided that the method 
of calculating health impact is robust and fair. The use of prize-based ‘pull’ 
mechanisms as part of a potentially optimal incentive mechanism to incentivise 
unmonopolisable and unprofitable therapies will be explored further in Chapter 
Seven.  
 
Despite these advantages, it may be argued that prize mechanisms would be 
expensive and displace funding for other mechanism such as direct grants for medical 
research, which may be a more socially beneficial means of incentivising 
development of new medicines.  
  
VIC  ‘Push’ Incentives  
 
‘Push’ incentives involve mechanisms to directly support medical research during the 
process of drug development. These can be contrasted with exclusivity and prize-
based ‘pull’ incentives, which do not reward innovators until a medicine has been 
developed. Typically, these ‘push’ incentives comprise research grants paid by 
governments or other publicly-funded organisations such as charities. The main 
difficulty is that ‘push’ incentives may reward medical research which does not 
ultimately lead to viable new treatments for patents.  
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There are other forms of miscellaneous ‘push’ incentives, such as increased tax 
breaks202 and priority review of medicines,203 however, this thesis will focus on 
increased public funding for clinical trials and open source approaches.  
 
A Increased Public Funding and Open Source Approaches  
 
1 Increased public funding 
 
While public funding accounts for approximately half of combined public and private 
spending on medical R&D,204 the primary focus is on basic research.205 The majority 
of public funding is administered through large government agencies.  
 
In the United States, public funding for medical research is administered by the 
National Institutes of Health (NIH), which was allocated approximately USD 30 
billion in 2014.206 The overall success rate for a typical grant application (R01) was 
17.5 per cent in 2013.207 There is limited information on how much is spent on 
clinical trials specifically,208 however, grant applications for funding clinical trials 
have a much lower chance of success.209  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
202 DJ Hemel and LL Ouellette “Beyond the Patents--Prizes Debate” (2013) 92 Texas Law Review 303 
at 321-323; KM Lybecker and RA Freeman “Funding Pharmaceutical Innovation through Direct Tax 
Credits” (2007) 2 Journal of Health Economics Policy & Law 267 at 267; To amend the Internal 
Revenue Code of 1986 to provide a tax credit for medical research related to developing qualified 
infectious disease products Bill 2007 S 2351/HR 4200. 
203 See “Fast Track, Breakthrough Therapy, Accelerated Approval and Priority Review: Expediting 
Availability of New Drugs for Patients with Serious Conditions” (accessed 4 June 2014) Food and 
Drug Adminstration <www.fda.gov>. The European Union also has implemented an “accelerated 
procedure” under Regulation 726/2004 laying down Community procedures for the authorisation and 
supervision of medicinal products for human and veterinary use and establishing a European Medicines 
Agency [2004] OJ L136/1, art 14(9). This applies to an application for marketing authorization “in 
respect of medicinal products for human use which are of major interest from the point of view of 
public health and in particular from the viewpoint of therapeutic innovation”, where such request is 
“duly substantiated”. 
204 “Private and Public R&D Spending: Total biopharmaceutical company R&D, PhRMA member 
R&D, and NIH operating budget: 1995-2009” (accessed 5 June 2014) PhRMA <www.phrma.org>. 
205 BN Sampat and FR Lichtenberg “What are the Respective Roles of the Public and Private Sectors in 
Pharmaceutical Innovation?” (2011) 30(2) Health Affairs 332 at 332. 
206  “NIH Budget: Research for the People” (11 March 2014) National Institutes of Health 
<www.nih.gov>. The NIH budget is allocated under the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2014 Pub 
L No 113-76. 
207 S Rockey “FY2013 By The Numbers: Research Applications, Funding, and Awards” (10 January 
2014) Extramural Nexus <www.nexus.od.nih.gov>. The average size of an R01 grant was USD 
405,874 in 2013, which is allocated over an average of 4.5 years: see S Rockey “How Long is an R01” 
(7 November 2013) Extramural Nexus <www.nexus.od.nih.gov>. 
208 AL Buchman “The State of Clinical Research in America” (2010) Journal of Investigative Medicine 
1 at 3.  
209  TA Kotchen  and others “ NIH Peer Review of Grant Applications for Clinical Research” (2004) 
291 JAMA 836 at 836, noting that grant requests for clinical research funding less likely be successful 
than requests for basic research funding; AN Schechter “The Crisis in Clinical Research: Endangering 
the Half-Century National Institutes of Health Consensus” (1998) 280 JAMA 1440 at 1441. See also 
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In New Zealand, public funding of medical research is administered by the Health 
Research Council (HRC), which was allocated government funding of NZD 84.64 
million in 2013.210 According to information received by the author from the HRC, 
approximately NZD 49 million was spent on publicly-funded clinical trials between 
2009 and 2013.211 However, the overall success rate of grant applications was only 9 
per cent between 2012 and 2013.212 
 
As mentioned in Chapter Three, it is estimated that 90 per cent of clinical trials are 
funded by private industry,213 which creates a significant private funding cooling 
effect for unpatentable, unmonopolisable, and unprofitable therapies. Relying on 
private companies to fund the vast majority of clinical trials creates various socially 
undesirable outcomes. In particular, private companies may only publish clinical trials 
that show favorable results for their drug products,214 and can manipulate the design 
of clinical trial methodologies to bias results in favor of their drugs.215 It may even be 
possible that private companies will “shelve” or “suppress” medical research that 
would threaten profitable blockbuster revenues.216   
 
Independent studies have confirmed the “funding effect” bias due to financial 
conflicts of interest.217 For example, studies have shown that clinical trials funded by 
for-profit organisations were significantly more likely to recommend an experimental 
drug (51 per cent) versus clinical trials funded by non-profit organisations (16 per 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
DG Nathan “Clinical Research: Perceptions, Reality, and Proposed Solutions” (1998) JAMA 1427 at 
1427-1428.  
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cent).218 In some cases, this reporting bias may cause considerable harm to the 
public.219  
 
Accordingly, there have been calls to increase public funding of clinical trials for new 
medicines in New Zealand220 and the United States,221 including a proposed global 
R&D treaty to replace the patent system.222 However, several commentators have 
been critical of increased reliance on public funding for drug development. DiMasi 
and Grabowski note the significant risk of wasteful expenditure due to information 
asymmetries between grant-making bodies and grantees.223 In addition, to be efficient, 
grants require effective therapeutic candidates to be chosen in advance, and 
governments “do not have a good track record of picking winners”.224 By contrast, 
according to Demsetz, private intellectual property rights, such as patent exclusivity, 
are better at facilitating the efficient production of information regarding socially 
optimal research, and the amount of resources to commit towards it. 225  
 
One proposed solution is the establishment of public-private-partnerships (PPPs), 
where a publicly funded organisation partners with a company to help develop a 
medicine to address an unmet medical need.226 Government agencies have taken on 	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the role of facilitating such PPPs to share the costs of clinical trials, such as the 
NCATS program at the NIH for accelerating drug development.227 However, the 
problem is that under the current system, PPPs will still ultimately need to rely on 
patent exclusivity rights for a new therapy to get to market.  The NIH acknowledged 
that insufficient patent protection is a barrier to obtaining private investment, 
particularly for repurposing failed drugs.228 
 
2 Open source approaches 
 
Another proposed solution is an ‘open source’ approach229 through the formation of 
so-called “pre-competitive consortia” that encourage the sharing of information and 
resources at the pre-clinical stage, such as the validation of drug targets and 
generating new animal models for disease that allow testing.230 It may be appropriate 
to strengthen the experimental use exception to patent infringement in order to 
facilitate such “pre-competitive” research.231 However, by definition, pre-competitive 
consortia anticipate the entry of a subsequent competitive phase where exclusivity 
rights are enforced. It is unclear when this competitive phase should ideally occur.  
 
Patent pools are another concept related to the ‘open source’ movement.  Patent pools 
involve a collective agreement to cross-license patents according to standard terms, in 
order to overcome the inefficiencies due to ‘patent thickets’, which, as discussed in 
Chapter Three, may result when multiple parties have overlapping patent rights to a 
medicine.232 For example, under the Medicines Patent Pool, launched by the WHO-
affiliated UNITAID in 2010, pharmaceutical companies license their patents over 
medicines to allow manufacture of HIV medication at generic prices.233 Other patent 	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pools have been suggested for neglected diseases, although these are not well-
established.234   
 
It will also be important to ensure that pre-competitive consortia and patent pools do 
not significantly restrict competition in a manner that may breach applicable law.235 
Further, it is unclear how increased public funding can incentivise drug development 
in a manner which is not wasteful, and how to co-ordinate the granting of exclusivity 
rights to private industry using collaborative ‘open source’ approaches in a manner 
that will provide adequate private incentives to develop new therapies after the pre-
competitive stage.   
 
3 How does increased public funding and open source approaches compare 
against ideal criteria?  
 
 Should any criteria be excluded? 
 
Various commentators have suggested replacing the current patent system with 
publicly funded clinical trials.236 Open source approaches can also be used to increase 
the efficiency of public funding, particularly in the pre-clinical stage. Additionally, 
the majority of current R&D spending on unmonopolisable and unprofitable therapies 
comes from publicly-funded sources because of the lack of private incentives to 
conduct clinical trials for such research.237 Therefore, it would not be appropriate to 
exclude any criteria from the following analysis.  
 
 
(a) Criterion one: incentivising unpatentable therapies 
 
As noted above, current levels of public funding are insufficient to develop new 
therapies without the involvement of private industry. Even with increased levels of 
public funding, pharmaceutical companies would be just as likely to screen 
unpatentable therapies, as under the current system. However, if drugs could be 
entirely funded from public sources (through grants available to private entities), it is 
arguable that such screening would not occur. Unfortunately, this assumes that 
government agencies can identify the most socially valuable research to fund and it is 	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Innovation” (2013) 7 NZIPJ 3 at 7-8.  
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arguable that public agencies have an information asymmetry in this regard.238 
Assuming that government agencies will have a limited healthcare budget, 239 
discretionary spending combined with information asymmetry means that otherwise 
viable socially valuable therapies may still be screened. Therefore, it is arguable that 
between 50 and 75 per cent of socially valuable but unpatentable therapies will not be 
screened. Accordingly, a score of three is provided under this criterion.  	  	  
(b) Criterion two: incentivising unmonopolisable therapies 
 
Increased public funding has the potential to optimally incentivise unmonopolisable 
therapies because a grant-making body can choose to fund research irrespective of 
whether it is highly ‘non-excludable’, such as dietary and lifestyle interventions.240 
Unfortunately, however, the same problems discussed above with respect to 
unpatentable therapies militate against the likelihood that the government could 
choose the most socially valuable therapies to research with a limited budget. 
Therefore, it is likely that only 50 to 75 per cent of valuable unmonopolisable 
therapies will not be screened under this criterion, and a score of three is provided.   
 
 
(c) Criterion three: incentivising unprofitable therapies 
 
Unprofitable therapies could be incentivised with public funding. For example, the 
establishment of various PPPs for neglected diseases has had some degree of 
success.241 However, in the absence of a viable market, it is likely that PPPs would 
have limited value to private industry, except from a public relations aspect. Further, 
the funding of unprofitable therapies by government agencies would involve 
significant financial risk. 
 
Increased public funding for unprofitable therapies will require selectivity in order to 
choose lower risk projects to fund, compared to the private industry which may be 
more willing to bear risk. Therefore, it is likely that between 50 to 75 per cent of 
valuable unmonopolisable therapies will not be screened under this criterion, and a 
score of three is granted.  	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(d) Criterion four: balancing dynamic and static efficiency  
 
Public funding is awarded during development of a new medicine, therefore, it can 
provide (1) private incentives for R&D. However, it is arguable that there would be 
some delays during the process of determining where to allocate funding. The 
possibility of an open source approach allows (2) competition without delay and static 
efficiency once a publicly funded medicine is ready to be distributed.242  
 
If government pays for all clinical trials then the drug can be made available at 
marginal cost, which (3) minimises deadweight losses and (4) maximises consumer 
surplus, both without delay. Therefore, because it is possible to provide (2), (3), and 
(4) without delay, and there is the possibility that (1) could have some delay, a rating 
of 4.5 is granted under this criterion.  
 
 
(e) Criterion five: linking rewards to improved health outcomes 
 
Public funding for pre-clinical and clinical research does not include a mechanism to 
link rewards to improved health outcomes. For example, publicly-funded research 
may cause significant breakthroughs without the original researcher obtaining any 
windfall benefit as a result. Further, providing such a benefit would be inconsistent 
with current scientific norms for medical researchers. Despite this, it is likely that a 
rational grant-making body would allocate increased funding towards therapies for 
unmet medical needs of the population as a whole. In that sense, increased public 
funding is capable of linking rewards to health impact. However, the requirement to 
allocate funds before therapeutic benefit has been established means that a grant 
mechanism is unlikely to maximise health impact for rewards paid. Therefore, a 
rating of two is provided under this criterion.  
 
 
(f) Criterion six: minimising administration costs to determine rewards 
 
Increased public funding creates a risk of high administrative costs due to a large 
taxpayer-funded bureaucracy and the lack of a market mechanism to determine the 
level of funding. Ouellete estimates administrative costs for grant funding comprise 
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up to a third of the amount of the grant.243 In addition, government agencies will have 
to determine which projects to fund in advance and bear the high risks and costs of 
clinical trial failure.  
 
Even having regard to the declining levels of R&D productivity in the private 
industry,244 it is likely that government agencies would be even more inefficient than 
the market. In particular, research grant recipients have no incentive to terminate a 
project, compared with the “quick win, fast fail” Darwinian selection approach of 
private drug development.245 By contrast, government agencies may continue to fund 
legacy projects with low chances of success, or fail to fund promising new therapies 
which do not fall within the current scientific paradigm. This is referred to as the 
“adverse selection” problem.246 
 
For open source approaches, it would be administratively costly to determine the 
appropriate timing for entry into the competitive phase, and manage ownership of IP, 
unless the use of standard joint venture agreements is feasible.247 
 
In light of the above, it is arguable that increased public funding would cause high 
administration costs. However, these would arguably not exceed potential social 
surplus gained because of the benefits from avoiding conflicts of interest and 
reporting biases.248 For this reason, a rating of two is provided under this criterion.  
 
 
(g) Criterion seven: minimising waste/inefficiency 
 
There are various advantages of increased public funding and an open source 
approach compared to the for-profit funding of clinical research. For example, 
publicly funded medicines will not encourage (1) excessive advertising.  In addition, 
(2) costly litigation with generic drug companies can be avoided if medicines are 
released into the public domain immediately. On the other hand, for PPPs requiring 
exclusivity, there may still be a risk of litigation with generics. Further, with “pre-	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245 SM Paul and others “How to improve R&D productivity: the pharmaceutical industry's grand 
challenge” (2010) 9 Nature Reviews Drug Discovery 203 at 212, Figure 5.  
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competitive consortia” prior to a competitive phase, there may be disputes between 
innovators if rights to intellectual property are uncertain or conflicting.  
 
The lack of monopoly pricing means that there would be no need for (4) arbitrage due 
to grey markets, (5) incentives to counterfeit drugs, and incentives to develop (7) me-
too drugs.  Finally, an open source approach would discourage (6) low transparency 
and duplication of R&D efforts, and avoid an (8) anti-commons effect.249 
 
Despite these advantages, there are various opportunities for waste/inefficiency with 
publicly-funded research. As noted above, DiMasi and Grabowski highlight the (3) 
opportunities for gaming, due to information asymmetry between the grantmaking 
body and the grantee, creating a “moral hazard” whereby the researcher is likely to 
change their behaviour once an agreement has been reached to fund the research. 
There is also a significant risk of (9) rent-seeking by political interference, especially 
where multiple parties compete for a larger pool of funding. It may also be difficult to 
manage such conflicts of interest, particularly where the pool of expertise limited.  
 
Increased public funding can also cause a (10) free-riding issue if only one country 
provides the majority of funding. A proposed solution is the Medical Research and 
Development Treaty250 which would co-ordinate allocation of funds towards specific 
R&D priorities via tradable R&D credits (similar to carbon credits).251 However, such 
proposals have been criticised due to complexity and not dealing with underlying 
intellectual property ownership issues. 252 
 
In light of the fact that all but three (or possibly four) waste/inefficiency factors are 
absent, a rating of three is provided under this criterion.  
 
 
(h) Criterion eight: incentivise incremental innovation and breakthroughs 
 
The high flexibility inherent for allocation of public funding has the potential to 
optimally incentivise incremental innovation and breakthroughs. Medical researchers 
often make major discoveries by chance, and many breakthrough medicines were 
discovered due to research undertaken by public sector research institutions.253 Open 	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(International Policy Network, 2007).  
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source approaches support the effectiveness of public funding by encouraging the 
exchange and validation of information.  
 
A possible drawback of publicly-funded research is that, unlike when an innovator 
has exclusive rights, no one party will be responsible if the therapy causes harm. On 
the other hand, with publicly funded research, there is no incentive to suppress 
adverse clinical trial results, which will help protect patients from harm. Therefore, 
overall, it is arguable that public funding and open source approaches do not 
compromise patient safety. 
 
Accordingly, increased public funding can optimally incentivise breakthroughs and 
incremental innovation without compromising patient safety, and that a score of five 
is awarded under this criterion.  
 
B Conclusion 
 
Public funding and open source approaches hold the most promise at the ‘pre-
competitive’ stage of drug development prior to commencement of clinical trials. 
Public funding may also be beneficial for incentivising unpatentable, 
unmonopolisable, and unprofitable therapies. The main issue with public funding is 
the lack of an efficient mechanism to choose which projects to support, which means 
that rewards may not be linked to improved health outcomes. Further, the high costs 
and risks of failure for drug development during clinical trials means that publicly 
funding all drug development is likely to be inefficient. Despite this, the public 
funding of clinical trials can avoid many of the waste/inefficiencies factors present in 
the current incentive system, and can also optimally incentivise breakthroughs and 
incremental innovation.  
 
Overall, increased public funding and open source approaches achieve a score of 3.19. 
Public funding could potentially be an optimal incentive system, if combined with an 
appropriate mechanism to help grant-makers select which therapies would have the 
greatest social value.  
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 Overall Conclusion 
 
Chapter Six has described and analysed various alternative mechanisms to overcome 
the current problems inherent in the patent system, with respect to the ideal criteria. 
Chapter Seven will propose two mechanisms as part of a hybrid system that combines 
the advantageous aspects of these alternative incentive mechanisms in a synergistic 
manner, and will specifically address the lack of incentives for development of 
unpatentable, unmonopolisable, and unprofitable therapies. 
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VII Proposed Optimal Incentive System  
 
A Introduction 
 
Chapter Three described how the high costs and risks of drug development created 
significant private funding cooling effects for unpatentable, unmonopolisable and 
unprofitable therapies. Chapter Five provided evidence of international obligations for 
countries to implement mechanisms that would maximise the right to health. Eight 
ideal criteria were suggested, against which the current incentive system was 
compared. This achieved a relatively low average rating of 2.63 out of five. Chapter 
Six described and analysed various alternative incentive mechanisms for medical 
therapies against these ideal criteria, which were separated into three categories: 
exclusivity-based ‘pull’ incentives, prize-based ‘pull’ incentives and ‘push’ 
incentives. Proposals for extended regulatory exclusivity and ex-post flexible prizes 
received the highest ratings of 3.36 and 3.5, respectively.  
 
This Chapter 7 will propose that two incentive mechanisms should be 
implemented as part of an optimal model that would address the insufficient 
incentives under the patent system to develop unpatentable, unmonopolisable and 
unprofitable therapies, while satisfying the remaining ideal criteria to the maximum 
extent possible. In particular, the proposals involve providing extended market 
exclusivity for unpatentable therapies upon regulatory approval, and providing 
flexible prizes for early-stage clinical trials of unmonopolisable and unprofitable 
therapies in conjunction with increased public funding for late stage clinical trials. 
The policy justification for implementing these reforms is the same as all intellectual 
property regimes: to incentivise production of socially valuable information.1  
 
It should be noted that the following proposed regimes do not require 
amendments to the current patent system, for example, by raising the threshold tests 
for novelty, inventive step, and sufficiency, or abolishing the doctrine of inherent 
anticipation. This avoids an objection of “discrimination as to the … field of 
technology” under Article 27.1 of TRIPS,2 and also may also result in “abusive 
patenting strategies” by pharmaceutical companies.3  Although the patent system 
received a low ranking under the criteria, the abolition of the patent system would not 
be practical or even necessary, as pharmaceutical companies will gradually begin to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 P Menell and S Scotchmer “Intellectual Property Law” in AM Polinsky and S Shavell (eds) 
Handbook of Law and Economics, Volume 2 (Elsevier, Netherlands, 2007) 1476 at 1476 -1482. 
2 TRIPS, art 27.1.  
3 BN Roin “Unpatentable drugs and the standards of patentability” (2009) 87 Tex L Rev 503 at 557.  
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rely less on patent exclusivity if a robust alternative mechanism was implemented. 
Therefore, the chapter will propose alternative incentive mechanisms to operate 
alongside the current patent system. Benefits and limitations to these proposed 
mechanisms will also be discussed.  
 
 
B Extended Market Exclusivity for Unpatentable Therapies 
 
1 Why market exclusivity? 
 
Chapter 6A discussed the advantages of regulatory exclusivity over patent exclusivity. 
There are two types of regulatory exclusivity: ‘data exclusivity’ protects clinical trial 
information submitted by an innovator to obtain regulatory approval, and ‘market 
exclusivity’ prevents a subsequent generic company from obtaining regulatory 
approval for the same drug, even if the latter conducts their own clinical trials. From 
an innovator’s perspective, market exclusivity is superior to data exclusivity, as the 
latter can be overcome by a competitor who undertakes the same clinical trials. 
Unlike patent rights, market exclusivity does not require any enforcement action by 
the innovator, because it is simply a result of the refusal by the regulatory authority to 
approve generic versions of a medicine until a minimum period of time has elapsed. 
Hence, market exclusivity is less susceptible to legal challenges, reducing the 
wasteful spending on litigation between innovators and generic drug companies. 
Although there may be a risk of compulsory licensing, as with the patent system, this 
has rarely occurred.4  
 
In addition, market exclusivity is awarded to an innovator that undertakes the 
expensive and risky clinical trials required to establish safety and efficacy and achieve 
regulatory approval. This more accurately reflects ‘contract theory’, which justifies 
the ‘reward’ of exclusivity provided in exchange for the generation of socially useful 
information. This can be contrasted with the significantly lower ‘utility’ standard of 
patentability which only requires evidence of the usefulness of a therapeutic candidate 
shown in pre-clinical laboratory tests,5 which, as already discussed, has a very low 
chance of being shown as safe and effective in human clinical trials.6  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4  R Beall and R Kuhn “Trends in Compulsory Licensing of Pharmaceuticals Since the Doha 
Declaration: A Database Analysis” 9 PLoS Med 1 at 3.  
5 For the standard in the United States, see Brenner v Manson 148 USPQ 689 (S.Ct. 1966); Lane Fox v 
Kensington & Knightsbridge Electric Lighting Co Ltd (1892) 9 RPC 411. 
6 For example, most compounds that have been found to have a potent anti-cancer effect in a petri dish 
or in mice have no therapeutic value in humans.   
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The other main advantage of market exclusivity is that it does not discriminate 
against therapies with long development times, for example, early interventions for 
diseases that have a gradual worsening of symptoms such as Alzheimer’s disease and 
multiple sclerosis. 7  Finally, for the purpose of determining rewards, market 
exclusivity has administratively low costs, using a market mechanism which allows 
the negotiation of price with the payer, according to the principles of 
pharmacoeconomic analysis.8 Bentham, a classical economist comparing prize-based 
rewards with exclusivity, noted that the latter is “more natural and less burdensome” 
and “produces an infinite effect and costs nothing”.9  
 
Despite the aforementioned advantages of market exclusivity, some problems 
with exclusivity remain. For example, with patents, the 20-year term runs from the 
filing date, which may encourage a faster pace of clinical development than market 
exclusivity, which runs from the date of regulatory approval. Market exclusivity may 
also change the dynamic with the regulatory agency. In particular, regulatory agencies 
may be more willing to refuse requests for marketing approval. By contrast, if only 
patent protection was available, regulators may choose to allow market approval of a 
new drug rather than insist on more clinical trials, because of the risk that an 
innovator would abandon it due to insufficient patent length.10  
 
Market exclusivity is also susceptible to gaming. For example, an innovator 
can wait until exclusivity has expired before seeking regulatory approval on a new 
version of a medicine. There may also be wasteful races to regulatory approval in 
absence of a suitable mechanism to provide ‘clinical exclusivity’ to the most 
appropriate innovator.  
 
Awarding ‘clinical exclusivity’ creates issues, such as determining who should 
receive the right, and whether this right can be withdrawn or provided to a more 
appropriate candidate. Providing greater discretion to a government agency without 
clear guidelines increases the potential for ‘rent-seeking’ due to ‘agency capture’ and 
also increases the risk of wasteful disputes. For example, a regulatory agency may 
grant clinical exclusivity to one competitor over another as a result of a conflict of 
interest, which is then litigated under judicial review procedures.11  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 See discussion of the ‘unpatentability factor’ of  insufficient patent length in Chapter Three.  
8 See discussion in Chapter Four.  
9 F Machlup An economic review of the patent system (US Government Printing Office, 1958) at 19.  
10 Although, this means that the regulatory agency is discharging its duties to deny unsafe or ineffective 
medicines from obtaining market approval.  
11 The availability of judicial review and appeal from decisions of the regulatory agency will be 
discussed below.  
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Chapter 6A also noted that the flexibility of market exclusivity makes it more 
susceptible to political manipulation. The advantage of the TRIPS agreement is that it 
guarantees a minimum period of patent exclusivity in all WTO member states, which 
minimises the potential for free-riding. By contrast, governments could be subject to 
political pressure to reduce the length of market exclusivity, especially with 
increasing healthcare costs, despite the detrimental effect this would have on long 
term dynamic efficiency. However, there is no reason why foreign governments 
cannot enter into reciprocal arrangements to guarantee a minimum period of market 
exclusivity. 
 
On the other hand, avoiding TRIPS could be an advantage as it would permit 
the fine-tuning of the exclusivity period according to social need, rather than having a 
fixed 20-year period. For example, increased exclusivity could be provided for 
medicines with a greater health impact and shorter exclusivity for “me-too” drugs. 
However, flexible exclusivity would exacerbate the influence of political pressure and 
‘rent-seeking’ in a highly-wasteful manner.  
 
Thus, an opportunity exists to propose a legislative framework to grant a fixed 
period of market exclusivity for new medicines that obtain regulatory approval that 
can address the lack of private incentives to develop unpatentable therapies.  
 
2 Proposed legislative framework: The Unpatentable Therapies (Extended 
Market Exclusivity) Bill  
 
This thesis proposes the Unpatentable Therapies (Extended Market Exclusivity) Bill 
(EME Bill) to establish a legislative framework of extended market exclusivity for the 
purpose of ensuring that unpatentable therapies are not unnecessarily screened from 
development due to insufficient patent protection. In a sense, the EME Bill provides a 
form of ‘commercialisation’ patent which rewards companies that achieve regulatory 
approval for a safe and effective medicine as opposed to developing a medicine which 
fulfils the patentability standards of novelty, inventive step, and utility at the priority 
date. As noted in Chapter 6A, extended regulatory exclusivity achieved a perfect 
rating of five for incentivising unpatentable therapies and overall rating of 3.36. This 
supports the notion of a regulatory exclusivity regime as most appropriate choice for 
addressing this particular gap in the patent system.  
 
The EME Bill will be similar, but not equivalent, to the proposed MODDERN 
Cures Bill, currently before United States Congress, as discussed in Chapter 6A. 
Relevant extracts from the MODDERN Cures Bill are attached as Appendix Two. 
Both proposals would incentivise unpatentable therapies, although the latter refers to 
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these as “dormant therapies”.12 As discussed in Chapter 6A, the MODDERN Cures 
Bill would provide patent extensions and data exclusivity in a manner that would 
overcome insufficient patent protection. By contrast, the EME Bill will not include 
patent extensions, due to the risk that patents could be effectively extended for a 
period exceeding 40 years, as will be discussed below. 
 
It will also be necessary to describe appropriate regulations behind the 
granting of ‘clinical exclusivity’ and ‘development certifications’ such that they are 
not susceptible to ‘gaming’ and ‘rent seeking’. Market exclusivity granted upon 
regulatory approval would be equivalent to a ‘method of use’ patent over the 
molecule in terms of the scope of protection granted, although it will not prevent 
approval of a competitor’s medicine which is ‘clinically superior’, as will be 
discussed below. Similarly to the patent regime, it should also be mandatory that 
innovators publish all clinical trial data regarding the medicine as a condition for 
receiving exclusivity.  
 
The exact length of exclusivity to be provided under the EME Bill will be 
subject to disagreement.13 However, a period of at least 12 to 15 years would be 
required in order to correspond with the average period of exclusivity of new 
medicines under the patent system. 14  As drafted, the current version of the 
MODDERN Cures Bill provides for 15 years of exclusivity from the date of 
regulatory approval of a medicine.15  
 
The following sections will provide a draft purpose section of the EME Bill, 
and will subsequently discuss the composition and function of the body established to 
administer the regime, and the process of decision-making by the administrative body.   
 
(a) Purpose of the EME Bill  
 
A draft purpose section for the EME Bill is provided below:  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 MODDERN Cures Bill, s 201.  
13 For example, this issue has been recently debated in Australia as part of a government review of 
pharmaceutical patents: see T Harris, D Nicol and N Gruen Pharmaceutical Patents Review Report 
(Pharmaceutical Patent Review Committee, Canberra, 2013) at 84.   
14 SC Hemphill and BN Sampat “Evergreening, patent challenges, and effective market life in 
pharmaceuticals” (2012) 31(2) Journal of Health Economics 327 at 330; H Grabowski, G Long and R 
Mortimer “Recent trends in brand-name and generic drug competition” (2013) 17(3) Journal of 
Medical Economics 207 at 207; S Shulman, JA DiMasi, KI Kaitin “Patent term restoration: the impact 
of the Waxman-Hatch Act on new drugs and biologics approved 1984–1995” (1999) 2 Journal of 
Biolaw and Business 63; HG Grabowski, J Vernon “Longer patents for increased generic competition 
in the US: the Waxman-Hatch Act after one decade” (1996) 10 PharmacoEconomics 110.  
15 MODDERN Cures Bill, s201(i)(4).  
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“The purposes of the Act are to- 
(a) provide an efficient and effective incentive system for  medicines that- 
(i) prevents medicines with insufficient patent protection from being 
screened out or abandoned from development by providing a minimum 
period of market exclusivity upon regulatory approval; and 
(ii) complies with New Zealand’s international obligations to maximise 
the human right to health; and  
(b) Ensures that exclusivity is granted- 
(i) in return for undertaking the high risk and expense of obtaining 
regulatory approval for a new medicine; and 
(ii) upon providing satisfactory evidence that a new medicine is clinically 
superior to existing medicines; and 
(c) Provides clinical exclusivity in advance of regulatory approval to potentially 
clinically superior medicines in a manner which promotes incremental 
innovation; and 
(d) Addresses concerns of Māori regarding medicines derived from indigenous 
plants and animals or from Māori traditional knowledge.” 
 
This purpose section above is provided by way of example only, in order to illustrate 
the primary aims of the EME Bill. 
 
(b) Unpatentable Therapies Advisory Committee 
 
It is proposed that the EME Bill would amend the Medicines Act 1981 to provide for 
the establishment of the Unpatentable Therapies Advisory Committee (UTAC). The 
UTAC would be an independent advisory committee to the Minister of Health,16 who 
is currently responsible for determining regulatory approval of new medicines,17 and 
enforcement of data exclusivity.18 UTAC members would comprise persons with 
experience in the practice of medicine, pharmaceutical chemistry and clinical trial 
design. The UTAC will have the power to appoint subcommittees having members 
with expertise in the unpatentable therapy being evaluated, if necessary. There will be 
a conflicts register in place with members being required to declare any direct or 
indirect conflict of interest and abstain from any decision where a conflict exists. 
Funding for salaries and other expenses of the UTAC would be approved by the 
Minister of Health as an advisory board and paid out of money appropriated by 
Parliament.19  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Notably, the function of the UTAC may be undertaken by the Medicines Assessment Advisory 
Committee, which currently advises the Minister on regulatory approval decisions.  
17 Medicines Act 1981, s 21. 
18 At s 23B.  
19 At s 8, s 14.  
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The UTAC’s function would be to evaluate applications by innovators for 
‘unpatentable therapy designation’ (UPa Designation) according to specific criteria, 
discussed in the next section. UPa Designation would initially provide innovators 
with ‘clinical exclusivity’ over their proposed ‘unpatentable therapy treatment 
protocol’,20 which is important to prevent inefficient ‘races’ to regulatory approval. 
The UTAC would also draft regulations to require the innovator to provide 
‘development certifications’21 at least every year that confirms clinical trials are 
ongoing, otherwise ‘clinical exclusivity’ will be rescinded. This is to ensure that 
innovators will actively commit sufficient resources towards clinical trials and are not 
merely using their ‘clinical exclusivity’ for strategic reasons, such as blocking 
competition to their own drug. Finally, the UTAC would determine the grant of 
‘market exclusivity’ over a particular therapy and ensure that follow-on innovators 
would be unable to obtain exclusivity over the ‘same drug’ unless it was ‘clinically 
superior’. Notably, even for pioneer drugs, it should only be possible for innovators to 
obtain UPa Designation if an unpatentable therapy is clinically superior compared to 
existing treatments.22 There should also be a discretion by the UTAC to deny UPa 
Designation in circumstances where it would conflict with policy issues, such as 
public order or morality exclusions to patentability discussed in Chapter Two. A 
definition of these terms and further commentary on the decision-making process of 
the UTAC will be provided in the next section.  
 
 (c) Decision-making process of the UTAC.  
 
The UTAC would be responsible for determining UPa Designation, which would 
provide ‘clinical exclusivity’ to an innovator over their submitted clinical trial 
treatment protocol, and then will provide a minimum period of ‘market exclusivity’ 
upon regulatory approval. As noted above, an innovator must provide regular 
‘development certifications’ to retain ‘clinical exclusivity’. Preferably, the applicable 
regulations would provide that development certifications are delivered annually and 
include information regarding progress in recruitment and running of clinical trials. 
Relevant information would include a timetable and milestones for completion23 as 
well as reasonable explanations for any deviations from the agreed timetable.  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 A treatment protocol is a formal document which provides details of the design and methodology of 
a clinical trial. It would include details of the drug being tested and the appropriate dosing regimen, 
characteristics of patients who are eligible to participate in the clinical trial (and which patients must be 
excluded), and the process of randomising patients into treatment and placebo groups.  
21 For comparison, see s 201(g) of MODDERN Cures Bill, attached in Appendix Two.  
22 This will act as an ‘anti-evergreening’ provision and also ensure that the reward of exclusivity is 
granted in return for a commensurate health benefit to society.  
23 For example, entering the next phase of clinical trials within 30 months.  
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At the same, time, it must be necessary to balance incentives for incremental 
innovation and breakthroughs by allowing other innovators to develop improved 
clinical trial treatment protocols. For example, after the granting of UPa Designation, 
an innovator’s clinical trial protocol, manufacturing information, and related clinical 
trial data would be published, thus establishing a quasi-‘priority-date’ to the 
innovator. This ‘clinical exclusivity’ will prevent subsequent innovators from 
conducting clinical trials over the ‘same drug’, which is defined as a drug which 
shares the same active ingredient for a small molecule drug or a ‘similar’ active 
ingredient24 for a biologic drug.25  
 
However, it is important that the process of granting ‘clinical exclusivity’ and 
subsequent ‘market exclusivity’ does not block incentives for incremental innovation 
and breakthroughs. This can be accomplished by allowing a subsequent innovator to 
obtain UPa Designation over the ‘same drug’ despite the existence of ‘clinical 
exclusivity’, provided there is a scientifically plausible rationale that the follow-on 
drug would have a ‘clinically superior effect’.  The latter is defined as a drug which 
has improved safety, improved efficacy, or otherwise makes a major contribution to 
patient care (such as, greater convenience of administration). 26  The process of 
obtaining Orphan Drug designation is similar, whereby the innovator must provide a 
scientifically plausible rationale of why a drug may be clinically superior when 
obtaining orphan drug designation over the ‘same drug’. 27 It will subsequently be 
possible for any follow-on innovator to obtain market exclusivity for a ‘clinically 
superior drug’, as long as this is ultimately demonstrated in clinical trials if regulatory 
approval is obtained. This promotes incremental innovation while also reducing 
incentives to file ‘me-too’ drugs. There is also a body of case law in the United States 
regarding the allocation of Orphan Drug designation and how to determine conflicts 
between innovators. 28 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 Similarly, the Orphan Drug Act Regulations also define the ‘same drug’ as one having the same 
active ingredient for a small molecule drug or similar principal molecular structure for a biologic: see 
21 CFR §316.3(b)(13); see also MODDERN Cures Bill, s 201(e)(1)(C).  
25 As noted in Chapter Two, as biologic drugs are based on proteins made in living organisms, the 
chemical structure of the ‘same’ drug may vary. Therefore, ‘biosimilar’ biologics are treated the same 
as ‘bioequivalent’ generic drugs under regulatory law.  
26 For a similar definition of clinical superiority in the Orphan Drug Regulations, see 21 CFR § 
316.3(b)(3). An equivalent definition is also provided in the MODDERN Cures Bill, s 201(e)(1)(C)(ii).  
27 21 CFR § 316.20(b)(5); 21 CFR § 316.25(a)(3).  
28 For example, Octapharma USA, Inc obtained orphan drug designation and regulatory approval for its 
drug, Wilate on the basis that it was clinically superior to an existing orphan drug, Humate-P, 
manufactured by CSL Behring.  In a Citizen’s Petition to the FDA, the latter argued that there was no 
evidence of ‘significant therapeutic advantage’ of Wilate over Humate-P, and the FDA agreed to 
withdraw orphan drug designation: see Letter from Leslie Kux (Assistant Commissioner for Policy, 
Food and Drug Administration) to Peter Turner (President, CSL Behring) regarding Citizen Petition to 
rescind Wilate Orphan Drug Designation (8 August 2012); see also Genentech, Inc v Bowden 676 F 
Supp 301 (DDC 1987) at 304.  
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With regard to the process of dispute resolution, decisions of the UTAC must 
be disputed within 90 days, with a right of appeal to the Medicines Review 
Committee under s 88 of the Medicines Act 1981, and further rights of appeal to the 
High Court and Court of Appeal under ss 89 and 93 of the Medicines Act 1981. In 
accordance with the decision of the Supreme Court of New Zealand in Austin, Nichols 
Inc v Stichting Lodestar, an appellate court can reconsider the decision of a lower 
court or tribunal on its merits without deferring to the lower court’s decision, even if 
it requires an assessment of fact or degree.29 In light of the high costs of drug 
development, the risk of ‘agency capture’30 of the UTAC would militate against 
including a privative clause or limiting the grounds of appeal, despite the fact this 
may increase the overall likelihood of prolonged litigation. By contrast, the United 
States traditionally has a deference to the decision-making process of the FDA as an 
‘expert agency’,31 although Courts may be more willing to intervene as the perception 
of the FDA’s independence from the pharmaceutical industry has lessened.32 
 
In conclusion, the proposed legislative framework allows the UTAC to award 
‘clinical exclusivity’ to innovators in order to prevent wasteful races to regulatory 
approval, while also promoting incremental innovation. The proposed legislative 
framework of the EME Bill will now be analysed with reference to the ideal criteria.  
 
 
3 How does an extended market exclusivity regime for unpatentable therapies 
compare against ideal criteria?  
 
 Should any criteria be excluded? 
 
As outlined above, the purpose of the EME Bill is to incentivise unpatentable 
therapies. Accordingly, it would be inappropriate to include incentivising 
unmonopolisable and unprofitable therapies in the following analysis.  
 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 Austin, Nichols Inc v Stichting Lodestar [2007] NZSC 41 at [16].  
30 As discussed in Chapter 6B, agency capture is the risk that a regulatory agency will be corrupted by 
private interests over which is exercises regulatory authority, in a manner which advances those private 
interests at the expense of public interests.  
31 JT O'Reilly “Losing deference in the FDA's second century: judicial review, politics, and a 
diminished legacy of expertise” (2007) 93 Cornell L Rev 939 at 942.  
32 At 959. For the standards of judicial review in the United States, see Administrative Procedure Act, 5 
USC § 706(2).  
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(a) Criterion one: Incentivising Unpatentable Therapies 
 
Provided that the length of market exclusivity under the EME Bill is greater than 
12.2-years, which is the average period of exclusivity for drugs which have obtained 
regulatory approval,33 and assuming equivalent levels of exclusivity are provided in 
the United States and other major jurisdictions, it is arguable that otherwise viable 
unpatentable therapies will not be screened during development. Hence, a score of 
five is achieved for this criterion.  
 
 
(b) Criterion four: Balancing dynamic and static efficiency 
 
An extended period of regulatory exclusivity over a molecule pursuant to the EME 
Bill would provide equivalent or potentially superior (1) private incentives for R&D, 
even compared to the exclusivity under the current patent system,34 although the 
receipt of monopoly rents is only possible from sales over the protection period. 
Further, (2) competition and consequent static efficiency are delayed until exclusivity 
has expired.  
 
As with all exclusivity-based alternative incentive mechanisms, the main 
drawback is that an innovator must charge a monopoly price above the marginal cost 
of production in order to recover their R&D costs. These monopoly profits have the 
potential to create deadweight losses. Arguably, both innovators and payers would 
negotiate a price which is acceptable for pharmaceutical reimbursement, as this will 
maximise sales and access to the greatest number of consumers.35 Pharmaceutical 
reimbursement will (3) minimise deadweight loss and (4) maximise consumer surplus 
without delay. Accordingly, a score of three can be provided under this criterion.  
 
 
(c) Criterion five: Linking rewards to improved health outcomes 
 
The EME Bill would only incentivise one type of therapy, namely unpatentable 
therapies. However, as noted in Chapter 6A, under the current system, payers can use 
pharmacoeconomic analysis, health metrics such as QALYs, and reference pricing to 
maximise health outcomes for rewards. Hence, a score of three is provided under this 
criterion.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 Hemphill and Sampat, above n 14, at  330. See also discussion in Chapter Three.  
34 J Freilich “Patent Infringement in the Context of Follow-On Biologics” (2012) 16 Stan Tech L Rev 9 
at 12. 
35 Unless the payers cannot afford the cost of the drug, however, it is likely that innovators would lower 
their price rather than risk not being reimbursed in a major jurisdiction.  
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(d) Criterion six: Minimisation of Administration Costs 
 
As already discussed in Chapter 6A, extended regulatory exclusivity regimes such as 
the EME Bill can piggyback on the existing regime for regulatory approval.  Market 
exclusivity allows the innovator and payers to negotiate a price in accordance with a 
quasi-market model.  
 
One of the main administrative difficulties faced by the UTAC could be 
determining which innovator obtains the UPa Designation granting “clinical 
exclusivity”. However, providing such rights on a first-come-first-served basis is the 
simplest and cheapest to administer. While this could create a situation where clinical 
exclusivity is awarded to an innovator that did not pay for the underlying R&D, this 
would not result in an unfair expropriation of property rights because an unpatentable 
therapy is already effectively in the ‘public domain’. Allowing follow-on innovators 
to obtain UPa Designation and exclusivity if they demonstrate “clinical superiority” 
over a previously-approved drug with the same active ingredient also has minimal 
administrative costs, and there is significant precedent under the Orphan Drug Act in 
the United States. Assessing the genuineness of development certifications would also 
create a minimal administrative burden. In light of the above, it is possible to award a 
score of five under this criterion.  
 
 
(e) Criterion seven: Minimisation of Waste/Inefficiency 
 
Most of the advantages of extended regulatory exclusivity apply to the EME Bill with 
respect to minimisation of waste/inefficiency. As discussed in Chapter 6A, extended 
regulatory exclusivity cannot be challenged easily, therefore the EME Bill can avoid 
waste due to (2) costly litigation between generics and innovators. Furthermore, 
exclusivity under the EME Bill is only available to therapies which have been proven 
to be ‘clinically superior’, which can negate (7) incentives to develop ‘me-too’ drugs. 
However, the MODDERN Cures Bill would go further as it only allows dormant 
therapy designation for unmet medical needs.36 Thus, there is a trade-off between 
restricting incentives for me-too drugs and incentivising incremental innovation. 
Another benefit under the EME Bill is the avoidance of (8) an anti-commons effect 
because both clinical and regulatory exclusivity are only available for new medicines 
with clinical superiority, as discussed above. In addition, an innovator applying for 
UPa Designation could rely on the ‘regulatory review’ defence to patent infringement 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 This may negatively impact on incentives for incremental innovation, as will be noted when 
discussing criterion eight below.  
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under s 145 of the Patents Act, which excludes infringement “for uses reasonably 
related to the development and submission of information required under any law”.37   
 
The EME Bill can potentially prevent (6) low transparency and wasteful races 
to regulatory approval, due to the requirement to publish clinical trial protocols and 
data and the assignment of ‘clinical exclusivity’ in advance. 38  Despite this, 
competitors may be less willing to share information due to the risk that ‘clinical 
exclusivity’ over an unpatentable therapy can be obtained by competitors. 39 
Therefore, it is unclear whether this waste/inefficiency factor is completely absent.  
 
In addition, implementing the EME Bill has the potential for other 
waste/inefficiency factors to be present. For example, providing rewards through a 
temporary period of market exclusivity creates (1) incentives for excessive marketing, 
while also encouraging (4) arbitrage due to grey markets and (5) incentives to 
counterfeit drugs.40 There may also be (3) opportunities for gaming, by ‘sitting’ on 
UPa Designation, in order to block a competitor, although the requirement for 
‘development certifications’ should address this.  
 
As noted in Chapter 6A, regulatory exclusivity can cause (9) rent seeking 
through political interference in the length of exclusivity. In absence of an 
international treaty, it will be difficult to address this issue as well as (10) free riding.  
 
Therefore, as six or possibly seven waste/inefficiency factors are not absent 
for extended regulatory exclusivity under the EME Bill, a score of two is provided 
under this criterion.  
 
(f) Criterion eight: Incentivise incremental innovation and breakthroughs 
 
Regulatory exclusivity under the EME Bill would provide almost optimal incentives 
for incremental innovation, compared to the MODDERN Cures Bill, as it would 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 Patents Act 2013, s 145. The United States provides a similar defence to infringement. See 
discussion of ‘Bolar exemptions’ in Chapter Two.	  	  
38 As discussed in Chapter Two under the Overview of the Patent System, in accordance with Kitch’s 
prospect theory, this would encourage R&D expenditure necessary for commercialisation by protecting 
the innovator from competition for that time. See Edmund W Kitch “The Nature and Function of the 
Patent System” (1977) 20 JL & Econ 265.  
39 However, arguably the patent system can also cause appropriation of another company’s R&D by 
allowing the patenting of incremental improvements. Notably, it may be possible to counteract the 
increased tendency to keep trade secrets by increasing funding for open source approaches and pre-
competitive consortia. 
40 D Bagozzi “Fact Sheet No 275: Substandard and Counterfeit Medicines” (November 2003) World 
Health Organization <www.who.int>. 
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allow exclusivity even if a therapy is not for an unmet medical need.41 However, in 
practice this will depend on the interpretation of “clinically superior” by the UTAC. 
Arguably, the threshold should not be too high in order to encourage incremental 
innovation. If market exclusivity only covers the molecule for use in a particular 
indication, this would also encourage finding new indications. However, if the 
threshold is too low, this may not encourage development of breakthroughs.   
 
Despite this, arguably, providing extended market exclusivity over a molecule 
and preventing registration of a subsequent unpatentable therapy unless it is 
‘clinically superior’ can optimally incentivise breakthroughs.42 Therefore, a score of 
4.5 is awarded under this criterion.  
 
Summary 
 
The current patent system results in unpatentable therapies being screened or 
abandoned by innovator companies for reasons not related to therapeutic value. This 
is a fundamental problem with the patent system. The EME Bill, if enacted in the 
major jurisdictions, could negate this problem. It would work alongside the current 
patent system because patents would not be involved in the process of allocating 
exclusivity or determining priority rights. It would also encourage incremental 
innovation by awarding clinical exclusivity to clinically superior therapies, as well as 
ensuring that innovators actively progress through clinical trials by providing 
development certifications. Payers could negotiate with innovators to determine the 
appropriate price, according to well-established procedures under the current 
incentive system.  
 
Overall, the incentive regime under the EME Bill scores an average of 3.75, 
which is significantly more optimal than the current patent system, at least for the 
purpose of incentivising unpatentable therapies. However, the main problem with the 
EME Bill is that it does not incentivise unmonopolisable and unprofitable therapies. 
This is of major concern, because such therapies are not incentivised under the current 
patent system either. The next section will propose an alternative mechanism to 
address this market failure.  
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 However, as noted above, this would increase incentives to develop ‘me-too’ drugs, at least for the 
period that exclusivity has not expired, after which introduction of generic drugs would lower the 
monopoly rents which are available.  
42See, for comparison, MODDERN Cures Bill, s201(e)(1)(C)(ii).  
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C Incentivising Unmonopolisable and Unprofitable Therapies with a Flexible 
Prize Fund and Increased Public Funding 
1  Why use a flexible prize fund? 
 
As discussed in Chapter 6B, various commentators have noted that flexible prize-
based mechanisms could incentivise development of unmonopolisable therapies, such 
as second uses for off-patent drugs,43and unprofitable therapies, such as neglected 
diseases.44 In particular, prizes can incentivise unmonopolisable and unprofitable 
therapies, because, unlike exclusivity-based incentives, the amount of rewards is de-
linked from the underlying sales of a medicine. The main problem with prize-based 
incentives is that the government may have insufficient information with which to 
determine the optimal prize amount.  
 
According to Wright45 and Gallini & Scotchmer46 if the government is more 
informed about the social benefits of a particular therapeutic innovation, then prizes 
and contracts for research result in less societal loss than patents. The problem is that 
under the current system, the government may have insufficient information 
compared to the private sector regarding which therapeutic candidates should be 
funded.47 As noted in Chapter Three, drug development has a high risk of failure, 
which means that governments are typically unwilling to fund large clinical trials. 
Therefore, it is proposed that a mechanism, to allow prizes to ‘de-risk’ viable 
therapies, is needed to address this information asymmetry, so that governments will 
be willing to fund larger clinical trials to validate their safety and efficacy.  
 
The author proposes establishing a flexible prize fund mechanism to 
incentivise therapies at the so-called “valley of death” between basic research and 
clinical research.48 In particular, this would involve establishing a number of small 
flexible prize funds for unmonopolisable and unprofitable therapies in specific disease 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43 T Syed “Should a Prize System for Pharmaceuticals Require Patent Protection for Eligibility?”(IGH 
Discussion Paper No 2, Incentives for Global Health, June 10, 2009) at 4.  
44 M Bakhoum “TRIPS, Patent Rights and Right to Health: 'Price' or 'Prize' for Better Access to 
Medicine?” (Max Planck Institute for Intellectual Property, Competition & Tax Law Research Paper 
No 10-07, 2009) at 46.  
45 BD Wright “The Economics of Invention Incentives: Patents, Prizes, and Research Contracts” 
(1983) 73 Amer Econ Rev 691 at 703.  
46 N Gallini and S Scotchmer “Intellectual Property: when is it the best incentive system?” in AB Jaffe, 
J Lerner and S Stern (eds) Innovation Policy and the Economy (Volume 2, MIT Press, Cambridge 
(Mass), 2002) at 54.  
47 At 55.  
48 This is also referred to as the gap ‘from bench to bedside’: see BS Coller, RM Califf “Traversing the 
Valley of Death: A Guide to Assessing Prospects for Translational Success” (2009) 1 Sci Transl Med 
10cm9; DJ Adams “The Valley of Death in anticancer drug development: a reassessment” (2012) 33 
Trends Pharmacol Sci 173.  
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categories, similar to scaled-down versions of the HIF,49 which can be used to “de-
risk” successful clinical research at the Phase II (efficacy) stage of clinical trials.50  
 
Focusing on early-stage clinical research means that a prize fund can be 
relatively smaller than the MIPF and HIF proposals; the latter anticipate prize funds 
requiring billions of dollars annually,51 which makes them politically difficult to 
implement. Another problem with large prize funds is a significant risk of agency 
capture and gaming.52 For example, if a reward is increased based on number of 
patients treated or subjective measurements of health impact, innovators could find 
ways to exaggerate these amounts.53 A small prize basing rewards on outcomes of 
standardised clinical trials would avoid this problem. Large flexible prizes would also 
be susceptible to the “time inconsistency problem”, whereby a prize administrator 
may force an innovator to take a lower reward once it has already sunk costs into 
R&D. 54 A smaller prize fund has lower stakes, and thus reduces these risks. 
 
However, a prize fund must still be large enough to act as an incentive for 
investors. As noted by Hemel and Ouellete, the major problem with prizes is that 
researchers must secure investor funds in advance in order to compete for the prize.55 
This can be contrasted with public funding via grants where researchers receive funds 
in advance. Researchers may conclude that seeking investors to compete in a smaller 
prize fund may not be a cost-effective use of time. On the other hand, researchers 
already spend months applying for grants,56 and only have approximately 20 per cent 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49 See discussion of Health Impact Fund in Chapter 6B.  
50 As discussed in Chapter Two under Regulatory Environment, Phase II clinical trials are used to 
provide initial proof of efficacy, after Phase I (safety). Phase II trials typically require at least 100 
patients. Phase III clinical trials typically involve at least 1000 patients and are the last hurdle before 
regulatory approval.  
51 As noted in Chapter 6B, the MIPF and HIF require annual funding of USD 80 billion and USD 6 
billion, respectively.  
52 See discussion of ‘agency capture’ in Chapter 6B.  
53 A Hollis and T Pogge The Health Impact Fund: Making New Medicines Accessible for All: a Report 
of Incentives for Global Health (Incentives for Global Health, 2008) at 30. 
54 JA DiMasi and HG Grabowski “Should the patent system for new medicines be abolished?” (2007) 
82(5) Clinical Pharmacolology & Therapeutics 488 at 489.  
55 DJ Hemel and LL Ouellette “Beyond the Patents--Prizes Debate” (2013) 92 Texas Law Review 303 
at 336.  
56See DL Herbert and others “On the time spent preparing grant proposals: an observational study of 
Australian researchers” (2013) 3(5) BMJ Open 1.  
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chance of being successfully funded.57 Therefore, researchers are already likely to be 
amenable to seeking alternative funding sources,58 including the private sector.    
 
Under the second part of the optimal model, it is proposed that government 
agencies would increase public funding of clinical trials for “de-risked” 
unmonopolisable and unprofitable therapies, so they can enter into mainstream 
clinical practice. We now turn to this second part.  
 
2 Why use increased public funding? 
 
According to the Global Intellectual Property Center, a United States policy think 
tank, prizes are more suited to incentivising a proof of concept, rather than 
commercialising a new drug. 59  Chapter Three explained that under the current 
incentive system, patent exclusivity is relied on to bring new therapies to market, 
however, this is unable to incentivise new unmonopolisable and unprofitable 
therapies. Conversely, as noted in Chapter 6C, increased public funding can be used 
to incentivise unmonopolisable and unpatentable therapies, although such proposals 
have been criticised by various commentators on the basis that governments “do not 
have a good track record of picking winners”.60 However, Gallini & Scotchmer note 
there are circumstances in which public funding can be a more optimal method of 
developing new innovations than intellectual property regimes: 61 
 
When both the costs and values of innovations are publicly observable to both 
firms and a public sponsor, [intellectual property] is not the best incentive 
scheme. A better scheme is for a public sponsor to choose the projects with the 
largest net social benefits, and pay for them on delivery, using funds from general 
revenue.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57 See Chapter 6C, citing TA Kotchen  and others “NIH Peer Review of Grant Applications for Clinical 
Research” (2004) 291 JAMA 836 at 836, noting that grant requests for clinical research funding less 
likely to be successful than requests for basic research funding; AN Schechter “The Crisis in Clinical 
Research: Endangering the Half-Century National Institutes of Health Consensus” (1998) 280 JAMA 
1440 at 1441; DG Nathan “Clinical Research: Perceptions, Reality, and Proposed Solutions” (1998) 
JAMA 1427 at 1427-1428. 
58 Researchers are already looking for alternative funding sources for their scientific projects, including 
seeking donations from the public via Internet-based ‘crowdfunding’ campaigns. See “Crowdfunding 
science: could it work?” The Guardian (online ed, United Kingdom, 11 November 2013). Examples of 
website offering crowdfunding platforms for scientific projects include: <www.petriedish.org>, 
<www.experiment.com>. 
59 Global Intellectual Property Center Prizes and Patent Pools Viable Alternatives to the Patent 
System? (GIPC White Paper Series, 23 November 2009). 
60 M Hart “The Chimera of Industrial Policy: Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow” (1993) 19 Can-US LJ 
19 at 36; see also JA DiMasi and H Grabowski “Patents and R&D incentives: Comments on the 
Hubbard and Love trade framework for financing pharmaceutical R&D” (Submission to the 
Commission on Intellectual Property Rights, Innovation and Public Health, 2004) at 7-11; H Demsetz 
“Information and Efficiency: Another Viewpoint” (1969) 12 JL & Econ 1 at 12. 
61 Gallini and Scotchmer , above n 46 at 54.  
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Therefore, the critical issue is to ensure that governments have sufficient information 
to choose to fund therapies with the most potential therapeutic value. Hence, an 
opportunity exists for prize funds to provide governments with information regarding 
which clinical trials should receive increased public funding. Notably, it is not 
necessary to increase public funding to the extent required to achieve regulatory 
approval for a new treatment. For example, a high-quality Phase II trial of an 
unmonopolisable therapy listed in the relevant compendia of medically ‘proven’ 
therapies will allow reimbursement by payers.62 With reimbursement available for the 
costs of a therapy, doctors are more likely to prescribe it to patients. In addition, for 
unprofitable therapies involving neglected diseases, interested stakeholders such as 
government agencies, research hospitals, charities, or PPPs63 can undertake further 
development.  
 
3 Proposed legislative framework: Medical (De-risking) Prize Fund Bill  
 
The Medical (De-risking) Prize Fund Bill (MPF Bill) is a legislative framework that 
would reward innovators that fulfill the requirements for ‘registration’ with a prize 
fund by showing that unmonopolisable and unprofitable therapies are effective in 
phase II clinical trials.64 As noted above, the mechanism would be similar to the HIF, 
which achieved an overall rating of 3.63 as part of the ex-post flexible prize regime 
proposals analysed in Chapter 6B.  
 
The first and most critical issue is the source of funding for prizes under the 
MPF Bill and the increased public funding for successful clinical trials. As discussed 
in Chapter 6C, in New Zealand, public funding of medical research is administered by 
the Health Research Council (HRC), which received funding of NZD 84.64 million in 
2013.65 The HRC currently is the main source of funding for clinical research of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62 For example, pursuant to s 1861(t)(2)(B)(ii) of the United States Social Security Act, reimbursement 
via Medicaid is permitted for ‘medically accepted indications’, which have not yet received regulatory 
approval, but have been referenced in the following compendia: the American Hospital Formulary 
Service-Drug Information, the US Pharmacopoeia-Drug Information, and the DRUGDEX Information. 
See American Society of Clinical Oncology “Reimbursement for cancer treatment: coverage of off-
label drug indications” (2006) 24 J Clin Oncol 3206 at 3208.    
63 As discussed in Chapter 6C under Increased Public Funding and Open Source Approaches, PPPs are 
public-private-partnerships formed between governments or charities and private companies, in order 
to overcome a market failure for socially valuable research which has barriers to development. 
64 Phase II clinical trials are used to demonstrate efficacy of a therapy, and require at least 100 patients, 
as well as other minimum criteria. See further discussion below regarding the administration of the 
Medical (De-risking) Prize Fund Bill [MPF Bill].  
65 Report of the Health Research Council of New Zealand for the year ended 30 June 2013, Presented 
to the House of Representatives Pursuant to Section 38 of the Health Research Council Act 1990  
(Health Research Council of  New Zealand, 2013) at 5.  
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unmonopolisable therapies in New Zealand.66 The role of the HRC in administering 
the MPF Bill will be discussed in more detail below.  
 
However, assuming additional funding is necessary, it is anticipated that 
PHARMAC will contribute funding for prizes and public funding for 
unmonopolisable therapies, which currently has an annual combined expenditure of 
NZD 783.6 million.67 While it might be argued that these funds are required for 
spending on monopolisable therapies, a modest allocation from this budget would 
help redress the inefficient systemic bias against unmonopolisable and unprofitable 
therapies. It is notable that PHARMAC has a legislative mandate to conduct clinical 
trials to ensure the best outcomes are received from pharmaceutical treatment, which 
could include unmonopolisable therapies such as second uses for generic drugs.68 In 
addition, a report of the New Zealand Health Committee has also recommended the 
implementation of an ‘innovation fund’ for co-sponsoring clinical trials which were 
specific to the New Zealand population,69 which could be another source of funds.  
 
With regard to unprofitable therapies that do not predominantly affect New 
Zealanders, such as neglected diseases, prizes70 and increased public funding may 
conceivably be allocated from the current NZD 1.5 billion budget for overseas 
developmental assistance.71 Once the successful clinical trials for neglected diseases 
are published, the HRC, overseas governments, non-government organisations, PPPs 
and charities can fund additional clinical trials order to replicate the results and 
disseminate more valuable information regarding which therapies are clinically 
useful.    
 
 The next sections will provide a draft purpose section for the MPF Bill, and 
then will discuss the composition and function of the body established to administer 
the regime, and the process of decision-making by that administrative body.   
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
66 According to information the author received from the Health Research Council, approximately 
NZD 49 million was spent on publicly-funded clinical trials between 2009 and 2013.The author does 
not have information regarding the amount spent on clinical trials by charitable organisations in New 
Zealand, but it is likely to be a significantly lower due to limited donor fundraising. The vast majority 
of clinical trials related to unmonopolisable and unprofitable therapies.  
67 Pharmaceutical Management Agency Annual Report For the year ended 30 June 2013, Presented to 
the House of Representatives pursuant to Section 150(3) of the Crown Entities Act 2004 
(Pharmaceutical Management Agency, 2013) at 11.  
68 New Zealand Public Health and Disability Act 2000, s 47(a), s 48(c).   
69 P Hutchison Inquiry into improving New Zealand’s environment to support innovation through 
clinical trials (Report of the Health Committee, June 2011) at 39.  
70 It is anticipated that the HRC would also administer these prizes. 
71 This is the amount made available to the Ministry between 2012-2015. See “Indicative programme 
allocations 2012/13 - 2014/15” (2012) Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade <www.aid.govt.nz>. 
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(a) Purpose of the MPF Bill  
 
A draft purpose section for the MPF Bill is provided below:  
 
“The purposes of the Act are to- 
(a) provide an efficient and effective incentive system for  medical therapies that- 
(i) provides incentives for clinical trials of unmonopolisable and 
unprofitable medicines by establishing flexible prize funds with an 
adequate level of rewards available to achieve the purpose of the Act; 
and 
(ii) complies with New Zealand’s international obligations to maximise 
the right to health; and  
(b) Ensures that prize rewards granted- 
 (i) in return for undertaking the high risk and expense of validating the 
safety and efficacy of new medical therapies; 
(ii) upon providing satisfactory evidence that a new medical therapy is a 
safe and effective treatment; and 
(c) Provides clinical exclusivity in advance of entitlement to prize rewards to 
potentially clinically superior medicines in a manner which promotes 
incremental innovation; and 
(c) Provides adequate public funding to validate the safety and efficacy of new 
medical therapies;   
(d) Addresses concerns of Māori regarding medical therapies derived from 
indigenous plants and animals or from Māori traditional knowledge.” 
 
This purpose section above is provided by way of example only, in order to illustrate 
the primary aims of the MPF Bill. 
 
(b) Prize Fund Advisory Committee 
 
Under the MPF Bill, it is proposed that prize funds will be administered by the HRC. 
By way of background, the HRC was established as a Crown entity under s 5 of the 
Health Research Council Act. The main function of the HRC is, inter alia, to advise 
the Minister of Health on health research policy, to negotiate bulk funding 
applications from the government once every three years, and to support public health 
research. 72  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
72 Health Research Council Act, s 6 
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Support for public research occurs through the HRC’s consideration of grant 
applications for medical research funding,73 and has established the Biomedical 
Research Committee74 and Public Health Research Committee75 to assist the HRC in 
this respect. Pursuant to s 17 of the HRC Act, the functions of research committees 
are to generate a policy on priorities for health care research,76 determine a policy for 
ranking grant applications for the purpose of health research,77 advise the HRC on 
which applications for grants should be supported,78 and monitor the performance of 
grantees.79 Therefore, the HRC is arguably the most appropriate government body 
with expertise to administer the prize mechanism under the MPF Bill and allocate 
subsequent public funding to successful research.  
 
The MPF Bill will establish another committee of the HRC, namely, the Prize 
Fund Advisory Committee (PFAC). The PFAC would administer prize funds for 
certain disease categories that can be subject to proposals from privately-funded 
innovators, as opposed to grant applications from established researchers under the 
current system.80 Importantly, proposals from innovators will not be restricted to New 
Zealand, as the point of the prize mechanism is that it allows all of the private 
industry to participate in the discovery and funding of socially valuable 
unmonopolisable and unprofitable therapies.  
 
Similar to the UTAC discussed above, PFAC members would comprise 
persons with relevant experience in the practice of medicine, pharmaceutical 
chemistry and clinical trial design, and will need to be subject to a conflict of interest 
policy which prevents them from acting where they have a direct or indirect financial 
or personal interest in any matter.81  
 
The PFAC will have multiple functions. It will be responsible for providing 
‘unmonopolisable/unprofitable therapy designation’ (Um/P Designation) for any new 
clinical trial proposal submitted under the particular prize fund disease category. This 
will allow the innovator to receive ‘clinical exclusivity’ over their protocol. The 
PFAC will also determine which clinical trials are eligible for ‘registration’ to the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
73 s 31.  
74 s 13. 
75 s 15.  
76 s 17(b).  
77 s 17(c). 
78 s 17(e). 
79 s 17(f). 
80 This proposal is not without some precedent. As noted in Chapter 6B, in the 18th century, medical 
research was generally funded using prizes rather than grants. See Robin Hanson "Patterns of 
Patronage: Why Grants Won Over Prizes in Science" (1998) University of California, Berkeley at 2.   
81 See Health Research Council Act, s 20, which specifies criteria and personal attributes of members 
of HRC research committees.  
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prize fund by demonstrating clinical efficacy. In a similar manner to the process under 
the EME Bill, once a clinical trial is ‘registered’, it will not be possible for follow-on 
innovators to obtain exclusivity over the same clinical trial protocol unless it was 
‘clinically superior’. The next section will provide further commentary on how these 
determinations by the PFAC will occur in practice.  
 
 
 (c)        Decision-making process of the PFAC.  
 
The first decision of the PFAC will be to establish the size of a prize fund in a 
particular disease category that is eligible to receive applications for Um/P 
Designation from innovators, as well as the criteria of a standardised clinical trial to 
allow ‘registration’. It is anticipated that the PFAC would initially establish pilot 
prizes in specific disease categories with the greatest social need, before subsequent 
expansion to other categories. The amounts allocated to the prize fund should initially 
be sufficient to incentivise ‘registration’ of at least two to three clinical trials for five 
years. For example, it would provide an innovator with a proportion of annual 
rewards over five years, by comparing the health impact of their ‘registered’ clinical 
trial with other ‘registered’ clinical trials. For clarity, the process of Um/P 
Designation and ‘registration’ of a clinical trial for an unmonopolisable therapy in the 
context of a pilot prize fund for heart disease will be described below.   
 
The PFAC first announces an ongoing prize fund of NZD 3 million per annum 
for heart disease. PFAC would specify the criteria for clinical trial protocols eligible 
to receive Um/P Designation and ‘registration’ to the prize fund. For example, for a 
heart disease prize fund, this would include unmonopolisable therapies to treat heart 
disease, such as dietary supplements, diets, lifestyle interventions, or even avoiding 
the use of certain mainstream medicines. Standardised condition-specific metrics will 
be used in order to allocate rewards rather than using QALYs to determine health 
impact.82 For example, a standard condition specific metric for heart disease could be 
using the cholesterol levels in the blood as a biomarker.83 The PFAC will also 
determine standardised inclusion and exclusion criteria of patients in order to prevent 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
82 This has the advantage of lower administration costs by avoiding the ‘weighting’ problems inherent 
in using QALYs, as already discussed in Chapter Four.	   In addition, use of standard measurements of 
clinical outcomes for a particular disease is a more objective and fair means to allocate rewards 
between innovators, which reduces the likelihood of costly litigation. 
83 As mentioned in the discussion of condition-specific health metrics in Chapter Four, a biomarker is a 
clinical measurement that is linked to the presence of disease. In this case, high cholesterol is linked to 
an increased risk of developing heart disease. Accordingly, the efficacy of many drugs (for example, 
statins) is based on their ability to lower cholesterol.  
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gaming,84 and avoid any confounding factors such as co-morbidity. The treatment 
must also apply to the general population in order to maximise health impact. In the 
event a clinical trial protocol is designed to treat a subset of the population,85 then the 
measurement of health impact will be reduced proportionally according to the ratio of 
that subpopulation to the general population.86  
 
In order to be eligible for Um/P Designation, clinical trial protocols must be 
new in that the intervention described by the clinical trial protocol must not have been 
shown to be effective in another published clinical trial at phase II equivalent or 
above. PFAC members will be expected to perform a search of published clinical 
trials to confirm this, which ensures that the prize fund will only incentivise 
development of new and useful information. Um/P Designation will also grant 
‘clinical exclusivity’ over a clinical trial treatment protocol, although this will require 
publication of the clinical trial protocol, methodology, and any relevant pre-clinical 
trial data. It will also be necessary for an innovator to commence clinical trials within 
1 year of the proposal in order to retain this exclusivity right. In order to minimise 
fraud, the clinical trials must be undertaken by an approved ‘contract research 
organisation’ which is independent of the innovator. All clinical trials conducted must 
be published, and as with the EME Bill,‘development certifications’ must be filed 
annually to retain ‘clinical exclusivity’.  
 
As mentioned above, rewards would be allocated to ‘registered’ clinical trials 
for five years annually according to their health impact.87 In order to be registered, a 
clinical trial must be a randomised controlled trial,88 which demonstrates statistical 
significance of therapeutic efficacy at a p-value of 0.05. This is the conventional 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
84 For example, a typical method to manipulate clinical trial results is to select patients which are more 
likely to respond well to a therapy and exclude patients who do not respond or are less likely to 
respond.  It is also important to measure all patient outcomes on an ‘intention to treat’ basis, which 
means that all patients are included in the final results even if they drop out of the clinical trial: see S 
Hollis and F Campbell “What is meant by intention to treat analysis? Survey of published randomised 
controlled trials” (1999) 319(7211) BMJ 670. 
85 For example, patients with certain genetic or physiological characteristics may respond better to a 
therapy. This is an example of ‘personalised medicine’.  
86 For example, if a particular unmonopolisable therapy was only effective in males, then the 
measurement of health impact would be reduced by approximately 50 per cent, having regard to the 
prevalence of males in the general population.  
87 According to Abromowicz, payment of prizes over a delayed period is optimal because it minimises 
fraud and ensures that sufficient information is available to determine the optimal level of rewards. See 
M Abramowicz “Perfecting patent prizes” (2003) 56 Vand L Rev 115 at 192.  
88 Randomised controlled trials [RCTs] are the “gold standard” for assessing whether a particular 
treatment is effective according to “evidence based medicine”. RCTs ensure that a treatment is 
compared against a placebo, which means that the health benefits can be attributed to the therapy, not 
the patient’s expectation. RCTs implement a ‘double blinding’ methodology with randomisation into 
treatment and placebo groups. This ensures that the patient and doctor are unaware of whether the 
treatment they receive is a placebo or genuine and reduces subconscious selection biases that may 
otherwise occur: see AW Chan and DG Altman “Epidemiology and reporting of randomised trials 
published in PubMed journals” (2005) 365 The Lancet 1159.  
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standard to ‘prove’ a therapy is effective in the medical profession, as it means there 
is only a 5 per cent chance that efficacy is due to random chance. 89 The clinical trial 
must compare the treatment plus ‘usual care’ with a placebo plus ‘usual care’.  
 
Once a clinical trial is ‘registered’ the PFAC will calculate incremental health 
impact in order to determine the allocation of rewards. In particular, each clinical trial 
which establishes statistically significant efficacy of therapy will be eligible to receive 
a proportion of the annual rewards in accordance with its incremental health impact 
versus other registered clinical trials. Incremental health impact is calculated by 
comparing the treatment with ‘usual care’ according to the condition-specific metrics. 
For example, we can assume that three clinical trials are ‘registered’ to the fund one 
year: a treatment protocol involving green tea lowered cholesterol 10 per cent over 
usual care, a herbal extract X lowered cholesterol by 5 per cent over usual care and a 
high-intensity exercise regime lowered cholesterol by 15 per cent over usual care. In 
that situation, assuming ‘registration’ occurred at the same time, NZD 3 million 
would be allocated to each innovator annually in a ratio of 10/5/15 respectively.90 
Each innovator would be eligible to receive annual rewards for five years, assuming 
that another clinical trial is not subsequently ‘registered’, which will dilute the amount 
of available rewards proportionally.  
 
As noted above, the ‘registration’ of clinical trials provides ‘clinical 
exclusivity’ with respect to the ‘same’ clinical trial protocol, which prevents ‘free-
riding’ and ‘races’. The ‘sameness’ of a clinical trial protocol is determined with 
reference to its ‘active ingredient’ or the aspect of the intervention being tested which 
is known to cause the therapeutic effect. For example, if the cholesterol lowering 
effect of green tea is known to be caused by a particular phytochemical X, a  
supplement containing phytochemical X will be deemed the ‘same’ intervention, and 
will not be eligible for Um/P Designation and subsequent ‘registration’ unless a 
scientifically plausible rationale is provided that it would have ‘clinical superiority’ 
either by improved safety, efficacy or otherwise making a major contribution to 
patient care.91 The decision making process of the PFAC here will be equivalent to 
the decision to grant UPa Designation, as previously described with reference to the 
EME Bill. Therefore, as with the EME Bill proposed above, clinical exclusivity is 
provided on a first-come-first-served basis, although it will also allow incremental 
innovation, through the registration of a ‘clinically superior’ protocol to the prize 
fund.  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
89 See HS Hochster “The power of “p”: on overpowered clinical trials and “positive” results” (2008) 2 
Gastro Can Res 108 at 108.  
90 Therefore, annual rewards will be allocated as NZD 1 million/500,000/1.5 million.  
91 See discussion of the determination of ‘clinical superiority’ in the context of the EME Bill above.  
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Another important function of the PFAC is to monitor developments in the 
medical literature which show that clinical result of a ‘registered’ clinical trial was not 
replicated in a subsequent clinical trial, performed under equivalent conditions. There 
is a known methodology which allows clinical trials to be combined, which is referred 
to as ‘systematic review’.92 In the event that a subsequent clinical trial puts the 
statistically significant efficacy of the registered clinical trial in doubt, it will be de-
registered from the prize fund.  
 
With regard to the dispute resolution process, as with the UTAC, the decisions 
of the PFAC must be made within 90 days. However, due to the increased 
administrative burden of the PFAC compared to the UTAC, there will be no general 
right of appeal, as this would interfere with administrative certainty and prolong 
litigation. Decisions made by public bodies can be challenged in an application for 
judicial review in the High Court under s 4 of the Judicature Amendment Act 1972 or 
under common law.93 Grounds for judicial review are much narrower than the 
grounds for appeal,94 and are typically limited to a consideration of how the decision 
was made, such as substantive unfairness and breach of natural justice,95 failure to 
apply internal procedures consistently, 96  and unreasonableness, 97  rather than 
permitting a review of the decision on the merits. Moreover, as noted by Venning J in 
New Zealand Climate Science Education Trust v National Institute of Water and 
Atmospheric Research Ltd 98 , a Court will be “cautious about interfering with 
decisions made and conclusions drawn by a specialist body… acting within its own 
sphere of expertise”,99 unless there was some defect in the decision-making process or 
it could be shown that the decision was clearly wrong in principle or in law.100 In 
particular, “the Court will be reluctant to adjudicate on matters of science and 
substitute its own inexpert view of the science if there is a tenable expert opinion”.101 
Accordingly, deference to the decisions of the PFAC is more appropriate in order to 
minimise uncertainty and prevent excessive disputes.  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
92 An in-depth discussion of the process of ‘systematic review’ is beyond the scope of this thesis. The 
Cochraine Collaboration is an international network of medical professionals which conduct such 
systematic reviews of clinical trials to determine whether a treatment is effective according to available 
data: see <www.cochrane.org>. 
93 Mercury Energy Ltd v ECNZ [1994] 2 NZLR 385 (PC) at 388.  
94 Compare Austin, Nichols Inc v Stichting Lodestar [2007] NZSC 41.  
95 Thames Valley Electric Power Board v NZFP Pulp & Paper Ltd [1994] 2 NZLR 641 at 652 per 
Cooke P.  
96 Pharmaceutical Management Agency Ltd v Roussel Uclaf Australia Pty Ltd [1998] NZAR 58 (CA). 
97 Wellington City Council v Woolworths New Zealand Ltd (No 2) [1996] 2 NZLR 537. 
98 New Zealand Climate Science Education Trust v National Institute of Water and Atmospheric 
Research Ltd [2013] 1 NZLR 75 (HC).  
99 At [45].  
100 At [48].  
101 At [47].  
	  	   215	  
4 How does a flexible prize fund and increased public funding for 
unmonopolisable and unprofitable therapies compare against ideal criteria?  
 
Should any criteria be excluded? 
 
The purpose of the MPF Bill is to incentivise unmonopolisable and unprofitable 
therapies. Therefore, it will not be appropriate to include incentivising unpatentable 
therapies as a criterion in the following analysis.   
 
 
(a) Criterion two: incentivising unmonopolisable therapies 
 
The MPF Bill is capable of incentivising any type of unmonopolisable therapy, 
regardless of excludability because rewards are determined according to condition-
specific metrics calculated during standardised clinical trials. Eligibility for rewards 
only requires a phase II equivalent trial, which means the MPF Bill has a relatively 
low cost compared to achieving ‘registration’ under the HIF or MIPF proposals. This 
also allows a relatively greater ‘impact’ for a smaller fund. Of course, if the MPF Bill 
is only implemented in New Zealand, funding levels may be too small to prevent 
screening of all unmonopolisable therapies. Therefore, as with the EME Bill, the 
assumption that there is some level of support from overseas jurisdictions, such as the 
United States. The availability of increased public funding to reproduce ‘de-risked’ 
clinical trials in larger studies will also be assumed.   
 
However, as noted in Chapter 6B with reference to flexible prize funds, the 
amount of prize rewards depends arbitrarily on the health impact of other ‘registered’ 
clinical trials in a particular fund, which means that a flexible prize mechanism under 
the MPF Bill may be unlikely to provide equivalent incentives as guaranteed 
exclusivity. Despite this, it is likely that flexible prize mechanisms are an 
improvement on fixed prizes, and can incentivise at least 75 per cent of 
unmonopolisable therapies, especially when combined with increased public funding. 
Therefore a rating of four is provided under this criterion.  
 
(b) Criterion three: incentivising unprofitable therapies 
 
The existence of prizes under the MPF Bill could also incentivise unprofitable 
therapies because rewards are de-linked from the underlying sales of a therapy. It can 
also be assumed that de-risked unprofitable therapies with the greatest health impact 
can receive sufficient funding to receive clinical validation. However, as discussed 
above with reference to unmonopolisable therapies, the availability of rewards under 
a flexible prize regime is more uncertain than exclusivity, although it provides greater 
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incentives than fixed prizes. Hence, de-risking prize funds combined with public 
funding could arguably incentivise over 75 per cent of unprofitable therapies, and 
therefore receive a rating of four.  
 
 
(c) Criterion four: balancing dynamic and static efficiency 
 
Well-designed flexible prizes can provide (1) private incentives for innovators to 
undertake clinical trials, although under the proposed MPF Bill, prize rewards are 
allocated over five years. There are also likely to be some delays for determining the 
allocation of public funding to ‘registered’ therapies, although ‘de-risking’ of viable 
therapies will help reduce these delays. A prize also allows (2) competition without 
delay to provide static efficiency.  
 
In addition, because unmonopolisable and unprofitable therapies will be made 
available at their marginal cost of production, flexible prizes and increased public 
funding can (3) minimise deadweight loss and (4) maximise consumer surplus. 
Because it is arguable that rewards and public funding will be delayed under the MPF 
Bill, a rating of 4 is provided under this criterion.  
 
 
(d) Criterion five: linking rewards to improved health outcomes 
 
The MPF Bill and increased public funding can incentivise more than one type of 
therapy. Further, prizes under the MPF Bill with well-designed and unambiguous 
criteria can specify condition-specific metrics that allows the government to fund the 
therapies that achieve the best relative clinical outcome compared to other ‘registered’ 
clinical trials. However, it is known that improved clinical outcomes do not typically 
extrapolate to improved outcomes for society generally, particularly in developing 
countries where co-morbidities may be present. 102  Moreover, once a particular 
unmonopolisable or unprofitable therapy is used in clinical practice, unforeseen 
adverse events may arise, at which time, rewards have already been received. Hence, 
as the proposed MPF Bill and increased public funding can link rewards to health 
impact, but will not maximise the same, they achieve a score of three under this 
criterion.  
 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
102 Hollis and Pogge, above n 53 at 29.  
	  	   217	  
(e) Criterion six: minimising administration costs to determine rewards 
 
The main difficulty with administration of prizes is the lack of a market mechanism to 
determine rewards. However, as discussed above, a fixed annual prize fund has at 
least an indirect means for determining the rewards through a self-correcting 
mechanism according to the number of registered clinical trials. Further, the use of 
standard condition-specific metrics rather than QALYs can lower administration 
costs, at least compared to the HIF and MIPF proposals. On the other hand, the 
necessity of establishing separate prize funds and standard clinical endpoints would 
tend to increase administrative costs.  
 
It is also recognised that administration costs are high for increased public 
funding, as discussed in Chapter 6C.103 However, a de-risking mechanism under the 
MPF Bill will mean that the government has more information available about the 
appropriate therapy to fund. However, it would not tend to lower administration costs 
overall, especially if larger clinical trials must be managed.   
 
Accordingly, the level of administration costs will be similar to proposed 
increased public funding mechanisms and flexible prize mechanisms. Therefore, a 
score of two is provided under this criterion.  
 
 
(f) Criterion seven: minimising waste/inefficiency 
 
There are various ways in which prize funds under the MPF Bill and increased public 
funding can create waste and inefficiency. First, there is a possibility for (2) costly 
litigation with the PFAC as to whether criteria for receiving rewards are satisfied, 
although as noted above, the scope of judicial review is limited. The design of 
unambiguous criteria and standard condition-specific metrics will help minimise 
disputes with innovators as to allocation of rewards. Second, there is also a potential 
for (3) gaming, whereby prize administrators exert pressure on participants to accept a 
smaller prize after the R&D expenditure has occurred, although this risk is lower with 
the smaller size of potential rewards under the MPF Bill compared to the HIF or 
MIPF. Again, the proper design of unambiguous criteria will help as well as the 
design of robust and transparent mechanisms for determining rewards.  
 
Third, having an administrative body to determine levels of funding within 
prize fund categories and select therapies for public funding creates a significant risk 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
103 DJ Hemel and LL Ouellette “Beyond the Patents--Prizes Debate” (2013) 92 Texas Law Review 303 
at 362. 
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of (9) rent seeking due to political interference, even with conflict of interest policies 
in place. Fourth, there is also an opportunity for (10) free riding, especially if other 
major jurisdictions do not implement equivalent prize fund mechanisms and increase 
public funding to replicate de-risked clinical trials.  
 
On the other hand, flexible prize mechanisms and public funding can avoid 
many waste/inefficiency factors associated with exclusivity-based incentives. For 
example, de-linking rewards from underlying sales of a therapy means no (1) 
incentives for excessive marketing. The lack of monopoly rents due to exclusivity 
means there is also no incentive to conduct (4) arbitrage due to grey markets and (5) 
incentives to counterfeit drugs.   
 
In addition, by using a mechanism to provide ‘clinical exclusivity’ in 
exchange for publication of the innovators clinical trial protocol, it is possible to 
avoid (6) low transparency and duplication of R&D efforts. Moreover, including a 
mechanism to only allow ‘registration’ for ‘clinically superior’ therapies, it is possible 
to avoid (7) incentives for me-too drugs. The absence of monopoly rents from 
exclusivity rights will also assist here. Prizes can also avoid an (8) ‘anticommons’ 
effect because rewards are not based on patent rights, although, as noted above, 
innovators may not be able to rely on exemptions from infringement of patents held 
by others. By contrast, public funding will support an open sourced approach.  
 
Therefore, four waste/inefficiency factors are arguably not absent, and 
accordingly, a score of three is provided under this criterion.  
 
 
(g) Criterion eight: Incentivise incremental innovation and breakthroughs 
 
Flexible prizes for early-stage clinical research have the potential to optimally 
incentivise incremental innovation and breakthroughs. With the MPF Bill, prizes will 
be provided for establishing clinical efficacy of a new type of unmonopolisable or 
unprofitable therapy. Breakthroughs will be incentivised by providing clinical 
exclusivity, and subsequent public funding, whereby incremental innovation will be 
facilitated by allowing ‘clinically superior’ therapies to achieve Um/P Designation 
and ‘registration’. In addition, public funding is flexible enough to incentivise both 
incremental innovation and breakthroughs.  
 
As noted in Chapter 6C, with public funding there may be a risk that no party 
will be responsible for minimising harm to patients because multiple parties may be 
delivering a therapy. However, public funding and an open source approach will 
	  	   219	  
ensure there are no incentives to suppress any adverse events which might harm 
patients. It is also notable that where unmonopolisable therapies are based on second 
uses of generic drugs, dietary supplements, diets, and lifestyle interventions, there is 
limited potential of harm to patients because they are inherently safer, at least 
compared to new ‘monopolisable’ drugs. Accordingly, it is possible to achieve a score 
of five under this criterion.  
 
 Summary 
 
A prize-based flexible reward mechanism can incentivise unmonopolisable and 
unprofitable therapies in a manner which cannot be accomplished with exclusivity-
based mechanisms. The MPF Bill would act synergistically with public research 
agencies to de-risk early stage clinical trials, and address the current information 
asymmetry between the private and public sectors. The most effective clinical trials 
will subsequently receive public funding. The public funding of research can also 
ensure that clinical trials are available to be used globally without restriction in a 
manner that can maximise human health. Overall, a flexible (de-risking) prize fund 
with increased public funding achieves an average score of 3.57, which is a 
significant improvement over the current patent system.  
 
 
 
D Conclusion 
 
The proposals for extended market exclusivity under the EME Bill and the proposal 
for a de-risking prize fund combined with increased public funding under the MPF 
Bill can optimally address the deficiencies in the current patent system with respect to 
the lack of incentives to develop unpatentable, unmonopolisable and unprofitable 
therapies. As shown on the comparison Table 2 below, these mechanisms achieve a 
significantly better outcome than the current patent system and alternative incentive 
mechanisms for incentivising development of socially valuable medicines.   
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Table 2: Comparison chart ranking current, alternative, and optimal incentive mechanisms104 
 
Exclusivity ‘Pull’ 
Incentives 
Prize ‘Pull’ 
Incentives 
Push  Optimal 
Criteria CPS PE RE OD FIP FLP PF EME MPF 
1. UPa 2 3 5 2 3 4 3 5 - 
2. UM 1 1 - - 3 4 3 - 4 
3. UPr 1 1 2 1 3 4 3 - 4 
4. DSE 3 3 3 3.5 4.5 4 4.5 3 4 
5. LR 3 3 3 2 2 4 2 3 3 
6. AC 5 4.5 4.5 4.5 3 2 2 5 2 
7. W/I 2 1 2 3 2 2 3 2 3 
8.In/Br 4 4 4 3 3 4 5 4.5 5 
Total 21 20.5 23.5 19 23.5 28 25.5 22.5 25 
Avg 2.63 2.56 3.36 2.71 2.94 3.5 3.19 3.75 3.57 
 
 
The EME Bill would arguably have a limited administrative burden to allocate 
‘clinical exclusivity’, which would be similar to the process already undertaken by the 
successful Orphan Drug reforms. It would not result in an overall increase in 
healthcare costs, because it would incentivise development of unpatentable medicines 
that would otherwise not be available for purchase. However, as will be discussed in 
Chapter Eight, it will require support of the United States in order to have an effect on 
private incentives to develop unpatentable therapies.  
 
With regards to the MPF Bill, there would be an administrative burden 
required to establish prizes for different disease categories and appropriate health 
metrics and criteria for each prize fund. However, this would arguably not be 
notionally different from the current administrative burden faced by government 
agencies that issue research grants, such as the HRC in New Zealand and the NIH in 
the United States. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
104 Legend: Criteria: One to Eight see Chapter Five; CPS=current patent system; PE=patent extension 
regimes; RE=extended regulatory exclusivity; OD=Orphan Drug reforms; FIP=fixed prizes; 
FLP=flexible prizes; PF=increased public funding; EME=extended market exclusivity bill; 
MPF=flexible prize fund bill.  
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VIII Conclusion 
A Introduction  
 
As noted in Chapter One, the aim of the thesis was to consider whether the current 
incentive system for medical therapies, comprising the patent system as well as its 
unique regulatory and reimbursement framework, adequately incentivises the 
development of socially valuable medical therapies, with reference to applicable law 
in New Zealand and the United States. It was determined that under the current 
incentive system there are certain broad categories of medical therapies that could 
have potentially high social value, but lack private incentives for development. The 
thesis proposes two reforms to optimally address these problems.  
 
This chapter will summarise the main findings of Chapters Two to Seven by 
considering how they have addressed the four research objectives specified in Chapter 
One. It will then reiterate the need for international support and how the adoption of 
these reforms in New Zealand can facilitate an internationally co-ordinated 
implementation of an optimal incentive system. Finally, it will emphasise why the 
proposed reforms require urgent consideration by policymakers.  
 
B Summary of Research Findings 
 
As stated above, the aim of the research was to analyse whether the current system 
and alternative incentive mechanisms adequately incentivise development of socially 
valuable medical therapies and to propose an optimal system that addresses this issue. 
This aim was achieved through the satisfaction of four objectives.  
 
The first objective was to provide background information regarding the legal 
requirements for patentability and regulatory approval for new medicines and 
describe how it is possible for innovators to lose exclusivity. In Chapter Two, it was 
shown that a medicine can lose patentability due to a prior disclosure, predictable 
benefits, or inadequate description, irrespective of the social value of that medicine. It 
was also shown how the loss of patentability may be unavoidable in many cases. 
Subsequently, it was shown that methods of medical treatment are excluded from 
patentability in New Zealand, although judicial inroads into those exclusions may 
allow patentability to be achieved certain cases. Finally, it was shown that 
competition from generic ‘off-patent’ drugs upon expiry or invalidity of patent 
protection can have a significantly adverse effect on profitability of a new medicine.  
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The second objective was to analyse why the pharmaceutical industry relies on 
patent protection to recover their development costs and the adverse consequences of 
such reliance. Chapter Three first discussed how the high costs and risks of drug 
development lead to screening of medicines on the basis of insufficient patentability 
irrespective of medical efficacy. It also discussed unpatentability factors that cause 
such screening, namely: lack of novelty, lack of inventive step, insufficiency/inutility, 
insufficient patent length, and unpatentability under law.  It was argued that ‘patent 
evergreening’ techniques that can allegedly be used by the pharmaceutical industry to 
rescue such ‘unpatentable therapies’ are generally ineffective because they result in 
weaker ‘secondary patents’ and cannot always prevent ‘off-label’ competition from 
generic drugs. It also defined the category of ‘unmonopolisable therapies’ over which 
a monopoly price cannot practically be enforced, and the category of ‘unprofitable 
therapies’ that lack commercial viability generally. It explained that the funding bias 
towards ‘monopolisable therapies’, and away from these unpatentable, unprofitable 
and unmonopolisable therapies, is likely to significantly increase global disease 
burden and exacerbate the industry’s productivity crisis. Chapter Three also briefly 
considered other problems created by reliance on patents, such as excessive litigation, 
high monopoly prices creating deadweight losses 1  and incentivising excessive 
marketing for the duration of the patent,2 a potential anti-commons effect,3 and 
encouraging the development of so-called ‘me-too’ drugs which are profitable but do 
not address unmet medical needs. 4  
 
The third objective was to consider the process of determining rewards under 
the current system, and to propose criteria for an ideal incentive system that would 
overcome the problems identified in Chapter Three. Chapter Four described the health 
metrics used in pharmacoeconomic analysis, which are a useful means to maximise 
health impact for a medicine within a given budget. Chapter Five emphasised that 
there were international obligations to implement mechanisms that maximise the 
human right to health. Criteria for an ideal incentive system were proposed, which 
included incentivising unpatentable, unmonopolisable and unprofitable therapies as 
well as maximising health and minimising administration costs and waste.  
 
The fourth objective was to analyse the current system and alternative 
incentive mechanisms using the ideal criteria as a benchmark, in order to determine 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 James Love and Tim Hubbard “The Big Idea: Prizes to Stimulate R&D for New Medicines” (2007)  
82 Chi-Kent L Rev 1519 at 1522. 
2 Kalman Applbaum “Is Marketing the Enemy of Pharmaceutical Research?” (2009) 39(4) Hastings 
Center Report 13 at 13.  
3 Michael A Heller and Rebecca S Eisenberg “Can Patents Deter Innovation?: The Anticommons in 
Biomedical Research” (1998) 280 Science 698 at 698.  
4 DW Light and JR Lexchin “Pharmaceutical research and development: what do we get for all that 
money?” (2012) 345(1) BMJ 1 at 2.   
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which incentives were optimal. In Chapter Five, it was confirmed that the current 
patent system performs poorly with respect to incentivising unpatentable, 
unmonopolisable, and unprofitable therapies. Chapter 6A showed that, in general, 
exclusivity-based incentive mechanisms are more suited towards incentivising 
unpatentable therapies rather than unmonopolisable or unprofitable therapies, and that 
extended regulatory exclusivity achieves the highest ranking because, arguably, no 
screening of unpatentable therapies would occur.   
 
In Chapter 6B, fixed ex-ante and flexible ex-post prize-based ‘pull incentives 
were analysed. It was shown that the main benefit of prize-based mechanisms is that 
they do not rely on enforcement of a monopoly price in order to provide incentives, 
and therefore, can incentivise unmonopolisable5 and unprofitable therapies.6 Flexible 
prize systems achieved the highest overall rating because, unlike fixed prizes, they 
could link increased rewards to improved health outcomes in a self-correcting 
manner. However, it was demonstrated that the main problem with prize-based 
proposals is the reliance on pre-determined criteria to calculate the appropriate level 
of rewards rather than a market-based mechanism. 
 
In Chapter 6C, increased public funding and open source approaches as ‘push’ 
incentives were analysed, and it was concluded that publicly funding research, while 
avoiding many problems with the current system, has the potential for substantial 
waste and inefficiency because the government lacks information regarding which are 
the most socially valuable medicines that should be funded, and that open source 
approaches are incompatible with the notion of private ownership of medical 
research.   
 
In Chapter Seven, the EME Bill was first proposed as part of an optimal 
incentive system. This would provide extended market exclusivity upon regulatory 
approval of unpatentable therapies, and would have significant advantages over the 
current patent system, as exclusivity could not be challenged under the patentability 
criteria. Practical issues were considered such as the establishment of an advisory 
committee to administer the allocation of ‘clinical exclusivity’ in advance of 
regulatory approval in order to prevent inefficient races, and reserving exclusivity for 
‘clinically superior’ therapies in order to encourage incremental innovation. 
Equivalent provisions from the Orphan Drug Act and proposed MODDERN Cures 
Bill discussed Chapter 6A were used as examples of preferred wording. It was 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 For example, see T Syed “Should a Prize System for Pharmaceuticals Require Patent Protection for 
Eligibility?” (Incentives for Global Health Discussion Paper No 2 10 June 2009) at 4.  
6 For example, see M Bakhoum “TRIPS, Patent Rights and Right to Health: 'Price' or 'Prize' for Better 
Access to Medicine?” (Max Planck Institute for Intellectual Property, Competition & Tax Law 
Research Paper No 10-07, 2009) at 46.  
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concluded that the EME Bill would receive the highest overall rating for the purpose 
of incentivising unpatentable therapies.  
 
With regard to incentivising unmonopolisable and unprofitable therapies, the 
MPF Bill was proposed, which would establish prize funds that leverage the private 
sector to de-risk a ‘proof-of-concept’ for the safety and efficacy of an 
unmonopolisable or unprofitable therapy in clinical trials. Public funding could then 
be used to validate the safety and efficacy of those therapies in larger clinical trials. It 
was argued that this is more efficient than the current system of grant funding, as ‘de-
risking’ the potential benefits of the therapy means that the government does not have 
to ‘pick the winners’ in advance.	  7 An administrative body would establish prize funds 
in discrete disease categories to be paid out annually to innovators that fulfill the 
criteria for ‘registration’ with the prize fund. Standardised health metrics and criteria 
for each clinical trial could be used to compare health outcomes for each therapy as a 
basis for allocating an amount from the annual prize fund that is proportional to health 
impact of the therapy. It was argued this would be a fair and robust mechanism to 
determine rewards, with limited potential for inefficiencies or gaming. It was 
concluded that the proposed mechanism in the MPF Bill achieved the highest overall 
rating for the purpose of incentivising unmonopolisable and unprofitable therapies.  
 
C The Need for Support from Major Jurisdictions  
 
Unfortunately, the implementation of a regulatory exclusivity mechanism in New 
Zealand as proposed in the EME Bill would be unlikely to have any impact on private 
incentives to develop unpatentable therapies, unless equivalent reforms, such as the 
proposed MODDERN Cures Bill attached as Appendix Two, are passed in the United 
States. The latter is the largest market for pharmaceutical companies.8 Without a 
sufficient period of exclusivity in the United States, there is “no real point to even 
make the drug”.9 However, as with the Orphan Drug Act, if the United States takes 
the initiative, then Europe and other high-income countries are likely to follow.10  
 
By contrast, the prize mechanism proposed in the MPF Bill could be 
established as a supplement to the typical grant funding process by the New Zealand 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 BD Wright “The Economics of Invention Incentives: Patents, Prizes, and Research Contracts” (1983) 
73 Amer Econ Rev 691 at 703-704.  
8 The United States accounting for 34 per cent of USD 950 billion global pharmaceutical sales in 2011: 
The Global Use of Medicines: outlook through 2016 (IMS Institute for Healthcare Informatics, 2012) 
at 5. 
9 T Bartfai and GV Lees Drug Discovery from Bedside to Wall Street (Elsevier, Burlington, 2006) at 
138.  
10 See DL Scott and others “Orphan Drug Programs/Policies in Australia, Japan and Canada” (2001) 35 
Drug Information Journal 1 at 1.  
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Health Research Council to help researchers obtain private funding. Although using a 
flexible prize mechanism to determine rewards is novel, using prizes to fund medical 
research has historical precedent.11 Successful results from the implementation of the 
MPF Bill mechanism in New Zealand are likely to inspire foreign jurisdictions to use 
prizes as private incentives for medical research.12  
 
As discussed in Chapter Five, it is arguable that New Zealand and foreign 
jurisdictions have a legal (and ethical) obligation to implement these incentive 
mechanisms in order to maximise the human right to health.  
 
D Closing the Deadly Gaps in the Patent System 
 
The pharmaceutical industry spends over US 135 billion dollars on medical research 
and development every year.13 While this is significant, payers spend USD 500 billion 
every year in monopoly markups, 14  and under the current system, innovators’ 
revenues will be put back into developing new patentable medicines. This is how the 
current system works; patents are part of the ‘social contract’ that rewards innovator 
companies for conducting expensive and risky clinical research.15 However, the 
patent system is poorly equipped to incentivise development of medically valuable 
clinical research that does not fall within its framework.16 Therefore, it is time to 
“look beyond the patent system”,17 and update the terms of the ‘social contract’ to 
account for a broader range of therapies.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11   R Hanson "Patterns of Patronage: Why Grants Won Over Prizes in Science" (University of 
California, Berkeley, 1998) at 10.  
12 As discussed in Chapter Six under the discussion of the MPF Bill, proposals from innovators would 
not be restricted to New Zealand. The prize would be a unilateral offer to any participant who can 
fulfill the criteria for registration of a clinical trial.  
13 The Pharmaceutical Industry and Global Health: Facts and Figures 2012 (International Federation 
of Pharmaceutical Manufacturers & Associations, 2012) at 5.  
14 In particular, patented or ‘branded’ drugs are approximately 12 times more expensive than off-patent 
or ‘generic’ drugs and global sales of branded drugs were USD 596 billion in 2011. See J Love and T 
Hubbard “The Big Idea: Prizes to Stimulate R&D for New Medicines” (2007) 82 Chi-Kent L Rev 1519 
at 1522; The Global Use of Medicines: outlook through 2016 (IMS Institute for Healthcare Informatics, 
July 2012) at 8.   
15 V Denicolò and LA Franzoni “The Contract Theory of Patents” (2004) 23 International Review of 
Law and Economics 365 at 365. 
16 T Cook “How IPRs, like Nature, Abhor a Vacuum, and What Can Happen When They Fill it - 
Lacunae and Overlaps in Intellectual Property” (2012) 17 JIPR 296 at 299; RS Eisenberg “Re-
examining the Role of Patents in Appropriating the Value of DNA Sequences” (2000) 49(3) Emory 
Law Journal 783 at 799.  Eisenberg was writing about genetic information, however, in the context of 
this thesis, the same argument applies to clinical trial data that cannot be protected under the current 
patent system.  
17 Eisenberg, at 799.  
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With an ageing baby boomer population and 70 per cent of people over 65 
having two or more chronic conditions, 18 is more important than ever to ensure that 
current incentive systems allocate funds towards developing therapies that can 
maximise health in a cost-effective manner. The most recognised therapies for 
treating age-related illness are based on diet and lifestyle interventions such as 
exercise,19 which lack private incentives under the current system.20  Under an ideal 
incentive system, funding for medical therapies would be allocated on the basis of 
scientific merit and potential health impact, irrespective of patentability, 
monopolisability, market size, and other irrelevant considerations from the 
perspective of the patient. Patentability and commercial viability have no relevance to 
the safety and efficacy of a medical therapy. However, pharmaceutical companies are 
not blameworthy for attempting to maximise profits within a flawed incentive system.  
 
This thesis defined three categories of medical therapies that are ignored under 
the current patent system, and showed that extended regulatory exclusivity is the most 
appropriate incentive for unpatentable therapies, while prizes and increased public 
funding are the most appropriate incentives for unmonopolisable and unprofitable 
therapies. It is recommended that further research is conducted to determine the extent 
of patentability screening in the industry, the consequences of a private funding bias 
away from socially valuable medical therapies, and that appropriate reforms are 
urgently implemented to address this.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 L Fontana and others “Medical research: Treat ageing” (2014) 511 Nature 405 at 406.  
19 At 406.  
20 See discussion of unmonopolisable therapies in Chapter Three.  
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GAPS IN THE PATENT SYSTEM FOR INCENTIVISING DEVELOPMENT OF DORMANT AND 
UNMONOPOLISABLE THERAPIES  
1.   Dormant Therapies 
1.1   Are you aware of any drug candidates which failed to attract funding or were 
dropped from development where the primary reason was perceived or actual insufficient 
patent protection (e.g. due to prior publication or insufficient patent length) as opposed to 
(i) perceived or actual lack of safety or efficacy or (ii) other commercial reasons. 
 (“Dormant Therapies”)   
• Yes     /     No 
 
If so, can you specify the approximate number of Dormant Therapies you are aware of: 
 
1.2   Are you aware of any such Dormant Therapies which are potential or actual 
treatments for unmet medical needs i.e. treatments for life‐threatening or other serious 
diseases or conditions for which no therapy exists or are potentially or actually clinically 
superior to existing first‐in‐class therapies?  
• Yes     /     No 
 
If so, can you identify as many Dormant Therapies for unmet medical needs as possible for 
you to recall: 
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2.   Rescuing Patent Protection for Dormant Therapies 
2.1   Are you aware of any potentially Dormant Therapies that were dropped for 
insufficient patent protection but subsequently obtained funding by relying on patenting 
derivatives, metabolites, selection inventions, new formulations or combinations with the 
same active ingredient, new uses, methods of administration or methods of manufacture 
(i.e. patent “evergreening” techniques) and/or ‘regulatory’ exclusivity (i.e. Orphan 
Drug/data exclusivity)?  
(“Rescued Dormant Therapies”).  
• Yes/No 
 
If yes, can you (a) specify the approximate number of Rescued Dormant Therapies you are 
aware of; and (b) identify as many Rescued Dormant Therapies as possible for you to recall: 
 
 
 
2.2   In your view, having regard to the entire set of potentially Dormant Therapies, what 
would be the typical percentage that could be “rescued” with “evergreening” techniques 
and/or ‘regulatory’ exclusivity and obtain private funding (i.e.  what proportion of 
potentially Dormant Therapies could become Rescued Dormant Therapies):  
• None of them     /     An insignificant amount (less than 5%)     /     A significant 
amount (between 5%‐50%)     /     A majority (between 50‐75%)     /     Most of them 
(greater than 75%)     /     Nearly all of them (greater than 90%)     /     All of them  
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3.  Perceived Impact on Society because of Dormant Therapies 
In your view, having regard to the entire set of potentially safe and effective drug 
candidates for unmet medical needs, what would be the typical proportion that are 
Dormant Therapies.  
• None of them     /     An insignificant amount (less than 5%)     /     A significant 
amount (between 5%‐50%)     /     A majority (between 50‐75%)     /     Most of them 
(greater than 75%)     /     Nearly all of them (greater than 90%).  
 
In your view, what do you think is the impact on society’s disease burden due to the lack of 
private incentives to develop Dormant Therapies for unmet medical needs? 
• No impact     /     Low impact     /     Moderate impact     /     High impact     /     
Severe impact 
 
Could you explain your reasoning? 
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4.        THE MODDERN Cures Act 
The MODDERN (Modernizing Our Drug and Diagnostics Evaluation and Regulatory Network) 
Cures Act was introduced in the U.S. House of Representatives on November 18, 2011. The 
Bill would incentivise development of Dormant Therapies by granting a sponsor 15 years of 
exclusivity to market the Dormant Therapy upon regulatory approval. Subject to the sponsor 
providing the FDA with regular development certifications that they are actively pursuing 
clinical trials, the Bill would allow the FDA to grant “clinical exclusivity” to the sponsor of the 
Dormant Therapy in advance of regulatory approval.  
In your view, would a 15 year period of exclusivity granted by the FDA upon regulatory 
approval as proposed by the MODDERN Cures Act adequately incentivise development of 
Dormant Therapies with insufficient patent protection? 
• Yes     /     No 
 
Could you explain why? 
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5.   Unmonopolisable Therapies 
5.1   Are you aware of any therapies which failed to attract funding or were dropped from 
development where the primary reason was perceived or actual lack of ability to enforce 
monopoly pricing over the therapy as opposed to (i) perceived or actual lack of safety or 
efficacy or (ii) insufficient patent protection per se.  
(“Unmonopolisable Therapies”) 
[Examples of such therapies include, second indications for cheap generic drugs for which 
patents cannot be used to prevent “off‐label” use by doctors or patients. For the same 
reason, patents cannot practically enforce monopoly prices for diets, dietary supplements, 
lifestyle interventions, surgical methods, “natural” remedies, and many complementary and 
alternative medicines. Therapies for neglected/third world diseases and other “unprofitable 
therapies” could also be considered a subset of this category, as an innovator company could 
not recover enough money from the market to justify significant R&D investment, even if 
they had patent protection].  
• Yes     /     No 
 
If so, can you specify the approximate number of Unmonopolisable Therapies you are aware 
of: 
 
 
5.2   Are you aware of any Unmonopolisable Therapies which are potential or actual 
treatments for unmet medical needs (i.e treatments for life‐threatening or other serious 
diseases or conditions for which no therapy exists or are potentially or actually clinically 
superior to existing first‐in‐class therapies? ) 
• Yes     /     No 
 
If so, can you identify as many Unmonopolisable therapies for unmet medical needs as 
possible for you to recall: 
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6.  Perceived Impact on Society because of Unmonopolisable Therapies 
In your view, having regard to the entire set of potentially safe and effective medical 
therapies for unmet medical needs, what would be the typical proportion that are 
Unmonopolisable Therapies.  
• None of them     /     An insignificant amount (less than 5%)     /     A significant 
amount (between 5%‐50%)     /     A majority (between 50‐75%)     /     Most of them 
(greater than 75%)     /     Nearly all of them (greater than 90%).  
In your view, what do you think is the impact on society’s disease burden due to the lack of 
private incentives to develop Unmonopolisable Therapies for unmet medical needs? 
• No impact     /     Low impact     /     Moderate impact     /     High impact     /     
Severe impact 
Could you explain why? 
 
7.  Prize‐based Incentives for Unmonopolisable Therapies 
In your view, would a monetary (or equivalent) prize/royalty for demonstrating safety and 
efficacy of an Unmonopolisable Therapy (via randomised controlled trials) adequately 
incentivise development of Unmonopolisable Therapies? 
• Yes     /     No 
 
If no, could you explain why? 
 
8.  Follow up questions 
Would you be prepared to answer some follow up questions on this survey by email? 
• Yes     /     No 
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APPENDIX 2 
 
MODDERN CURES Bill - Extract 
 
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 
 
    This Act may be cited as the ``Modernizing Our Drug & Diagnostics  
Evaluation and Regulatory Network Cures Act of 2013'' or the ``MODDERN  
Cures Act of 2013''. 
 
SEC. 2. TABLE OF CONTENTS. 
 
    The table of contents for this Act is as follows: 
 
Sec. 1. Short title. 
Sec. 2. Table of contents. 
Sec. 3. Findings. 
Sec. 4. Definitions. 
 
              TITLE I--ADVANCING DIAGNOSTICS FOR PATIENTS 
 
Sec. 101. Developing a common lexicon to facilitate progress on  
                diagnostics. 
 
Sec. 102. Creating incentives for innovative diagnostics. 
 
Sec. 103. Promoting the development of innovative diagnostics. 
 
          TITLE II--CAPTURING LOST OPPORTUNITIES FOR PATIENTS 
 
Sec. 201. Dormant therapies. 
Sec. 202. Study regarding new indications for existing therapies. 
 
SEC. 3. FINDINGS. 
 
    The Congress makes the following findings: 
 
            (1) More than 133 million Americans, or 45 percent of the  
        population, have at least one chronic condition. A quarter of  
        Americans have multiple chronic conditions. 
 
            (2) Chronic diseases have become the leading cause of death  
        and disability in the United States. Seven out of every 10  
        deaths are attributable to chronic disease. Chronic diseases  
        also compromise the quality of life of millions of Americans. 
 
            (3) Despite $80 billion spent annually on research and  
        development, many diseases and conditions lack effective  
        treatments. 
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            (4) Many commonly used drugs are effective in only 50 to 75  
        percent of the patient population, which can lead to  
        devastating long-term side effects, resulting in the potential  
        risks outweighing the benefits for some patients. 
 
            (5) Advanced and innovative diagnostic tests have the  
        potential to dramatically increase the efficacy and safety of  
        drugs by better predicting how patients will respond to a given  
        therapy. 
 
            (6) Despite their promise, many drugs and diagnostics may  
        go undeveloped due to uncertain regulatory and reimbursement  
        processes, among other reasons. 
 
            (7) In addition, there is reason to believe that potential  
        treatments with tremendous value to patients are never  
        developed or are discontinued during research and development  
        due to insufficiencies in the intellectual property system. 
 
            (8) It is in the public interest to address the hurdles  
        that may be precluding new treatments from reaching patients  
        and to remove the disincentives for the development of  
        therapies for these unmet needs. 
 
SEC. 4. DEFINITIONS. 
 
    In this Act: 
 
            (1) The term ``biological product'' has the meaning given  
        to that term in section 351 of the Public Health Service Act  
        (42 U.S.C. 262). 
 
            (2) The term ``drug'' has the meaning given to that term in  
        section 201 of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (21  
        U.S.C. 321). 
 
            (3) The term ``medicine'' means a biological product or a  
        drug. 
 
            (4) The term ``Secretary'' means the Secretary of Health  
        and Human Services. 
 
[TITLE I--ADVANCING DIAGNOSTICS FOR PATIENTS – OMMITTED] 
 
TITLE II--CAPTURING LOST OPPORTUNITIES FOR PATIENTS 
 
SEC. 201. DORMANT THERAPIES. 
 
    (a) Designation as Dormant Therapy.--The Secretary shall designate  
a medicine as a dormant therapy if— 
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            (1) the sponsor of the medicine submits a request for such  
        designation meeting the requirements under subsection (b), and  
        the request has not been withdrawn under subsection (d)(1); and 
 
            (2) the Secretary determines that— 
 
                    (A) the medicine is being investigated or is  
                intended to be investigated for an indication to  
                address one or more unmet medical needs; 
 
                    (B) a suitable clinical plan for such  
                investigations of the medicine has been developed by  
                the sponsor; 
 
                    (C) the sponsor intends to file an application  
                pursuant to section 505(b) of the Federal Food, Drug,  
                and Cosmetic Act (21 U.S.C. 355(b)) or section 351(a)  
                of the Public Health Service Act (42 U.S.C. 262(a)) for  
                approval or licensing of the medicine for an indication  
                described in subparagraph (A); and 
 
                    (D) the request for designation was made on or  
                before the date of submission of any application under  
                section 505 of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act  
                (21 U.S.C. 355) or section 351 of the Public Health  
                Service Act (42 U.S.C. 262) for the approval or  
                licensure of commercial marketing or use of a medicine  
                that in the case of a drug shares an active moiety that  
                is the same as, and in the case of a biologic contains  
                an active moiety that is highly similar to, an active  
                moiety in the medicine for which designation is being  
                requested. 
 
    (b) Requirements for Request for Designation as Dormant Therapy.--A  
request under subsection (a)(1) with respect to a medicine may only be  
made by the sponsor of the medicine and shall contain each of the  
following: 
 
            (1) A listing of all patents and applications for patents  
        under which the sponsor has rights and that may be reasonably  
        construed to provide protection for the medicine. 
 
            (2) A waiver of patent rights to the extent required under  
        subsection (c) to take effect, if at all, as provided under  
        subsection (c)(3). 
 
            (3) Such additional information as the Secretary may  
        require by regulation in order to determine eligibility for  
        designation under subsection (a). 
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    (c) Waiver of Patent Rights Expiring After the Protection Period  
 
            (1) Patent waiver.-- 
                    (A) In general.--Subject to subparagraph (B), the  
                request under this subsection shall include a waiver of  
                the right to enforce or otherwise assert any patent  
                described in subsection (b)(1) (or any patent issued on  
                the basis of an application described in subsection  
                (b)(1)), which may expire after the end of the  
                protection period for the dormant therapy, against any  
                applicable product described in paragraph (2). The  
                waiver shall be made by the owner of the patent or  
                application for patent, as the case may be. 
 
                    (B) Limitations on patent waiver.--Any patent  
                waiver provided pursuant to this section, should it  
                become effective— 
 
                            (i) shall have no effect during the  
                        protection period for the medicine to which the  
                        waiver relates; and 
 
                            (ii) shall have no effect with respect to  
                        the subject matter of a claimed invention in a  
                        patent that does not provide any protection for  
                        such medicine with respect to an applicable  
                        product described in paragraph (2). 
 
            (2) Applicable products described.--An applicable product  
        is described in this paragraph only if— 
 
                    (A) it is approved or licensed pursuant to an  
                application that— 
 
                            (i) is filed under section 505(b)(2) or  
                        505(j) of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic  
                        Act (21 U.S.C. 355(b)(2), (j)) or section  
                        351(k) of the Public Health Service Act (42  
                        U.S.C. 262(k)); and 
 
                            (ii) references or otherwise relies upon  
                        the approval or licensure of the dormant  
                        therapy to which the waiver relates; and 
                    (B) the approval of the product occurs after the  
                expiration of the protection period applicable to the  
                medicine to which the request under subsection (a)(1)  
                relates. 
 
            (3) Effective date of waiver.--A waiver under subsection  
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        (b)(2) with respect to a patent shall take effect, if at all,  
        on the date the Director publishes the notice required under  
        subsection (e)(2)(F) relating to the patent. 
 
    (d) Withdrawal of Request for Designation, Revocation by the  
Secretary.— 
 
            (1) In general.--The sponsor of a medicine may withdraw a  
        request for designation under subsection (a)(1) with respect to  
        a medicine unless the medicine has been approved or licensed  
        under section 505 of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act  
        (21 U.S.C. 355) or section 351 of the Public Health Service Act  
        (42 U.S.C. 262). The Secretary shall deny a designation request  
        or revoke any designation granted if at any time the Secretary  
        finds that the sponsor is not in compliance with subsections  
        (c)(1) and (g)(1). 
 
            (2) Effects of withdrawal of request or revocation of  
        designation.--If the sponsor of a medicine withdraws a request  
        under subsection (b) or the Secretary denies a designation  
        request or revokes a designation with respect to the medicine— 
 
                    (A) any patent waiver submitted under this section  
                with respect to the medicine, but not yet effective, is  
                canceled and deemed a nullity; 
 
                    (B) any patent waiver that has taken effect under  
                this section with respect to the medicine shall remain  
                in effect; 
 
                    (C) any patent term extension granted by the  
                Director under subsection (e)(2) with respect to the  
                medicine shall be canceled, except that the Director  
                shall maintain the patent term extension for one  
                patent, to be selected by the sponsor of the medicine,  
                for the period of extension that would have been  
                applicable under section 156 of title 35, United States  
                Code; and 
 
                    (D) the designation, if made, otherwise shall be  
                treated as never having been requested or made or  
                having effect. 
 
            (3) Basis for revocation.--The Secretary may revoke a  
        designation made under subsection (a), but only based upon a  
        finding by the Secretary under paragraph (1). 
 
    (e) Guaranteed Protections for Dormant Therapies.— 
 
            (1) Applications filed during the protection period.-- 
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        During the protection period for a dormant therapy,  
        notwithstanding any other provision of the Federal Food, Drug,  
        and Cosmetic Act (21 U.S.C. 301 et seq.) or the Public Health  
        Service Act (42 U.S.C. 201 et seq.)— 
 
                    (A) absent a right of reference from the holder of  
                such approved application for the dormant therapy, the  
                Secretary shall not approve an application filed  
                pursuant to section 505(b)(2) or section 505(j) of the  
                Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (21 U.S.C.  
                355(b)(2), (j)) or section 351(k) of the Public Health  
                Service Act (42 U.S.C. 262(k)) referencing or otherwise  
                relying on the approval or licensure of the dormant  
                therapy; 
 
                    (B) the Secretary shall not approve— 
 
                            (i) an application filed pursuant to such  
                        section 505(b)(2) or 505(j) that references or  
                        otherwise relies on the approval or licensure  
                        of a medicine that is not the dormant therapy,  
                        was approved subsequent to the approval of the  
                        dormant therapy, and contains the same active  
                        moiety as the active moiety in the dormant  
                        therapy (or if the dormant therapy contains  
                        more than one active moiety, all of the active  
                        moieties are the same); or 
 
                            (ii) an application filed pursuant to such  
                        section 351(k) that references or otherwise  
                        relies on the approval or licensure of a  
                        medicine that is not the dormant therapy, was  
                        approved subsequent to the approval or  
                        licensure of the dormant therapy, and contains  
                        an active moiety that is highly similar to the  
                        active moiety in the dormant therapy (or if the  
                        dormant therapy contains more than one active  
                        moiety, all of the active moieties are highly  
                        similar); and 
 
                    (C) the Secretary shall not approve an application  
                filed pursuant to section 505(b)(1) of the Federal  
                Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (21 U.S.C. 355(b)(1)) for  
                a drug that contains the same active moiety as the  
                active moiety in the dormant therapy (or if the dormant  
                therapy contains more than one active moiety, all of  
                the active moieties are the same), or an application  
                filed pursuant to section 351(a) of the Public Health  
                Service Act (42 U.S.C. 262(a)) for a biological product  
                that contains an active moiety that is highly similar  
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                to the active moiety in the dormant therapy (or if the  
                dormant therapy contains more than one active moiety,  
                all of the active moieties are highly similar),  
                unless— 
 
                            (i) the information provided to support  
                        approval of such application is comparable in  
                        scope and extent, including with respect to  
                        design and extent of preclinical and clinical  
                        testing, to the information provided to support  
                        approval of the application for the dormant  
                        therapy under section 505(b) of the Federal  
                        Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act (21 U.S.C. 355(b))  
                        or section 351(a) of the Public Health Service  
                        Act (42 U.S.C. 262(a)); and 
 
                            (ii) if such clinical testing had not  
                        commenced before the approval of the  
                        application for the dormant therapy, the  
                        clinical testing establishes clinical  
                        superiority in the form of a significant  
                        therapeutic advantage over and above that  
                        provided by the dormant therapy in one or more  
                        of the following ways: 
 
                                    (I) Greater effectiveness on a  
                                clinically meaningful endpoint. 
 
                                    (II) Greater safety in a  
                                substantial portion of the target  
                                populations. 
 
                                    (III) Where neither greater safety  
                                nor greater effectiveness has been  
                                shown, a demonstration that the drug  
                                otherwise makes a major contribution to  
                                patient care. 
 
            (2) Patent term alignment with data package protection  
        period.— 
 
                    (A) In general.--Notwithstanding any provision of  
                title 35, United States Code, a sponsor of a medicine  
                designated as a dormant therapy under subsection  
                (a)(1), upon the approval or licensure thereof under  
                section 505 of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act  
                (21 U.S.C. 355) or section 351 of the Public Health  
                Service Act (42 U.S.C. 262), and in lieu of filing a  
                patent term extension application under section 156(d)  
                of such title 35, shall be entitled to patent term  
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                extensions in accordance with this paragraph. 
 
                    (B) Submission of final listing of patents and  
                applications for patents following approval.— 
 
                            (i) Submission.--The sponsor of the dormant  
                        therapy, within a period to be set by the  
                        Director of not less than 2 months beginning on  
                        the date the Secretary approves or licenses the  
                        dormant therapy, shall submit to the Director— 
 
                                    (I) the listing of patents and  
                                applications for patents provided to  
                                the Secretary under subsection (b)(1); 
 
                                    (II) any revisions to such listing  
                                as may be required for compliance with  
                                subsection (b)(1); and 
 
                                    (III) any documentation the  
                                Director may require from the patentee  
                                or patent applicant (as the case may  
                                be) of the waiver of patent rights  
                                required under subsection (b)(2). 
 
                            (ii) Failure to provide sufficient  
                        documentation of waiver.--If the Director  
                        determines that the sponsor has not complied  
                        with the waiver requirements under subsection  
                        (c), after providing the sponsor the  
                        opportunity to remedy any insufficiency, the  
                        Director shall so notify the Secretary that the  
                        patent waiver requirements for designation have  
                        not been satisfied. 
 
                    (C) Extension of patents.— 
 
                            (i) In general.--Unless the Director has  
                        notified the Secretary of a determination under  
                        subparagraph (B)(ii), for each patent  
                        identified in a submission pursuant to  
                        subparagraph (B)(i), and for each patent  
                        issuing based upon an application for patent so  
                        identified, the Director shall, within the 3- 
                        month period beginning on the date of the  
                        submission, extend the patent to expire at the  
                        end of the protection period for the dormant  
                        therapy, if the patent would otherwise expire  
                        before the end of the protection period. If the  
                        Director has so notified the Secretary under  
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                        subparagraph (B)(ii), the Director shall extend  
                        one such patent, selected by the sponsor, for  
                        the period that would have been applicable had  
                        an application for extension been filed under  
                        section 156 of title 35, United States Code,  
                        with respect to such patent. 
 
                            (ii) Application of certain provisions.-- 
                        During the period of an extension under clause  
                        (i)— 
 
                                    (I) the rights under the patent  
                                shall be limited in the manner provided  
                                under section 156(b) of title 35,  
                                United States Code; and 
 
                                    (II) the terms ``product'' and  
                                ``approved product'' in such section  
                                156(b) shall be deemed to include forms  
                                of the active moiety of the dormant  
                                therapy and highly similar active  
                                moieties that might be approved by the  
                                Secretary based upon an application  
                                filed under section 505(b)(2) or 505(j)  
                                of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic  
                                Act (21 U.S.C. 355(b)(2), (j)) or under  
                                section 351(k) of the Public Health  
                                Service Act (42 U.S.C. 262(k)) that  
                                references or otherwise relies upon the  
                                dormant therapy. 
 
                    (D) Interim patent extensions.--Notwithstanding any  
                provision of title 35, United States Code, with respect  
                to any patent listed (or patent issuing on an  
                application listed) under subsection (b)(1) that would  
                otherwise expire before the sponsor could make a  
                submission under subparagraph (B), the Director, upon  
                application of the patentee, shall grant to the  
                patentee an interim extension of such patent, subject  
                to the limitations in section 156(d)(5)(F) of such  
                title 35, for such period as may be necessary to permit  
                the sponsor to submit the listing under subparagraph  
                (B) and, if the patent is therein listed, to extend the  
                patent as provided under subparagraph (C). The Director  
                may require, for any patent extended under this  
                subparagraph, that the sponsor of the dormant therapy  
                to which the patent relates provide periodic  
                certifications that development of the dormant therapy  
                is continuing. The Director may terminate any interim  
                extension for which a required certification has not  
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                been made. 
 
                    (E) Notice of extension.--For each patent that is  
                extended under this paragraph, the Director shall  
                publish a notice of such extension and issue a  
                certificate of extension described in section 156(e)(1)  
                of title 35, United States Code. 
 
                    (F) Notice of waiver.--For each patent identified  
                in a submission under subparagraph (B)(i), and each  
                patent issuing based upon an application for patent so  
                identified, that expires after the end of the  
                protection period for the dormant therapy, the Director  
                shall publish a notice that the patent is subject to  
                the limited waiver of the right to enforce described in  
                subsection (c)(1). 
 
    (f) Certain FDA Protections Inapplicable.--If a medicine has been  
designated as a dormant therapy under subsection (a), the protections  
otherwise applicable with respect to such medicine under sections 505A,  
505E, and 527 of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (21 U.S.C.  
355a, 355f, 360cc) shall not apply. The preceding sentence shall not be  
construed to affect any protections applicable with respect to a drug,  
including a drug designated under section 526 of such Act (21 U.S.C.  
360bb) for a rare disease or condition, under provisions other than  
such sections 505A, 505E, and 527. 
 
    (g) Development Certifications.— 
 
            (1) In general.--The Secretary shall require that the  
        sponsor of a dormant therapy provide periodic certifications  
        that development of the dormant therapy to address one or more  
        unmet medical needs is continuing. 
 
            (2) Determination of noncompliance.--If the Secretary  
        concludes that the sponsor has not complied with paragraph (1),  
        after providing the sponsor the opportunity to remedy any  
        insufficiency, the Secretary shall, for purposes of subsection  
        (d)(1), determine that the sponsor is not in compliance with  
        the certification requirement under paragraph (1). 
 
    (h) Collaboration.--Nothing in this section shall be construed as  
preventing a sponsor from collaborating with other entities in  
developing a dormant therapy or applying for a dormant therapy  
designation. 
 
    (i) Definitions.--For purposes of this section: 
 
            (1) The term ``address one or more unmet medical needs''  
        refers to-- 
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                    (A) addressing a need for medicines for the  
                treatment of one or more life-threatening or other  
                serious diseases or conditions for which no therapy  
                exists; or 
 
                    (B) if one or more therapies are available for the  
                treatment of such a disease or condition, demonstrating  
                through clinical investigations-- 
 
                            (i) one or more improved effects on serious  
                        outcomes of the disease or condition that are  
                        affected by alternative therapies, such as  
                        superiority of the medicine used alone or in  
                        combination with other therapies in an active  
                        controlled trial assessing an endpoint  
                        reflecting serious morbidity; 
 
                            (ii) one or more effects on serious  
                        outcomes of the disease or condition not known  
                        to be affected by alternative therapies, such  
                        as progressive disability in multiple sclerosis  
                        when alternative therapies have shown an effect  
                        on exacerbations but have not shown an effect  
                        on progressive disability; 
 
                            (iii) an ability-- 
 
                                    (I) to provide one or more benefits  
                                in patients who are unable to tolerate  
                                or are unresponsive to alternative  
                                therapies, such as an antipsychotic  
                                agent that is effective in people  
                                failing standard therapy; or 
 
                                    (II) to be used effectively in  
                                combination with other critical agents  
                                that cannot be combined with  
                                alternative therapies; 
 
                            (iv) an ability to provide one or more  
                        benefits similar to those of alternative  
                        therapies while— 
 
                                    (I) avoiding serious toxicity that  
                                is present in alternative therapies; or 
 
                                    (II) avoiding less serious toxicity  
                                that is common in alternative therapies  
                                and causes discontinuation of treatment  
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                                of a life-threatening or serious  
                                disease; or 
 
                            (v) an ability to provide one or more  
                        benefits similar to those of alternative  
                        therapies but with improvement in some factor,  
                        such as compliance or convenience, that is  
                        shown to lead to improved effects on serious  
                        outcomes. 
 
            (2) The term ``Director'' means the Under Secretary of  
        Commerce for Intellectual Property and Director of the United  
        States Patent and Trademark Office. 
 
            (3) The term ``dormant therapy'' means a medicine  
        designated as a dormant therapy under subsection (a). 
 
            (4) The term ``protection period'' for a dormant therapy  
        means the period that-- 
 
                    (A) begins on the date on which the Secretary first  
                approves an application under section 505(b) of the  
                Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (21 U.S.C. 355(b))  
                or section 351(a) of the Public Health Service Act (42  
                U.S.C. 262(a)) for the dormant therapy for any  
                indication; and 
 
                    (B) ends on the date that is 15 years after the  
                date of such approval. 
 
            (5) The term ``sponsor'' for a dormant therapy is the  
        person who takes responsibility for the designation and  
        development of the dormant therapy. The sponsor may be a single  
        entity or an entity collaborating with one or more other  
        entities. 
 
SEC. 202. STUDY REGARDING NEW INDICATIONS FOR EXISTING THERAPIES. 
 
    Not later than one year after the date of the enactment of this  
Act, the Secretary shall enter into an arrangement with the Institute  
of Medicine (or, if the Institute declines, another appropriate  
entity)-- 
            (1) to conduct a study on intellectual property laws and  
        their impact on therapy and diagnostic development in order to  
        formulate recommendations on how to facilitate the clinical  
        evaluation and development of therapies currently available on  
        the market for new potential indications; and 
            (2) not later than 18 months after such date of the  
        enactment, to submit a report to the Secretary and the Congress  
        containing the results of such study. 
